MY THREE YEARS 
IN AMERICA 



BY 

COUNT BERNSTORFF 



NEW YORK 
CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS 

1920 



Copyright, 1920, by 
CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS 



THE 6CRIBNER PRESS 



JUL '2 1920 ' 



CONTENTS 

PACB 

Introduction 1 

CHAPTBR 

I. Germany and the United States Before the 

War 13 

II. The German Propaganda in the United States 35 

III. Political Events Preceding the **Lusitania" 

Incident 58 

IV. Economic Questions 80 

V. The So-called German Conspiracies .... 101 

VI. The ''Lusitania" Incident 127 

VII. The ''Arabic" Incident 166 

VIII. The Second "Lusitania" Crisis 212 

IX. The "Sussex" Incident 241 

X. American Medla.tion 270 

XI. The Rupture of Diplomatic Relations .... 353 

XII. The Return Home 393 

INDEX 417 



MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 



MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 



INTRODUCTION 

MY FUKDAMENTAL POLITICAL VIEWS BEFORE AND 
DURING THE WAR 

It was in my own home, the German Embassy in Lon- 
don, where the atmosphere was entirely political, that I 
learned my first steps in politics. My father did not be- 
long to that class of diplomats, so prevalent to-day, who 
treat politics as an occupation to be pursued only in 
their spare time. His whole life was consecrated to the 
cause of the German nation, and from my earliest child- 
hood my mind was filled with the same idea, to the 
exclusion of all others. 

Owing to my father's share in the negotiations which 
brought about the marriage of the Emperor Frederick 
with the Princess Royal of England, the Imperial couple 
became closely connected with my parents, and, as Crown 
Prince and Princess, frequently resided at the Embassy 
in London. It was the entourage of the Emperor Fred- 
erick that first inspired in me those political views, 
which, during a long diplomatic career, gradually 
crystallized into the deep-rooted convictions of my polit- 
ical outlook. I believed Germany's salvation to lie in 
the direction of a liberal development of Unification and 
Parliamentary Government, as also in an attitude of 
consistent friendliness towards England and the United 
States of America. Thus, to use a modern phrase, I 

1 



2 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

was an avowed supporter of tlie Western Policy. At 
the present moment, while we are standing as mourners 
at the grave of our national hopes, I am more than ever 
convinced, that had this policy been steadily pursued, 
we should have been spared the catastrophe that has 
overtaken us. 

On the other hand, I will not deny, that even the 
Oriental Policy would have proved a feasible political 
scheme, if only we had decided to pursue it in good time. 
Albeit, I am of opinion that even Bismarck had already 
started us in the direction of the Western Policy, when 
in 1879 he decided in favor of Austria-Hungary and not 
Russia. Despite all that the careworn recluse of Fried- 
richsruhe may have written against Caprivi's policy, 
which was decidedly Western in tendency, he was him- 
self the founder of the Triple Alliance, which, without 
the good-will of England, could not have come into ex- 
istence. Had we pursued an Eastern Policy, though it 
would ultimately have led to the sacrifice and partition 
of Austria-Hungary, it would not have secured us those 
advantages in the Orient of which Marschall speaks. 
Nevertheless, I have always regretted that we sent such 
a first-rate man to Constantinople, for him ultimately 
to become the able director of the false policy which we 
pursued there. There is an Oriental proverb which 
says: *' Never lay your load on a dead camePs back.'* 

If, as I always used to hope, we had resolved to adopt 
the Western Policy, we should in any case have had to 
be prepared, in certain circumstances, to venture with 
England's help upon a war against Russia. And the 
experiences of the Five- Years War have taught us that 
we should have won such a conflict with ease. I never 
wanted a war with Russia, and was never an enemy of 
that country ; but I believed that our position among the 
nations of the world would compel us to decide one way 



MY POLITICAL VIEWS 3 

or the other, and I felt, just as Caprivi did, that we 
should not very well be able to avoid war. Even if, in 
the event of a war between the Triple Alliance and 
Eussia and France, England had only maintained an 
attitude of friendly neutrality, this would have proved 
very much more favorable for us than the situation 
which developed out of the Encirclement Policy {Ein- 
kreisungspolitik). Furthermore, had we pursued the 
Western Policy, we should have had to reckon with 
the possibility of England's wishing to moderate, even 
in a perfectly friendly manner, our somewhat explosive 
economic development. I should not, however, have re- 
garded this altogether as a disadvantage. For, truth to 
tell, we grew a little too rapidly. We ought, as *' junior 
partners" in Britain's world-empire, to have gathered 
our strength more slowly. As an example of what I 
mean, take the policy which France and Japan have 
pursued since the beginning of the present century. If 
we had done the same, we should, at all events, have 
been saved from so seriously overheating the boilers of 
our industrial development, we should not have out- 
stripped England as quickly as we undoubtedly could 
have done if we had been left to develop freely, but we 
should also have escaped the mortal danger which we 
drew upon ourselves by provoking universal hostility. 
It is impossible now for me to demonstrate retro- 
spectively that we should have been able to conclude an 
alliance with England. Prince Biilow denies that this 
was ever the case. Maybe that during his tenure of 
office this possibility did not offer a sufficient guarantee 
of future security to warrant our incurring the hostility 
of Russia. I am convinced, however, that an alliance 
with England would have been within our power, if we 
had pursued Caprivi 's policy consistently, and the 
Kruger telegram had never been dispatched. Unfortu- 



4 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

nately we have always had statesmen at the hehn in 
Germany, — ^Bismarck not excepted, — the bulk of whose 
views and knowledge were essentially continental, and 
who never felt qnite at home with English ways of 
thinking. I feel perfectly satisfied on this point, how- 
ever, that English commercial jealousy, with which we 
naturally had to reckon, would not have proved an in- 
superable obstacle to a good understanding with Eng- 
land, provided that we had declared ourselves ready, if 
necessary, to fight Russia. 

The policy of the free hand, which we pursued until 
the outbreak of war, aimed at the highest possible re- 
sults. Prince Billow, who was the inaugurator of this 
policy, might possibly have known how to steer us 
through the "Danger-Zone'' without provoking war. 
And then in a few years to come, we should have become 
so strong and should have left the Danger-Zone so very 
far behind us, that, as far as human judgment could 
tell, we should no longer have had any need to fear war. 
German naval construction from the beginning of the 
present century certainly made our relationship to 
England very much worse, while it also materially in- 
creased the danger of our position from the standpoint 
of world-politics. The Biilow-Tirpitz notion of a Bisiko- 
flotte,* may, however, only have been practicable on 
condition that our diplomacy were sufficiently skilful to 
avoid war, as long as the **risk" idea in England was 
not able, of itself, to maintain peace. 

German foreign policy had been ably conducted by 
Bismarck; but, in keeping with the times, it had been 
ahnost exclusively Continental and European. At the 
very moment when Bismarck withdrew from the arena, 
Germany's era of world-politics began. It was not the 

^Literally: a fleet for risks or for taking riska; a fleet to be used at a 
yenture. 



MY POLITICAL VIEWS S 

free bloom of our statesmen's own creative powers; but 
a bitter necessity, born of the imperative need of pro- 
viding Germany's increasing population with sufficient 
foodstuffs. But it was not our world-politics, as such, 
that brought about our downfall ; but the way we set to 
work in prosecuting our policy. The Triple Alliance, 
with its excellent Reinsurance Treaty, did not constitute 
a sufficiently powerful springboard from which to take 
our plunge into world-politics. The Reinsurance con- 
tract could not be anything but a makeshift, which merely 
deferred the inevitable choice which had to be made 
between Russia and Austria-Hungary. In the course of 
time, we should either have had to decide entirely in 
favor of Russia, in the manner outlined above, or we 
should have had to try to come to an understanding 
with England, upon terms which, at all events, we should 
not have been at liberty to choose for ourselves. Unfor- 
tunately, however, it was an axiom of post-Bismarckian 
German politics, that the differences between Russia and 
England were irreconcilable, and that the Triple Alli- 
ance would have to constitute the needle-index of the 
scales between these two hostile Powers. This propo- 
sition was incessantly contested both verbaUy and in 
writing by Herr von Holstein, who was then the leading 
spirit at the Foreign Office. He perceived that its chief 
flaw was the weak point in the Triple Alliance itself, — 
that is to say, the differences between Austria-Hungary 
and Italy on the one hand, and Italy's dependence upon 
England's superior power in the Mediterranean on the 
other. Furthermore, he recognized the prodigious pos- 
sibility, which was not beyond the art of English states- 
manship, of a compromise between England and Russia. 
He did not see, however, how the hostility of the French 
to ourselves would serve as a medixmi for this universal 
coalition against us. 



6 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

In the last Entente Note of the Five- Years War there 
is the following passage : 

"For many years the rulers of Germany, true to the 
Prussian tradition, strove for a position of dominance 
in Europe. They required that they should be able to 
dictate and tyrannize to a subservient Europe, as they 
dictated and tyrannized over subservient Germany.'* 

We Germans know that this indictment is a lie; but 
unfortunately all unprejudiced Germans must acknowl- 
edge that for years this lie has been believed outside 
Germany. We, for our part, cherished similar views 
about our enemies, nor did we make a sufficient effort 
to dissipate their prejudices. On the contrary we con- 
stantly lent color to them by means of the extravagant 
and high-flown speeches, which formed the accompani- 
ment to our world and naval policy, and by means of our 
opposition to pacifism, disarmament, and arbitration 
schemes, etc., etc. The extent to which our attitude at 
the Hague Conference damaged us in the eyes of the 
whole world is no longer a secret to anybody. As Hein- 
rich Friedjung rightly observes: 

**At the Hague Conference German diplomacy deliv- 
ered itself up to the vengeance of the pacifists, like a 
culprit.*' 

During my tenure of office in Washington I succeeded 
on three occasions in coming to an agreement with the 
Government there regarding the terms of an arbitration 
treaty. All three treaties were, however, rejected in 
Berlin, and consequently in America I never ceased from 
being questioned reproachfully as to the reason why the 
United States had been able to conclude arbitration 



MY POLITICAL VIEWS 7 

treaties with every other State in the world, bnt not with 
Germany. 

The Entente Note, already quoted above, contained 
this further statement: 

**As soon as their preparations were complete, they 
encouraged a subservient aUy to declare war against 
Serbia at forty-eight hours ' notice, knowing f uU well that 
a conflict involving the control of the Balkans could not 
be localized and almost certainly meant a general war. 
In order to make doubly sure, they refused every attempt 
at conciliation and conference until it was too late, and 
the world war was inevitable for which they had plotted, 
and for which alone among the nations they were fully 
equipped and prepared." 

The leaders of the Entente Powers would like to exalt 
this distortion of history into a dogma, in order that 
their various peoples may not bring any unpleasant 
charges against them. And yet the historical truth is 
already pretty clear to all who look for it honestly and 
without prejudice. The German Government believed 
that the Serbian propaganda would annihilate Austria- 
Hungary, and hoped, moreover, that her last faithful 
ally would experience a political renaissance as the result 
of her chastisement of Serbia. That is why they gave 
Count Berchtold a free hand, in the belief that Count 
Bulow's success over the Bosnian crisis could be re- 
peated. Meanwhile, however, the situation had changed. 
Russia and France, relying upon England's help, wanted 
to risk a war. When the German Government saw this 
they tried, like a driver of a car about to collide with 
another vehicle, to jam on all breaks, and to drive back- 
wards. But it was then too late. The mistake our Gov- 
ernment made was to consent to Austria-Hungary's 



8 MY THEEE YEAES IN AMEBICA 

making so daring an experiment, at a moment of sncH 
critical tension. 

It is not true either that we were thorongHy equipped 
and prepared for war. "We had neither sufficient sup- 
plies of munitions, foodstuffs and raw materials, jior any 
plan of campaign for a war with England. Be this as 
it may, we should not have been defeated if we had 
abided firmly by our defensive policy. The heroic spirit 
displayed by the German people surpassed all bounds, 
and they believed quite honestly that they were fighting 
a war of defence. If our policy had been conducted with 
corresponding consistency we should have saved our po- 
sition in the world. "We ought always to have borne in 
mind the analogy of the Seven Years "War, in order to 
have been ready at any moment to extricate ourselves 
from the hopeless business.with the least possible amount 
of loss. 

After the first battle of the Marne, President "Wilson 
consistently maintained that a decision was no longer 
possible by force of arms. This view, which I also shared, 
gave us some common ground, upon which, despite our 
other differences, we were able to some extent to work 
together. 

Eegarding Dr. Wilson's personality certain doubts 
have been and are stiU entertained by many people. He 
is the most brilliant and most eloquent exponent of the 
American point of view. But he does not devote the 
same energy and consistency to the execution of his vari- 
ous progranmies as he does to their formation. There 
can be no question that, as a result both of his origin 
and his training, the President is very much under the 
sway of English thought and ideals. Nevertheless, his 
ambition to be a Peacemaker and an Arbiter Mundi cer- 
tainly suggested the chance of our winning him over to 
our side, in the event of our being unable to achieve a 



MY POLITICAL VIEWS 9 

decisive victory with the forces at our disposal. In this 
case, Wilson, as the democratic leader of the strongest 
neutral Power, was the most suitable person to propose 
and to bring about a Peace by arrangement. 

After the opening of the U-boat campaign, two alter- 
natives remained open to us, one of which we were com- 
pelled to choose. If the prospects of a U-boat war prom- 
ised to secure a victory, it was naturally incumbent upon 
US to prosecute it with aU possible speed and energy. 
If, as I personally believed, the U-boat war did not guar- 
antee a victory, it ought, owing to the enormous amount 
of friction to which it could not help giving rise, under 
all circumstances to have been abandoned; for, by cre- 
ating American hostility, it did us more harm than good. 

I, as the German Ambassador, in the greatest neutral 
State, with the evidences of American power all about 
me, could not help feeling it my duty to maintain our 
diplomatic relations with the United States. I was con- 
vinced that we should most certainly lose the war if 
America stepped in against us. And thus I realized 
ever more and more the supreme importance of prevent- 
ing this from taking place. 

My communications to the Central Government were 
framed with a view to inducing them also to adopt this 
attitude; but they, of course, had to form their conclu- 
sions, not from one source, but from all the sources of ■ 
information they possessed. At all events, isolated as 
I was at Washington, I could not confine myself merely 
to the task of furnishing my Government with informa- 
tion; but was compelled on occasion to act on my own 
initiative, in order to prevent any premature develop- 
ment in the diplomatic situation from becoming utterly 
hopeless. 

The policy for which I stood not only promised the 
negative success of keeping America out of the war, but 



10 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

it also offered the only prospect there was of obtain- 
ing, with neutral help, a Peace by arrangement. My be- 
lief that such a peace could have been obtained through 
Dr. Wilson is, of course, no longer susceptible of proof 
to-day. It may perhaps sound improbable in view of 
the President's behavior at Versailles. It is my opinion, 
however, that, previous to the 31st of January, 1917, 
Dr. Wilson's attitude towards us was radically di:fferent, 
I base my assumption that Wilson might in those days 
have assisted us in obtaining a Peace by negotiation 
upon the following points : 

(1) A Peace by mediation was the only way in which 
the United States could avoid becoming involved in the 
war, and this is what the American public opinion of the 
day wished above all to prevent. 

(2) It is true that even if he had wished to do so, 
Wilson could not have declared war on England, neither 
could he by any exercise of force have prevented the 
delivery of munitions to the Allies, or have compelled 
England to observe the rights of nations. He could, 
however, have obliged England to conclude a Peace by 
arrangement with us; not only because in so doing he 
would have had the support of American public opiaion, 
but also because such a policy was in keeping with the 
best political interests of the United States. 

I therefore pursued the policy of Peace with undeviat- 
ing consistency, and to this day I still believe it to have 
been the only right policy. A thorough prosecution of 
the U-boat campaign was also a feasible scheme. But 
the worst thing that we could possibly do, was to steer 
the zigzag course ; for by so doing we were certain not 
only to cause constant vexations to America, but, by 
our half measures and partial pliancy, also to drive Mr. 



MY POLITICAL VIEWS 11 

Wilson even further and further into the inflexible atti- 
tude of a policy of prestige. Unfortunately, however, 
it was precisely this zigzag course that we adopted ; and / 
thus, in addition to destroying the prospects which 
my policy had offered, according to the view of the 
Naval people, we also crippled the effects of the U-boat 
campaign. 

My policy might best be described as that of "a silent 
resolve to obtain Peace." It was utterly wrong to pub- 
lish our readiness for Peace broadcast. We should have 
presented a strong front to the outside world, and we 
should have increased the powers of resistance which 
we actually possessed by emphasizing our strength both 
to our people at home and to other States. According 
to my view, we ought, after the first battle of the Marne, 
to have recognized in our heart of hearts that victory 
was out of the question, and consequently we should 
have striven to conclude a Peace, the relatively unfavor- 
able terms of which might perhaps have temporarily 
staggered public opinion in Germany and created some 
indignation. It was not right, however, to allow defer- 
ence to public opinion to outweigh other considerations, 
as it did in our case. The political leaders of the Em- 
pire ought to have kept the High Military Command, 
which from its point of view naturally demanded firmer 
** assurances'* than the general situation warranted, more 
thoroughly within bounds, just as Bismarck did. Pre- 
sumably the High Military Command would have been 
able to perform its duties quite as efficiently if it had 
been prevented from exercising too much influence on 
the policy which aimed at a conclusion of peace. 

As a politician I consider that the ultimate cause of 
our misfortune was our lack of a uniform policy both 
before and during the war. If, at the time of Bismarck's 
retirement, we had made a timely and resolute decision 



12 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

either in favor of the Western Policy that he advocated, 
or in favor of the Eastern Policy, we should have pre- 
vented the development of a situation in the politics of 
the world which ultimately led to our own undoing. If, 
during the war, however, we had completely abandoned 
the U-boat campaign, and had made every possible effort 
to come to an understanding with America, we should, 
in my opinion, have been able to extricate ourselves from 
it satisfactorily. Be this as it may, it is also possible 
that if the U-boat campaign had been prosecuted reso- 
lutely, and without any shilly-shallying — a thing I never 
wished — ^we should not have suffered so complete a col- 
lapse from the military, economic, political and moral 
point of view, as we must otherwise have done. Accord- 
ing to my view it is the hesitating zigzag course that we 
pursued which is chiefly to blame for the fact that of all 
possible results of the epoch of German world-politics, 
the unhappiest for ourselves has come to pass. The 
Wilhehninian Age perished owing to the fact that no 
definite objects were either selected or pursued in good 
^ .. time, and, above all, because both before and during the 
I war, two systems in the Government of the country were 
I constantly at variance with each other and mutually 
corroding. 



CHAPTER I 

GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES BEFORE 
THE WAR 

Anyone who has lived some time in the United States 
will feel with Goethe that ** America is better off than 
onr own Continent.'^ Owing to the almost perfect au- 
tarchy existing there, grave economic problems never) 
really arise. Nowhere else, during the whole course ofv 
my various diplomatic wanderings, have I ever seen a| 
happier people, who looked more cheerfully into the\ 
future. In view of the comparatively sparse population/ 
of the country, intensive agricultural production has only 
become necessary in a few isolated districts; there are 
always purchasers in plenty for the rich surplus of raw 
materials available, and industry has not yet been di- 
rected solely towards export. As a result of these happy 
conditions, the American citizen feels but little interest 
for what goes on in other countries. In the period pre- 
ceding the Five-Years War, if the political interests of 
the United States ever happened to cross those of Eu- 
rope, it was almost exclusively in regard to American 
questions. As a proof of this we have only to think of 
the Spanish- American War, and of the various incidents 
relating to Venezuela ; whereas it was only with difficulty 
that the German Government succeeded in inducing 
President Roosevelt's Administration to take part in 
the Algeciras Conference, at which the presence of the 
United States representative in no way alleviated our 
task. 

13 



14 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

Up to tlie time of the Five- Years War, the Foreign 
Policy conducted from Washington was almost entirely- 
Pan-American, and the Monroe Doctrine was the begin- 
ning and end of it; for even if that versatile man. Pres- 
ident Roosevelt, was fond of extending his activities to 
other spheres, as, for instance, when he brought the 
Russo-Japanese War to an end by the Peace of Ports- 
mouth, the Panama Canal scheme remained his favorite 
child. But in the case of the Russo-Japanese War, it 
was home politics, which in America are chiefly respon- 
sible for turning the scales in regard to Foreign Policy, 
that again played the principal part. Mr. Roosevelt 
wished to win over to his side the very strong pacifist 
element in America; whereas the Imperialists — ^partic- 
ularly later on — deprecated these successful attempts at 
mediation, because they prevented a further weakening 
of both of the belligerent parties. Even Roosevelt's Sec- 
retary of State, John Hay, concerned himself actively 
with the Far East, and was known in America as the 
spiritual founder of the policy of the *'Open Door." In 
this particular matter, the German Government fre- 
quently acted hand in hand with the American, and it 
was owing to this circumstance that the Foreign Office, 
at Berlin very much wished to have the United States 
represented at the Algeciras Conference. The German 
Government believed that the Americans would also de- 
clare themselves in favor of the "Open Door'' even in 
Morocco. This assumption, however, turned out to be 
a false one, owing to the fact that the political and eco- 
nomic interest shown by the United States for countries 
on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean was not sufficiently 
keen. The Algeciras Conference was a fairly trustwor- 
thy forecast of all that subsequently happened at the 
Peace Conference at Versailles. Equally lacking in foun- 
dation was also the assumption, so prevalent in Ger- 



GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES 15 

many, that, as the result of their energetic Far-Eastern 
policy, the Americans would plunge themselves into a 
serious conflict with Japan. 

The question of the Philippines, which arose out of 
the Spanish- American War and the Cuban aifair, con- 
stitutes a certain contrast to the customary Pan-Amer- 
ican Foreign Policy of the United States. A large num- 
ber of Americans — possibly the majority — ^would like to 
relinquish the Philippines as soon as the inhabitants of 
these islands are in a position to rule themselves. At 
its inception, the question of the Philippines brought us 
into a conflict with the United States, which was remem- 
bered by Americans for years. Heinrich Friedjung, re- 
ferring to this incident, says: 

*' Quite superfluously it occurred to the German Gov- 
ernment to make our East-Asiatic Squadron, under Ad- 
miral Diederichs, appear before Manila precisely at the 
moment when, in 1898, the decision was made regarding 
the Philippines. This was done simply out of a pointless 
consciousness of power, without any intention to cause 
offence.'* 

This criticism is partly justified. And yet the affair 
was somewhat different from the version of it which the 
American Ambassador, Andrew White, allowed to filter 
through; for, seeing that, as the United States did not 
intend to retain the Philippines, they could raise no ob- 
jection to Germany's wishing to acquire them. Thanks 
to his friendly attitude towards Germany, Andrew White 
had, on his own initiative, exceeded his instructions and 
was duly censured by his Government for his zeal. Nev- 
ertheless, a misunderstanding had occurred, as the result 
of which the Berlin Foreign Office had acted in perfect 
good faith. In the public mind in the United States, how- 



16, MY THREE YEAES IN AMERICA 

ever, the feeling still rankled that Germany had wished 
to make a demonstration against their Government ; and 
the English Press, which at that time was hostile to us, 
applied the bellows enthusiastically to the glowing em- 
bers of American ill-humor. 

The Venezuela affair, in the year 1902, which was a 
matter of lodging certain complaints against the Vene- 
zuelan Government, ended in a similar manner. Ger- 
many and England together sent their ultimatum to 
Venezuela, and when no heed was paid to it, they insti- 
tuted a blockade of a number of Venezuelan ports. It 
was at this time that I was appointed Secretary to the 
Embassy in London, where I had to conduct a good deal 
of the negotiations regarding the Venezuela question, 
with the Foreign Ofifice. The whole affair, as initiated 
by ourselves, was, in proportion to the German claims, 
much too elaborate. The first suggestion which led to 
the common action on the part of the British and our- 
selves, came from the English side; but we should have 
been wiser, from the point of view of our own advan- 
tage, if we had not listened to the suggestion. It was 
absolutely clear from the start that the American Gov- 
ernment would raise objections to this sort of procedure, 
on the part of European powers, in South America, 
and that England, true to her usual custom, would climb 
down before the United States the moment she recog- 
nized plainly the latter 's displeasure. And when public 
opinion in America raised a violent protest, and, inci- 
dentally, resolutely assumed that Germany wished to 
obtain a footing in Venezuela, the English Press attacked 
us in the rear by asserting that the whole affair had 
been engineered by Germany, in order to embroil Eng- 
land with the United States. At President Roosevelt's 
wish the matter was finally settled with America's 
help ; but in the United States it left behind the widely 



GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES 17 

I 

prevalent impression that Germany would infringe the 
Monroe Doctrine the moment she had the power to do 
so. 

President Taft, who in the year 1909 took President 
Roosevelt's place, endeavored, with his Secretary of 
State, Philander Knox, to develop still further the pol- 
icy of the *'Open Door,'' inaugurated by John Hay. Both 
gentlemen felt the keenest interest in the Far East. The 
former had been Governor of the Philippines, the latter 
had been closely connected with the Pittsburgh iron in- 
dustry, and knew the need of extending its sphere of 
activities. Mr. Knox suggested the proposal of interna- 
tionalizing the railways of Manchuria. When, however, 
this American notion met with response in Germany, and 
apart from its general rejection elsewhere, had the fur- 
ther effect of drawing Japan and Russia together again, 
Mr. Knox abandoned his active Far-Eastern policy, and 
confined himself to stimulating the large banks of Amer- 
ica into becoming interested in the building of railways 
and other economic means of development in China. This 
policy was described as ''Dollar Diplomacy" by the 
Democratic Opposition, and violently opposed. When, 
therefore, the votes went against the Republican Party, 
and President Wilson came to the helm, he let the Far- 
Eastern policy drop. High Finance immediately seized 
this opportunity in order to extricate itself from Chi- 
nese undertakings. It had only embarked upon "Dollar 
Diplomacy" at the request of the Government, and the 
venture had yielded but little profit, owing to the fact 
that Americans are not inclined to invest in foreign 
securities. 

Secretary of State Knox's policy, which was always 
supported by us, accounted for the fact that the official re- 
lations between the German and American Governments 
5vere never more cordial than during the years 1909-13, 



18 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

in spite of a short disturbance resulting from a dispute 
over our potash exports to the United States. The best 
proof of how friendly the official relations of the two 
Governments were is showfi by the ease with which this 
quarrel was settled. We were also successful in con- 
cluding a commercial agreement which was satisfactory 
to both sides, and overcame tiie danger of a customs war 
as the result of America's new customs tariffs; whereas 
Taft's economic plans, which aimed at reciprocity and 
union with Canada, came to grief for political reasons, 
as the result of Canadian Opposition, and left behind a 
bitter after-taste both in the United States, Canada and 
England. 

Official diplomatic communications excepted, however, 
it must unfortunately be admitted, that mutual misunder- 
standing has been the principal feature of German- Amer- 
ican relations. In Germany there was no understanding 
for the curious mixture of political sagacity, commercial 
acumen, tenacity and sentimentality, which goes to make 
up the character of the American people. The power 
of the Union was therefore underestimated by us, and 
the high-spirited utterances of American youthful 
strength were more disapproved of than was necessary, 
because they were interpreted as mere **blu:ff'' and arro- 
gance. We never sufficiently allowed for the fact that 
the Americans are very ** emotional" — ^that is to say, 
that they are easily carried away by their feelings and 
then become uncertara. Political surprises in the United 
States are almost the rule. 

On the other hand, Americans never give themselves 
time to learn to understand a foreign nation. A knowl- 
edge of foreign languages is by no means general in the 
United States. The Americans unconsciously borrow 
their thoughts and ideas from England, because it is the 
only nation whose literature and Press are accessible 



GEEMANY AND THE UNITED STATES 19 

to them in the original tongue. Naturally this fact con- 
tributed very considerably, before the Five- Years War, 
towards making the comprehension of Germany difficult ; 
because in those days German-English relations were 
growing more and more unfavorable every day, and this 
decline in friendliness found a powerful echo in the Eng- 
lish Press and other literature. The English language 
exercises more absolute power in the United States than 
even in England itself. For example, it would never 
occur to any diplomat in "Washington to transact his 
business in any other language than English. Whereas, 
in London, I never once heard the French Ambassador 
pronounce one word of English — even in an after-dinner 
speech — M. Jusserand in Washington always spoke Eng- 
lish. But, in spite of the claim that the French make, 
that their language prevails in diplomatic circles, he 
could not have done otherwise; because I have never, 
during the whole of the eight years of my official activi- 
ties in Washington, met one Secretary of State who had 
mastered any other language than English. It is obvious 
that this state of affairs opens all doors and avenues to 
English political and cultural influences. 

Thus, before the outbreak of the Five- Years War, the 
majority of Americans already looked upon the Germans, 
however unconsciously, through the optics of the English 
Press and English literary publications. A large number 
of people in the United States honestly believed, more- 
over, in the rumored German scheme to seize the empire 
of the world. Our enormous successes in the economic 
field provoked unbounded admiration and led, on the one 
hand, to an over-estimation of our power, which did not 
prove favorable to us politically, while, on the other 
hand, the Americans who frequently indulged in gener- 
alizations about Germany were prone to judge us accord- 
ing to the German- American Beer-Philistine, whom they 



20 MY THREE TEARS IN AMERICA 

disdainfully called a **Diitclmian." The Americans* 
view of the German people wavered between these two 
extremes ; bnt every year opinion tended to incline more 
and more in the direction of the former. The phantom 
of a German world-empire, extending from Hamburg to 
Bagdad, had already taken possession of the American 
mind long before the war; and in the United States it 
was feared that the next step would be that this world- 
empire would infringe the Monroe Doctrine and found 
colonies in South America. Professor Baxungarten, in 
an entertaining book, has pointed out to what extent the 
publications of the Pan-German party contributed to- 
wards promoting such conceptions in America. 

Our Press was a little too fond of making attacks on 
the Monroe Doctrine in particular. I was always of the 
opinion that we ought, openly and officially, to have rec- 
ognized this American article of faith. As regards the 
Monroe Doctrine, the question is not one of Right, but 
one of Power. We certainly had not the power to in- 
fringe the Monroe Doctrine, even if we had had the in- 
tention, which was never the case. It would, therefore, 
have been more wise to acknowledge it, and thus to im- 
prove the political attitude, towards ourselves, of a 
country on which we were so very much dependent for 
a number of our raw-material supplies. I have often 
wondered whether the Imperial Government would not 
have regarded it as its duty to avoid war at all costs, if 
our economic dependence upon foreign countries had 
been more clearly recognized. German prosperity was 
based to a great extent on the Germans overseas, who 
had settled down in every corner of the earth, just as 
in former days the Greeks had settled all over the Roman 
Empire. The Germans overseas constituted a colonial 
empire, which was a far more precious source of wealth 
than many a foreign possession belonging to other Pow- 



GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES 21 

ers. In my opinion not sufficient allowance was made for 
this state of affairs. 

Finally, a further cause of misunderstandings, as I 
have already mentioned in the Introduction, was to be 
found in the general disfavor with which American pac- 
ifist tendencies were regarded in Germany. Nine-tenths 
of the American nation are pacifists, either through their 
education and sentimental prepossession in favor of the 
principle, or out of a sense of commercial expediency. 
People in the United States did not understand that the 
German people, owing to their tragic history, are com- 
pelled to cultivate and to uphold the martial spirit of 
their ancestors. The tj^es of the German officer of 
the reserve and of the members of the student corps are 
particularly unsympathetic to the American, and, for cer- 
tain German foibles, all sign of that understanding that 
readily forgives, is entirely absent in the United States, 
owing to the fact that our historical development is not 
realized over there. 

, Although the Americans are largely and unconsciously 
I swayed by the influence of English ideas, we must be 
j careful to avoid falling into the error, so common in 
! Germany, of regarding them as Anglo-Saxons. The 
Americans themselves, in their own country, scarcely 
ever call themselves Anglo-Saxons. This term is used 
by the English when they are anxious to claim their 
American cousins as their own. Occasionally, too, an 
American may use the expression when making an after- 
dinner speech at some fraternizing function. As a rule, 
however, the Americans insist on being Americans, and 
nothing else. On the 11th May, 1914, at a memorial 
service for the men who feU at Vera Cruz, President 
Wilson, in one of his finest speeches, said : 

"Notice how truly these men were of our blood. I 
mean of our American blood, which is not drawn from 



22 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

any one country, whicli is not drawn from any one stock, 
which is not drawn from any one language of the modern 
world; but free men everywhere have sent their sons 
and their brothers and their daughters to this country 
in order to make that great compounded nation which 
consists of all the sturdy elements and of all the best 
elements of the whole globe. I listened again to this list 
of the dead with a profound interest, because of the 
mixture of the names, for the names bear the marks of 
the several national stocks from which these men came. 
But they are not Irishmen or Germans or Frenchmen or 
Hebrews or Italians any more. They were not when they 
went to Vera Cruz; they were Americans; every one of 
them, with no difference in their Americanism because 
of the stock from which they came. They were in a pecu- 
liar sense of our blood, and they proved it by showing 
that they were of our spirit, that no matter what their 
derivation, no matter where their people came from, they 
thought and wished and did the things that were Ameri- 
can; and the flag under which they served was a flag 
in which all the blood of mankind is united to make a 
free nation." 

The above words of President Wilson are the key to 
the attitude of the Americans who are of German origin. 
True, these people, almost without exception, still cling 
to their old home with heartfelt affection; but they are 
Americans, like the rest of the nation. "Germania is 
our mother, and Columbia is our bride," said Carl 
Schurz, and with these words he described the situation 
in a nutshell. Just as a man shall "leave his father and 
his mother, and shall cleave unto his wife," so the man 
who is generally styled the German- American decides in 
favor of his new home-land, when a conflict arises be- 
tween America and Germany. He will, however, do any- 



GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES 23 

thing in his power to avoid such a conflict. Even before 
the war, we in Germany entirely failed to understand 
the difficult and delicate position of the American of 
German origin. And during the war this was more than 
ever the case. The question of the * * German- Americans * * 
has never been dealt with tactfully in Germany. Our 
greatest mistake was to expect too much from them. The 
Americans of German origin have retained in their new 
home all the failings and virtues of the German people. 
We could not, therefore, blame them if they showed less 
interest and less understanding in regard to political 
questions than the rest of America ; for did they not, on 
the other hand, distinguish themselves by their respect 
for the established order of things, and by the fidelity 
and industry with which they pursued their various call- 
ings ? The inevitable consequence of these national qual- 
ities was that they did not exercise the political influence 
which would have been only in keeping with their numer- 
ical superiority. For instance, I might mention that, on 
the occasion when I first visited Milwaukee, I was wel- 
comed by an Irish mayor, a circumstance which some- 
what surprised me, seeing that at the time the town 
contained from 300,000 to 400,000 Germans. 

In consequence of the state of affairs described above, 
the principal object of German policy in the United 
States before the war was to try to bring about a more 
satisfactory understanding between the two peoples. 
Prince Henry's journey to America, the exchange of 
University professors and school teachers, which took 
place on this occasion, the visits of the two fleets, the 
American Institute in Berlin, and similar more or less 
successful undertakings served the same purpose. Ger- 
man diplomatic representatives were instructed to pro- 
mote this policy with all their power. When I was ap- 
pointed Ambassador in Washington, the Kaiser's and 



24 MY THEEE TEARS IN AMERICA 

the Chancellor's principal injunction, in taking leave of 
me, was that I should enlighten public opinion in the 
United States regarding the peaceful and friendly inten- 
tions of German policy. Prince Bulow also said to me 
that I must without fail bring the negotiations about an 
Arbitration Treaty with the United States, which had 
been left unfinished owing to the death of my predeces- 
sor, to a satisfactory conclusion. Despite these definite 
instructions, the German Government, as I have already 
pointed out, ultimately blundered and stumbled over legal 
quibbles. In any case, however. Prince Biilow had mean- 
while vacated his office. The effect upon the American 
mind of our obstruction of this matter should not be 
under-estimated. It helped not a little to convince public 
opinion in the United States of the alleged warlike in- 
tentions of the German people. 

' In accordance with American custom, the semi-official 
and semi-private activities concerned with fostering a 
better understanding between the two States had to be 
published to the whole world, and this had the inevitable 
disadvantage of provoking opposition, both in Germany 
and in the United States, among all those who had rea- 
sons for being hostile. Unfortunately, the official repre- 
sentatives of Germany in Washington were always a 
thorn in the side of a certain section of the German Press, 
whenever they tried, in consideration of the American 
attitude of mind and social customs, to introduce a 
warmer feeling into the relations between the two sides. 
Even in the time of my predecessor. Speck von Stern- 
burg, the German Embassy was on such occasions 
charged with softness and an excessive desire to become 
adapted to American ways; and this remained the case 
during my tenure of office. 

Our Press in general, moreover, never revealed a suffi- 
cient amount of interest or understanding in regard to 



GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES 25 

American affairs. There were only a very few German 
newspaper correspondents in the United States, and those 
that did happen to be there were too poorly paid to be 
able to keep properly in touch with American social life. 
About twelve months before the war, the well-known 
wealthy German- American, Hermann Sielcken, offered to 
help me out of this difficulty by undertaking to pay the 
salary of a first-rate American journalist, of German 
origin, who was to reside in Washington, and act as the 
representative there of Wolff's telegraphic bureau. I 
immediately took steps to organize this telegraphic ser- 
vice. Very shortly afterwards, however, I was informed 
by Berlin, that the telegrams would be too expensive, as 
the subject was not of enough interest, and in this case 
the Wolff Bureau would only have had to defray the 
cost of the actual telegrams. This was the way the sup- 
ply of news was organized in a country that imagined it 
was practising world-politics. 

Mr. Wilson took up his quarters in the White House, 
Washington, about a year before the war, and opened his 
period of office with several internal reforms. Then came 
the American-Mexican crisis, and relations with Europe 
in general, and Germany in particular, therefore, fell 
somewhat into the background. 

Woodrow Wilson was a University don and an histo- 
rian. His works are distinguished by their brilliant style 
and the masterly manner in which he wields the English 
language — a power which was also manifested in his 
political speeches and proclamations. Mr. Wilson sprang 
into political and general fame when he was President 
of the University of Princeton, and was elected as Gov- 
ernor of the State of New Jersey. Even in those days 
he displayed, side by side, on the one hand, his democratic 
bias which led him violently to oppose the aristocratic 
student-clubs, and on the other, his egocentric and auto- 



26 MY THEEE YEARS IN AMEEICA 

cratic leanings which made him inaccessible to any ad- 
vice from outside, and constantly embroiled him with the 
governing council of the University. As Governor of 
New Jersey, The Holy Land of "Trusts,'* Mr. "Wilson 
opened an extraordinarily sharp campaign against their 
dominion. Mr. Eoosevelt, it is true, had spoken a good 
deal against the trusts, but he had done little. He could 
not, however, have achieved much real success, because 
the Eepublican Party was too much bound up with the 
trusts, and dependent on them. At the time when Mr. 
Eoosevelt wanted to take action, he also succeeded in 
splitting up his party, so that real reform could only be 
expected from the Democratic side. The conviction that 
this was so was the cause of Mr. Wilson's success in the 
Presidential election of 1912. 

In regard to external politics, Mr. Wilson was pac- 
ifistic, as was also his party; whereas the Imperialists 
belonged almost without exception to the Eepublican 
Party. In spite of ''Wall Street," and the influence of 
English ideas and opinions upon American society. Pac- 
ifist tendencies largely prevailed in the United States 
before the outbreak of the Five- Years War; how much 
more was this the case, therefore, when Mr. Wilson, in 
accordance with American custom, gave the post of Sec- 
retary of State to the politician to whose influence he 
owed his nomination as candidate for the Presidency by 
the Democratic Party. Thus did Mr. William Jennings 
Bryan attain to the dignity of Secretary of State after he 
had thrice stood as a candidate for the Presidency with- 
out success. ■ 

In all political questions, Mr. Bryan followed a much 
more radical tendency than Mr. Wilson. His opponents 
call him a dishonest demagogue. I, on the contrary, 
would prefer to call Mr. Bryan an honest visionary and 
fanatic, whose passionate enthusiasm may go to make 



GEEMANY AND THE UNITED STATES 27 

an exemplary speechmaker at large meetings, but not a 
statesman whose concern is the world of realities. He 
who in his enthusiasm believes he will be able to see his 
ideal realized in this world next Thursday week is not 
necessarily dishonest on that account, even if he over- 
looks the fact that things are going very badly indeed. 

It was believed in a large number of circles that Mr. 
Bryan would not accept the post of Secretary of State, 
for even at that time everybody who was in the know 
was already aware that Mr. Wilson could only tolerate 
subordinates and not men with opinions of their own. 
Mr. Bryan, however, felt the moral obligation, at least 
to attempt to give his radical views a chance of succeed- 
ing, and declared, as he took over the post, that so long 
as he was Secretary of State the United States would 
never go to war. He even wanted this principle to be 
generally accepted by the rest of the world, and with this 
end in view, submitted to all foreign Governments the 
draft of an Arbitration and Peace-Treaty, which was 
to make war utterly impossible in the future. As is well 
known, the German Government, unlike all the others, 
refused to fall in with Mr. Bryan's wishes. The Secre- 
tary of State was a little mortified by this, even though 
he still hoped that we should ultimately follow the ex- 
ample of the other Powers. Every time we met, he used 
to remind me of his draft Arbitration Treaty, which I 
had forwarded to Berlin. Later on I often regretted 
that we did not fall in with Mr. Bryan's wishes; who, 
by the by, during the war, again returned to the question, 
but in vain. If the treaty had been signed by us, it would 
most probably have facilitated the negotiations about the 
U-boat campaign. 

The diplomatic corps in Washington thus found itself 
confronted by an entirely new situation. The Eepubli- 
can Party had been at the helm for sixteen years, and 



28 MY THEEE YEAES IN AMEKICA 

had now to vacate every one of the administrative posts. 
Even onr personal intercourse with the President was 
governed by different formalities from those which ex- 
isted in the days of his predecessors. Mr. Eoosevelt 
liked to maintain friendly relations with those diplomats 
whose company pleased him. He disregarded the old 
traditional etiquette, according to which the President 
was not allowed to visit the Ambassadors or any private 
houses in Washington. The friendly relations that ex- 
isted between Mr. Eoosevelt and Baron Speck von Stern- 
burg are well known. When in the year 1908, after this 
gentleman's decease, I assumed his post at Washington, 
Mr. Eoosevelt invited me to the White House on the 
evening after my first audience, to a private interview, 
in which every topic of the day was discussed. Invita- 
tions of this kind were of frequent occurrence during the 
last two months of Eoosevelt 's administration, which, at 
the time of my entering office, was already drawing to its 
close. For instance, Mr. Eoosevelt showed me the draft 
of the speech which after his retirement he delivered at 
the University of Berlin. 

My dealings with President Taft were on the same 
footing; for he also was in favor of an amicable and 
unconventional relationship. On one occasion he invited 
me to join him in his private Pullman on a journey to 
his home in Cincinnati, where we attended the musical 
festival together. On another occasion, he suddenly ap- 
peared, without formal notice, at the Embassy, while we 
were holding a ball in honor of his daughter, and later 
on he accepted an invitation to my daughter's wedding. 

President Wilson, who by inclination and habit is a 
recluse and a lonely worker, does not like company. He 
re-introduced the old etiquette and confined himself only 
to visiting the houses of Cabinet members, which had 
been the customary tradition. He also kept himself aloof 



GEBMANY AND THE UNITED STATES 29 

from the banquets, which are such a favorite feature of 
social life in America, and severely limited the company 
at the White House. Thus the New Year Keception was 
discontinued entirely. This attitude on the part of the 
President was the outcome of his tastes and inclinations. 
But I certainly do not believe that he simply developed 
a theory out of his own peculiar tastes, as so often hap- 
pens in life. I am more inclined to believe that Mr. Wil- 
son regarded the old American tradition as more expe- 
dient, on the grounds that it enabled the President to 
remain free from all intimacy, and thus to safeguard 
the complete impartiality which his high office demanded. 
The peculiar friendship which unites Mr. Wilson with 
Mr. House is no objection to this theory, for the latter 
has to some extent always been in the position of a min- 
ister without portfolio. An adviser of this sort, who 
incurs no responsibility by the advice he gives, is more 
readily accepted by American opinion than by any other, 
because the President of the United States is known to 
be alone and exclusively responsible, whereas his min- 
isters are only looked upon as his assistants. 

Generally speaking, the political situation in the 
United States before the Five- Years War was as fol- 
lows: On the one hand, owing to the influence of Eng- 
lish ideas, which I have already mentioned, it was to 
be expected that a feeling of sympathy with the Entente 
would probably preponderate in the public mind; while 
on the other hand, owing to the general indifference that 
prevailed with regard to all that happened in Europe, 
and to the strong pacifist tendencies, no interference in 
the war was to be expected from America, unless unfore- 
seen circumstances provoked it. At all events it was 
to be feared that the inflammability of the Americans' 
feelings would once again be under-estimated in Ger- 
many, as it had been already. It has never been prop- 



30 MY THEEE YEAES IN AMERICA 

erly understood in our country, despite the fact that the 
Manila and Venezuela affairs might have taught us a 
lesson in this respect. The juxtaposition in the Ameri- 
can people's character of Pacifism and an impulsive lust 
of war should have been known to us, if more sedulous 
attention had been paid in Germany to American con- 
ditions and characteristics. The American judges affairs 
in Europe, partly from the standpoint of his own private 
sentiment of justice, and partly under the guidance of 
merely emotional values ; but not, as was generally sup- 
posed in Germany, simply from a cold and business-like 
point of view. If this had been reckoned with in Ger- 
many, the terrible effect upon public opinion in America 
of the invasion of Belgium and of the sinking of the 
Lusitania — particularly in view of the influence of Eng- 
lish propaganda — ^would have been adequately valued 
from the start. 

On May 17th, 1915, in a report addressed to the Im- 
perial Chancellor, I wrote as follows : 

*'It is not a bit of good glossing over things. Our best 
plan, therefore, is frankly to acknowledge that our prop- 
aganda in this country has, as the result of the Lusitania 
incident, completely coUapsed. To everyone who is fa- 
miliar with the American character this could have been 
foreseen. I therefore beg leave to point out in time, that 
another event like the present one would certainly mean 
war with the United States. Side by side in the Ameri- 
can character there lie two apparently completely con- 
tradictory traits. The cool, calculating man of business 
is not recognizable when he is deeply moved and excited 
— that is to say, when he is actuated by what is here 
called * emotion.' At such moments he can be compared 
only to an hysterical woman, to whom talking is of no 
avail. The only hope is to gain time while the attack 



GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES 31 

passes over. At present it is impossible to foresee what 
will be the ontcome of the Lusitania incident. I can only 
hope that we shall survive it without war. Be this as it 
may, however, we can only resume our propaganda when 
the storm has subsided.'' 

Here I should like to intrude a few of my own views 
regarding the importance of public opinion in the United 
States. 

In Europe, where people are constantly hearing about 
the truly extraordinary and far-reaching authority of 
the American President — the London Times once said 
that, after the overthrow of the Russian Czar, the Pres- 
ident of the United States was the last remaining auto- 
crat — it is difficult to form a correct estimate of the power 
of public opinion in the Union. In America, just as no 
mayor can with impunity ignore the public opinion of 
his city, and no governor the public opinion of his state, 
so the President of the Republic, despite his far-reaching 
authority, cannot for long run counter to the public opin- 
ion of his country. The fact has often been emphasized 
by Mr. Wilson himself, among others, that the American 
President must **keep his ear to the ground" — that is 
to say, must pay strict attention to public opinion and 
act in harmony with it. For the American statesman, 
whose highest ambition consists either in being re-elected, 
or at least in seeing his party returned to power, any 
othei" course would amount to political suicide ; for any 
attempt at swimming against the tide will certainly .be 
avenged at the next elections. 

It must be remembered that public opinion in the 
United States is seldom so homogeneous and unanimous 
a thing as, for example, in England. Particularly in 
questions of foreign politics, public opinion in the Union, 
stretching, as it does, over a whole continent, reacts in 



32 MY THEEE YEAKS IN AMERICA 

widely varying ways in different localities, and to a very 
different degree. Thus, in the States bordering on the 
Atlantic coast, which are more closely in touch with the 
Old World, there is, as a rule, a very definite public 
opinion on European questions, while the West remains 
more or less indifferent. On the other hand, in the Gulf 
States a very lively interest is taken by the public in 
the Mexican problem, and the Pacific States are closely 
concerned with the Japanese question, matters which 
arouse hardly more than academic interest in other lo- 
calities. This is also reflected in the American Daily 
Press, which does not produce papers exerting equal 
influence over the whole nation, but rather, in accord- 
ance with the customary geographical division of the 
Union into seven economic spheres of interest — ^namely, 
New York, New England, Middle Atlantic States, South- 
ern States, Middle West, Western and Pacific States, 
comprises seven different daily presses, each of which 
gives first place to quite a different problem from the 
rest. It is true that the New York Press is certainly 
the most important mirror of American public opinion 
on European questions. Nevertheless, this importance 
should not lead to the erroneous assumption that the 
American Press and the New York Press are synony- 
mous terms. The perusal of the latter does not suffice 
for the formation of a reliable judgment of American 
public opinion, with regard to certain questions which 
concern the whole nation; rather it is necessary also to 
study the leading papers of New England, the Middle 
Atlantic States, and particularly the West. The reports 
of German and English correspondents on feeling in 
America, which, as so often happens, are based purely 
on the New York Press, frequently play one false, if one 
relies on them for an estimate of the public opinion of 
the whole nation. The "Associated Press,'' therefore, 



GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES 33 

makes it a rule with all questions of national importance, 
not only to reproduce extracts from the New York Press, 
but also to publish precis of the opinions of at least fifty 
leading journals from all parts of the Union. 

The American daily papers are more important as a 
medium for influencing public opinion than as a mirror 
for reflecting it. The United States is the land of propa- 
ganda 'par excellence! Every important enterprise, of 
no matter what nature, has its Press agent ; the greatest 
of all is the propaganda lasting for months, which is 
carried on before the biennial elections, and of the mag- 
nitude of which it is difficult for the average European 
to gain any conception. It is therefore not surprising 
that the political leaders of the country make very wide 
use of the Press in important questions of foreign poli- 
tics, to influence public opinion in favor of the Govern- 
ment policy. Not only the great news agencies, but also 
all leading newspapers of the Union maintain their per- 
manent special correspondents in Washington, and these 
are received almost daily by the Secretary of State, and 
as a rule once a week by the President. The informa- 
tion that they receive at these interviews they communi- 
cate to their papers in the greatest detail, without nam- 
ing the high officials from whom it has emanated, and 
in this way they naturally act as megaphones through 
which the views of the Government are spread through- 
out the whole country. In foreign questions it was often 
striking how newspapers would hold back their com- 
ments until they had received in this way a mot d'ordre 
from Washington. 

Of course this possibility for the Government to create 
opinion on concrete questions only applies so long as a 
firm public opinion has not already set in. As soon as 
the process of ** crystallization/^ as it is called, is com- 
plete, there is nothing left for the Government but to 



34 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

follow the preponderating public opinion. Even a man 
like Mr. Wilson, who possesses an unusually high degree 
of self-will, has always followed public opinion, for the 
correct interpretation of which — apart from his own pro- 
verbial instinct — ^he commands the services of his secre- 
tary, Mr. Tumulty, and a large staff, as well as the organ- 
ization of the Democratic party, which spreads through 
the length and breadth of the country. If, in a few ex- 
ceptional cases, the President has set himself in opposi- 
tion to public opinion, we might be sure that it would not 
be long before he again set his course on theirs. 



CHAPTER n 
THE GERMAN PROPAGANDA IN THE UNITED STATES 

When I received the news of the murder of Archduke 
Francis Ferdinand, I was dining with the Spanish Am- 
bassador at the Metropolitan Club in Washington. Sig- 
nor Riano and I were not for a moment in doubt as to the 
very serious, peace-menacing character of the incident, 
but we found little interest in the matter among the 
Americans in the club, who, as always, regarded Euro- 
pean affairs with indifference. As to the results oi the 
murder, I received in Washington no information, either 
officially or through the Press. 

I therefore, on the 7th July, began my usual summer 
leave, which had been granted a few weeks before. For 
the last time I crossed the ocean on one of the proud 
German liners, and, indeed, on the finest of our whole 
merchant fleet, the Vaterland. For the last time I saw, 
on my arrival, the port of Hamburg and the lower Elbe 
in all their glory. Germans who live at home can hardly 
imagine with what love and what pride we foreign am- 
bassadors and exiled Germans regarded the German ship- 
ping-lines. 

A few days after I had arrived in my home at Starn- 
berg there began strong public excitement and uneasiness 
over the political situation. However, of late years so 
many crises had been successfully averted at the eleventh 
hour, that this time, too, I hoped up to the last minute 
that a change for the better would set in. It seemed as 
though the responsibility for a war was too great to be 

36 



36 MY THEEE YEARS IN AMERICA 

borne by any one man — ^whoever he might be — ^who would 
have to make the final decision. 

On the wonderful, still summer evening of the 1st 
August, we heard across the Starnberger Lake, in all 
the surrounding villages, the muffled beat of drums an- 
nouncing mobilization. The dark forebodings with which 
the sound of the drums filled me have fixed that hour 
indelibly in my memory. 

The following day was devoted to preparations for the 
journey to Berlin, where I had to receive instructions 
before returning with all possible speed to Washington. 
The journey from Munich to Berlin, which could only be 
made in military trains, occupied forty-eight hours. 

In the Wilhelmstrasse I had interviews with the au- 
thorities, the substance of which was instructions to en- 
lighten the Government and people of the United States 
on the German standpoint. In doing so I was to avoid 
any appearance of aggression towards England, because 
an understanding with Great Britain had to be concluded 
as soon as possible. The Berlin view on the question 
of guilt was even then very much the same as has been 
set down in the memorandum of the conunission of four 
of the 27th May, 1919, at Versailles, namely, that Russia 
was the originator of the war. 

Further, I was informed at the Foreign Office, that in 
addition to some other additions to the staff of the Wash- 
ington Embassy, the former Secretary of State of the 
Colonial Office, Dr. Dernburg, and Privy Councillor Al- 
bert, of the Ministry of the Interior, were to accompany 
me; the former as representative of the German Red 
Cross, the latter as agent of the "Central Purchasing 
Company.'* Dr. Dernburg 's chief task, however, was to 
raise a loan in the United States, the proceeds of which 
were to pay for Herr Albert's purchases for the afore- 
said company. For this purpose the Imperial Treasury 



THE GERMAN PROPAGANDA 37 

supplied us with Treasury notes, which could only be 
made negotiable by my signature. This gave rise later 
to the legend that Dr. Dernburg was armed with millions 
for propaganda purposes. 

Our journey was wearisome but passed off without in- 
cident. In forty-eight hours we reached Rotterdam, 
where we boarded the Dutch steamer No or dam. As we 
went aboard we were all in high spirits, for we had seen 
everywhere in Germany a wonderful, self-sacrificing and 
noble enthusiasm. On the steamer, however, which inci- 
dentally was badly overloaded, the picture changed. We 
suddenly found ourselves surrounded by hostile feeling, 
and among our fellow-passengers there were only a few 
friendly to the German cause. The bitter daily struggle 
toward which we were travelling was to begin on the 
ship. We plunged straight into it, and tried as far as 
possible to influence our fellow passengers. 

At Dover the ship was inspected by a British officer; 
the inspection, however, passed off without any incon- 
venience to us, as in those first days of the war the regula- 
tions of international law were still to some extent re- 
spected. We had already made all preparations to throw 
the Treasury notes overboard, in case we were searched. 
As a curiosity I mention a comic interlude that occurred 
after we had left Dover Harbor. A friendly German- 
American from a Western State, who did not know who 
I was, but had recognized me as a German, accosted me 
with the remark : ''Take care that you don't expose your- 
self to annoyance ; the people on board think you are the 
German Ambassador in Washington." The excellent 
man was overcome with amazement when I admitted my 
identity. We had not had our names entered on the 
passengers' list, but apart from this made no secret of 
our journey, as it was already known in Rotterdam. 

After an eleven days' voyage, we landed in New York 



38 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

on the 23rd Angnst. Our arrival was a relief, as during 
the journey we had been overwhelmed exclusively with 
enemy wireless reports of French victories. Every day 
we had received news of the annihilation of a fresh Ger- 
man Army Corps. In comparison with this mental tor- 
ture, the cross-fire of jquestions from countless American 
Pressmen, not altogether friendly towards Germany, was 
comparatively easy to bear. 

As is known, American public opinion at that time had 
been given a one-sided view of the causes and course of 
the war, for England, who, immediately after the declar- 
ation of war, had cut our Transatlantic cable, held the 
whole of the Transatlantic news apparatus in her hands. 
Apart from this, however, our enemies found from the 
beginning very important Allies in a number of leading 
American newspapers, which, in their daily issue of from 
three to six editions, did all they could to spread anti- 
German feeling. In New York the bitterest attacks on 
Germany were made by the Herald and the Evening 
Telegram, which were in close touch with France, as well 
as the Tribune and Times, which followed in England's 
wake; somewhat more moderate were the Sun and the 
\ Globe; the only neutrals were the Evening Post and the 
I American. Outside New York the Press raged against 
\ us, particularly in New England and the Middle- Atlantic 
1 States. In the South and "West we were also baited by 
I the Press, but with considerably less intensity. The only 
\ papers which could be called neutral were those of the 
' Hearst Press, which took up an outspoken National- 
American standpoint, and, in addition, the Chicago Trib- 
une, the WasJiington Post, and a few minor newspapers. 
It was already very significant that papers like the Bos- 
ton Transcript, the Brooklyn Eagle, the Baltimore Sun, 
and a few others opened their letter-boxes to anti-Ger- 
man articles, which, it is true, they condemned with fair 



THE GERMAN PROPAGANDA 39 

regularity in their leading articles or editorial notes. 
Against this campaign, fed systematically and daily with 
British propaganda information — especially on the sub- 
ject of German atrocities in Belgium — the small number 
of papers in the German language, which, moreover, were 
little heeded by public opinion, and at the head of which 
stood the old New Yorker Staatszeitung and the coura- 
geous weekly Fatherland, founded shortly after the out- 
break of war by the young German-American, G. S. 
Vierick, could make but little headway. 

On my arrival in New York, and during the next few 
weeks, I made an honest .effort by daily interviews of 
the representatives of the leading daily newspapers to 
explain the German standpoint to the American public. 
I soon noticed, however, that these efforts were not only 
practically fruitless but that they were even fraught with 
certain dangers for me. The daily struggle with the 
Press was threatening to undermine my official position 
and to compromise my relations with the Washington 
Government «o seriously that I should not have been in 
a position to carry through with success the diplomatic 
negotiations which were likely to be called for. I there- 
fore considered it as my duty to the German people to 
give up, as far as I personally was concerned, all propa- 
ganda in favor of the German cause. Certainly I have 
had a good deal further to do with American journalists 
xmtil the final rupture; but I categorically refused to 
grant interviews or to receive newspaper correspondents 
who were not prepared to treat my statements purely as 
confidential, private information. 

I should like to take this opportunity to remark that 
the American journalist is far better than the reputation 
he enjoys in Europe. In spite of the hostile atmosphere 
which surrounded me in America I have never had to 
complain of an indiscretion. True, many minor New 



40 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

York reporters whom I did not receive invented state- 
ments which I had never made; but such experiences 
are common to all politicians in America. Moreover, the 
results of these journalistic tricks were almost always 
local and were easily contradicted. In Washington such 
things never occurred. The journalists there were quite 
extraordinarily capable and trustworthy men, who al- 
ways behaved like * ' gentlemen. ' ' My relations with them 
remained very friendly to the last. In so far as I was 
not forced to keep silence for political reasons I have 
always told them the real truth. Of course, I was as 
little capable as the American journalists of foreseeing 
that the policy I was representing was doomed to ulti- 
mate failure. 

Just at the time when I gave up personal propaganda 
in order to devote myself to my political and diplomatic 
activities in Washington, the financial mission of Sec- 
retary of State Dr. Dernburg had failed. President Wil- 
son had stated clearly that it would be an unneutral act 
for loans to be raised in the Union by the combatant 
States. Our friends in high financial circles in New York 
regarded this decision as favorable to Germany, for they 
foresaw — what actually happened — that for every million 
received by us, our enemies would raise a hundred mil- 
lions. As a result of this decision of the President, 
Privy Councillor Albert had to finance his purchases as 
far as possible privately, while Dr. Dernburg, whose 
time was not fully occupied by his duties as delegate of 
the Red Cross, which had meanwhile been organized by 
Geheim Oberregierungrat Meyer Gerhardt and Rittmeis- 
ter Hecker, would have left America if there had re- 
mained any possibility of doing so. There was not, how- 
ever, as the English inspected all neutral ships shortly 
after they left the American ports and — in flagrant con- 
travention of international law, which only allows the 



THE GERMAN PEOPAGANDA 41 

arrest of persons who are already enrolled in the fighting 
forces— ^summarily arrested and interned every German 
capable of bearing arms. As Dr. Dernburg was thus an 
unwilling prisoner in New York he began to write articles 
on the world- war for the daily Press. He had a gift for 
explaining the causes of the war in a quiet, interesting 
manner, and particularly for setting out the German 
standpoint in a conciliatory form. His propaganda work 
therefore met with extraordinary success. The editors 
of newspapers and periodicals pressed him to contribute 
to their columns, and the whole New York Press readily 
printed all the articles he sent in to contradict the state- 
ments of the anti-Germans. 

Out of this activity developed, in co-operation with the 
Foreign Office, Dr. Dernburg 's New York Press Bureau, 
a solution of the propaganda question which was exceed- 
ingly welcome to me. As a private person Dr. Dernburg 
could say and write much that could not be said officially 
and therefore could not come from me. Consequently 
I took it for granted that — ^in spite of certain suggestions 
to the contrary — Dr. Dernburg would not be attached 
to the Embassy, which would only hamper his work, and 
also that the Press Bureau would retain its independent 
and unofficial character. I may take it as a well-known 
fact that Washington is the political, and New York the 
economic, capital of the United States, which has always 
resulted in a certain geographical division of the corre- 
sponding diplomatic duties. It naturally had its disad- 
vantages that there should be, apart from the Consulate- 
General, four other independent German establishments 
in New York, namely, the offices of Dr. Dernburg, Privy 
Councillor Albert, the military attache Captain von 
Papen and the naval attache Conunander Boy-Ed. In 
order to keep, to some extent, in touch with these gen- 
tlemen, I occasionally travelled to New York and inter- 



42 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

viewed them together in the Ritz-Carlton Hotel, where 
I usually stayed and in which Dr. Dernburg lived; for 
their offices, scattered as they were over the lower town, 
and which, moreover, I never entered, were unsuitable 
for the purpose. Our mutual personal relations were 
always of the best. On the other hand, it was naturally 
difficult to make any headway with our official business, 
since each received independent instructions from Berlin. 
This was least the case with Dr. Dernburg, because his 
responsible authority as far as propaganda was con- 
cerned was partly the Foreign Office itself and partly 
the semi-official ** Central Office for Foreign Service." 
The other three gentlemen, however, were all responsible 
to home departments other than mine. Captain von 
Papen and Commander Boy-Ed frequently held back 
from me the instructions they had received from Berlin 
in order not to embarrass the Embassy by passing on 
military or naval information. Financially, too, the four 
officials were completely independent and had their own 
banking accounts, for which they had to account individ- 
ually to their respective departments at home. Only 
Privy Councillor Albert had, for the purchase on a large 
scale of raw material, definite funds which were in any 
event under my control. Concerning the activities of 
these four gentlemen, countless legends have been spread 
in America and in part have found their way to Germany. 
In spite of all the reproaches levelled against them, and 
indirectly against myself, with regard to propaganda — 
I shall speak of the so-called conspiracies in Chapter V. 
— nothing has reached my ears of which these gentlemen 
need in any way be ashamed. Individual mistakes we 
have, of course, all made; in view of the ferocity and 
protraction of the struggle they were inevitable. But 
in general the German propaganda in America in no way 
deserves the abuse with which it has been covered, in 



THE GERMAN PROPAGANDA 43 

part, too, at home. If it had really been so clnmsy or 
ineffective as the enemy Press afterwards claimed, the 
Entente and their American partisans wonld not have 
set in motion such gigantic machinery to combat it. One 
need only read G. Lechartier's book, ** Intrigues et Dip- 
lomatics a Washington,'* to see what importance was 
attached to our propaganda by the enemy. In spite of 
all the bitterness which the author infuses into his ficti- 
tious narration, admiration for the German activity in 
the United States shines through the whole book. Fur- 
ther, at the end of 1918 a Commission of the Senate ap- 
pointed to investigate German propaganda, as a result 
of the publication of protocols on this subject, repeatedly 
stated that its work had in no way been in vain, but 
rather its after effects had made themselves strongly felt 
"like poison gas" long after America's entry into the 
war. One may well venture to say that, had it not been 
for the serious crisis caused by the submarine war, it 
would probably in time have succeeded in completely 
neutralizing the anti- German campaign. 

As regards our justification for openly championing 
the German cause before the people of the United States 
by written and spoken word, this is self-evident in a coun- 
try which recognizes the principles of freedom of the 
Press and free speech. Apart from this, however, the 
American Government have themselves provided a 
precedent in this connection during the civil war, when 
President Lincoln in 1863 sent to England the famous 
preacher, Henry Ward Beecher, whose sympathies were 
strongly on the side of the Federals. Through his 
speeches, afterwards published as ** Patriotic Ad- 
dresses," he did much towards swaying public opinion 
in favor of the Northern States. In this war, too, Amer- 
ica, after abandoning her neutrality, has carried out 
vigorous propaganda in neutral countries, as is shown 



<; 



44 MY THEEE YEARS IN AMERICA 

by the mission of the well-known New York supporter 
of woman suffrage, Mrs. Norman Whitehouse, under the 
auspices of the official Press Bureau and with the special 
approval of Secretary of State Lansing. Moreover our 
justification has been expressly upheld by a statement of 
Commissioner Bruce Bielaski of the American Law 
Department, who appeared as chief witness against us 
before the above mentioned Commission of Inquiry. He 
declared that there was no law in the United States 
which, before her entry into the war, rendered illegal 
German or any other foreign propaganda. Why all this 
noise then? — it is reasonable to ask. Why, then, has the 
suggestion persisted at home and abroad, almost from 
the appearance of Dr. Dernburg until the present day, 
that we had, with our propaganda campaign, made our- 
selves guilty of treachery to the United States? 

From the moral point of view, too, no exception can 
be taken to the German propaganda. The United States 
was neutral and wished to remain so. The German pro- 
paganda was working for the same end. I have never 
heard of a single case of bribery by our representatives. 
If money was spent on our side, it was purely for the 
purpose of spreading articles and pamphlets pleading 
United States neutrality. Applications were frequently 
made to us by writers and editors who from inner con- 
viction were ready to write and circulate articles of this 
kind, but were not financially in a position to do so. The 
leaders of German propaganda would surely have been 
neglectful of their duty if in such cases they had not 
provided the necessary funds. All Governments in the 
world have always proceeded in a similar way, and in 
particular' that of the United States since their entry 
into the war, as is shown by the case of the Freie Zeitung 
of Bern — therefore equally in a neutral country. These 
facts must throw a strange light on the inquiry of the 



THE GEEMAN PROPAGANDA 45 

American Senate into German propaganda, delayed as 
it was until last winter and carried through with such 
elaborate machinery. It is obvious that beneath it all 
there lay — ^what irony ! — a purely propagandist purpose, 
namely, that of humiliating Germany in the person of 
her late official representative accredited to the United 
States, and to make her appear contemptible in the eyes 
of the uncritical public! 

Whereas in the first months of the war no one in Amer- 
ica had thought of connecting ** German Propaganda'* 
with anything shocking, our opponents afterwards suc- 
ceeded in disseminating the idea that a few offences 
against the law committed by Imperial and American 
Germans represented an important, even the most im- 
portant, part of the German propaganda work. So it 
was brought about that even in the time before Amer- 
ica's entry into the war, everyone who openly stood up 
for Germany's cause was stamped by the expression 
*' German Propagandist" as a person of doubtful integ- 
rity. The gradual official perpetuation of this admittedly 
misleading identification of our absolutely unexception- 
able propaganda with a few regrettable offences against 
the American penal code — this and no other was the 
object of that inquiry by the Senate. The prejudicial 
headlines under which the published articles were 
printed, such as ** Brewery and Brandy Interests" and 
** German-Bolshevist Propaganda," themselves sufficed 
to indicate that our propaganda was to be crucified be- 
tween two ** malefactors"; for to the average American 
citizen there is nothing more horrifying than the distil- 
lery on the one hand and Bolshevism on the other. In 
this connection I must not omit to mention that the great 
majority of the documents laid before the Commission 
had been secured by means of bribery or theft. It is also 
worth while to remind the reader of the significant words 



46 MY THEEE YEAKS IN AMERICA 

of Senator Reed, a member of the Commission, who said 
at one point in the examination: **I am interested in 
trying to distil some truth from a mass of statements 
which are so manifestly unfair and distorted that it is 
hard to characterize them in parliamentary language/' 

As for the fantastic figures with which the Americans 
have undertaken to estimate the cost of our propaganda, 
they rest — ^in so far as they are not simply the fruit of 
a malicious imagination — on the, to say the least of it, 
superficial hypothesis that all the money paid out by 
the different German offices from the outbreak of war 
until the breaking off of diplomatic relations between 
Germany and America, the amount of which has been 
arrived at on the strength of a minute scrutiny of the 
books of all the banks with which these offices have done 
business, were used for purposes of propaganda. As 
a matter of fact, of course, far the greater part of this 
outlay went to finance the very extensive purchases of 
Privy Councillor Albert as well as certain business trans- 
actions concluded by Captain von Papen, which will be 
discussed later. In comparison with this the sum we de- 
voted to propaganda work was quite small. The Press 
Bureau was frequently very appreciably hampered by 
the fact that even for quite minor expenditure outside 
the fixed budget, previous sanction had to be obtained 
from Berlin. Consequently much useful work would have 
had to remain undone if, particularly in the first months 
of the war, self-sacrificing German- Americans to whom 
it was only of the slightest interest that the German point 
of view should be accurately and emphatically explained, 
had not placed small sums at the disposal of the leaders 
of our propaganda. In the two and a half years between 
the outbreak of war and the rupture between Germany 
and America the sums paid out from official funds for 
propaganda work in the Union — ^including minor contri- 



THE GERMAN PROPAGANDA 47 

butions for other countries, as, for example, the pictures 
distributed from New York over South America and 
Eastern Asia — do not, all told, exceed a million dollars. 
That is surely only a small fraction of what England 
and France have expended during the war in order, in 
spite of very thorough preparation in peace time, to 
win over American public opinion to their cause. It is 
actually only a sixth of what, according to the Chicago 
Tribune on the 1st November, 1919, the ofl&cial American 
Press Bureau of Mr. George Creel has spent in order 
to ** cement enthusiasm for the war" during the eighteen 
months between America*^ entry into the war and the 
conclusion of the Armistice. The thirty-five to fifty mil- 
lion dollars which, according to the statements of our 
enemies, were swallowed up by German propaganda in 
the United States belong, therefore, to the realms of 
fable. 

In this connection I must mention yet another, far 
more malicious legend, namely, the slander widely spread 
in America last year, that the funds collected in America 
for the German Red Cross were used to finance German 
propaganda. It is a fact that every dollar that went to 
the German Red Cross Delegation in New York was re- 
mitted to the home organization for which it was in- 
tended. Of course these funds were in the first place 
paid into the various New York banking accounts from 
which Dr. Dernburg drew the funds for the Press Bu- 
reau. But, as Captain Hecker has most definitely stated, 
their equivalent was remitted to Germany through the 
bank, regardless of the changes in the exchange. 

Dr. Dernburg, in organizing the Press Bureau, availed 
himself of the assistance he found in New York. The 
suggestion, widely current in America and repeated by 
a member of the American Secret Service before the 
Senatorial inquiry, that this Press Bureau had formed, 



48 MY THEEE YEARS IN AMERICA 

as it were, a part of the German mobilization, and that, 
therefore, the most skilled propaganda experts from 
Europe and the Far East had been gathered together 
in New York in order that, after a preliminary run there, 
they might be let loose on the American world, is a ridi- 
cnlous invention. Just as Dr. Dernburg himself became 
a propagandist without any premeditation, so it was 
also the case with his colleagues. At first his only as- 
sistants were the New York Press Agent of the Ham- 
burg- Amerika line, Herr M. B. Claussen, and after the 
entry of Japan into the war a Government official from 
that country who was unable to continue his journey to 
Germany, because the passport across the Atlantic 
granted him through the instrumentality of the State 
Department was rejected by the British authorities. 
This official, Dr. Alexander Fuehr, the interpreter of 
the Consulate-General in Yokohama, who had great ex- 
perience in Press matters and possessed an intimate 
knowledge of American affairs, assisted by quite a small 
staff of assistants engaged in New York, issued the daily 
bulletins of the ** German Information Service," which 
appeared for a year and consisted of translations of 
the substance of the German newspapers, comments on 
daily events and occasional interviews with people who 
had returned from Europe. It was Herr Claussens's 
duty to circulate the bulletins, the arrival of which was 
in no way kept secret, among the American Press, and 
to see to it that they should be reproduced as fully as 
possible, which was done, especially m the provincial 
Press. 

Later, when the propaganda movement had developed 
to the extent of publishing and circulating leaflets, 
brochures and longer pamphlets, Dr. Dernburg decided 
to employ in the Press Bureau a well-known American 
publicist in the person of Mr. William Bayard Hale, who 



THE GERMAN PROPAGANDA 49 

had already done good work, by speaking and "writing, 
towards an unbiassed appreciation of the German point 
of view, and he was assisted by two younger New York 
journalists. Later, when the bureau took up war-pic- 
ture and war-film propaganda, these were joined by two 
more young German Government officials. Dr. Mechlen- 
burg and Herr Plage, who also were held up in America 
on their way from Japan. More than a dozen persons, 
including messengers, have never been employed by the 
Press Bureau at a time. Of the thirty-one trained 
propagandists imported from Germany who, according 
to Captain Lester's evidence before the Senatorial Cora- 
mission, were supposed to have worked in the Press 
Bureau, in so far as their names were given in the proto- 
cols of the inquiry, we are assured by Herr Fuehr that 
not one was employed there! 

In addition to his direction of the Press Bureau Dr. 
Dernburg, who continued with inexhaustible energy to 
write articles for the periodicals and instructive letters 
for the daily Press, was responsible for keeping in touch 
with the directors of the American Press. He also 
availed himself of invitations to speak in American and 
German circles, and sometimes in other places than New 
York. As far as I know he never founded any societies 
for propaganda purposes. On the other hand, when such 
societies which had arisen without his influence turned 
to him, he of course supported them by word and 
deed. 

For all questions of propaganda Dr. Dernburg had the 
assistance of a small conunittee nominated by himself 
and consisting, in addition to Herren Albert, Meyer 
Gerhardt and Fuehr, of a few American journalists and 
business men. It was his custom to confer with this 
committee once or twice a month, when the general situa- 
tion, the prevailing fluctuations of public opinion and 



50 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

the probable influence of the propaganda material about 
to be published, were discussed in detail. 

With this entirely improvised and, as will be seen, 
very modest machinery, Dr. Dernburg began his cam- 
paign. The enemy statement that the German propa- 
ganda in the United States had been actually organized 
many years before the war, so that in 1914 we might 
have'ready at our disposal an organization with branches 
in every part of the country, is unfortunately devoid of 
any foundation. It is a regrettable fact that, in spite 
of my repeated warnings to the authorities, nothing was 
ever done on the German side before the war. It is 
well known that at that time the power of public opinion 
in democratic countries was very little understood in 
Germany. It was thought at home — ^which is typical 
of the objective, matter-of-fact German national charac- 
ter — that it was much more important that the right 
should be done than that it should be recognized as right 
by the public. Added to this was the under-estimation 
of the influence of the United States on the development 
of world politics. 

Before the war no one in Germany had thought it pos- 
sible that the Union would have to be reckoned with 
as a factor, much less a decisive factor, in a European 
war. This was a mistake, the effect of which unfortu- 
nately was felt until well into 1917 — the result was that 
there was never enough money available to keep in touch 
and co-operate with the American Press. As a matter 
of fact I had, in the course of my activities in Washing- 
ton, personally entered into certain social relations with 
the proprietors of a few great American newspapers. 
But from Berlin no advances were made. Even with 
the German-American papers there was no organized 
connection, and they themselves did not work together 
in any way. It is true that for years there had been 



THE GEEMAN PEOPAGANDA 51 

a business connection between the greatest American 
news-agency, the Associated Press, and the Wolff Tele- 
graphic Bureau ; as, however, the agency was not served 
direct with Berlin Wolff-telegrams, but by its own repre- 
sentatives there, this did not amount to much. England, 
on the other hand — quite apart from the close relation- 
ship resulting from a common language — ^had for years 
maintained and systematically cultivated the closest 
contact with the American Press. It followed, then, 
that on the outbreak of war the English influence on the 
American daily Press was enormous. It did not rest as 
exclusively as has been assumed in Germany on direct 
proprietary rights. I do not think that, with the exception 
of a single newspaper in one of the smaller cities any 
great American paper was directly bought by England. 
Here and there considerable blocks of American news- 
paper shares may have been in English hands and influ- 
enced the tendency of certain papers. If, however, it is 
true — as was credibly stated in Irish-American quarters 
during the first year of the war — that Lord Northcliffe 
boasted a year or two before the war of ** controlling" 
seventeen American papers, it is difficult to believe that 
this influence of the English press-magnates was based on 
hard cash. Bather is it the case that certain newspapers 
received their otherwise very costly private news-service 
from England on very advantageous terms. To others, 
English writers of leading articles are said to have been 
attached, without cost to the newspaper — a scheme of 
which I have often heard in America, but which is diffi- 
cult to prove, as all American newspapers maintain the 
strictest secrecy as to the origin of their leading articles. 
It is, however, conunon knowledge that with regard to 
European affairs the American news service was swayed 
by this entirely English organization. Until the out- 
break of the war the American news agencies drew ex- 



52 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

clnsively from English sources. Moreover, those news- 
papers which in the United States play a very important 
part, inasmuch as they are the fount of most of the new. 
ideas by which the tone of the Press in influenced, were 
in a very considerable degree served from England. On 
the other hand, the wide field of cinematographic pro- 
duction was strongly influenced by the French fihn. In 
this way our enemies in the United States had, at the 
outbreak of war, a boundless and excellently prepared 
field for the propagation of their news, and the represen- 
tation of their point of view, but more particularly for 
their attack on the German cause. In spite of this, 
however, they immediately inundated the Union with 
propagandist literature, particularly through the agents 
of the English shipping lines, who were scattered all 
over the country, and the well-known author and poli- 
tician, Sir Gilbert Parker, sent from London tons of this 
matter to well-known American business men, profes- 
sors and politicians. 

On our side, it is true, and I should like to emphasize 
this to their credit, that on the outbreak of war the 
German-American newspapers took up our cause un- 
hesitatingly and as one man. Further, they have, until 
America's entry into the war, honestly striven to win 
full justice for the American point of view, and to com- 
bat the unneutral leanings of the majority of the Ameri- 
cans and the slanderous attacks of our enemies. As, 
however, they are not accessible to the general public, 
who do not know German, and in particular scarcely 
ever come into the hands of the authoritative American 
political circles, their support remained more or less 
academic. Very valuable services were rendered to the 
German cause by the already-mentioned weekly paper 
Fatherland, which was printed in English ; in view, how- 
ever, of its reputation as a partisan journal, it naturally 



THE GERMAN PROPAGANDA 53 

could not exert so deep an influence as the local daily 
papers, which carried on the English propaganda with- 
out allowing it to become too conspicuous. For tele- 
graphic communication from Germany to America we 
had to rely solely on the two German wireless stations 
at Sayville and Tuckerton, erected shortly before the 
outbreak of war, and we soon succeeded, subject to 
American censorship, in getting a regular Press-service, 
which was spread, not only over the whole of the United 
States, but was also passed on to South America and 
East Asia. But in the first place, in spite of repeated 
extension and strengthening, these two stations were 
quite inadequate; in the second place, the Press-service 
never succeeded in adapting itself thoroughly to Ameri- 
can requirements. The same may be said of most of the 
German propaganda literature which reached America 
in fairly large quantities since the third month of the 
war, partly in German and partly in not always irre- 
proachable English. This, like the Press telegrams, 
showed a complete lack of understanding of American 
national psychology. The American character, I should 
like to repeat here, is by no means so dry and calculating 
as the German picture of an American business man 
usually represents. The outstanding characteristic of 
the average American is rather a great, even though 
superficial, sentimentality. There is no news for which 
a way cannot be guaranteed through the whole country, 
if clothed in a sentimental form. Our enemies have ex- 
ploited this circumstance with the greatest refinement 
in the case of the German invasion of "poor little Bel- 
gium,'* the shooting of the *' heroic nurse,*' Edith Cavell, 
and other incidents. Those who had charge of the Ber- 
lin propaganda, on the other hand, made very little of 
such occurrences on the enemy side, e.g., the violation 
of Greece, the bombing of the Corpus Christi procession 



54 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

in Karlsrulie, etc. One tiling that would have exerted 
a tremendous influence in America, if its publicity had 
been handled with only average skill, was the sufferings 
of our children, women and old people as a result of the 
British hunger blockade — that they have made no at- 
tempt to bring to the notice of the world. 

On the other hand they put themselves to the greatest 
possible trouble to lay **The Truth About the War'^ 
before American public opinion. This, however, fell on 
unfavorable ground, for the American does not care to 
be instructed. He had no interest in learning the 
** truth *' which the German Press communications and 
explanatory pamphlets were so anxious to impress upon 
him. The American likes to form his own opinions and 
so only requires facts. The possibility of exerting in- 
fluence therefore lies rather in the choice of the facts 
and the way in which they are presented, than in logical 
and convincing argument. It is all the easier to influence 
him by the well-timed transmission of skilfully disposed 
facts, since his usually very limited general knowledge 
and his complete ignorance of European affairs deprive 
him of the simplest premises for a critical judgment 
of the facts presented to him from the enemy side. It is 
quite incredible what the American public will swallow 
in the way of lies if they are only repeated often enough 
and properly served up. It all turns on which side gets 
the news in first; for the first impression sticks. Cor- 
rections are generally vain, especially as they appear 
as a rule in small print and in inconspicuous places. 
"When, for example, the American Press got the first 
news of the ** destruction'* of Rheims cathedral from 
London and in the English version, no German correc- 
tion, however well-founded, would succeed in removing 
the first impression. 

Particularly ineffective in their influence on American 



THE GERMAN PROPAGANDA 55 

public opinion — as may be said here in anticipation — 
have been the majority of our official Notes. In view 
of the subsequent ever-increasing interruption of the 
news service from Germany, they were the last and only 
means by which the German standpoint could be brought 
before the American people. Their effectiveness de- 
pended entirely on the impression that they made on 
American public opinion and not on the Washington 
Government; yet they were nearly always drawn up in 
Berlin in the form of juristic precis, propagandist but 
quite futile.' 

All these factors must be taken into consideration in 
attempting to estimate the success of our propaganda 
in the United States. They show that on the one hand 
the prevailing conditions of American public opinion 
were extraordinarily unfavorable to our propaganda, 
and that the support it received from home, with a few 
exceptions, was misguided. 

Dr. Dernburg, then, had not a chance during the eight 
months of his activity in America of transforming her 
into a pro-German country, and it is certain that no one 
else could have done it in his place. But he succeeded 
to a great extent, and within a comparatively short 
time, in more or less crippling the enemy propaganda, 
and at least in gradually rendering ineffective the gross- 
est misrepresentations of our enemies. By his own 
writings and other methods of spreading the truth, and 
particularly by the numerous brochures and books, which 
at his suggestion were written by American supporters 
of the German cause and distributed in thousands 
directly or indirectly by the Press Bureau with the help 
of a skilfully compiled address-book, he succeeded in 
exerting very considerable influence. By keeping in touch 
with American journalists and other influential persons 
he did much good work, particularly in the first months 



56 MY THEEE YEARS IN AMERICA 

of the war. His connection with Irish leaders laid the 
foundation for 'a co-operation which in the following 
year was of great importance to onr position in the 
United States, and which, with a somewhat more intelli- 
gent backing by our Government departments at home, 
might have been more fruitful stiU. 

One branch of our propaganda which was also initiated 
under Dr. Dernburg, but was chiefly developed after 
his departure, was the moving-picture propaganda, for 
which a very efficient company was floated by Privy 
Councillor Albert. At first it was intended to be an 
agency for the circulation of films from Germany. As, 
however, suitable material for the American market 
could not be obtained there, the ** American Correspon- 
dent Film Co.'' decided to send its own agents to Ger- 
many and Austria with a view to making suitable films 
for their purpose. In this way several important film- 
dramas were produced which have had great success in 
hundreds of American cinemas. In spite of this the 
company had finally to be liquidated, chiefly owing to 
lack of support from the military authorities at home. 

With the sinking of the Lusitania our propaganda of 
enlightenment in the United States substantially came 
to an end. Henceforward the principal aim • of its 
activity, which, after Dr. Dernburg 's departure, came 
under the direction of Privy Councillor Albert, was to 
keep the United States out of the war. Side by side 
with this, an attempt was made to influence public feel- 
ing against the export of arms and ammunition and 
against the Anglo-French loan, and to demonstrate the 
increasingly prejudiced effect wrought by England on 
American economic interests. In November, 1915, I 
urged, as I cabled at the time to Chancellor Bethmann- 
HoUweg, the complete suppression of propaganda. The 
Press Bureau in New York continued under the direction 



THE GERMAN PROPAGANDA 57 

of Dr. Fuehr, until the breaking off of relations between 
America and Germany. It concerned itself, however, 
apart from certain regular literary contributions to cer- 
tain journals, less with propaganda work than with 
keeping an eye on the American Press. and the develop- 
ment of the news service to and from Germany as weU 
as to South America and Eastern Asia. 



- CHAPTER ni 

POLITICAL EVENTS PRECEDING THll 
"LUSITANIA" INCIDENT 

As I mentioned in the first chapter, it was to be ex- 
pected that public opinion in America would range itself 
overwhelmingly on the side of the Entente. As a result 
of the violation of Belgian neutrality, this happened far 
in excess of expectation. The violence of the statements 
of the anti-German party called forth strong replies from 
those who desired a strict neutrality on the part of the 
United States. The adherents of the latter party were 
always stigmatized as pro-Germans, although even the 
German- Americans never called for anything more than 
an unconditional neutrality. This also was the aim for 
which the German policy was working through its repre- 
sentatives in America. "We never hoped for anything 
further. ^ 

The waves of excitement ran so high that even the 
private relations of the adherents of both parties con- 
tending suffered. President Wilson, therefore, on the 
18th August, 1914, issued a proclamation to the Ameri- 
can people which is of special interest because it lays 
down in a definite form the policy to which he logically 
and unwaveringly adhered until the rupture. 

In this proclamation the following sentences occur : 
"Every man who really loves America will act and speak 
in the true spirit' of neutrality, which is the spirit of 
impartiality and fairness and friendliness to all con- 
cerned." And further: *'The people of the United 

58 



PRECEDING THE *'LUSITANIA'» 59 

States . . . may be divided in camps of hostile opinion. 
. . . Such divisions among iis would be fatal to our 
peace of mind and might seriously stand in the way of 
the proper performance of our duty as the one great 
nation at peace, the one people holding itself ready to 
play a part of impartial mediation and speak the coun- 
sels of peace and accommodation, not as a partisan, but 
as a friend." 

The policy outlined in these quotations from Mr. Wil- 
son's proclamation won the approval of an overwhelm- 
ing majority of the American people, for even among 
the supporters of the Entente there was only a small 
minority who desired an active participation in the war 
by the United States. Apart from the fact that the 
traditional American policy seemed to preclude any such 
intervention in European affairs, it was to the interest 
of the United States to play with unimpaired power the 
role of Arbiter mundi, when the States of ancient Europe, 
tired of tearing one another to pieces, at last longed for 
peace again. America could not but hope that neither 
of the two warring parties would come out of the war 
in a dominating position. There is, therefore, a certain 
modicum of truth in the view frequently expressed in 
Germany that the United States would in any case 
finally have entered the war to prevent the so-called 
** German Peace. *' But the question is whether such a 
peace was possible in face of the superior strength of 
our enemies. If we had won the first battle of the Marne 
and had then been prepared to restore Belgium and 
conclude a moderate peace, it is conceivable that we 
might have come to terms with England on the basis 
of a kind of Treaty of Amiens. After the loss of the 
battle of the Marne a ** German Peace'' was out of 
the question. The possibility of such a peace has never 
''recurred. It was therefore necessary for the German 



60 MY THREE YEABS IN AMERICA 

policy to strive for a peace by understanding on the 
basis of the status quo. Just as Frederick the Great 
defended Prussia's newly won position as a great Power 
against overwhelming odds, so we were fighting under 
similar conditions for the maintenance of Germany's 
position in the world. 

Our Government had declared urhi et orhi that they 
were waging a defensive war, and were therefore obliged 
to regulate their policy accordingly. If we had desired 
a peace like that of Hubertusburg we should have won. 
It is often contended in Germany to-day that it would 
still have been possible to attain this end. I have strug- 
gled for it in America for two and a half years and am 
as convinced to-day as I was then, that by acquiescing 
in the policy of the United States we should have ob- 
tained a peace which would have met the needs of the 
German people, if only those who desired the same thing 
at home had been in a position to carry their wishes 
through. 

In Germany it is also alleged, contrary to my own 
opinion, that the German people could not have held 
out if they had not been driven on by the ''Will to con- 
quer." I regard this view as an injustice to the German 
nation. If our home propaganda, instead of continually 
awakening vain hopes, had insisted on telling the real 
truth, the German people would have faced danger to 
the last. We ought to have repeated constantly that 
our situation was very serious, but that we must clench 
our teeth, and our Government must be ready to seize 
the first opportunity to end the defensive war by a cor- 
responding peace. 

The controversy about the "German peace'* or ** peace 
by negotiation" must be touched on here because it 
formed the nucleus of the diplomatic struggle in Wash- 
ington. At the beginning of the war these catchwords 



PRECEDING THE ^^LUSITANIA'' 61 

had not yet been invented, but their substance even then 
controlled the situation. The attitude of the American 
Government and public opinion towards us depended in 
the first place on whether they thought that we were 
striving for world-mastery or were waging a defensive 
war. 

Immediately after my return from Europe I called on 
President Wilson, who had taken the opportunity of the 
war and the death of his first wife, to withdraw even 
more than ever from the outer world. He was generally 
known as the recluse of the White House. He only re- 
ceived people with whom he had political business to 
settle. Particularly from diplomats and other foreigners 
Mr. Wilson kept very aloof, because he was anxious to 
avoid the appearance of preference or partiality. 

After the disillusionment of Versailles it is difficult 
for a German to form an unbiassed judgment of Mr. 
Wilson. We must not forget, however, that no serious 
attempt has ever been made in Germany to get an un- 
prejudiced estimate of Mr. Wilson's personality. In the 
course of the war he has come to be regarded more and 
more as unneutral and anti-German, whereas, to the 
average American public opinion, he appeared in quite 
a different light. Later, after the defeat of our arms, 
we hailed Mr. Wilson as the Messiah who was to save 
Germany and the whole world from dire distress. When, 
therefore, at Versailles, the President, instead of un- 
folding and carrying through a far-reaching programme 
for the general reconstruction of the world, approved 
all the ultra-chauvinistic and nationalistic mistakes of 
the European statesmen and proclaimed as the aim 
of the peace the punishment of Germany, Mr. Wilson 
was set down in Germany without more ado as a 
hypocrite. 

I think that through all the phases of the war the Ger- 



62 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

man opinion of Mr. "Wilson has suffered from sheer 
exaggeration. The chief mistake lay in separating Wil- 
son's personality from public opinion in the United 
States. In spite of his strong will and his autocratic 
leanings, Mr. Wilson is still, in the first place, a perfect 
type of the .American politician. In his speeches he 
always tries to voice public opinion, and in his policy to 
follow its wishes. 

He certainly tries to direct and influence public opinion. 
But he changes his front at once if he notices that he 
has strayed from the way that the aura popularis would 
have him follow. In order to form a correct judgment 
of Mr. Wilson's actions and speeches it is always neces- 
sary to ask oneself, in the first place, what end he has 
in view for his own political position and that of his 
party in America. He proclaims in a most dazzling way 
the ideals of the American people. But their realization 
always depends on his own actual political interests and 
those of the Democratic party. Mr. Wilson's attitude 
has always been synonymous with that of his party, be- 
cause the latter can produce no other personality capable 
of competing with the President. Therefore, Mr. Wil- 
son always met with little or no opposition within the 
Democratic party, and he was able to follow for a long 
time his own inclination to adopt a quite independent 
policy. 

Socially the President is very congenial when once he 
has made up his mind to emerge from his narrow circle. 
He has not the reputation of being a loyal friend, and 
is accused of ingratitude by many of his former col- 
leagues and enthusiastic adherents. In any case, how- 
I ever, Mr. Wilson is an implacable enemy when once he 
/ feels himself personally attacked or slighted. As a re- 
sult of his sensitiveness he has a strong tendency to 
J make the mistake of regarding political differences of 



PBECEDING THE **LUSITANIA" 63 

opinion as personal antipathy. The President has never 
forgiven the German Government for having caused the 
failure of his peace-policy of 1916-17, which was sup- 
ported by public opinion in America. In Germany his 
later speeches, in which he drew a distinction between 
the German people and the Imperial Government, were 
regarded as hypocrisy. Such a differentiation was at 
that time based on American public feeling, which held 
autocracy and militarism responsible for the disasters 
which had been brought upon the world. The question 
has, however, never been answered why this distinction 
was abandoned by Mr. Wilson at Versailles. Without 
wishing in any way either to accuse or defend him I 
consider the answer to this riddle to be that the Presi- 
dent allowed himself to be convinced of the complicity 
of the German people by the statesmen of the Entente. 
He was at the time in a mood with regard to us which 
predisposed him to such influences. Mr. Wilson was by 
origin, up-bringing and training a pacifist. When it is 
remembered that with us and in neutral countries it was 
the pacifists themselves who were the most indignant 
at the Peace of Versailles, that they were the very people 
who for the most part advised against the signature of 
this peace, one can imagine the feelings aroused in a 
disillusioned pacifist like Wilson by those whom he re- 
gards as responsible for having thwarted the possibility 
of an ideal pacifist peace. 

Apart from this, Mr. Wilson at Versailles no longer 
dominated American public opinion, and his political 
power consequently collapsed. In the United States the 
old indifference to European affairs regained the upper 
hand. Men were satisfied with having brought about a 
victory over autocracy and militarism. They wanted 
nothing further. The American troops were crowding 
home, and, finally, feeling in the United States was still 



64 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

so strongly against us that no one would have under- 
stood the President if he had caused a rupture with his 
Allies on our behalf. 

At Versailles, too, an outstanding peculiarity of Mr. 
Wilson's may have played a part which even during the 
earlier negotiations had been of great importance. He 
is a man who is slow to make up his mind, and likes to 
postpone decisions until they are inevitable. He is al- 
ways ready to wait and see whether the situation may 
not improve or some unexpected event occur. How often 
during the Washington negotiations did, first I and then 
our enemies, believe that we had set President Wilson 
on a definite course. But again and again the requisite 
decision would be postponed. In Washington it was 
generally taken under the strong pressure of public 
opinion. In Versailles the Entente statesmen may well 
have forced a decision by displaying a stronger will and 
a wider knowledge of European affairs. Mr. Wilson was 
at Versailles in the position of the giant Antaeus, who 
drew his strength from his native soil. Once away from 
American ground Hercules (Clemenceau) was able to 
crush him. 

At the time I am now describing the circumstances 
were quite different, because at that time Mr. Wilson 
had a reliable support for his policy in American public 
opinion. In Germany, at the very beginning of the war, 
great resentment was felt against Mr. Wilson for the 
cold negative in his reply to the Emperor's telegram in 
which Mr. Wilson was asked to condemn the atrocities 
perpetrated by the Belgian population and francs-tireurs. 
It was not, however, noticed in Germany that the Presi- 
dent at the same time likewise refused to receive a Bel- 
gian deputation which came to America to beg for his 
help. 

During my conversation with the President already 



PBECEDING THE **LUSITANIA" 65 

mentioned, he made a statement on the lines of his 
proclamation of neutrality of which I have already given 
the substance. My reply that the American neutrality 
seemed to us to be tinged with sympathy for our enemies 
Mr. Wilson contradicted emphatically. He thought that 
this appearance was the result of England's naval 
power, which he could do nothing to alter. In this con- 
nection the President made the following remark, which 
struck me very forcibly at the time : 

**The United States must remain neutral, because 
otherwise the fact that her population is drawn from 
so many European countries would give rise to serious 
domestic difficulties." 

My remark about the benevolence of the United States' 
neutrality towards our enemies was at the time chiefly 
prompted by the differences that had arisen with regard 
to the wireless stations. 

The fact that this question arose gives yet another 
proof of how little we were prepared for war. By Ger- 
man enterprise two wireless stations had been erected on 
the east coast of the United States as a means of direct 
conmiunication with Europe, one at Sayville (Long Is- 
land, the other at Tuckerton (New" Jersey). Both were 
partly financed by American and French capital. As 
at the beginning of the war the cable fell entirely into 
English hands and was destroyed by them, we had no 
telegraphic communication with home at our disposal. 
We had to fall back exclusively on the wireless stations, 
when, as frequently happened, we were unable to make 
use of the circuitous routes via neutral countries. Un- 
fortunately it appeared that the legal position with re- 
gard to the proprietorship of the two stations was not 
clear. Actions were immediately brought on the French 
side, and the closing of the stations by decree of the 



66 MY THEEE YEAES IN AMERICA 

courts demanded. Under these circumstances it was for- 
tunate for us that the American Government, after tedi- 
ous negotiations with me, took over possession of both 
stations. Otherwise they would have been closed and we 
should have been unable to use them. 

Our satisfaction at this decision was modified by the 
establishment of a censorship of radio-telegrams on the 
part of the American Government on the strength of 
the Hague Convention, which prohibits the communica- 
tion by wireless from a neutral country with the mili- 
tary or naval forces of a combatant. If the stations had 
been publicly used before the war we should have stood 
on firm legal ground, for such cases are excepted by the 
Hague Convention. Unfortunately the stations were in 
1914 only partially completed, and the application of the 
clauses in question was therefore doubtful. It is true 
that the stations were ready for immediate use, but as 
a result of the French protest the American Government 
held strictly to the legal standpoint. In these negotia- 
tions we had to content ourselves with pointing out that 
whereas our enemies could pass on military information 
to their Governments by means of coded cablegrams, we 
should be confined to the use of the wireless stations. 
Finally we came to an agreement with the American 
Government that they should have a copy of the code 
which we used for the wireless telegrams. In this way 
their contents were kept secret from the enemy, but not 
from the "Washington Government. This course we only 
agreed to as a last resource as it was not suitable for 
handling negotiations in which the American Govern- 
ment was concerned. 

The course of this controversy was typical of the fate 
of German interests in America throughout the wholfe 
period of American neutrality. Unfortunately we had 
absolutely no means at hand for putting any pressure on 



PRECEDING THE **LUSITANIA'* 67 

America in our own favor. In comparison with the pub- 
lic opinion in the Eastern States, which followed in the 
wake of the Entente, and with the authoritative circles 
of New York, Wilson's Administration without question 
strove for an honorable neutrality. In spite of this most 
of their decisions were materially unfavorable to us, so 
that a German observer from a distance might, not with- 
out reason, obtain the impression that the neutrality of 
the American Government was mere hypocrisy and that 
all kinds of pretexts were found for helping England. 

This was not the chief impression made on a near ob- 
server. In politics the Americans are first and foremost 
jurists, and indeed in a narrower and more literal sense 
than the English Imperialists, with whom, according to 
their old traditions, justice only serves as a cloak for 
their political ambitions. I cannot judge how far the 
Americans have become full-blooded Imperialists since 
their entry into the war, i.e., since about 1917. At the 
time of which I speak this was far from being the case. 
If, moreover, it is a fact that the majority of the deci- 
sions of the United States turned out unfavorably to us, 
the question of the American motives should have been 
carefully differentiated from the other question as to 
what inferences may be drawn from the state of affairs. 
Even if we had had just reason to complain of unfair 
treatment it was for us to be as indulgent towards Amer- 
ica as was compatible with our final aim not to lose the 
war. The question is not whether we had cause for re- 
sentment and retaliation, but simply what benefit could 
be extracted for Germany out of the existing situation. 

At this visit to the White House, the only question that 
was acute was that of the wireless stations. This and 
the negotiations which I shall mention later, dealing with 
the coaling of our ships of war and the American export 
of arms and ammunition, I discussed with Secretary of 



68 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

State Bryan. The first time I visited this gentleman he 
exclaimed with great warmth: **Now you see I was right 
when I kept repeating that preparation for war was the 
best way of bringing war about. All the European Pow- 
ers were armed to the teeth and always maintained that 
this heavy armament was necessary to protect them from 
war. Now the fallacy is obvious. We alone live in peace 
because we are unarmed.'' 

Mr. Bryan has always been a genuine pacifist, and 
later sacrificed his Ministerial appointment to his con- 
victions. So long as he remained in office he continued 
to influence the American Government to maintain neu- 
trality and constantly strove to bring about peace. 

A first attempt in this direction was made from Wash- 
ington immediately after the outbreak of the war, but 
met with no response from the combatant Powers. At 
the beginning of September, Mr. Bryan repeated the 
offer of American mediation. 

At that time a vigorous agitation had begun in New 
York for the restoration of peace. Mr. WiUiam Ran- 
dolph Hearst, the well-known editor of widely circulated 
newspapers, and other well-known personalities, called 
together great meetings at which America's historical 
mission was said to be the stopping of the wholesale 
murder that was going on in Europe. At this time I was, 
together with several other gentlemen, staying with 
James Speyer, the banker, at his country house. The 
host and the majority of the guests, among whom was 
the late ambassador in Constantinople, Oscar Straus, 
were supporters of the prevailing pacific movement. 
The question of American mediation was eagerly dis- 
cussed at the dinner table. Mr. Straus was an extremely 
warm adherent of this idea. He turned particularly to 
me because the German Government were regarded as 
opponents of the pacifist ideas. I said that we had not 



PRECEDING THE **LUSITANIA" 69 

desired the war and would certainly be ready at the first 
suitable opportunity for a peace by understanding. 
Thereupon Mr. Straus declared that he would at once 
travel to Washington and repeat my words to Mr. Bryan. 
Immediately after dinner he went to the station and on 
the following day I received a wire from the Secretary 
of State, asking me to return to Washington as soon as 
I could to discuss the matter with him. There we had 
a long interview in his private residence, with the result 
that an American offer of mediation was sent to the 
Imperial Chancellor. Meanwhile Mr. Straus had gone 
to the ambassadors of the other combatant Powers, who 
all more or less rejected the proposal. The friendly 
reply of the German Government coincided in principle 
with what I had said, but added that Mr. Bryan should 
first address himself to the enemy, as the further course 
of the negotiations depended on their attitude, which 
was not yet known. The American Government never 
returned to the question and I had no reason to urge them 
to do so. Any importunity on our side would have given 
an impression of weakness, Nevertheless this interlude 
was so far favorable to us that it contrasted our readi- 
ness for negotiation with the enemy's refusal. 

In consequence of the failure of their first attempt to 
intervene the American Government thought it necessary 
to exercise more restraint. In spite of this, however, 
President Wilson, before the end of the winter of 
1914-15, sent his intimate friend, Colonel Edward M. 
House, to London, Paris and Berlin, in order to ascertain 
semi-officially whether there were any possibilities of 
peace. 

Mr. House, who lived in an unpretentious abode in 
New York, occupied a peculiar and very influential po- 
sition at the White House. Bound to the President by 
intimate friendship, he has always refused to accept any 



70 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

Ministerial appointment, either at home or abroad, al- 
though he was only possessed of modest means and 
conld certainly have had any post in the Cabinet or as 
an ambassador that he had liked to choose. In this way 
he remained entirely independent, and since President 
Wilson *s entry into office, was his confidential adviser 
in domestic, and particularly in foreign politics. As such 
Colonel House had a position that is without precedent 
in American history. During his stay in London, at this 
time, he is said to have described himself to the wife of 
an English Cabinet Minister, herself not favorably dis- 
posed towards America, as the **eyes and ears of the 
President.*' I know from my own experience how thor- 
oughly and effectively he was able to inform his friend 
on the European situation, and how perfectly correctly, 
on the other hand, he interpreted Mr. Wilson's views. 

It was not easy to become more closely acquainted with 
Colonel House, whose almost proverbial economy of 
speech might be compared with the taciturnity of old 
Moltke. 

Unlike the majority of his fellow-nationals, and par- 
ticularly his immediate fellow-countrymen of the South- 
ern States, Colonel House, while possessing great per- 
sonal charm and the courtesy that is characteristic of 
the Southern States, is reserved and retiring. It took 
a considerable time before I got to know this able and 
interesting man at all intimately. I did not become in- 
timate with him until the time of the journey to Berlin 
already mentioned. Even then it was the earnest wish 
of Colonel House to obtain for his great friend the chief 
credit of being the founder of peace. Colonel House was 
particularly well fitted to be the champion of the Presi- 
dent's ideas. I have never known a more upright and 
honorable pacifist than he. He had a horror of war be- 
cause he regarded it as the contradiction of his ideals 



PRECEDING THE ^'LUSITANIA'' 71 

of tlie nobility of the human race. He often spoke with 
indignation of the people who were enriching themselves 
out of the war, and added that he would never touch the 
profits of war industry. He afterwards repeatedly told 
me that he had spoken as energetically in London against 
the blockade, which was a breach of international law, 
as against the submarine war in Berlin. Both these types 
of warfare were repugnant to the warm, sympathetic 
heart of Colonel House. He could not understand why 
women and children should die of hunger or drowning 
in order that the aims of an imperialist policy, which 
he condemned, might be attained. At the same time he 
was convinced that neither of these types could decide 
the war, but would only serve to rouse in both the com- 
batant countries a boundless hatred which would cer- 
tainly stand in the way of future co-operation in the work 
of restoring peace. In many of his remarks at that time, 
Colonel House proved to be right, since the war was 
decided mainly by the entry of America and the con- 
sequent overwhelming superiority in men, money and 
material. 

Meanwhile, as a result of the traffic in munitions, feel- 
ing in Germany had turned sharply against the United 
States. Our position with regard to this question was 
very unfavorable as we had no legal basis for complaint. 
The clause of the Hague Convention which permitted 
such traffic had been included in the second Hague Con- 
vention at our own suggestion. Nevertheless it was nat- 
ural that the one-sided support of our enemies by the 
rapidly growing American war industry roused strong 
feeling in Germany. As a result there began a contro- 
versy with the American Government similar to that 
with England during the war of 1870-71. Even in the 
United States there was a considerable minority which 
disapproved of the munitions traffic, though on moral 



72 MY THREE YEAES IN AMERICA 

rather than political or international grounds. It goes 
without saying that the agitation of this minority was 
supported in every way by the German representatives. 
There was no law in America to prohibit such support, 
which could not, moreover, be regarded as a breach of 
American neutrality. It is true that in this way a few 
Germans got themselves into an awkward position be- 
cause they were suspected of stirring up the German- 
Americans, who together with the Irish played a lead- 
ing part in the agitation against the Government In 
particular, Dr. Dernburg became unpopular in America, 
since he began to address meetings in addition to his 
journalistic work. The Washington Government re- 
garded him as the leader of the *' hyphenated Ameri- 
cans'' who were opposing the policy of the President's 
Administration, because the latter took up the strict legal 
standpoint that the traffic in munitions was permissible, 
and that it would therefore be a breach of neutrality in j 
our favor if such traffic were forbidden after the out- 
break of hostilities. President Wilson himself even had 
an idea of nationalizing the munition factories, which 
would have rendered traffic with the combatant Powers 
a breach of international law. When, however, he 
sounded Congress on this matter, it became evident that 
a majority could not be obtained for such a step. The ; 
United States had already brought forward a similar I 
proposal at the Hague Conference with the intention 
of conceding one of the chief demands of the pacifists. 
It was in wide circles in America an axiom that the muni- 
tions factories were the chief incentives to war. As dur- ; 
ing the first winter of the war there were very few such ■ 
factories in America the President's plan was not merely j 
Utopian but meant in all seriousness, in which connection 
it should be noted that American industrial circles were , 
among Mr. Wilson's bitterest opponents. If Mr. Wil- f 



PRECEDING THE ^'LUSITANIA^' 73 

son^s proposal had been known to German public opinion 
he would have been more favorably judged. 

The negotiations which I had to carry out on this ques- 
tion of the munitions traffic concerned themselves also 
with the question of the coaling of our ships of war. 
This was based on an agreement between the American 
Government and the Hamburg- Amerika line. The port 
authorities had at first shown themselves agreeable. As 
a result of the English protest the attitude of the Amer- 
ican Government became increasingly strict. With the 
actual coaling I had nothing to do. That came within 
the sphere of the Naval Attache, who, for obvious rea- 
sons connected with the conduct of the war at sea, kept 
his actions strictly secret. My first connection with this 
question was when I was instructed to hand over to the 
American Government the following memorandum, dated 
15th December, 1914: 

"According to the provisions of general international 
law, there is nothing to prevent neutral States from 
allowing contraband of war to reach the enemies of Ger- 
many through or out of their territory. This is also 
permitted by Article VII. of the Hague Convention of 
the 19th October, 1907, dealing with the rights and duties 
of neutrals in the case of land or sea war. If a -State 
uses this freedom to the advantage of our enemies, that 
State, according to a generally recognized provision of 
international law, which is confirmed in Article IX. of 
the two aforesaid Conventions, may not hamper Ger- 
many's military power with regard to contraband 
through or out of its territory. 

*'The declaration of neutrality of the United States 
takes this view fuUy into account since the furnishing 
of- contraband of war to all combatants is likewise per- 
mitted: *A11 persons may lawfully and without restric- 



74 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

tion by reason of the aforesaid state of war, mannfactnre 
and sell within the United States, arms and ammunitions 
of war and other articles ordinarily known as contraband 
of war.' 

*'This principle has been accepted in the widest sense 
by the public declaration of the American State Depart- 
ment of the 15th October, 1914, with regard to neutrality 
and contraband. 

** Nevertheless different port authorities in the United 
States have refused to supply the necessary fuel to mer- 
chant vessels in which it might be carried to German 
ships of war on the high seas or in other neutral ports. 
According to the principles of international law already 
mentioned, there is no need for a neutral State to prevent 
the transport of fuel in this way ; such a State then ought 
not to hold up merchant ships loaded in this way nor 
interfere with their freedom of movement, once it has 
countenanced the supply of contraband to the enemy. 
The only case in which it would be the duty of such a 
nation to hamper the movements of these ships in this 
one-sided fashion would be one in which such traffic 
might be turning the ports into German naval bases. 
This might perhaps have been the case if German coal 
depots had been situated at these ports, or if the ships 
used them for a regular calling port on their way to the 
German naval forces. It is, however, unnecessary to 
urge that the occasional sailing of a merchant ship with 
coal for German ships of war does not make a port into 
a base for German naval enterprises out of keeping with 
neutrality. 

**Our enemies are obtaining contraband of war from 
the United States, in particular rifles, to the value of 
many milliards of marks; this is within their rights. 
But toleration becomes serious injustice if the United 
States refuses to allow the occasional provisioning of our 



PEECEDING THE **LUSITANIA" 75 

ships of war from her ports. This would mean unequal 
treatment of the combatants and a recognized rule of 
neutrality would be infringed to our disadvantages." 

This memorandum played an important part in the 
subsequent negotiations, because Mr. Flood, the presi- 
dent of the Committee for Foreign Affairs of the Amer- 
ican House of Representatives, interpreted it as amount- 
ing to a German agreement to the supply of arms and 
ammunition to her enemies. 

In view of the situation in the United States, it was 
to our interest to leave the struggle for a prohibition 
of the munitions traffic to our American friends. The 
efforts of Senator Stone in this direction are well known, 
and have been recently quoted before the Commission of 
the German National Assembly. If a considerable num- 
ber of influential Americans took up the case for the 
prohibition there was far more hope of bringing it about 
than if it was apparent that the American Government 
were surrendering to German pressure. The pacifist Mr. 
Bryan was very sensitive on this poiat and visited me 
frequently to assert his neutrality. 

I therefore advised the Imperial Government in this 
matter not to send an official Note for the moment, so 
that the American agitation in favor of the prohibition 
of munition traffic might have full freedom for develop- 
ment. As, however, our enemies continually harked back 
to the idea that the Imperial Government did not take 
exception to the supply of munitions, I was forced, as 
the result of continual pressure from our American 
friends, to alter my attitude, and, after receiving permis- 
sion from Berlin, to hand to the Washington Government 
on 4th April, 1915, a memorandtun, of which I give the 
most important part here. 

** Further I should like to refer to the attitude of the 



76 MY THEEE YEAES IN AMERICA 

United States towards the question of the export of arms. 
The Imperial Government is convinced that the Govern- 
ment of the United States agree with them on this point, 
that questions of neutrality should be dealt with not 
merely with regard to the strict letter, but the spirit also 
must be taken into consideration, in which neutrality is 
carried through. 

**The situation arising out of the present war cannot 
be compared with that in any previous war. For this 
reason no reference to supplies of arms from Germany 
in such wars is justified; for then the question was not 
whether the combatants should be supplied with mate- 
rial but which of the competing States should secure the 
contract. 

"In the present war all the nations which possess a 
war-industry of any importance are either themselves 
involved in the war, or occupied with completing their 
own armament, and therefore have prohibited the export 
of war material. The United States are accordingly the 
only neutral State in a position to supply war-material. 
The idea of neutrality has, therefore, assumed a new 
significance, which is quite independent of the strict let- 
ter of the laws that have hitherto prevailed. On the 
other hand the United States are founding a gigantic 
war industry in the broadest sense, and they are not only 
working the existing plant but are straining every nerve 
to develop it and to erect new factories. The interna- 
tional agreement for the protection of the rights of neu- 
trals certainly arose from the necessity of protecting the 
existing branches of industry in neutral countries as 
far as possible against an encroachment upon their pre- 
rogatives. But it can in no way accord with the spirit 
of honorable neutrality, if advantage is taken of such 
international agreements to found a new industry in a 
neutral State, such as appears in the development in the 



PRECEDING THE **LUSITANIA" 77 

United States of an arms-industry, the output of which 
can, in view of the existing situation, be solely to the 
advantage of the combatant powers, 

''This industry is at present only delivering its wares 
to the enemies of Germany. The readiness, in theory, 
to do the same for Germany, even if the transport were 
possible, does not alter the case. If it is the desire of 
the American people to maintain an honorable neutral- 
ity, the United States will find the means to stop this 
one-sided traffic in arms, or at least to use it for the pur- 
pose of protecting legitimate commerce with Germany, 
particularly in respect of foodstuffs. This conception 
of neutrality should appeal all the more to the United 
States in view of the fact that they have allowed them- 
selves to be influenced by the same standpoint in their 
policy in regard to Mexico. On the 4th February, 1914, 
President Wilson, according to a statement of a member 
of Congress on 30th December, 1914, before the commis- 
sion for foreign affairs with regard to the withdrawal 
of the prohibition of the export of arms to Mexico, said : 
'We shall be observing true neutrality by taking into 
consideration the accompanying circumstances of the 
case. ... He then took up the following point of view : 
'Carranza, in contrast to Huerta, has no ports at his 
disposal for the importation of war-material, so in his 
case we are bound, as a State, to treat Carranza and 
Huerta alike, if we are to be true to the real spirit of 
neutrality and not mere paper neutrality. ' 

"This point of view, applied to the present case, in- 
dicates prohibition of the export of arms." 

Although during the war all Notes were at once made 
public, the American Government were very annoyed at 
my publishing this memorandum, which in any case 
would have met with no success. The agitation for the 
prohibition of the export of arms and munitions was 



78 MY THEEE YEARS IN AMERICA 

"-V ..-- 
vigorously pressed, and in spite of the *^Lusitania inci- 
dent'* never completely subsided. But the American 
Government held to their point of view, which they ex- 
plained to me on the 21st April, as follows: 

**In the third place, I note with sincere regret that, in 
discussing the sale and exportation of arms by citizens 
of the United States to the enemies of Germany, Your 
Excellency seems to be under the impression that it was 
within the choice of the Government of the United States, 
notwithstanding its professed neutrality and its diligent 
efforts to maintain it in other particulars, to inhibit this 
trade, and that its failure to do so manifested an unfair 
attitude toward Germany. This Government holds, as I 
believe Your Excellency is aware, and as it is constrained 
to hold in view of the present indisputable doctrines of 
accepted international law, that any change in its own 
laws of neutrality during the progress of a war which 
would affect unequally the relations of the United States 
with the nations at war would be an unjustifiable de- 
parture from the principle of strict neutrality by which it 
has consistently sought to direct its actions, and I re- 
spectfully submit that none of the circumstances urged 
in Your Excellency's memorandum alters the principle 
involved. The placing of an embargo on the trade in 
arms at the present time would constitute such a change 
and be a direct violation of the neutrality of the United 
States. It will, I feel assured, be clear to Your Excel- 
lency that, holding this view and considering itself in 
honor bound by it, it is out of the question for this Gov- 
ernment to consider such a course.'* 

In the meantime, Colonel House returned from Europe 
without having met with any success, but he had opened 
useful personal relations. The Governments of all the 
combatant Powers then held the opinion that the time 
had not yet come when they could welcome the mediation 



PRECEDING THE ^'LUSITANIA'' 79 

of President Wilson. Colonel House, however, did not 
allow the lack of success of his first mission to deter him 
from further efforts, and remained to the last the keenest 
supporter of American mediation. Since this journey 
Colonel House and I became on very friendly and inti- 
mate terms, which should have helped to bring about such 
a peaces 



CHAPTER IV: 

ECONOMIC QUESTIONS 

In the preceding chapter I mentioned that Dr. Dern- 
bnrg*s plan for raising a loan in the United States had 
failed. Later the direction of all onr economic and finan- 
cial affairs passed into the hands of Geheimrat Albert. 
His original task was to organize in New York extensive 
shipments of foodstuffs, particular wheat and fats, which 
were to be exported through the New York office of the 
Hamburg- Amerika line. This depended, in the first place, 
on the possibility of raising the necessary funds, and in 
the second, on the possibility that England, out of regard 
for the neutrals, and particularly the United States, 
would be compelled to abide by the codified principles of 
international law. Neither of these premises materialized. 

As the necessary means for carrying through the 
scheme could not be raised it might have been possible 
to finance it if the Government had taken over the not 
inconsiderable funds of the German banks and the great 
industrial enterprises, e.g., the chemical factories in the 
United States, and used them for the shipments. The 
suggestions we made to this effect were not answered 
until the end of August, when we arrived in New York 
and had already lost many weeks in trying to negotiate 
the loan. One organ, which immediately after the war 
had taken up these questions on its own initiative, failed, 
and so nothing was done in the whole wide sphere of 
credit, supply of raw materials and foodstuffs and ship- 
ping until my arrival with the other gentlemen, so that 

80 



ECONOMIC QUESTIONS 81 

the most favorable opportunity was lost. Remittances 
from Germany did not arrive until long afterwards, and 
then only to a very modest extent. Consequently the 
whole economic scheme was considerably narrowed and 
hampered from the beginning. 

The second assumption, that the United States, in con- 
sideration of her great commercial connections with Ger- 
many, would maintain her rights as a neutral State to 
unrestricted sea trade within the provisions of interna- 
tional law, proved to be unfounded. The United States, 
at any rate according to the view of some very distin- 
guished Americans, as, for example, in the journal New 
Republic^ violated the spirit of neutrality when she al- 
lowed commerce of the neutrals one with another to be 
strangled by England. To the interest in traffic with the 
neutral States, and indirectly with Germany, was opposed 
the interest in the still greater trade with our enemies, 
to which was added, and indeed to a rapidly increasing 
extent, the supply of war material. The United States 
did not realize the extent of their economic power in 
respect of Englandj as the inexperienced, newly-ap- 
pointed Democratic Government had no statistics to 
which to refer, and from a military point of view were 
defenceless for want of an army or fleet. So England 
was able, slowly and cautiously, but surely, to cut off the 
Central Powers from the American market. In view of 
this state of things the important thing was to pass aU 
shipments off as neutral. The exporter had to be an 
American or a subject of neutral Europe. The financing 
had also to be European, at any rate outwardly. The 
destination could only be a port in Holland, Scandinavia, 
Spain or — at that time — Italy. Consequently it was not 
long before the consignments could no longer be made 
through the New York representative of the Hamburg- 
Amerika line, but were taken in hand by Herr Albert 



82 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

Mmself, who merely availed himself of the professional 
advice of the Hamburg- Amerika line. 

All decisions therefore could emanate from the same 
source, which prevented loss of time, especially as the 
financial responsibility also rested with Herr Albert. 
The most important thing, however, was that attention 
was distracted from the shipping, as for a long time Herr 
Albert remained unknown, whereas the Hamburg- Amer- 
ika line from the first was kept under the closest obser- 
vation by England. On the other hand, this arrangement 
exposed the cargoes to condemnation by the English prize 
courts as they were now State-owned. But Herr Albert 
could assume — and, as it turned out, rightly — that so 
long as the English respected neutral property, it would 
be difficult as a rule to trace the shipments back to him. 
Otherwise there would have been no security for a Ger- 
man private undertaking. 

In carrying out his task, Herr Albert at first shipped 
the purchased goods by the usual lines (Scandinavia- 
American line). Soon, however, difficulties arose, because 
these lines, in order to avoid being held up in English 
ports, would no longer accept cargoes which were in- 
tended, if possible, for Germany, so a special line was 
formed sailing under the American flag. The direction 
of this line was in the hands of an American firm who 
represented themselves as the owners, whereas, in real- 
ity, the ships were chartered by Herr Albert. As, at 
the beginning of the war, the American flag was more 
respected by the English than those of the other neu- 
trals, a number of these ships got through without much 
delay. Later this method of shipping also became im- 
possible. Then single ships were chartered — ^mostly un- 
der the American flag — and when the owners, from fear 
of loss, refused the charter, or when outrageous condi- 



ECONOMIC QUESTIONS 83 

tions made chartering impossible, they were bought out- 
right. The ships were consigned as blockade runners to a 
neutral port, and later either made direct for Germany or 
were taken in by a German ship of war. As the most im- 
portant examples I may mention the Eir, Maumee, Win- 
neconne, Duneyre, Andrew, Welch and Prince Waldemar. 

With the tightening up of the English measures and 
blockade these undertakings became increasingly difficult, 
and finally had to be abandoned. Moreover the cost and 
the trouble of preparation grew out of all proportion 
to the results. Every individual shipment had to be pre- 
pared long beforehand. Out of ten attempts often only 
one would succeed. Very often an attempt which had 
cost weeks of work would fall through at the last moment 
owing to the refusal of credit by the banks, particularly 
when the political position was strained, or to an indis- 
cretion, or English watchfulness, or difficulties with the 
American port authorities. 

The English surveillance had assumed dimensions that 
would not have been possible without the tacit conni- 
vance, which at times became active support, of the Amer- 
ican authorities. Not only did the English consuls de- 
mand that in each individual case the bills of lading 
should be submitted to them, but in addition to this an 
efficient surveillance and spy service was organized, 
partly by American detective bureaus and partly by a 
separate and wide-reaching service. The English had 
confidential agents in all the shipping offices, whose serv- 
ices had for the most part been acquired by bribery. At 
various times attempts were made to break into Herr 
Albert's office, to learn the combination for opening his 
safe, to get hold of papers through the charwomen and 
other employees, and even to rob him personally of pa- 
pers. The control of the American port authorities was 
within the letter of the law, but in practice it worked 



84 MY THEEE YEARS IN AMEEICA 

very unfavorably to ns. The regulation was that ship 
and cargo mnst be consigned to a definite port. This 
regulation was drawn up purely for purposes of statis- 
tics, and consequently no importance was attached to it 
before the war. As a rule the bills of lading were filled 
in by subordinate employees of the exporter. Soon after 
the outbreak of the war a special *' neutrality squad** 
was attached to the ** Collector of the Port of New York" 
whose duty it was to maintain strict neutrality by seeing 
that the said laws were properly observed. This led, in 
cases where there was a suspicion that the cargo was not 
intended for the given port of destination, but for Grer- 
many, to an exhaustive inquiry. This measure could not 
fail to act as a deterrent, and even Herr Albert was 
seriously hampered in his enterprises. The whole sys- 
tem amounted to a complement of the English blockade. 
When Herr Albert finally succeeded in coming to an 
agreement with the Customs authorities in this matter 
a great number of opportunities had been missed and 
the shipments had been made practically impossible by 
the tightening of the English blockade. 

There was no question of entrusting the shipping to 
American exporters who had had long experience of 
German trade. Herr Albert from the first considered 
it advisable to interfere as little as possible with the 
existing business relations between the two countries, and 
he left it to the firms trading with Germany to carry 
through their commissions as best they could. This 
method of supplying Germany with food, however, com- 
pletely failed. The fault also lies partly with the im- 
porters in Germany. In these circles it was for a long 
time hoped, but in vain, to obtain consignments from 
American firms. Further, they clung too long to the busi- 
ness methods of peace, demanded estimates, bargained 
about prices, and, most important of all, did not realize 



ECONOMIC QUESTIONS 85 

that the risk to the exporter as a result of the English 
blockade made special compensation or payment neces- 
sary. In consequence the valuable time at the beginning 
of the war was lost. Very soon, however, the American 
exporters withdrew completely, because those who had 
had previous business relations with Germany were 
known to the English, and so were suspected and finally 
placed on the black list. A shipment by one of these 
firms would then at once have been marked down as des- 
tined for Germany, and would have run risk of capture. 
Herr Albert, therefore, made use of special agencies. 
At first, in addition to employing Danish firms, he 
founded several new American export companies. These 
new organizations were of course only available for a 
short time, and, as soon as they came under English sus- 
picion and were consequently rendered useless, had to be 
replaced by others. 

The reproach that has been made from time to time 
that these enterprises were confined to a small clique 
of confidential persons and firms seems to be unjustified 
by the facts. The circumstances demanded the closest 
possible secrecy, for otherwise the origin and destination 
of the cargoes would have been discovered by the Eng- 
lish secret service before they left New York. This would 
have involved the complete loss of the cargo as a result 
of the English embargo. That firms already engaged, 
even though for a short time, in German- American com- 
merce could not be considered is obvious. Not only were 
they known to the English, but in some cases their Ger- 
man names already laid them open to suspicion. Ac- 
cordingly, their occasional requests that they should carry 
through enterprises of this nature were consistently re- 
fused. This criticism is only made by a small circle of 
German-American firms grouped round the German 
Union and the so-called German- American Chamber of 



86 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

Commerce, and originated in an anxiety, understandable 
but based on an inadequate knowledge of the facts, to 
participate in the undertakings. 

Although the export of raw material did not actually 
come within the scope of Herr Albert 's original commis- 
sion, it often became necessary, at special request or 
from the nature of the case, to lend a helping hand in 
the export of raw material, particularly wool and cotton. 
In this way, in the autumn of 1914, the American steamer 
Luckenhach was successfully run through direct to Ger^ 
many with several million pounds of wool on boards 
With regard to cotton, Herr Albert, also in the autumn 
of 1914, by negotiations which he carried on through me 
with the State Department and the Foreign Trade Ad- 
viser, succeeded in obtaining English recognition that 
cotton should not be regarded as contraband of war.' 
Even after this recognition, England made the export of 
cotton practically impossible by intimidating the cotton 
exporters in every possible way, among others by spread- 
ing the rumor that the ships would be captured never- 
theless, and by prohibiting English insurance companies 
from underwriting such cargoes. Here Herr Albert in- 
tervened by effecting the insurance through German 
insurance companies, and proved by the loading and arm- 
ing of cotton ships, e.g., the American ship Carolyn, that 
the threat of capture was not to be taken seriously but 
was simply an attempt at intimidation on the part of the 
English. In this way, confidence was so far restored that 
in the autumn of 1914 and the begirming of 1915 a large 
number of other firms joined in the business. When, 
later, cotton was made unconditional contraband of war, 
Herr Albert made attempts to fit out blockade runners 
— ^which ended with the arrival at a German port of the 
Eir with 10,000 bales of cotton. 

The various attempts to export copper, rubber and 



ECONOMIC QUESTIONS 87 

other raw materials which were unconditional contra- 
band, apart from the cases already mentioned of wool 
and cotton, proved impossible, in spite of repeated, ex- 
tensive and very cautions preparation. A very ambitious 
scheme of this kind with the S.S. Atlantic had to be 
abandoned at the last moment owing to difficulties with 
the port authorities. 

All these enterprises, the purchase, sale and shipment 
of foodstuffs and raw material, the chartering, buying 
and selling of ships, the founding of shipping lines, new 
companies, etc., as well as the financial business had their 
political as well as their purely business side. They were 
either intended to serve as precedents in the definite 
phases of development of international maritime law or 
to exert influence on American public opinion from an 
economic point of view. 

When the result of these shipping enterprises is 
weighed after the event, it will be seen that they did not 
play a decisive part in the supply of Germany with food- 
stuffs and raw material. Germany would during the first 
year of war have managed to get along even without the 
few hxmdred thousand tons which in this way were 
brought in via neutral countries. Nevertheless, in con- 
junction with the imports from neutral countries, they 
several times served to relieve the situation. Very im- 
portant in this respect was the successful struggle for 
the free import of cotton at the end of 1914 and the be- 
ginning of 1915, quite apart from our own shipments. 
Without this we should have come to an end of our sup- 
plies considerably earlier. 

The question of war and marine insurance very soon 
called for particular attention to the interests of our own 
shipping. The American insurance market was domi- 
nated by the English companies. The latter not only 
conducted about two-thirds of the whole insurance busi- 



88 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

ness of the country, but also exerted a decisive influence 
on the American companies. In addition to this, they 
held an authoritative position as holding a share of the 
capital. England very soon gave instructions that Eng- 
lish insurance companies should not participate in any 
business in which German interests were in any way in- 
volved. Consequently in making shipments to neutral 
countries, we were faced with great difficulties, for the 
power of the German insurance companies and the few 
American companies that were independent of England 
did not suffice. 

The two most important German companies with 
branches in New York, the NorddeutscJie Versicherwigs- 
gesellschaft and the Mannheimer VersicJierungsgesell- 
schaft, which was excellently, actively, and very loyally 
represented in New York by the firm F, Hermann & Co., 
at first offered an insurance limit of about 75,000 dol- 
lars, that is 150,000 dollars together, which in any case 
was insufficient. At first they had no authority to under- 
take war insurance. 

The economic importance of the insurance question is 
obvious on the face of it. No marine insurance was pos- 
sible without war insurance. In particular the American 
Government bureau for war insurance made the cover- 
ing of the marine insurance an essential condition. This 
example was followed by all the American insurance 
companies. A satisfactory settlement of the insurance 
— ^both war and marine — on the other hand was a neces- 
sary condition for the financing of the shipments. The 
shippers only obtained credit from the bank on handing 
over the insurance policies. In addition to this it came 
about later that the few American shipping lines which 
remained independent of England, and so were on the 
black list, were no longer in a position to cover the **HuU 
Insurance,'' i.e., the insurance of the ship herself, and 



ECONOMIC QUESTIONS 89 

therefore the solution of the insurance question became 
a necessary condition for obtaining freight space. Here 
too, then, it was to our interest to come to the rescue, 
because otherwise the lines in question would have been 
forced to come to an understanding with the English 
firms, which would have placed their tonnage at the serv- 
ice of our enemies. 

To begin with, Herr Albert himself undertook the in- 
surance in cases of exceptional importance. It was at 
most a question of a small balance, by the furnishing of 
which an immediate risk or a dangerous delay in ship- 
ment was avoided. Our chief efforts were directed 
towards raising the insurance limit of the German com- 
panies. As a result a pool of German insurance com- 
panies was formed whose limit for marine and war 
insurance was gradually raised more and more. In this 
way it was possible to carry through a number of shij)- 
ments to European countries, to keep a not inconsider- 
able tonnage — about 30,000 tons — out of the hands of the 
Allies, as well as to enable a number of important Ger- 
man firms in South America to carry on extensive trade 
between North and South America, and so to maintain 
their business activity in spite of the measures adopted 
by the English. 

About our propaganda I have already spoken in detail 
in the second chapter. It may be mentioned again here 
that the centre of gravity of our active propaganda lay 
in the economic question, which was to a certain extent 
the key to the understanding of our American policy 
during the war. 

Though the vast and rapid development of American 
export trade through the trade in war material, and the 
change in position from debtor to creditor, was only 
efiPected gradually, and the loss of the German market 
at first made itself adversely felt both actively and pas- 



90 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

sively, the size of the contracts from the Allies and the 
consequent profits at once acted like a narcotic on public 
opinion. This was all the more the case as a result of 
the extraordinarily skilful way in which the English 
handled the question. They always proceeded cautiously 
and gradually. For instance, they at first accepted the 
Declaration of London in principle, but made several 
alterations which to the public, who did not realize the 
extent of their effect, seemed unimportant and which yet 
formed the basis for the gradual throwing overboard 
of the Declaration of London. After public opinion had 
grown accustomed to the English encroachments and the 
interests affected had been pacified by the Allied con- 
tracts, the blockade was introduced after careful prep- 
aration in the Press; it was not at first described as a 
blockade, but was gradually and systematically tightened. 
Among other things, the export of cotton to Germany 
was expressly agreed to at the end of 1914, but was 
afterwards hampered in practice by various measures, 
as, for example, the holding up of individual ships, and 
the refusal of marine insurance, and finally brought to an 
end by the declaration of cotton as unconditional con- 
traband. It is characteristic that the declaration of cot- 
ton as unconditional contraband was made public on the 
very day on which the whole American Press was in a 
state of great excitement over the Arabic case, so that 
this comparatively unimportant incident filled the front 
pages and leading articles of the newspapers, while the 
extremely important economic measure was published in 
a place where it would hardly be noticed. 

We made vigorous efforts to oppose this English step. 
We got into touch with the importers of German goods, 
who formed an association and forwarded a protest to 
Washington. Without attracting attention, we gave the 
association the assistance of a firm of solicitors, whose 



ECONOMIC QUESTIONS 91 

services were at our disposal, as legal advisers. Eela- 
tions were entered into with the cotton interest, which, 
through the political pressure of the Southern States, 
exerted great influence on public opinion and in Congress. 
Various projects for buying cotton on a large scale for 
Germany were considered, discussed with the cotton in- 
terest and tested by small purchases. In the same way 
negotiations were entered upon with the great meat com- 
panies, the copper interest and others by systematic ex- 
planation and emphasis of the interests with regard to 
the German market. The result, partly for the reasons 
given, partly owing to the political development of the 
general relations between Germany and the United 
States, was small. This, however, can hardly be taken 
as an argument against the expediency of the steps taken 
as at that time. No one could foresee the later develop- 
ment of the war and particularly the length of time it 
was going to last; whereas had the war been shorter 
there is no doubt that these measures would have at- 
tained their object. 

An important part of the economic propaganda was 
the institution of the so-called ** Issues," i.e., the attempt 
by carefully construing individual incidents to make clear 
to public opinion the fundamental injustice of the Eng- 
lish encroachments and their far-reaching consequences 
in practice. The most important case in this direction 
is that of the Wilhelmina, According to the prevailing 
principles of international law, foodstuffs were only con- 
ditional contraband. They might be imported into Ger- 
many if they were intended for the exclusive use of the 
civil population. As, however, England succeeded in 
restraining the exporters from any attempt to consign 
foodstuffs to Germany, especially as in view of the enor- 
mous supplies that were being forwarded to our enemies 
they had little interest in such shipment, the question 



92 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

never reached a clear issue. Herr Albert therefore in- 
duced an American firm to sMp foodstuffs for the civil 
population of Germany on the American steamer Wil- 
helmina, bound for Hamburg, by himself undertaking 
the whole risk from behind the scenes. This was arranged 
in such a way as to preserve in appearance the good faith 
of the American firm, and to make the shipment seem 
purely American in the eyes of the American Govern- 
ment and the English. 

The Wilhelmina was taken by the English into Fal- 
mouth and detained on the grounds that Hamburg was 
a fortified town, and that, according to the measures 
adopted by Germany for supplying the civil population 
with food — requisitioning, centralization of distribution, 
etc. — there was no longer any distinction between the 
supply of the military and the civil population. While 
the negotiations on this question were still in the air, 
and seemed to be progressing favorably for us, Eng- 
land resorted to a general blockade. Consequently the 
case lost its interest, both practical and as a question of 
principle, especially as England declared her readiness 
to pay for the goods at Hamburg prices. As, on the other 
hand, insistence on the purely theoretical claims would 
give rise to the danger that the English or American 
secret service might in the end succeed in proving the 
German origin of the undertaking, Herr Albert accepted 
the proffered payment of the English Government, and 
received as compensation a sum which covered all the 
expenses. 

Such incidents could have been construed in several 
ways. One of the most important, and also the most 
popular, was the shipment of cotton to Germany for the 
civilian population between the autumn of 1915 and the 
middle of 1916. The declaration of cotton as absolute 
contraband was at first only on paper, as no American 



ECONOMIC QUESTIONS 93 

exporters had hitherto ventured to ship cotton. Conse- 
quently, detailed discussions took place as to whether 
such an undertaking should be entered upon in the full 
light of publicity. Great excitement among the cotton 
growers proved the extremely keen and widespread in- 
terest. England would have been forced to act on her 
declaration at a time when the American Government 
could not afford to ignore the interests of the cotton 
industry, with its influence on domestic politics. The 
full effect of the meagreness of the crops, and on the 
other hand the increase of consumption in the United 
States, and consequent rise in price, was not yet realized 
by the public, nor even in cotton circles. The cotton 
industry viewed with anxiety the increased difficulty of 
finding a market, and were anxious for a reopening of 
that of the Central Powers. 

Certainly a shipment of cotton to Germany would only 
have been justified in conjunction with comprehensive 
other measures, particularly purchases on the American 
cotton market on German account. As a result of detailed 
discussion with American interested parties, who repeat- 
edly urged us to such a step, we forwarded proposals to 
Berlin on these lines. Their general purport was that 
about a million bales of cotton should be bought outright 
on behalf of Germany, and that in addition options should 
be secured on a further million or two million bales on 
the understanding that the taking up of the options should 
be dependent on the possibility of shipment to Germany. 
On the strength of these measures the shipment of one 
big consignment should have been undertaken. The plan 
had sound prospects of success. In any case there would 
have been no risk worth mentioning, as, to the initiated, 
there was no doubt as to the rise of prices. In view of 
the new bank legislation (Federal Keserve Act), no in- 
superable difficulties would have stood in the way of 



94 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

financing the shipment. The indirect political pressure 
on the American Government and public opinion, with 
its reaction on England, would have been considerable. 

Unfortunately the plan was frustrated by the taking 
up of the matter in America direct from Germany, with- 
out regard to the shipment difficulty, without going into 
the question of the options and without knowledge of the 
political or economic situation. Bremen actually placed 
a contract in New York for one million bales to be de- 
livered in Bremen at a fixed price. It was, however, 
clear from the first to anyone acquainted with the cir- 
cunastances that such a step was bound to be futile. The 
whole thing turned on the question of shipping. The 
American Press, again under English influence, at once 
pointed the finger of scorn, saying that the contract was 
not meant seriously, but was merely a piece of bluff for 
purposes of German propaganda. 

After this had brought about the collapse of the more 
ambitious plan, the shipment of a single cargo still con- 
tinued to be discussed and detailed preparations were 
made. The idea had, however, to be abandoned, because 
the difficulties of passing off the shipment as a purely 
American enterprise were practically insuperable with- 
out the background of great economic measures, which 
placed the cost out of all proportion to the chances 
of success. The whole cost, as in the ^^WilJielmina case'' 
would have to be guaranteed from Germany, and would 
of course have been lost if the English secret service 
succeeded in establishing the German connection. 

The propaganda for preventing and hampering the 
supply of war material to our enemies turned at first on 
the question of principle whether such supplies were rec- 
oncilable with neutrality. The attempt was made — as has 
been briefly mentioned already — ^with the special support 
of the German-American circles, to impress upon the 



ECONOMIC QUESTIONS 95 

American people the immorality and essentially imneu- 
tral nature of the supplies, especially in view of the vast 
scale they were assuming. It is well known that these 
attempts, which extended to a strictly legal exertion of 
influence on Congress, failed. The lack of unity and 
limited political experience of the German-Americans 
contributed to this result, but the economic interest of 
the nation in the supplies, in which the whole American 
Administration and industry were finally concerned, 
formed the decisive factor. 

Attempts too were very soon made to hamper the sup- 
plies in a practical way. In August, 1914, it might per- 
haps have been possible to buy up the Bethlehem Steel 
Works, if the outlay of the necessary capital had been 
promptly decided upon. At that time the Americans 
themselves did not foresee what a gigantic proportion 
these supplies were to assume. The purchase of these 
works would have deprived the whole munition industry 
of its main support. Similar proposals have repeatedly 
been worked out by us, as, for example, the proposal to 
amalgamate the whole shrapnel industry of the United 
States. The fear, well grounded in itself, that such an 
arrangement was scarcely within the bounds of practical 
politics and could have been got round, could be ignored. 
In case of disputes as to the validity of such a step we 
should have gained more by the publicity than we stood 
to lose. At that time, however, the Berlin Government 
took up a negative attitude, and did not interest itself 
in the question until the beginning of 1915, when the vast 
supplies of material from America began to make them- 
selves felt and the concentration of German industry on 
the production of munitions was not yet complete. The 
Military Attache received instructions to do everything 
possible to hamper the fulfilment of the great outstand- 
ing French and Eussian contracts for shrapnel, which 



96 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

was at tliat time still the chief shell nsed by the Allies. 
This was done successfully, if on a small scale, by found- 
ing an undertaking of our own, called the Bridgeport 
Projectile Company, and entering into contracts to esr 
tablish the most important machinery for the manufac- 
ture of powder and shrapnel. Through this company, 
which originally passed as entirely American, the special 
machiaery required for the manufacture of shrapnel was 
bought on a scale which seriously affected the American 
output, and in particular hindered the acceptance and 
carrying through of further contracts from the Allies 
for a considerable time. Herr Albert assisted and ad- 
vised the Military Attache in making these contracts, 
arranged the financing of the enterprise later on, and 
worked at its development after Herr von Papen's de- 
parture. 

Still more successful were the efforts to remove from 
the market the surplus benzol, which is the raw product 
for the production of picric acid. The benzol was bought 
up by a company specially formed for the purpose, who 
sent it to a chemical works under German management 
to be manufactured into salicylic preparations. These 
products were sold for the most part for the American 
market, and also, with the approval of the Ministry for 
War, exported to neutral countries. The undertaking 
was eventually closed down after making considerable 
profits for the Imperial Treasury. In the same way, for 
some time, aU the bromine coming on to the market, the 
products of which were used to manufacture and increase 
the density of gas, were bought up. 

To these efforts to hamper and delay the supply of 
war material belonged also the much-discussed agree- 
ment with the Bosch Magneto Company, the American 
branch of the Stuttgart firm. The substance of the ar- 
rangement was that this company, which was imder Ger- 



ECONOMIC QUESTIONS 97 

man direction, shonld not inunediately refuse Allied 
contracts for fuses, but should appear to accept them 
and delay their fulfilment, and, to complete the decep- 
tion, even occasionally deliver small quantities, and final- 
ly, at the last moment, refuse to complete the contract. 
This procedure was attacked at the time by a German- 
American journalist, von Skal. On the strength of short 
notices which Herr von Skal published in the German 
PresSj in ignorance of the real state of the case, public 
opinion in Germany turned against the parent firm, the 
Bosch works in Stuttgart. The question then became the 
subject of my reports, and was submitted to an inquiry 
by the home authorities and the courts. I still hold to 
my opinion that the whole affair was unnecessarily ex- 
aggerated by German public opinion, and that the de- 
tailed investigation into its legality by the home author- 
ities and courts was unnecessary, as the managing 
director of the American branch and the directors of the 
German company had acted in perfect good faith in an 
attempt to advance the interests of the German cause. 
It was merely a question of the result. If their policy 
of procrastination had succeeded in delaying the con- 
tracts and had kept our enemies for a considerable time 
from building their own factory for fuses and aeroplane 
magnetoes, their action would have been justified ; in the 
contrary event it would have been vain, but blameless 
from a moral and legal point of view. The fact that at 
the beginning the English relied on the possibility of the 
production and supply of such fuses from America, and 
only later gradually came to a decision to build and fit 
out their own factories, consequently under much more 
difficult circumstances, offered, an opening for this pro- 
cedure. That difficulties were caused to the enemy in 
this respect until quite recently is unjnistakably shown 
by the messages that reached America from England. 



98 MY THEEE YEARS IN AMERICA 

As a result of the extensive purchases of the Allies, 
there came about a gradual change in the attitude of the 
American Government to the question of issuing loans. 
At the end of March, 1915, we succeeded, acting on in- 
structions from Berlin, in raising a small loan. It in- 
volved an unusual amount of trouble. The American 
financial world was already completely dominated by the 
Morgan trust. This domination resulted from the fact 
that the Allied commissions were concentrated in English 
hands and were placed by England in the hands of J. P. 
Morgan & Co., who acted as the agents of the English 
Government. As these commissions finally included 
every sphere of economic life, all the great American 
banks and bankers were called upon, and so drawn into 
the Morgan circle. The result was that no big firm could 
be induced to undertake a German loan. However, sev- 
eral trust companies of repute, who already had or 
wished to have business relations with Germany, de- 
clared their readiness to become partners in a syndicate 
if we succeeded in finding a "Syndicate Manager." A 
certain New York firm which afterwards made a name 
for itself, but at that time was comparatively unknown, 
seemed suited for this position. When all the prepara- 
tions and preliminary agreements had been carried 
through, the trust companies, under the pressure of the 
Morgan influence, declared that their names must not be 
associated with the syndicate. Meanwhile the matter 
had gone so far that withdrawal would have meant a 
moral surrender which would have been dangerous for 
our credit. Consequently, we had to make up our minds 
to negotiate the loan under the signature of this one firm, 
which was naturally undesirable for the general interest. 

Looking back, I am of the opinion that we should have 
done better not to consider a loan in the United States, 
but to remit the necessary funds from Berlin. This had 



ECONOMIC QUESTIONS 99 

to be done later to redeem the loan, and at a time when 
the rate of exchange was much more unfavorable. When 
the loan was raised we had certainly no idea that it would 
have to be redeemed during the war, as we had reckoned 
on a shorter duration of hostilities. On the other hand 
there is no truth in the statement that this loan in some 
way cleared the way for further Allied loans. These 
loans, which were the natural result of the great supplies 
of material to the Allies, would have come in any case. 
We did, however, deprive ourselves by this loan of an 
argument to prove the defective neutrality of the United 
States. 

In 1916 we succeeded in getting hold of some five mil- 
lions in Treasury notes without formal loan negotiations. 

Another economic question which occupied my atten- 
tion was connected with the export of German dye-stuffs 
to the United States. In Berlin it was held that German 
dye-stuffs should be withheld from the United States as 
a lever for inducing them to protest against the English 
blockade, and possibly have it raised. The same point 
of view was adopted with regard to other goods which 
were necessities for the United States, as, for example, 
potassic salt, sugar beetroot seed and other commodities. 
A change of view did not occur until the spring of 1916 
at my suggestion. It is my belief that the withholding 
of these goods proved a serious mistake. The political 
aim of bringing pressure to bear on England with a view 
to the raising of the blockade was not realized. The 
American industry partly got over the difficulty by ob- 
taining dye-stuffs in other ways — importation of Ger- 
man dyes from China, where they had been systemati- 
cally bought, smuggling of German dyes via neutral coun- 
tries, importation of Swiss dyes, introduction of natural 



100 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

dyes and dye-snbstitutes — ^but more especially by the 
foundation of a dye industry of their own. In the case 
of potash, they had simply to do with what little they 
could get; which was all the easier as the American 
manure manufacturers and dealers had already in their 
own interests begun a systematic propaganda to prove 
that potash was not indispensable, but could be replaced 
by their own products. It might be observed as a gen- 
eralization that ultimately no individual product has 
proved to be really indispensable. The result of holding 
back our exports was therefore simply — apart from a 
quite unnecessary straining of political relations, since 
England succeeded in diverting all the odium on to us — 
a scarcity of important German commodities in the 
United States and the substitution of their own pro- 
duction. 

In negotiating the German loan, the chief difficulty was 
that grasping speculators got hold of the market, dis- 
credited the war loan by underbidding one another and 
in part by direct dishonorable dealing, and also that 
owing to the impossibility of producing ready money, 
interest in the war loan flagged. Early on I suggested 
the issue of biUs ad interim. The scheme, however, failed, 
because the representative of the Deutsche Bank opposed 
it, and because the natural opposition of two great insti- 
tutions, who were making a profitable business out of 
the sale of war loans and the speculations on the value 
of the mark, which were closely connected with it, could 
not be overcome. I am still of the opinion that with 
well-timed organization the sum raised by the war loan 
could have been increased by several millions. 



CHAPTER V 
THE SO-CALLED GERMAN CONSPIRACIES 

Immediately after the ontbreak of war, onr crnisers in 
foreign waters were cut off from their base of opera- 
tions, and the German Reservists in North and South 
America were prevented from returning home owing to 
the British Command of the Sea. Measures to assist 
them were therefore taken by the German Nationals and 
German Americans in the United States, which although 
not in themselves aimed at the Union, certainly trans- 
gressed its laws. Moreover during the year 1915 and 
succeeding years, several deeds of violence against the 
enemies of Germany, or preparations for such deeds, 
were discovered, involving more or less serious offences 
against the laws of America. Both kinds of activity, 
comprised under the suggestive term "German Conspir- 
acies*' or ''German Plots against American Neutrality," 
were skilfully used by our enemies to discredit us, and 
these agitations did considerable harm to the German 
cause, besides being a serious obstacle in the way of my 
policy. 

Among the measures for assisting the German fleet may 
be mentioned, in the first place, the case of the Hamburg- 
Amerika Line, which has already been noticed. The New 
York branch, acting in accordance with the instructions 
of their head offices in Hamburg, dispatched about a 
dozen chartered vessels, laden with coal and provisions, 
to the squadron of German cruisers and auxiliary cruis- 
ers then on the high seas. This cargo was declared in 

101 



102 MY THREE YEAES IN AMERICA 

the ships' clearing papers to be consigned to ports be- 
yond the area of open sea where the German cruisers 
were known to be. When it came out later that the New 
York branch of the Hamburg-Amerika Line had made 
use of this device for coaling German men-of-war, the 
chief officials were brought up on the charge of deliber- 
ately making false declarations in their clearing papers, 
and their chief, Dr. Biinz, a man of the highest character, 
with three of his subordinates, was condemned, in De- 
cember, 1915, to eighteen months' imprisonment in the 
first instance. 

The severity of the penalty thus inflicted on a man so 
universally respected, who had, during his long tenure of 
the office of Consul-General in Chicago and New York, 
gained the warm affection of many Americans, was re- 
garded merely as a manifestatoin for the benefit of the 
outside world of the American Government's intention 
to preserve a strict neutrality. No one supposed that the 
aged Dr. Biinz would really have to undergo his sentence, 
and as a matter of fact he remained at liberty for some 
time even after America's declaration of war. In the 
summer of 1917 a violent press-campaign broke out 
against him, whereupon, despite his ill health, he offered 
of his own accord to serve his sentence and was removed 
to the State prison at Atlanta, where he died in 1918. 
All honor to his memory! 

Considering that his offence was nothing more than a 
technical violation of the letter of the American Cus- 
toms regulations and was actuated by no base motive, 
nor by liostility to the United States, the punishment in- 
flicted was excessively harsh. It was pleaded on his be- 
half in the speech for the defence that America during 
the war against Spain had acted in exactly the same way, 
when ships were dispatched from the neutral harbor of 
Ilong Kong to coal Admiral Dewey's fleet before Manila 



THE GERMAN CONSPIRACIES 103 

and their cargo was declared as being scrap-iron con- 
signed to Macao. An indication of the state of public 
opinion in the Eastern States of America at the end of 
1915 may be found in the fact that the heavy sentence 
on this ** German Conspirator'* met with general ap- 
proval apart from a few emphatic protests on the part 
of the German- American papers. 

A number of German Reserve officers domiciled in 
America succeeded, despite the close watch maintained 
by England on the seas, in effecting their return to the 
Fatherland, thanks to a secret bureau in New York, or- 
ganized by German-Americans, which provided them 
with false or forged American passports. This bu- 
reau was closed by the American police consequent on 
the discovery in January, 1915, of four German Reserv- 
ists, with such papers in their possession, on board a 
Norwegian ship in New York harbor. The organizer 
had apparently fled from New York some time before, 
but finally feU into the hands of the British, and was 
drowned in a torpedoed transport. The Reservists were 
discharged on payment of heavy fines. One, however, was 
sentenced to three years' penal servitude. In estimating 
this affair, it must be remembered that according to the 
recognized conventions of international law, British men- 
of-war were not justified in making prisoners of individ- 
ual unarmed Germans returning to their homes in neutral 
vessels. The American Government itself explicitly af- 
firmed as much when a ship flying the Stars and Stripes 
was held up in mid-ocean for examination. As a rule, 
however, neutral Powers were too weak to stand up for 
their rights against British violations of international 
law, and so all Germans who were discovered by the 
British on their homeward voyage were made prisoners 
of war. Our countrymen, therefore, if they wished to 
do their duty by going to the defence of their Father- 



104 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

land, were compelled, in face of this flagrant violation 
of the Law of Nations, to provide themselves with false 
passports. They had thus to choose between two con- 
flicting duties, a dilemma all too common in life, and one 
which the individual must solve according to his lights. 
The bearers of such false passports certainly risked 
heavy penalties, but shrank still more from incurring any 
suspicion of skulking or cowardice. 

It would seem, moreover, that there is little to choose, 
from the moral point of view, between their ** sailing 
under false flags," for the purpose of evading the Brit- 
ish guardians of the sea, and the hoisting of neutral 
ensigns by British ships to escape from Gernaan subma- 
rines. 

There can, at all events, be no question of a "German 
conspiracy*' in these cases of forged passports, as I had 
officially announced on behalf of the German Govern- 
ment, that under the circumstances no one who remained 
in America would, on his arrival in Germany, be pun- 
ished for not answering the call to the Colors. I can 
repudiate in the most express terms any personal re- 
sponsibility for the activities of the above-mentioned 
secret bureau in New York, although attempts have been 
made to connect my name with it on the sole ground of a 
letter, said to have been written to me by von Wedell 
before his departure, which was, as a matter of fact, first 
made known to me by its publication in the Press. It is 
true that this gentleman, a New York barrister before 
the war, was a personal acquaintance of mine; he had, 
however, immediately after the outbreak of hostilities, 
hastened back to Germany to join his own regiment, and 
later returned secretly to America, presumably under 
orders from his superiors, only to disappear again with 
equal secrecy after a short stay. I had never even heard 
the name of Rueroede before his arrest, but in view of 



THE GERMAN CONSPIEACIES 105 

his denial that any personal profit accrued to him from 
Ms services in providing his fellow-countrymen with doc- 
uments for the purpose of facilitating their escape from 
British vigilance, I much regret the severity of the pen- 
alty inflicted on him. 

If the cases of the Hamburg- Amerika Line and the fal- 
sification of the passports damaged the German cause 
in America, this was still more true of the acts of vio- 
lence planned or carried out by Germans or German- 
Americans against individuals known to be hostile to our 
cause. The few authentic cases of this sort of thing were, 
as every impartial person must recognize, engineered by 
a few patriotic but foolish hotheads ; the more sober and 
responsible German elements in the United States were 
certainly no party to them. 

To the list of these outrages, the enemies of Germany 
deliberately added others which probably had no foun- 
dation in fact. Thus, for every accident which occurred 
in any American munition factory — and many accidents 
were bound to happen in the new works which had sprung 
up like mushrooms all over the land, and were staffed 
with absolutely untrained personnel — "German agents" 
were regularly held responsible, and the anti-German 
Press, particularly the Providence Journal, announced 
these accidents as "a clear manifestation of the notori- 
ous German system of f rightfulness." Worse still, these 
papers instilled into their readers the firm conviction 
that these crimes were an essential part of German prop- 
aganda, and in their cartoons represented the German, 
more particularly the German- American, as a bearded 
anarchist with a bomb ready in his hand. 

I myself was frequently libelled in this manner by the 
"Yellow Press," and represented both by pen and pencil 
las the ringleader and instigator of the so-called "con- 
spiracies"; this accusation, at first tentative, later grew 



106 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

increasingly clear and unmistakable. The campaign of 
calumny in which even the more respectable Press took 
its share, was, however, directed more particularly 
against the Military Attache, Captain von Papen, and 
the Naval Attache, Captain Boy-Ed, whose names were 
openly coupled with some of the crimes which came be- 
fore the American Courts of Justice. Both these officers 
finally fell victims to this agitation, and had to be recalled 
from America in December, 1915, in accordance with a 
request from the United States Government. At the same 
time, in the annual Presidential message to Congress, 
statutory measures were laid down against Americans 
implicated in these conspiracies, or, as the phrase ran, 
against all those ** contriving schemes for the destruc- 
tion of the independence, and implicated in plots against 
the neutrality, of the Government. ' ^ Not until the declar- 
ation of war against Germany, on April 2nd, 1917, did 
President Wilson venture openly to accuse the official 
German representatives in America of complicity in these 
designs, in the following words: **It is unhappily not a 
matter of conjecture but a fact proved in our courts of 
justice, that the intrigues which have more than once 
come 'perilously near to disturbing the peace and dislo- 
cating the industries of the country have been carried 
on at the instigation, with the support, and even under 
the personal direction of official agents of the Imperial 
Government accredited to the Government of the United 
States.'* Since then my own name has been mentioned 
as the supreme head of the German *' Conspiracy *' in 
America, in the innumerable propaganda pamphlets with 
which the official ''Committee of Public Information '* 
has flooded America and Europe. And I have been 
openly accused of having instigated and furthered, or at 
the very least been privy to, all manner of criminal 
activities. In interviews with American journalists I 



THE GERMAN CONSPIRACIES 107 

have more than once refuted these calumnies, which can 
be supported by no evidence, and were solely intended 
to arouse popular feeling against Germany; but I must 
now refer again to the more definite of these accusations. 

It must be left to the impartial historian of the future 
to establish the full truth concerning the German con- 
spiracies in the United States ; any evidence given under 
the influence of the passions arising out of the war can, 
of course, possess only a limited value. It is obvious 
from the proceedings concerning the constitution of the 
Senate Committee that much of the evidence was preju- 
diced and unreliable, probably because it was based 
solely on information given by Germans or former Ger- 
mans, whose identities were kept strictly secret, and who 
told deliberate lies, either because, like Judas, they had 
received a reward for their treachery, or because, having 
severed all ties with their old country, they wished to 
secure their footing in the new. 

In any case I myself was never a partner to any 
proceedings w^hich contravened the laws of the United 
States. I never instigated such proceedings, nor did I 
consciously afford their authors assistance, whether 
financially or otherwise. I was in no single instance 
privy to any illegal acts, or to any preparations for such 
acts. Indeed, as a rule I heard of them first through 
the papers, and even then scarcely believed in the very 
existence of most of the conspiracies for which I was 
afterwards held accountable. I shall hardly be blamed 
for this by anyone who remembered the number of 
projects which we were all duly accused of entertaining, 
such as the various alleged plans for the invasion of 
Canada with a force recruited from the German- Ameri- 
can rifle clubs, and many another wild-cat scheme attrib- 
uted to us in the first months of the war. 

Such offences against the laws of America as were 



108 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

actually committed were certainly reprobated by none 
more sincerely than by myself, if only because nothing 
could be imagined more certain to militate against my 
policy, as I have here described it, than these outrages 
and the popular indignation aroused by them. I fully 
realized that these individual acts, in defiance of the 
law of the land and the resulting spread of Germano- 
phobia, were bound to damage me in the eyes of the 
United States Government and public opinion. It is 
thus obviously absurd to accuse me of being responsible 
in any way for the acts in question, seeing that any such 
instigation, or even approval on my part, would have 
involved the utter ruin of my own policy! 

Another accusation against my conduct while in 
America is that I at all events connived at the com- 
mission of crimes under the direction of officers attached 
to the Embassy of which I was in charge, or of other 
German Secret Service agents. The evidence for this 
consists of certain cipher telegrams from the military 
authorities in Germany, addressed to the Embassy in 
Washington; these were decoded in England and said 
to contain instructions for outrages to be committed in 
Canadian territory. I cannot say if these messages were 
genuine or no. Military cipher telegrams, formally ad- 
dressed to the military attache, were frequently received 
at the Embassy, but were always sent forward at once 
by the registry to Captain von Papen's office in New 
York, as a matter of routine, and without being referred 
to me in any way. Von Papen certainly never told me a 
word about any instructions from his superiors that he 
should endeavor to foment disorders as alleged. For 
the present, then, I consider that there is insufficient , 
evidence for his having received any such orders; but | 
in all these matters I can, of course, speak only for my- 
self, military matters being entirely out of my province, j 



THE GERMAN CONSPIRACIES 109 

Soon after von Papen's recall I entered a protest against 
the sending of a successor, as there was no longer any- 
useful purpose to be served by the employment of a 
Military Attache, whose presence would only serve as 
a pretext for a renewed hostile agitation against us. 

Whether the illegal acts of the Secret Agents sent to 
the United States by the military authorities were com- 
mitted in accordance with their orders or on their own 
initiative I had no means of knowing at the time, nor 
have I been able to discover since my return home. I 
may observe, however, that I more than once urgently 
requested the Foreign Office to use all their influence 
against the dispatch of Secret Service men to America. 
Moreover, I had published in the Press a notice, couched 
in strong terms and signed by myself, warning all Ger- 
mans domiciled in the United States not to involve 
themselves in any illegal activities under any circum- 
stances whatever. And I think I am justified in saying 
that twelve months before the severance of diplomatic 
relations, I had made a clean sweep of all ** conspiracies" 
and extorted a promise that no more "agents" should 
be sent over from Germany. On my arrival home, I was 
held by some to have been at fault for not having put 
down the movement earlier; to which my reply must 
be that as a matter of fact it was the cases of Rintelen 
and Fay that first earned us the reputation of "con- 
spirators": all the rest came to light later, and were in 
great measure connected with their machinations. I 
took steps, as soon as I heard of these two affairs, to 
avoid any repetition of them, in which effort I was 
successful. 

The following throws some light on the attitude of 
the United States Government towards me in the matter 
of the "conspiracies." When in November, 1915, the 
Press campaign had reached the height of its violence. 



110 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

I forwarded a Note to Mr. Lansing, the Secretary of 
State, protesting strongly against the unjustifiable at- 
tacks aimed at myself and my colleagues of the Embassy 
and requesting that some effort should be made to sup- 
press them, as follows: 

** Washington, Nov. 16, 1915. 

**The continuance of the baseless attacks on myself 
and the colleagues of my Embassy in the columns of 
the Providence Journal impels me to ask whether your 
Excellency cannot see your way to make it clear that 
these attacks are not countenanced by the American 
Government. Such slanders against the representatives 
of a friendly Power who have a right to claim the pro- 
tection and hospitality of the United States authori- 
ties would be incomprehensible, were it not a matter of 
common knowledge that the Providence Journal is a 
* hyphenated' Anglo-American paper. To borrow the 
phrase of the United States President, this journal is 
obviously a greater friend of other countries than its 
own. 

"For the last fifteen months I and all my colleagues 
have had, if I may say so, a whole army of American 
private detectives on our track. Day and night they 
have pursued us in the service of our enemies. Yet, 
although official German documents have been stolen, 
no one has yet succeeded in producing a single proof 
of illegal activities on the part of any one of us. 

**I should esteem it a great favor if your Excellency 
could see your way to secure this Embassy against a 
repetition of these baseless attacks, which have as their 
sole foundation the pre-supposition of conspiracies which 
have no existence in fact." 

I never received any reply to this letter, but a short 
time after Mr. Lansing while informing me that the 



THE GERMAN CONSPIRACIES 111 

American Government felt itself compelled to ask for 
the recall of Captains Boy-Ed and von Papen, as being 
no longer acceptable to them (this affair I propose to 
refer to again in another place), stated in the most ex- 
plicit terms that I was in no way implicated in the matter. 
The fact that the American Government, even after the 
departure of the two attaches, maintained the same in- 
timate relations with me throughout the fourteen months 
which elapsed before its diplomatic representatives were 
recalled from Germany, proves that this was no empty 
compliment, but was meant in all sincerity. 

I feel myself compelled to insist on these facts, in 
view of the efforts subsequently made to represent me 
as the originator or leader of the famous *' conspiracies,'* 
which were later immeasurably exaggerated by Ameri- 
can propaganda. This propaganda has poisoned the 
mind of the average American citizen to such an extent 
that he firmly believes the German Embassy to have 
been a nest of anarchists, who even during the period 
of his country's neutrality "waged war" in the most 
dastardly manner against her. 

And yet these stories of so-called ** conspiracies," 
with their legions of conspirators, and resulting lengthy 
lists of German outrages in America, will not bear seri- 
ous examination. 

Irrefutable evidence on the subject can be found in 
the official report of the Senate Committee of Inquiry 
into the activities of German propaganda, which has al- 
ready been mentioned more than once. After the deposi- 
tions of Mr. Bruce Bielaski on this subject had gone on 
for two days. Senator Nelson, being tired of this dry 
recital — he had already expressed the opinion that most 
of the evidence given so far was too academic — asked 
this officer of the Department of Justice for a report 
on the German attempts **to foment strikes and cause 



112 MY THEEE YEAES IN AMERICA 

explosions in munition factories" which he apparently 
considered to be an integral part of German propaganda. 
Mr. Bielaski then referred to the "more important cases 
of offences against the law, which had been fathered by 
the German Government." He prefaced his statement 
with the remark that the list he was abont to give was 
complete in every way; twenty-four cases were dealt 
with, and the names of the incriminated individuals 
given, as reproduced below: 

1. Falsification of passports (von Wedell, Rueroede). 

2. Destruction of a bridge in Canada (Horn). 

3. Falsification of passports (Stegler, Madden, Cook). 

4. Falsification of passports (Liideritz). 

5. Attempted destruction of a canal in Canada (von 

der Goltz, Tauscher, Fritzen). 

6. Falsification of passports (Sanders, Wxmmerburg, 

and two accomplices). 

7. Supplying of coal, etc., to German men-of-war at 

sea (Bunz, Koeter, Hofmeister, Poppinghaus). 

8. Attempt to bring about a revolution in India 

(Bopp, von Schack, von Brinken, Earn Chandra, 
and twenty-five accomplices). 

9. Attempt to blow up a railway tunnel in Canada 

(Bopp and three accomplices). 

10. Attempted destruction of munition factories and 

railway bridges in Canada (Kaltschmidt, and five 
accomplices). 

11. Plot to destroy Allied munition ships by infernal 

machines (Fay, Scholtz, Dacher and three ac- 
complices). 

12. Plot to destroy Allied munition ships by incendiary 

bombs (Scheele, von Kleist, Wolpart, Bode). 

13. Attempt to foment strikes in factories engaged in 

the making of war materials (Eintelen, Lamar, 
Martin). 



THE GERMAN CONSPIRACIES 113 

14. Attempt to foment strikes among the dockers (no 

convictions). 

15. Sending of spies to Canada (Konig). 

16. Perjury in the matter of the arming of the 

Lusitania (Stahl). 

17. Attempt to smuggle rubber to Germany (Jaeger 

and five accomplices). 

18. Attempt to smuggle ashore chronometer of an in- 

terned German ship (Thierichens). 

19. Attempt to smuggle nickel to Germany (Olsen and 

two accomplices). 

20. Attempt to smuggle rubber to Germany (New- 

mann and accomplices). 

21. Sinking of a German ship at the entrance of an 

American harbor (Captain and crew of the 
Liehenfels), 

22. Attempt to smuggle rubber to Germany (Soloman 

and accomplices). 

23. Falsification of passports (Rintelen and Meloy). 

24. Plan to destroy AUied army horses by means of 

bacteria (Sternberg). 

The above is the substance of the evidence given by 
Bielaski. I have no wish to extenuate, in the slightest 
degree, the few serious offences against common law 
included in this list, but I imagine that the unprejudiced 
reader will not fail to observe that Mr. Bielaski found 
it necessary to rake up everything possible in order to be 
able to present the Committee with a respectable cata- 
logue of crimes instigated by the German Government in 
the United States. Apparently his only object was to 
produce a list of imposing length, and for this purpose he 
included in it cases in which it would be difficult for 
even the most suspicious mind to discover the hand of 
the German Government. Moreover even he himself 



114 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

did not venture directly to assert the complicity of the 
representatives of the German Empire in any single one 
of these offences. In reply to Senator Overman, who 
asked if Captains von Papen and Boy-Ed were held to 
be implicated in all these illegal acts, Mr. Bielaski gave 
the following evasive answer: *'The most important, 
and most serious of these illegal acts, were, generally 
speaking, inspired, financed and conducted by one or 
other of the accredited representatives of Germany. " 
Officials or agents in the service of Germany were, how- 
ever, mentioned by name as leaders or accomplices only 
in the first fourteen and the two last cases, and I may be 
allowed to emphasize the fact that by the admission of 
Mr. Bielaski himself, my own name was coupled only 
with the agitation for a revolution in India, which was 
supposed to be a part of Germany's designs. Even if 
we take Mr. Bielaski 's unconfirmed evidence as being 
reliable, the total number of individuals convicted on 
these charges in the American Courts of Justice amounts 
only to sixty-seven, of whom apparently only sixteen 
were German nationals; and their offences fall imder 
the following heads: the case of the Hamburg- Amerika 
Line and the five cases of falsification of passports al- 
ready mentioned : the so-called Indian plot : one case of 
successful and three of attempted sabotage in Canada: 
and finally the cases numbered ten to fourteen and 
twenty-four in Bielaski 's list of the illegal acts planned 
by the agents Rintelen, Fay and Sternberg. 

I propose to go into the details of these cases later. 
What I am now concerned to establish is that the list in 
question is from one point of view more interesting for 
what it omits than for what it includes. 

In the first place one may notice the absence of the ac- 
cusation previously made against us more than once, 
that we had plotted to embroil the United States in war 



THE GERMAN CONSPIRACIES 115 

with Mexico and Japan ; from the fact that Mr. Bielaski 
made no mention of this in his evidence before the Senate 
Committee it must be supposed that these ridiculous 
stories with which American public opinion had been 
at one time so assiduously spoon-fed were finally ex- 
ploded. 

As a matter of fact, during my service in Washington, 
nothing was further from my thoughts than to conspire 
with Mexican Generals, as any such action would have 
seriously interfered with my chosen policy. As con- 
cerning Japan I may, incidentally, remark that Mr. Hale, 
when he was acting in collaboration with us in propa- 
ganda work, particularly stipulated that we should not 
undertake anything which might inflame the existing 
antagonism between America and Japan — a condition 
which Dr. Dernburg accepted without hesitation, since 
both he and his assistant Dr. Fuehr, who knew Japan 
well, were decidedly opposed to any such agitation. 

In order to avoid misunderstanding, I wish expressly 
to state that I do not deny that instructions were sent by 
Zimmermann, the Secretary of State, to our Embassy in 
Mexico, which envisaged co-operation with that country 
against the United States as well as an understanding 
with Japan, but must point out that this was recom- 
mended in the event — and only in the event — of the 
United States declaring war on us. 

I shall return to these instructions later, only remark- 
ing here that it was my duty to pass them on to von 
Eckhardt. 

It should further be noted that the design, frequently 
imputed to us in earlier days, of endeavoring to stir up 
a negro rising in the United States was also omitted from 
Mr. Bielaski *s list. To the request of a Senator of a 
Southern State for his opinion on this point, he replied 
without hesitation that no efforts in this direction had 



116 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

been made by any of the official representatives of 
Germany. 

It is noteworthy, moreover, that this agent of the De- 
partment of Justice, who had heretofore consistently 
held ns guilty of promoting strikes in munition factories 
and sabotage of all kinds, failed to follow up his charges. 
I must admit that, in view of what had already appeared 
in the Press on the subject of German "conspiracies," I 
had expected that definite proceedings would be taken on 
this charge, if they were taken at all ; and apparently the 
members of the Senate Committee were also of this 
opinion, for one of them expressly asked Mr. Bielaski if 
he had any evidence to produce on the subject. His re- 
ply was : *'I know very little, if anything, of that ; I don^t 
think that during our neutrality there were any instances 
of criminal activities of that kind." 

Again, the Bureau for the Employment of German 
Workers, which was likewise at one time proclaimed as 
a device or cloak for a dangerous *' German Conspiracy," 
was not mentioned in Bielaski 's catalogue, which con- 
clusively proves that this calumny had been allowed to 
drop. The office in question, which was known as the 
Liibau Bureau from the name of its chief, was started 
by Captain von Papen with the assistance of the Austro- 
Hungarian Ambassador, after Dr. Dumba and I had 
pointed out clearly to our fellow-countrymen working 
in the American munition factories that any of them 
who took part in the manufacture of arms or supplies 
for our enemies would render themselves liable to be 
tried for high treason in their native land. After this 
it was the bounden duty of both Embassies to find em- 
ployment for all those who voluntarily resigned from 
the factories working for the Entente; and from first 
to last this office, which had branches in Philadelphia, 
Chicago, Pittsburgh and Cleveland, and provided about 



THE OEEMAN CONSPIRACIES 117 

4,500 men with fresh employment of an unobjectionable 
nature, was never guilty of any illegal act. 

My open reference to the German law of high treason, 
however, was much criticized by the greater part of the 
American Press, which stigmatized it as an attempt **to 
introduce the German criminal code into America," and 
as an infringement of the sovereignty of the United 
States. Such criticism appears somewhat unwarranted 
in view of the wide application given to the law of treason 
by the Americans themselves shortly afterwards. 

After this digression on the subject of the conspiracies 
which had been previously imputed to us, but were now 
dropped out of Bielaski's list, I propose to return to the 
instances of illegal action which were definitely laid to 
our charge. 

The first of these is the action of Werner Horn, a re- 
tired German officer, which gained us for the first time 
the opprobrious epithet of *' dynamiters." Horn, of 
whose presence in America I was not aware until the 
story of his crime appeared in the papers, contrived in 
February, 1915, to blow up a railway bridge near Vane- 
boro, in the territory of Canada, on the line running 
through the State of Maine to Halifax. Apparently he 
believed, as did many other people, that this railway was 
being utilized for the transport of Canadian troops. As 
the act was quite senseless, and could at worst only have 
held up traffic for a few hours. Captain von Papen saw 
no objection to advancing to Horn, who was without 
means, a sum sufficient to pay the fees of his defending 
counsel. To the best of my knowledge Horn was simply 
kept under observation for some time, and it was only 
after America 's entry into the war that he was sentenced 
to a term of imprisonment for a breach of the regulations 
with regard to the transport of explosives (he had ap- 
parently carried his dynamite with him in a hand-bag). 



118 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

Of the three attempts at sabotage in Canada, the Wel- 
land Canal affair caused at the time the greatest sensa- 
tion in New York. The Welland Canal connects Lake 
Ontario with Lake Erie, west of Niagara FaUs, i.e., 
through Canadian territory, and it is a highway for all 
seaborne trafl&c on the great lakes, and particularly for 
the transport of corn to the coast. It was, therefore, 
considered advantageous from a military point of view 
to attempt the destruction of the canal. This had ap- 
parently already been projected in September by a Ger- 
man adventurer, calling himself Horst von der Goltz, 
but for some unexplained reason the idea had been 
abandoned at the last moment. 

Captain Hans Tauscher, Krupps' representative in 
New York, was charged in 1916 with having supplied 
dynamite for this scheme, but was acquitted, on his call- 
ing evidence to prove that he had no knowledge of the 
use which was to be made of the explosive. 

The first information that I had about the attempt on 
the "Welland Canal was the report of the proceedings 
against Captain Tauscher. Even to-day the full truth 
of the matter has not yet come to light. The leading 
figure of the drama, von der Goltz, while on his way to 
Germany in October, 1914, fell into the hands of the 
British. When Captain von Papen returned to Ger- 
many in December, 1915, under safe conduct of Great 
Britain, his papers were taken from him at a Scottish 
port; among them was his American check book, and 
an examination of this led to the identification of von der 
Goltz as the individual who had planned the destruction 
of the Welland Canal. The latter, it would seem, was 
thereupon offered, by the English authorities, the alter- 
natives of being shot or of returning to America under 
a guarantee of personal safety, and giving evidence 
against Germany in open court. He chose the latter 



THE GERMAN CONSPIRACIES 119 

course^ and turned ** State's evidence" in New York, 
where he was kept under constant supervision. His 
statements, however, in view of the pressure brought to 
bear upon him, and of his doubtful past, can only be re- 
garded as of somewhat doubtful value. 

During the whole course of my period of office in the 
United States I heard nothing about the case of Albert 
Kaltschmidt, the German resident in Detroit, who, after 
America's declaration of war, was arrested on a charge 
of conspiring — apparently some time in 1915 — ^to blow 
up a munition factory, an arsenal and a railway bridge 
in Canada, and sentenced in December, 1917, to penal 
servitude, together with four of his confederates, and the 
statements made in the American Press which fastened 
upon me the responsibility for the deeds of violence then 
simmering in the brain of this individual, on the ground 
that, in October, 1915, he had received a considerable ad- 
vance from a banking account opened in my name and 
that of Privy Councillor Albert, I most emphatically 
deny. Kaltschmidt, who was a well-known business man, 
had acted on behalf of Albert and von Papen in several 
negotiations, with the object of forestalling the Entente's 
agents in the purchase of important war material, and 
had consequently been in receipt of considerable sums 
of money for this purpose, both from von Papen and 
from the general funds of the Embassy. This had, of 
course, earned him the undying hatred of the outwitted 
agents of our enemies, and he had also, in company with 
his sister and brother-in-law (both of whom were later 
convicted of complicity in his designs), got himself dis- 
liked for the prominent part he played in the agitation 
for an embargo on the export of arms and munitions of 
war. It seems quite possible that the charges against 
him were the work of private enemies, and that the 
American Criminal Court, which condemned him, was 



120 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

hoodwinked by the schemings of certain Canadians ; the 
fact that these criminal designs on Kaltschmidt's part 
only came to light after the United States had become 
a belligerent adds probability to the supposition. One 
thing, however, is certain, that even if the alleged plot 
on the part of Kaltschmidt and his relations had any real 
existence, the initiative was theirs alone, and cannot be 
laid at the door of the Embassy. 

The affair of Bopp, the German Consul-General at 
San Francisco, was also one which aronsed mnch feeling 
against Germany. This gentleman had already, as early 
as 1915, been accused of having delayed or destroyed 
certain cargoes of military material for Russia, with the 
aid of certain abettors ; his subordinates, von Schack, the 
Vice-Consul, and von Brinken, the Attache, were also 
believed to be implicated. In the following year he was 
further charged with having incited one Louis J. Smith 
to blow up a tunnel on the Canadian Pacific Railway, 
with the idea of destroying supplies on their way to 
Russia. All three officials were therefore brought to 
trial, but dismissed with a caution. However, at the end 
of 1916, he and his two subordinates were again brought 
up on a serious charge and sentenced on the testimony 
of their chief lieutenant. Smith, who turned State's 
evidence* against them, to a term of imprisonment. 

All three resigned from their posts and lodged an 
appeal, but were again found guilty in the second in- 
stance, after America had entered the war. Consul- 
General Bopp and his colleagues if they had in reality 
committed the offences of which they were accused, were 

*For the benefit of the reader not familiar with American legal pro- 
cedure, it should be explained that in cases where several individuals 
are charged in common with an offence, any one of them may be assured 
of a pardon if he turns State's evidence and informs against his associ- 
ates. This course of action, reprehensible as it undoubtedly is, from a 
moral point of view, has the advantage of facilitating the task of police 
spies! 



THE GERMAN CONSPIRACIES 121 

certainly actuated in no way by the Embassy or any high 
authorities, but must be held solely and entirely respon- 
sible for the course they adopted. In his reports to me, 
Bopp invariably asserted his innocence, and I am rather 
inclined to believe that he really fell into one of the traps 
which the Allied Secret Service were always setting for 
our officials in America. 

According to common report, Consul-General Bopp, 
Schack and von Brinken later underwent yet a further 
term of imprisonment for their complicity in the so- 
called Indian conspiracy. I am quite certain that noth- 
ing was ever heard of this affair until after the American 
declaration of war; then, however, newspaper reports 
were shown me, the effect that in the year of 1916 an 
attempt had been made by the Indian Nationalists in 
San Francisco, with German co-operation, to bring about 
an armed rising in British India — an absolute ** wild- 
goose chase,'' which, of course, came to nothing. It was 
asserted in this connection that a cargo of arms and 
ammunition on board the small schooner Annie Larsen, 
and destined for our forces in German East Africa, was, 
in reality, dispatched to India via Java and Siam ; but no 
proofs were brought forward in support of this state- 
ment. In connection with this design, four persons were 
sentenced at Chicago, in October, 1917, and ten (accord- 
ing to Bielaski twenty-nine in all) at San Francisco, in 
August, 1918, to long terms of imprisonment, for having 
** illegally conspired in the United States to make war 
against the territories and possessions of His Majesty 
the King of Great Britain and Ireland and Emperor of 
India." It seems that this affair was exploited with 
great success by the American propaganda service to in- 
flame the minds of its people against Germany. As a 
matter of fact, I cannot too strongly condemn on prin- 
ciple all military enterprises undertaken from neutral 



122 MY THEEE YEARS IN AMERICA 

territory; but, from the purely moral point of view, I 
cannot but remark that it ill befits America to give vent 
to righteous indignation over such activities, considering 
the facilities she afforded to Czechs and Poles, during 
her period of neutrality, for supporting to the utmost of 
their power their blood brothers in their designs against 
the Central Powers. Besides, even if it be admitted 
that the schooner in question was actually sent by the 
Indian Nationalists with her cargo of arms, it is absurd 
to regard the dispatch of this small supply of war ma- 
terial as a crime, and gloss over the fact that whole 
arsenals and ammunition columns were being shipped 
every day to France ! 

I now propose, in conclusion, to deal with the illegal 
activities attributed by American opinion to the secret 
agents controlled by the German military authorities, 
and sent by them to the United States. 

As regards the machinations of Franz Rintelen, my 
first information about him reached me in the late 
autumn of 1915, and even now I have to rely for most 
of the details on the American papers. Rintelen, who 
was a banker by profession, and during the war held a 
commission as Captain-Lieutenant in the Imperial Naval 
Reserve, appeared in America in April, 1915, and pre- 
sented himself to me during one of my periodical visits 
to New York. He declined at the time to give any in- 
formation as to his official position in the country, or the 
nature of his duties; I therefore wired to the Foreign 
Office for some details about him, but received no reply. 
Some time afterwards he applied to me for proofs of 
identity, which I refused to grant him, and as his con- 
tinued presence in New York was considered undesirable 
by both von Papen and Boy-Ed, they took steps to have 
him sent back to Germany. He was captured, however, 
by the British, on his voyage home. Shortly after this, 



THE GEEMAN CONSPIRACIES 123 

the affair of Rintelen became a matter of common talk, 
and the first indications of his mysterious intrigues for 
the purpose of interfering with the delivery of munitions 
from the United States to the Allies appeared in the 
Press; the Foreign Office thereupon instructed me to 
issue an official dementi on the subject. Mr. Lansing, 
the Secretary of State, however, informed me that, as a 
matter of fact, Rintelen, while in England, had confessed 
himself to be an emissary of the German Government. I 
then heard from Captain Boy-Ed that Rintelen, by rep- 
resenting himself as empowered to purchase large stocks 
of raw material for Germany in the United States, had 
obtained a considerable advance from the Embassy's 
funds. This fact was one of the main reasons for the 
American Government's request in December, 1915, that 
Boy-Ed should be recalled. I was never able either in 
America or Germany to discover the details of Rintelen 's 
intrigues ; he himself never allowed anything to leak out 
about it at the Embassy, and was unable to send any 
report on the subject to Germany, as he was handed over 
to the United States by the British after the American 
declaration of war, and sentenced to some years' penal 
servitude. The current story in the United States is 
that he was proved to have been in touch with the Mexi- 
can General, Huerta, with the object of bringing about 
war between the two Republics — an offence of which the 
famous list of Mr. Bielaski makes no mention. Further, 
he was supposed to have founded, in conjunction with 
a member of Congress, and two individuals of evil repu- 
tation, a society of workmen in Chicago, with the object 
of obtaining from Congress an embargo on the export of 
arms — an undertaking which according to the afore- 
mentioned report cost a great deal and proved entirely 
valueless from the point of view of the German Govern- 
ment. It is not known whether this undertaking brought 



124 MY THEEE YEARS IN AMERICA 

Rintelen and his assistants within the reach of the Sher- 
man Act against conspiracies inciting industrial dis- 
orders, or whether he had, in addition, made efforts to 
bring about strikes in munition works. He was certainly 
suspected of endeavoring to cause trouble among the 
dockers of New York, in the hope of preventing or delay- 
ing the shipment of war material to the AUies ; but even 
Bielaski admitted before the Senate Committee that 
there was no tangible evidence of this. 

As a matter of fact, the real grounds of Rintelen 's 
conviction were apparently that he had prepared, 
through the agency of a certain German chemist, domi- 
ciled in America, named Scheele, a number of incendiary 
bombs, which were apparently to be secreted by three 
officers of the German Mercantile Marine on board Allied 
munition ships, with the object of causing fires on the 
voyage. After America's entry into the war, Rintelen 
and his accomplices were sentenced on this count to 
fairly lengthy terms of imprisonment, and these sen- 
tences they are serving at the present moment in the 
Federal prison at Atlanta. 

I have been unable to discover how far Rintelen was 
actually guilty of the offences imputed to him; but I 
can only observe that he, and, in so far as he acted under 
orders, his superiors, gravely compromised the position 
of the German official representatives in the United 
States, and afforded our enemies an excellent opportunity 
of inflaming public opinion against Germany. It is im- 
possible to over-estimate the unfortunate effect produced 
throughout the world by the discovery of bombs on board 
a German passenger-steamer, and of their secretion in 
the holds of Allied munition ships. 

Another attempt of a similar kind, which had most 
unfortunate results from our point of view, was that 
attributed to a German, Lieutenant Fay, who had like- 



THE GERMAN CONSPIRACIES 125 

wise come to America in April, 1915, and two other Ger- 
mans, by name Scholz and Daeche. Their idea was to 
put AUied munition ships out of action by means of in- 
fernal machines, fastened to the rudders, and timed to 
explode shortly after their departure. My first informa- 
tion concerning these gentlemen was the report in the 
Press of their arrest, which was apparently effected 
while they were experimenting with their apparatus 
under cover of a wood. A telegraphic inquiry elicited 
from Berlin the reply that Fay was absolutely unknown 
there ; it is possible, however, that he had really come to 
America on some business of an official nature. He and 
his accomplices were sentenced in May, 1916, to several 
years' penal servitude, although no proof was adduced 
that any real damage could possibly have been caused 
by their contrivance, which experts informed me was not 
a practicable one. 

Last of all, on Bielaski's list comes the case of the 
German agent Stermberg, of whom, also, I had never 
heard. In January, 1915, he was arrested on a charge 
of having attempted to inoculate horses, purchased for 
the Allied Armies, with disease germs. As his practical 
knowledge was not great, his intentions were in excess 
of his performances. Bielaski, in his evidence before the 
Senate Committee, at first hesitated to mention this case 
at all, and was only induced to do so by the insistence of 
another Government official; it is clear, therefore, that 
he attached very little importance to it, and, as a matter 
of fact, the charge was not supported by any witnesses 
in a court of law, or by any legal attestation. 

In a word, during all our period of service in America, 
as representatives of the German Empire, practically 
nothing of all that was alleged against us was proved 
to be true. A few of the stories of illegal activity, how- 
ever, were based on some foundation of truth, and were 



126 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

popularly but erroneously supposed to further the in- 
terests of Germany. By these means we were first 
brought into discredit, and from that time on, every 
rumor, or piece of gossip concerning acts of violence on 
the part of Germans, whether based on fact or not, 
served only to increase the wide-spread popular sus- 
picion and distrust of everyone and everything German. 



CHAPTER VI 
THE "LUSITANIA" INCIDENT 

On August 6th, 1914, the Government of the United 
States proposed to all the belligerent Powers that the 
laws of war at sea, as laid down in the Declaration of 
London of 1909, should be observed throughout the pres- 
ent war. This reasonable suggestion, which, had it been 
generally observed, would have saved the world much 
distress, came to nothing, owing to the refusal of Great 
Britain to accept it as it stood without reservation. The 
United States Government thereupon withdrew its pro- 
posal on October 24th, and announced that "It was re- 
solved in future to see that the rights and duties of the 
Government and citizens of the United States should be 
settled in accordance with the accepted principles of in- 
ternational law and the treaty obligations of the United 
States, without reference to the provisions of the Dec- 
laration of London.'/ Moreover, the American Gov- 
ernment drew up protests and demands for compensa- 
tion, for use in case of any infringement of these rights, 
or of any interference with their free exercise on the 
part of the belligerent Powers. 

On November 3rd, 1914, Great Britain declared the 
whole of the North Sea a theatre of war, and thereupon 
instituted, in flagrant violation of the Law of Nations, 
a blockade of the adjoining neutral coasts and ports. 
General disappointment was felt in Germany that the 

127 



128 MY THEEE YEARS IN AMEEICA 

United States made no attempt to vindicate her rights 
in this matter, and confined herself to demanding com- 
pensation in individual cases of infringement. 

Both in Germany and elsewhere it was clearly recog- 
nized that England's design was to use this illegal block- 
ade for the purpose of starving out the German people. 
During a discussion between myself and Mr. Lansing, 
later Secretary of State, on the matter of assistance to be 
sent by America to Belgium, he expressed the opinion 
that nothing would come of the scheme, as Lord Kitch- 
ener had adopted the attitude that no food supplies 
could under any circumstances be sent to territory in 
German occupation. I answered that I had expected this 
refusal, as it was England's intention to starve us out, 
to which Mr. Lansing replied: *'Yes, the British frankly 
admit as much." It will be remembered that, as a 
matter of fact, Lord Kitchener withdrew his refusal in 
view of the pressure of English public opinion, which 
demanded that relief should be sent to Belgium on ac- 
count of the distress prevalent there, and despite the 
fact that such a measure was of indirect assistance to 
us. A subsequent proposal from the American Govern- 
ment for the dispatch of similar relief to Poland was 
declined in London. ' 

We Germans had hoped that the neutral States would 
vigorously claim their right to freedom of mutual trade, 
and would take effective measures, in conjunction with 
the leadership of the United States, to force the British 
Government to suspend the oppressive and extra-legal 
policy. This they failed to do, at any rate, in time to 
forestall the fateful decision on our part to xmdertake 
submarine warfare. It is now impossible to tell whether 
this policy might not have had more favorable results, 
had not the growing estrangement between Germany 
and America caused by the new campaign nipped in the 



THE ''LUSITANIA'^ INCIDENT 129 

bnd any possibility of serious Anglo-American differ- 
ences. In the other nentral countries this submarine 
warfare alienated all sympathy for us, and no doubt 
was one reason why the neutral States, which in previ- 
ous wars had always attempted to vindicate their rights 
as against the Power which had command of the sea, 
now refrained from any concerted action to this end. 
Such a procedure on their part would have indirectly 
influenced the situation in favor of Germany, as the 
weaker Power at sea; it will be remembered that the 
United States, during their War of Independence against 
England, drew much advantage from a similar attitude 
on the part of the European Powers. My knowledge 
of America leads me to believe that, had we not incurred 
such odium by our infringement of Belgian neutrality 
and our adoption of submarine warfare, the action of 
the Washington Government might have been other 
than it was ; had it even raised a finger to protest against 
England ^s methods, the latter must instantly have given 
way, as had so frequently happened during the last 
twenty-five years, when the United States took up on 
any point an attitude hostile to Britain. The contrast 
between this passive attitude on the part of the Presi- 
dent and the traditional forward policy of America vis- 
a-vis England, goes far to support the contention of 
Wilson's detractors in Germany — that these two coun- 
tries were in league and were playing a preconcerted 
game. 

It is impossible to convince one's political foes on any 
point except by positive proof, and until the time comes 
when the enemy's archives are published, such proof 
cannot, of course, be adduced on this particular matter. 
This time is still far distant. Why should the enemy 
publish their archives ? They have won and have there- 
fore no reason to grumble at the course of events, Thus 



130 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

I can at present only combat with counter-arguments 
the contention that I misunderstood the true state of 
affairs in America. The hypothesis of secret collusion 
between America and England seems in the present case 
unnecessary; the attitude of public opinion in America 
is in itself sufficient explanation of the situation at the 
time. Sympathy for us from the very first day of the 
war there was none ; but had the general feeling been as 
strongly for us as it actually was against us, no doubt 
the Government would have kicked against the English 
illegalities, and enforced an embargo against her. I still 
hold to my view that Mr. Wilson made a real effort to 
maintain the observance of a strict neutrality; but the 
decisive factor was that he found himself, as a result of 
his efforts, in increasing measure in conflict with the 
overwhelming Germanophobe sentiment of the people, 
and continually exposed to the reproach put forward in 
the Eastern States that he was a pro-German. 

The American public, indifferent as it was to the 
affairs of Europe and entirely ignorant of its compli- 
cated problems, failed to understand the fuU extent of 
the peril to the very existence of the German Empire, 
which compelled its rulers, much against their will and 
with heavy hearts, to have recourse to the invasion of 
Belgium. They themselves, living in perfect security 
and under pleasant conditions, had no means of realizing 
the perilous position of a comparatively small people, 
such as the Germans, surrounded by greedy foes, and 
straitened within narrow frontiers; their judgment, as 
already remarked, was swayed by their individual senti- 
ments of justice and humanity. The attitude of the 
Allied and Associated Powers at Versailles might have 
enlightened the American people as to the peril of dis- 
memberment which threatened a defeated Germany; but 
such realization, even supposing it to have taken place, 



THE *'LUSITANIA" INCIDENT 131 

has come too late to affect the consequences of the war. 
I am convinced that they will in a few years be forced 
to admit that Germany during the course of her struggle 
was, contrary to the generally accepted view of to-day, 
quite as much sinned against as sinning. 

The German Government, then, decided upon the adop- 
tion of submarine warfare, and issued a declaration to 
this effect. This document, together with explanatory 
memorandum, was delivered by me on February 4th, 
1915, to the Secretary of State, Mr. Bryan ; it was to the 
effect that the territorial waters of Great Britain and 
Ireland, including the whole of the English Channel, 
were declared a war area. From February 18th on- 
wards every enemy merchant ship encountered in this 
area was liable to be sunk, without any guarantee that 
time could be given for the escape of passengers and 
crew. Neutral shipping in the war zone was likewise 
liable to the same dangers, as owing to the misuse of 
neutral flags resulting from the British Government's 
order of January 31st, and the chances of naval warfare, 
the possibility of damage to other shipping as a result 
of attacks on hostile vessels might sometimes be un- 
avoidable. 

I regarded it as my main duty, when handing this 
document to Mr. Bryan, to recommend to the United 
States Government that they should warn all American 
citizens of the danger to the crews, passengers and car- 
goes of hostile merchant ships moving within the war 
area from this time onwards. Further, I felt it neces- 
sary to draw attention to the advisability of an urgent 
recommendation that American shipping should keep 
clear of the danger zone, notwithstanding the express 
statement in the memorandum that the German naval 
forces had orders to avoid any interference with neutral 
vessels clearly recognizable as such. 



132 MY THEEE YEAES IN AMERICA 

Mr. Secretary Bryan was at first incredulons ; he be- 
lieved a submarine campaign of this nature to be un- 
thinkable, and my statements to be merely bluff. The 
American Government therefore resolved to take no 
measures of precaution, but to dispatch a Note to Berlin 
on February 12th, summarizing the two conflicting points 
of \'iew, which remained irreconcilable throughout the 
whole controversy, on the subject of the submarine war. 
Germany, on the one hand, defended her course of action 
as a reprisal justified by the British blockade, which 
both parties to the discussion agreed to be contrary to 
the Law of Nations. The United States, for her part, 
maintained that as long as the blockade of Great Britain 
was not made effective, neutral shipping had the right 
to go where it wished unharmed, and that the German 
submarines were empowered only to hold up merchant 
ships for search purposes, unless these same ships of- 
fered resistance or endeavored to escape. 

The chief germ of dissension lay in the fact that the 
British blockade, which was defended by its authors as 
being merely an extension of the rights of sea warfare 
to square with the progress of the modern military ma- 
chine, was met on America's part only by paper protests, 
while our own extension of the same rights by means of 
submarine warfare was treated as a casus belli. At a later 
period of the war the Imperial Government made certain 
proposals to the United States, who might, by accepting 
them, have safeguarded all their commercial and ship- 
ping interests, not to mention the lives of their citizens, 
to the fullest possible extent, and yet have allowed us 
a free field for our submarine warfare. These proposals 
the United States rejected; thus she set herself to com- 
bat with all her strength any continuance of the blockade 
restrictions through our submarines, while conniving at 
the similar restrictions exercised by England, although 



THE **LUSITANIA" INCIDENT 133 

these latter infringed far more seriously the rights of 
neutral Powers. 

The following extract from the American Note of 
February 12th clearly presaged the conflict to come: 

**This (xovernment has carefully noted the explana- 
tory statement issued by the Imperial German Govern- 
ment at the same time with the proclamation of the 
German Admiralty, and takes this occasion to remind 
the Imperial German Government very respectfully that 
the Government of the United States is open to none of 
the criticisms for unneutral action to which the German 
Government believe the governments of certain other 
neutral nations have laid themselves open ; that the Gov- 
ernment of the United States has not consented or ac- 
quiesced in any measures which may have been taken by 
the other belligerent nations in the present war which 
operate to restrain neutral trade, but has, on the con- 
trary, taken in aU such matters a position which war- 
rants it in holding those governments responsible in the 
proper way for any untoward effects upon American 
shipping which the accepted principles of international 
law do not justify; and that it, therefore, regards itself 
as free in the present instance to take with a clear con- 
science and upon accepted principles the position indi- 
cated in this Note. 

**If the commanders of German vessels of war should 
act upon the presumption that the flag of the United 
States was not being used in good faith and should 
destroy on the high seas an American or the lives of 
American citizens, it would be difficult for the Govern- 
ment of the United States to view the act in any other 
light than as an indefensible violation of neutral rights 
which it would be very hard indeed to reconcile with the 



134 MY THREE YEAES IN AMERICA 

friendly relations now so happily subsisting between the 
two Governments. 

**If such a deplorable situation should arise, the Im- 
perial German Government can readily appreciate that 
the Government of the United States would be con- 
strained to hold the Imperial German Government to a 
strict accountability for such acts of their naval authori- 
ties, and to take any steps it might be necessary to take 
to safeguard the American lives and property and to 
secure to American citizens the full enjoyment of their 
acknowledged rights on the high seas." 

The Imperial Government reaffirmed its standpoint in 
a further Note, dated February 16th, the gist and con- 
clusion of which was as under: 

"If the American Government, by reason of that 
weight which it is able and entitled to cast into the bal- 
ance which decides the fate of peoples, should succeed 
even now in removing those causes which make the pres- 
ent action of the German Government an imperious 
duty; if the American Government, in short, should suc- 
ceed in inducing the Powers at war with Germany to 
abide by the terms of the Declaration of London, and 
to permit the free importation into Germany of food- 
stuffs and raw material, the Imperial Government would 
recognize in such action a service of inestimable value, 
tending to introduce a spirit of greater humanity into 
the conduct of the war, and would willingly draw its own 
conclusions from the resulting new situation." 

This Note was effective, in that it induced the Ameri- 
can Government to dispatch on February 22nd an iden- 
tical Note to Great Britain and Germany, with the ob- 
ject of arriving at a modus vivendi in the matter. Their 
proposal was as follows: Submarines were not to be 



THE ''LUSITANIA'^ INCIDENT 135 

employed in any attack on merchant ships of whatever 
nationality, save in execution of the rights of detention 
or search; merchant ships, for their part, were not to 
make use of neutral flags, whether as a ri^e de guerre 
or to avoid identification. Great Britain would give free 
passage to provisions and food supplies consigned to cer- 
tain agents in Germany, to be named by the United 
States. These agents would receive all goods thus im- 
ported and dispatch them to specially licensed distribut- 
ing firms, who were to be responsible that they were 
issued exclusively to the civilian population. 

The above project was concurred in by the German 
Government in a Note of February 28th, which added 
that **The Imperial Government considered it right that 
other raw materials, essential to manufacture for peace- 
ful purposes, and also fodder, should also be imported 
without interference." 

The British Government, as was to be expected, re- 
jected the American proposal on somewhat flimsy pre- 
texts, for England *s sea supremacy was at stake in this 
as in her previous wars. ''Britannia rules the waves" 
was, and ever must be, the guiding principle of all her 
policy, while her world-Empire endures. On this vitally 
important question England could not be expected ever 
to yield an inch of her own free will. 

Thus the American attempt at mediation died a 
natural death. 

Our adoption of submarine warfare was to be re- 
garded, according to our Note of February 16th, as a 
measure of reprisal in answer to the English blockade. 
From a tactical point of view, this contention was un- 
fortunate, as it afforded America the opportunity .of 
agreeing at once, and thus of conceding us a point which 
benefited us not at all, but merely gave the United States 
all the more right to renew its protests against the sub- 



136 MY THEEE YEARS IN AMEEICA. 

marine war. It would have been wiser for us to have 
initiated the submarine campaign simply as a new 
weapon of war without reference to the English block- 
ade ; still better, to put it into operation without declar- 
ing a blockade of Great Britain and Ireland, which could 
never be really effective, and caused constant friction 
between ourselves and America. Our declaration that 
the territorial waters of Great Britain were to be re- 
garded as a war area was a legal formality modelled on 
the earlier English proclamation of the barred zones, 
and at once antagonized public opinion in the United 
States. By adopting the point of view we did with re- 
gard to reprisals, we laid ourselves open to the charge 
of illegality, and added to the ill-feeling already excited 
by the submarine campaign. If the contention of cer- 
tain naval authorities that the observance of the Declara- 
tion of London by our enemies would have brought us 
no important material advantage is correct, the issue 
of our Note of February 16th becomes even less compre- 
hensible. Having admitted in this Note that the declara- 
tion of the barred zones was caused by the fact that all 
was not well with us, we could hardly expect England 
would fall in with the proposal made at our suggestion 
by Mr. Wilson, and thus allow us so easy a diplomatic 
triumph. The President, however, after his rebuff from 
England, was bound, in order to maintain his prestige, 
to bring all possible pressure to bear on us, in the hope 
of compensating by diplomatic success in Berlin for his 
failure in London. My subsequent attitude was laid 
down, but at the same time made more difficult, by this 
interchange of Notes; but, generally speaking, my per- 
sonal action in the matter began with the Lusitania in- 
cident; previous ,to this the negotiations had been en- 
tirely in the hands of Berlin. 

The "Washington Government then for the present as-j 



THE **LUSITANIA" INCIDENT 137 

srnned a waiting attitude, until such time as loss of 
American lives through our submarine activities should 
compel its intervention. With regard to damage to 
property, the standpoint was consistently maintained 
that claims for compensation for financial loss must be 
fuUy met, Every day might see a serious conflict, and 
this possibility was a source of constant anxiety to us 
Germans in the United States. The American Govern- 
ment, we thought, still underestimated the dangers of 
the situation, and failed to take any measures of precau- 
tion. In the middle of April I held a meeting in New 
York, with the representatives of the other German ad- 
ministrative departments, and in view of the great re- 
sponsibility incumbent on us, we resolved on the motion 
of Dr. Dernburg to issue a warning to the Press in the 
form usually adopted for shipping notices. As a rule, 
these shipping notices were published by the Consulate 
as a matter of routine. Dr. Dernburg having, however, 
been unable to come to an agreement with the New York 
Consulate on the matter, I took upon myself to issue the 
advertisement as from the German Ambassador, It ran 
as follows : 

"Travellers intending to embark for an Atlantic voy- 
age are reminded that a state of war exists between 
Germany and her AUies and Great Britain and her 
Allies ; that the zone of war includes the waters adjacent 
to the British Isles ; that, in accordance with the formal 
notice given by the Imperial German Government, ves- 
sels flying the flag of Great Britain or any of her AUies 
are liable to destruction in those waters ; and that trav- 
ellers sailing in the war zone in ships of Great Britain 
or her Allies do so at their own risk." 

** Imperial German Embassy, Washington. 
''April 22nd, 1915.'* 



138 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

This notice was intended to appear in the Press on 
April 24th and the two following Saturdays. By one of 
those fatal coincidences beloved of history, it happened 
that owing to technical difficulties the communique was 
not actually published until May 1st — the very date on 
which the Lusitania left New York harbor. This con- 
junction was bound to appear intentional rather than 
fortuitous, and even to-day the majority of Americans 
believe that I must have known beforehand of the design 
to torpedo the Lusitania. 

As the true facts of the matter are not yet clear, and 
were never explained officially, I have no means of say- 
ing whether the destruction of the Lusitania was the 
result of a deliberate purpose on the part of our naval 
authorities. To the best of my belief technical factors 
render it impossible for a submarine commander to make 
any one particular ship the object of his attack, so that 
the officer responsible for the sinking of the Lusitania 
could not have been certain what vessel he had to deal 
with. In any case, whether the action of our naval 
authorities was planned out beforehand or not, we in 
America had no knowledge of any such plan; indeed, 
until it actually occurred, I believed the destruction of 
the Lusitania to be unthinkable, not merely for humani- 
tarian reasons, but because it was obviously sound policy 
to refrain as far as possible from any attack on passen- 
ger ships. I did not at the time realize how difficult it 
was for our naval forces to insure the safety of such 
vessels without impairing the efficiency of the submarine 
blockade. Again, I did not believe it possible to torpedo 
a rapidly-moving ship like the Lusitania if she were 
going at full speed ; and, finally, I supposed that a mod- 
ern liner, if actually struck, would remain afloat long 
enough to allow of the rescue of her passengers. The 
captain of the Lusitania himself seems to have been quite 



THE '^LUSITANIA" INCIDENT 139 

at ease in his mind on the matter ; at all events, he took 
no precautionary measures to avoid the danger threat- 
ening him, or to insure the safety of the people on board 
in case of need. The rapidity with which the ship went 
down and the resulting heavy death-roll can only be at- 
tributed to the explosion of the masses of ammunition 
which formed part of the cargo. 

Let me once more lay stress on the fact that our notice 
to the Press had no particular reference to the Lusi- 
tania, but was simply a general warning, the publication 
of which was motived simply by humanity and wise pol- 
icy, and was rendered necessary by the apathetic be- 
havior of the Washington authorities in the matter. We 
rightly imagined that many Americans had not taken 
the trouble to read the Notes officially exchanged, and 
would thus rush blindly into danger. Our failure to 
achieve any result by our efforts may be appreciated 
from an extract from the London Daily Telegraph of 
May 3rd, which is before me as I write. The New York 
correspondent of this paper dealt with our warning in 
the following headlines: 

** German Threat to Atlantic Liners." 
"Berlin's Latest Bluff." 
*'EmicuLED IN America." 

On May 7th I travelled to New York in the afternoon 
— a fact in itself sufficient to prove that I was not expect- 
ing the disaster to the Lusitania. It chanced that Paul 
Warburg and another American banker were on the 
same train. I bought an evening paper at Philadelphia, 
and there read the first news about the sinking of the 
great liner; I read them to my two travelling compan- 
ions, both of whom disbelieved the story at the time; 
but Jacob Schiff met us in New York with the news that 



140 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

it was all too true, and tliat in the first moment of ex- 
citement lie had hurried to the station to inform his 
brother-in-law, Warburg, of what had happened. I had 
come to New York with the intention of being present at 
a performance of The Bat, given by a German company 
for the benefit of the German Red Cross; but when I 
learned on my arrival at the Ritz- Carlton Hotel that over 
one hundred Americans, including many women and 
children, had lost their lives in the sinking of the Litsi- 
tania, I at once gave up all idea of attending the per- 
formance. As the hotel was soon surrounded on all 
sides by newspaper reporters, I remained indoors until 
my departure on the morrow; I should have returned to 
Washington at once, but for having to interview certain 
German gentlemen in New York. 

Unfortunately it so happened that Dr. Dernburg was 
then away at Cleveland, addressing a meeting; he took 
the opportunity of defending the destruction of the 
Xiusitania on the ground that she was carrying munitions 
of war. This speech aroused a storm of execration 
throughout the country, which was already indignant 
enough over the fatal event itself. Even to-day no 
German seems to realize the full violence of the passion 
thus aroused; we, accustomed as we have been to daily 
reports of battles and casualties, were little impressed 
by the destruction of a solitary passenger ship. America," 
however, execrated us whole-heartedly as murderers of 
women and children, oblivious of the fact that the victims 
of the submarine campaign were far less numerous than 
the women and children killed by the English blockade, 
and that death by drowning is no more dreadful than slow 
starvation. Every one naturally realizes his own mis- 
fortunes more vividly than those of others, and the 
Lusitania incident first brought home to the United 
States the horrors of war, and convinced aU her people 



THE ''LUSITANIA'' INCIDENT 141 

that a flagrant injury had been done them. On my depar- 
ture from New York I found myself at once face to face 
with this immense popular excitement. I left my hotel by 
a side door, but did not manage to escape notice ; several 
cars filled with reporters followed me to the station, and 
pressed round me so persistently that I was unable to 
shake them off. I could only refuse to make any state- 
ment, which only increased the excitement of the re- 
porters ; but had I said anything at that time, I should but 
have added fuel to the fire which was already raging in 
the minds of all. Finally I succeeded in forcing my way 
through the infuriated and howling mob of pressmen and 
reaching the train. 

For the first few days after my return to Washington 
I remained in seclusion, so as to avoid any possibility of 
unpleasant incidents. Those Germans who live in the 
congenial surroundings of their homes can have little 
conception of the hostility with which we in America had 
to contend. "We had many true friends, who right up to 
the final breach between the two countries never deserted 
us, To them I shall ever feel myself indebted, more par- 
ticularly in view of their harsh treatment at the hands 
of their feUow-countrymen and enemy diplomatists, as 
a result of their staunchness. The pro-Entente elements 
of the country proposed not only to boycott us socially, 
but also to terrorize all pro-German Americans. In this 
connection it is of interest to note that a certain neutral 
representative was accused by his Government of having 
taken our part; he was led to believe that this charge 
had originated in the Eussian Embassy, and taxed M. 
Bakmetieff with the fact. The latter had no better proof 
of it to adduce than the report that the Dutch Ambassa- 
dor — for he it was who had been thus attacked — occa- 
sionally had breakfast with me at my club, and always 
stayed at the German headquarters, the Eitz-Carlton 



142 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

Hotel, whenever lie came to New York. The above ex- 
ample is typical of the attitude usually adopted towards 
us ; despite it all, throughout the war I never wanted for 
true and loyal friends in America, even though, partic- 
ularly after the Lusitcmia incident, one or other shrank 
from braving the resulting public odium. Such half- 
hearted champions we could easily dispense with; the 
situation at the moment was so strained that we had no 
use for any save trustworthy and reliable men on our 
side. I may take this opportunity to place it on record 
that my relations with all the State Departments re- 
mained to the last of the friendliest; I should be doing 
them an injustice, did I not expressly affirm this. 

President "Wilson must certainly have under-estimated 
the spirit of angry hostility towards Germany which 
then held sway over his people's minds, otherwise he 
would probably not have gone directly counter to it, as 
he did in a speech which has now become famous. On 
May 10th at Philadelphia he gave evidence of his peace- 
ful inclinations in the following words: 

"The example of America must be a special example. 
The example of America must be the example not merely 
of peace because it will not fight, but of peace because 
peace is the healing and elevating influence of the world 
and strife is not. There is such a thing as a man being 
too proud to fight. There is such a thing as a nation 
being so right that it does not need to convince others 
by force that it is right.'' 

This speech did but increase the indignation raging 
throughout the country, and the phrase **Too proud to 
fight" became the favorite joke of the Jingo and Entente 
party against Mr. Wilson. Public opinion with one voice 
demanded the severance of diplomatic relations with 



THE ^'LUSITANIA'^ INCIDENT 143 

Germany; and before this powerful pressure the Presi- 
dent deemed it advisable to explain away his words. 

It may be said, perhaps, in answer to the above, that 
America was indeed bitterly angry, but still not resolved 
on war; and that public opinion was indignant, not at 
Wilson *s desire to keep the peace, but at the unfortunate 
expression *'Too proud to fight." 

This view was held, for example, by von Tirpitz, and 
also found expression more than once in the reports of 
the so-called German Chamber of Commerce in New 
York, which were regularly transmitted to Germany, and 
exercised considerable influence on opinion in that coun- 
try, although their author was a man of no political in- 
sight, and the Chamber of Commerce had, as a matter 
of fact, no actual existence. 

They were simply a journalistic device on the part of 
the paper which published these reports. During the 
war, and under the influence of the passions which it 
aroused, there was continually going on in America any 
amount of mischievous gossip and intrigue concerning 
which many interesting stories might be told. I have no 
intention, however, of concerning myself with these un- 
worthy matters now, any more than I allowed them at the 
time to color my official reports to the home Govern- 
ment ; I can only say that if the reports of the Chamber 
of Commerce had any sort of influence on German opin- 
ion, it was much to be regretted. The opinion, therein 
expressed, that the United States would never, under any 
circumstances, embark on hostilities against us was un- 
fortunately belied by later events, and the idea that 
America was at that time compelled to keep the peace 
by defects in her military equipment, had no foundation 
in fact. Admittedly, she was in the year 1917 insuffi- 
ciently equipped for war, and the question of making 



144 MY THEEE YEAES IN AMERICA 

good her deficiencies had not got beyond the stage of 
discussion. I should, of course, have been only too pleased 
if my repeated warnings as to the danger of war with 
America had proved to be unfounded; in point of fact, 
after the Lusitania incident, America was, for a period 
of three weeks, on the verge of breaking off diplomatic 
relations, and panic reigned on the Stock Exchanges 
throughout the country. The fact that Congress was not 
sitting at the time prevented a flood of speeches which 
would only have increased the tension. It will be remem- 
bered that by the American Constitution the annual 
sessions of Congress are , short and long alternately; 
the short session had come to an end on March 4, 1915, 
and the President had refrained from summoning Con- 
gress again, as he wished to avoid discussion on the 
question of war. 

The irresistible strength of the popular indignation 
may be accurately estimated from the fact that even the 
German- Americans were terror-stricken by its violence. 
Not only did our propaganda collapse completely, but 
even our political friends dared not open their mouths, 
and only ventured to assert themselves once more after 
the settlement of the Arabic case. Germanism in Amer- 
ica may be said to have been absolutely killed by the 
Lusitania incident, and only gradually came to life again. 

The first expressions of opinion which I received from 
the President and Mr. Bryan gave me good grounds for 
hope that these gentlemen would do everything in their 
power to preserve peace. I append the two telegrams 
which I sent to the Foreign Office : 

(1). "Washington, May 9th, 1915. 
^^ Lusitania incident has caused great excitement, es- 
pecially in New York, which is most affected, but I hope 
that no serious consequences will ensue. Mr. Wilson 



THE **LUSITANIA'^ INCIDENT 145 

regards matters calmly. I recommend expression of re- 
gret for loss of so many American lives, in whatever 
form may be possible without admission of our respon- 
sibility.'* 

(2). ^'Washington, May 10th, 1915. 
** Bryan spoke to me very seriously concerning Lusi- 
tania incident. His influence will, in any case, be exer- 
cised in favor of peace. This influence is great, as Wil- 
son depends on Bryan for his re-election. Roosevelt, on 
the other hand, is beating the patriotic drum, in order to 
win over the Jingo elements. It is significant of Bryan's 
real views that he regrets that we did not support his 
well-known attempt at mediation ; therefore, I again rec- 
ommend that we should endeavor to bring about an at- 
tempt at mediation in some form, in case the position 
here becomes critical. This would be a good argumen- 
turn ad hominem in order to avoid war. Another way 
out, which is recommended, is that we should renew our 
offer to give up submarine warfare provided that Eng- 
land adheres to the principles of International Law, and 
gives up her policy of starvation. The position is in 
any case very serious; I hope and believe that we shall 
find a way out of the present crisis, but in case of any 
such recurrence, no solution can be guaranteed." 

American indignation was directed particularly 
against Dr. Dernburg, who had defended, in public, the 
torpedoing of the Lusitania. I had, therefore, no other 
resource but to advise him to leave the country of his 
own accord. He would probably have been deported in 
any case, and his continued presence in America could 
no longer serve any useful purpose, while it was to be 
hoped that his voluntary departure would appease the 
popular wrath in some degree, and postpone the immi- 
nent rupture of diplomatic relations. The sea was rag- 



146 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

ing and demanded a sacrifice. I sent the following re- 
port to Berlin on the subject of Dr. Dernburg's resolve 
to leave the country: 

"Washington, May 17th, 1915. 

*'As I have already wired to your Excellency, Dr. 
Dernburg has decided to leave the country of his own 
free will. I believe that, in so doing, he is rendering 
a great service to the Fatherland, a service rendered 
easier by the fact that he could no longer hope to con- 
tinue in the exercise of his former duties. As I have 
already reported, he had exposed himself to attack by 
our enemies by his action in going counter to the present 
outbreak of hysterical feeling in a speech and an inter- 
view which were, unfortunately, not in accordance with 
your Excellency's instructions, received by me on the fol- 
lowing day. So long as Dernburg only wrote articles 
for the papers, he rendered distinguished and highly ap- 
preciated service, but when he commenced to deliver 
speeches at German- American meetings he trod on very 
dangerous ground. On this point we are all in agree- 
ment here. In any case, in war every possible method 
must be tried, and if any individual is sacrificed it must 
be regarded as unfortunately unavoidable. 

"When I informed Mr. Bryan that Dr. Dernburg had 
decided to return home if the American Government 
would secure him a safe conduct from our enemies, the 
satisfaction of the Secretary of State was even more pro- 
nounced than I had expected. He remarked that Dr. 
Dernburg's speeches had given rise to the suspicion that 
the German Government wished to inflame the minds of 
the American people against President Wilson's adminis- 
tration. It might be possible, now that there were no 
longer any grounds for this idea, to avoid an immediate 
rupture, of diplomatic relations." 



THE ^'LUSITANIA'^ INCIDENT 147 

On May 13th the American Government dispatched a 
strongly worded Note to Berlin, which restated their 
point of view, as previously given. I reproduce textually 
the following passage from the Note, which, from the 
point of view of subsequent events, is of fundamental 
importance. 

"The Government of the United States, therefore, de- 
sires to call the attention of the Imperial German Gov- 
ernment with the utmost earnestness to the fact that the 
objection to their present method of attack against the 
trade of their enemies lies in the practical impossibility 
of employing submarines in the destruction of commerce 
without disregarding those rules of fairness, reason, jus- 
tice, and humanity, which all modern opinion regards as 
imperative. It is practically impossible for the officers 
of a submarine to visit a merchantman at sea and exam- 
ine her papers and cargo. It is practically impossible 
for them to make a prize of her; and, if they cannot 
put a prize crew on board of her, they cannot sink her 
without leaving her crew and all on board of her to the 
mercy of the sea in her small boats. . . . Manifestly 
submarines cannot be used against merchantmen, as 
the last few weeks have shown, without an inevitable 
violation of many sacred principles of justice and hu- 
manity. 

"American citizens act within their indisputable rights 
in taking their ships and in travelling wherever their 
legitimate business calls them on the high seas, and exer- 
cise those rights in what should be the well- justified con- 
fidence that their lives will not be endangered by acts 
done in clear violation of universally acknowledged in- 
ternational obligations, and certainly in the confidence 
that their own Government will sustain them in the exer- 
cise of their rights. 



148 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

** There was recently published in the newspapers of 
the United States, I regret to inform the Imperial Ger- 
man Government, a formal warning, purporting to come 
from the Imperial Germany Embassy at "Washington, ad- 
dressed to the people of the United States, and stating, 
in effect, that any citizen of the United States who exer- 
cised his right of free travel, upon the seas, would do 
so at his peril if his journey should take him within the 
zone of waters within which the Imperial German Navy 
was using submarines against the commerce of Great 
Britain and France, notwithstanding the respectful, but 
very earnest protests of his Government, the Government 
of the United States. I do not refer to this for the pur- 
pose of calling the attention of the Imperial German 
Government at this time to the surprising irregularity 
of a communication from the Imperial Germany Embassy 
at Washington addressed to the people of the United 
States through the newspapers, but only for the purpose 
of pointing out that no warning that an unlawful and 
inhumane act will be committed can possibly be ac- 
cepted as an excuse or palliation for' that act or as an 

abatement of the responsibility for its commission. 
#-* « « « « m «> 

**The Government of the United States cannot believe 
that the commanders of the vessels which committed 
these acts of lawlessness did so except under a misappre- 
hension of the orders issued by the Imperial German 
naval authorities. ... It confidently expects, therefore, 
that the Imperial German Government will disavow the 
acts of which the Government of the United States com- 
plains, that they will make reparation so far as repara- 
tion is possible for injuries which are without measure, 
and that they will take immediate steps to prevent the 
recurrence of anything so obviously subversive of the 
principles of warfare for which the Imperial German 



THE *'LUSITANIA" INCIDENT 149 

Goverimient have in the past so wisely and firmly con- 
tended. 

* * * • • * •• 

"The Imperial German Government will not expect the 
Government of the United States to omit any word or 
any act necessary to the performance of its sacred duty 
of maintaining the rights of the United States and its 
citizens and of safeguarding their free exercise and en- 
joyment/' 

The demands contained in the above Note would have 
made the continuance of the submarine campaign impos- 
sible, and this was, no doubt, the intention of the Union 
Government. The German answer of May 28th, which 
defended the torpedoing of the Lusitania on the grounds 
that she should be considered as an auxiliary cruiser and 
provided with guns, changed the situation in no way. 
Besides, the Lusitania had ammunition and Canadian 
troops on board; there can be no doubt that the main 
reason why she sank so rapidly was the exploding of her 
cargo of ammunition by the torpedo which struck her. 
With regard to the loss of human life, the German Gov- 
ernment had already expressed, to the neutral Powers 
concerned, its deep regret for the death of their subjects 
— ^I had in person conveyed these regrets to the United 
States Government a few days after the destruction of 
the Lusitania. 

After this first exchange of Notes, the gulf between 
the two points of view appeared fixed, and was bound 
in face of the prevalent excitement to lead to a severance 
of diplomatic relations, unless sufficient time were gained 
to allow the storms of passion to abate. Telegraphic 
communication between the German Government and the 
Embassy at Washington was carried out by a circuitous 
route, which made it extremely slow; thus I was com- 



« 



150 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

pelled to decide on my own responsibility and take im- 
mediate action. I fully realized that the rupture of diplo- 
matic relations would mean war. In America we were 
face to face with a vigorous hostile propaganda, which 
had as its sole object to draw the United States into war, 
and thus bring about a decision by force of arms. From 
the time of the Lusitania incident onwards, the diplomatic 
struggle between ourselves and the Entente was centred 
entirely around the question of the future action of the 
United States. The threatened rupture of relations be- 
tween that country and Germany would have left the field 
open for hostile propaganda, by taking from us all chance 
of combating it. War would thus have been inevitable 
sooner or later. The first and most urgent necessity was, 
therefore, the avoidance of such a rupture at whatever 
cost, and my efforts were now solely directed to this end. 
As things turned out, it might, perhaps, have been better 
if the United States had actually gone to war at this 
moment. Her military pressure, and our consequent de- 
feat, would have come two years earlier, before the Ger- 
man people had been demoralized and exhausted by four 
years of war and blockade. But at that time I had good 
hopes of being able to bring about peace through Amer- 
ican mediation, and consequently wished to gain time 
at all costs. 

I resolved, without waiting for instructions from Ber- 
lin, to make use of my privileged position as Ambassador 
to demand an audience with the President. I heard later, 
among other things when I was at Manila, that on this 
very day, June 2nd, all preparations had been made for 
breaking off relations, and for the inevitable resulting 
war. As a result of my interview, however, they were 
cancelled. I had a long conversation with the President 
and two of his advisers. Mr. Wilson felt the position 
acutely, and was animated solely by a desire to preserve 



THE ''LUSITANIA" INCIDENT 151 

peace. We both realized that it was a question of gaining 
time, and succeeded in coming to an agreement on the 
measures to be taken to mitigate the crisis. We took the 
view that the isolation of Germany had given rise to an 
atmosphere of misunderstanding between her and the 
United States, and that the establishment of some sort 
of personal relationship might be expected to ease this 
tension ; I, therefore, proposed, and the President agreed, 
that Meyer Gerhardt, a member of the Privy Council, who 
had accompanied Dr. Dernburg to America, and was then 
acting on behalf of the German Red Cross, should at 
once go to Germany and report in person to the Govern- 
ment. Mr. Wilson, for his part, undertook that no final 
decision should be taken until Meyer Gerhardt had re- 
ported the results of his mission. 

At the end of this interview I was convinced in my 
own mind that the President would never enter on war 
with Germany, otherwise I could not conceive why he 
should have concurred in my proposals instead of break- 
ing off relations at once. He would, had he chosen the 
latter course, have had American public opinion more 
decidedly behind him than it was later, at the time of the 
final breach. Not a voice would have been raised in op- 
position, except that of the Secretary of State, Mr. Bryan, 
who, as it was, resigned his office on the ground that the 
exchange of Notes threatened to involve the United 
States in war, and could not be reconciled, therefore, with 
his own pacific intentions. 

It is certain that if I had not at this stage of th6 Lust- 
tania crisis had my interview with the President, rela- 
tions would have been broken off and war between the 
United States and Germany must inevitably have fol- 
lowed. The view is stiU held in many quarters that we 
might safely have disregarded American susceptibilities, 
as President Wilson was entirely averse to war and would 



152 MY THEEE YEAES IN AMERICA 

have avoided it by whatever means ; then we shonld have 
been free to carry on our submarine campaign. This 
was not the opinion held by myself or any of my col- 
leagues at the Embassy, and later events proved us to 
have been in the right, as against those Germans and 
German- Americans, who, in May, 1915, and afterwards, 
averred that the United States would never declare war 
on us, and maintained the same view in January and 
February, 1917. The principles of my later policy were 
based on the events of this Lusitunia crisis ; I had then 
gathered the conviction that Mr. Wilson wanted peace 
but the country wanted war ; that the President alone had 
prevented an immediate rupture, but that as the respon- 
sible leader of the American people, he would be com- 
pelled to bow eventually to public opinion. When Mr. 
Wilson had to explain away his unlucky speech at Phila- 
delphia, no action was taken from the German side, and 
no information given him which might lead him to under- 
stand that Germany desired to avoid a casus belli at all 
costs, for fear of giving Mr. Wilson an opportunity to 
gain a cheap triumph over Germany in a verbal wrangle. 

I believe it unjust to Mr. Wilson to suppose that he 
wished to bluff us into surrender at this time. He had, 
while fully realizing the danger of war, sought all ways 
and means to avoid it, and on this hypothesis my whole 
policy was founded. Moreover the President had then 
mentioned to me for the first time that he was consider- 
ing an attempt at mediation between the belligerents. 

After my audience at the White House I sent the fol- 
lowing wire to the Foreign Office: 

Cipher 
"Washington, June 2nd, 1915. 
** Seriousness of the present situation here induced me 
to seek interview with President Wilson. In most cordial 



THE ''LUSITANIA" INCIDENT 153 

exchange of views, in course of which we repeatedly em- 
phasized our mutual desire to find some solution of the 
present difficulties, Wilson always came back to point 
that he was concerned purely with humanitarian aspect 
of matter, and that question of indemnification for loss 
of American lives in Lusitania was only of secondary im- 
portance. His main object was complete cessation of 
submarine warfare, and from point of view of this ulti- 
mate aim, smaller concessions on our part could only 
be regarded as half measures. It behooved us by giving 
up submarine campaign to appeal to moral sense of 
world; for issue of the war could never be finally decided 
by armies but only by peace of understanding. Our vol- 
untary cessation of submarine warfare would inspire 
Wilson to press for a raising of English hunger blockade. 
Reliable reports from London state that present Cabinet 
would agree to this. Wilson hopes that this might be 
first stage in a peace movement on large scale, which he 
would introduce as head of leading neutral Powers, 

** American reply may be expected to lay little stress 
on purely legal aspect of matter and to dwell rather on 
question of humanity, emphatically enough, but as Wil- 
son told me, in a sharper form. 

** President remarked that on one point at least we 
should be in agreement, as both Germany and United 
States of America had always been in favor of freedom 
of seas. 

"Cordiality of conversation must not blind our eyes 
to seriousness of situation. If our next Note does not 
tend to tranquillize matters, Wilson is bound to recall his 
Ambassador. I recommend most earnestly that this 
should be avoided at all costs, in view of its disastrous 
moral effect and fact that this result would be immediate 
increase in export of munitions, and in financial support 



154 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

for our enemies on immense scale. Good prospect ex- 
ists of success of present movement for forbidding export 
of arms should understanding be reached ; and also move- 
ment by Wilson in direction of peace is sure to follow. 
Decisive factor in result is that our reply should strike 
correct note from point of view of public opinion, which 
is decisive factor in balance here. For this essential to 
leave out legal details and to lift discussion to level of 
humanitarian standpoint. Meyer Gerhardt leaves to- 
morrow- for Germany as Red Cross representative ; he 
wUl report fully in Berlin on situation. Beg that our 
reply be held up till his arrival. Wilson cbncurs in this. ' ' 

Meyer Gerhardt was in a position to give for the first 
time a full and accurate review of the American situation 
to the Berlin authorities. I had given him most precise 
information of my own views and had placed him in full 
possession of the details of my interview with Mr. Wil- 
son. For the rest I had to content myself with short 
telegrams by circuitous routes. During our conversation, 
however, the President offered for the first time to permit 
me to dispatch a cipher telegram through the State De- 
partment, to be sent on by the American Embassy in 
Berlin. My reports as a matter of fact were somewhat 
infrequent and always short, as we had to put all our 
messages into cipher, and this was not always possible. 
In explanation of the inevitable incompleteness of my 
communication with the Foreign Office, I may remark 
that the telegrams of the Wolff and Trans-Ocean Bureaus 
were regarded as the main sources of information for 
either side, and that I made use of various arrangements 
of words, to which the Foreign Office alone had the key, 
for the purpose of making my own views easily distin- 
guishable in these telegrams. 



THE **LUSITANIA'» INCIDENT 155 

Meyer Gerhardt, armed with a certificate from Mr. 
Bryan, to the effect that he was undertaking his journey 
at the express desire of the .American Government, 
crossed over to Germany with aU possible speed. It 
may be doubted if the English authorities would have 
taken any notice of this safe conduct, but by good fortune 
the Norwegian vessel which took him over escaped the 
attention of their cruisers. His mission was so far suc- 
cessful that the excitement in the United States had time 
to die down somewhat and the first crisis in German- 
American relations was thereby tided over satisfactorily. 
Apart from that, Meyer Gerhardt's mission had no effect 
on the future course of negotiations. The exchange of 
Notes between Washington and Berlin continued without 
an understanding being arrived at; both Governments 
persisting in their original points of view. 

The second American Note, dispatched on June 10th, 
led to the resignation of Mr. Bryan, the Secretary of 
State. He considered that American citizens should be 
forbidden to take passage in vessels bearing the flag of 
any belligerent nation, and holding these views as he did, 
declined to make himself responsible for a further ex- 
change of Notes which he believed was bound in thq end 
to result in war. 

The resignation of the Secretary of State had another 
diplomatic prelude of a tragi-comic character. The 
Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, Dr. Dumba, besought 
Mr. Bryan to discuss the German- American conflict with 
him ; both gentlemen wished to find some solution to the 
dispute and hoped that the Ambassadors not directly 
concerned in it might profitably try to mediate. It was 
said later, and probably with truth, that there was a 
mutual misunderstanding on this subject; but whatever 
be the truth of that, Dr. Dumba took upon himself to 



156 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

send a radiogram to Vienna, by way of Nauen, in wMch 
he gave the following resume of Mr. Bryan's views: 

**The United States desire no war. Her Notes, how- 
ever strongly worded, meant no harm, but had to be writ- 
ten in order to pacify the excited public opinion of Amer- 
ica. The Berlin Government therefore need not feel 
itself injured, but need only make suitable concessions if 
it desires to put an end to the dispute." 

This telegram from Dr. Dumba had just reached the 
German Foreign Office at the moment when the Ameri- 
can Ambassador arrived to inform the Under Secretary 
of State, Zimmermann, in his customary blunt and abrupt 
manner, that Germany must yield to America's demands 
or war would inevitably follow. Zimmermann thereupon, 
with the object of causing Mr. Gerard to moderate his 
tone, showed him Dumba 's wire, which pointed to the 
inference that the attitude of the American Ambassador 
was merely a bluff. Mr. Gerard, as in duty bound, re- 
ported the facts to Washington; mutual recriminations 
ensued and the Press got hold of the story (nothing ever 
remained a secret for long in the American capital). 
The general impression there was that Germany, once 
she were convinced of America 's serious intentions to ap- 
peal if necessary to arms, would back down ; and that now 
Mr. Bryan was made to appear as a wrecker of the Pres- 
ident's policy. His resignation thus became more neces- 
sary than ever, and Mr. Lansing, hitherto head of the 
State Department of Justice, replaced him. American 
opinion, however, laid the chief blame' for what had oc- 
curred on Dr. Diomba, who was henceforward regarded 
as a dangerous intriguer. 

Mr. Lansing was a lawyer, not a politician, and looked 
at everything from the point of view of a lawyer and his 



THE *'LUSITANIA" INCIDENT 157 

position as the President's sole legal adviser. He was, 
so to speak, Mr. Wilson's legal conscience. My personal 
relations with him were always extremely cordial. 

Mr. Bryan's point of view was in every sense that of 
a neutral. The only really effective way of safeguard- 
ing American interests was, of course, to forbid the use 
of hostile passenger ships by citizens of the United 
States, who could perfectly well travel on their own 
vessels, or those of Holland or Scandinavia. However, 
the greater part of American public opinion did not ac- 
cept this strict view of neutrality, and Mr. Wilson, there- 
fore, adapted himself to the predominant opinion. It 
was useless for us to demand that the President should 
interpret his neutrality in the manner most convenient 
to us; we had to accept the fact that his ideas on this 
subject were neither ours nor Mr. Bryan's, and, on this 
basis, endeavor to come to an understanding with Mr. 
Wilson, if we did not intend to bring the United States 
into the war. It must be remembered that, as I have 
already said, we had no means of bringing pressure to 
bear on America, whereas from her point of view war 
with Germany would be a comparatively simple affair, 
which would involve no vital risks for her, but would, 
on the contrary, greatly benefit her from an industrial 
point of view, besides gratifying the jingoes, by giving 
them an opportunity of making full use of their long- 
desired Army, Navy and commercial fleet. There could 
be considered, as factors tending to the preservation of 
peace, only the pacific sentiment of the majority of the 
people working in alliance with the dilatory policy of 
the President, who still nourished a hope that some fa- 
vorable turn or other in events, or perhaps the advent 
of peace, would give him a chance to avoid breaking 
off relations with Germany. 

The diplomatic incident, mentioned above, made such 



158 MY THBEE YEAES IN AMEEICA 

an impression on Mr. Gerard, as to induce him to make, 
on his own initiative in Berlin, at the time when the 
American Note of 10th June had to be answered, a pro- 
posal which met with a by no means cordial reception. 
His suggestion was that a certain number of passenger 
ships, detailed beforehand for the purpose, and rendered 
clearly recognizable, should be used for the transport of 
Americans to England; but though this scheme was em- 
bodied in the German Note of 8th July, it was at once 
rejected at Washington. Any assent to it would no doubt 
have involved a further departure from the principles 
laid down by the American Government — principles which 
it desired should be generally accepted, but which had 
already been in some measure compromised. The vessels 
which it was suggested should be employed in this service 
were to be marked in red, white and blue stripes, and 
as barbers' shops in the United States are decorated in 
this manner, they were called ** Barber Ships.'* 

On the 21st of July, the final American Note on the 
Lusitania case was dispatched. The Washington Gov- 
ernment modified their position to the extent that they 
recognized the legality of submarine warfare, provided 
that before the sinking of any merchant ship, the crew 
and passengers were given a chance to leave in safety; 
in the main, however, the Note maintained the original 
American point of view. It read as follows: 

*'If a belligerent cannot retaliate against an enemy 
without injuring the lives of neutrals as well as their 
property, humanity as well as justice and due regard for 
the dignity of neutral Powers should dictate that the 
practice be discontinued. If persisted in it would in 
such circumstances constitute an unpardonable offence 
against the Sovereignty of the neutral nation affected 
. . . the Government of the United States cannot believe 



THE '^LUSITANIA^^ INCIDENT 159 

that the Imperial Government will longer refrain from 
disavowing the wanton act of its naval commander in 
sinking the Lusitcmia or offering reparation for the 
American lives lost, so far as reparation can be made for 
the needless destruction of human life by that illegal act. 
**In the meanwhile the very value which this Govern- 
ment sets upon the long, unbroken friendship between 
the people and Government of the United States and the 
people and Government of the German nation, impels it 
to press most solemnly upon the Imperial German Gov- 
ernment the necessity for the scrupulous observance of 
neutral rights. This is a critical matter. Friendship 
itself prompts it to say to the Imperial Government that 
repetition by the commanders of German naval vassels 
of acts in contravention of those rights must be regarded 
by the Government of the United States when they affect 
American citizens as deliberately unfriendly.^* 

The first act of the German- American negotiations on 
the subject of submarine warfare thus closed with this 
open threat that war would follow any further action 
by Germany on the lines of the torpedoing of the Lusi- 
tania. 

I think it well to reproduce here four of my reports, 
dated from Cedarhurst, a suburb of New York, where 
the Embassy usually had its headquarters during the hot 
summer months. 

(1) Cipher 

** Cedarhurst, June 9th, 1915. 
**The political outlook in America appears at present 
as calm as a summer's day. The position abroad is per- 
haps reacting on internal affairs to some extent, as Mr. 
Wilson, as is usual in this country, considers foreign 



160 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

affairs primarily from the point of view of their influence 
on the prospects of next year's presidential campaign. 

**The tide of anti-German feeling aroused by the Lusi^ 
tania incident is still running pretty high, but it may 
now be regarded as certain, that neither the President 
nor the American people want a war with Germany. Mr. 
Wilson, then, will, I believe, have public opinion on his 
side, if he can find an honorable solution to his differ- 
ences with us, and make use of this solution as the basis 
for a peace movement on a large scale. I am now even 
more convinced than I was a short time ago, at the time 
of my long interview with him, that the President's ideas 
are developing in this direction, and that this is the cause 
of his suddenly taking up the Mexican question again, 
as he hopes to find in it a means of diverting public opin- 
ion. I am unwilling to give any grounds for exaggerated 
optimism, but my recent observations incline me to the 
belief that the President and his Cabinet are more neu- 
tral than is commonly supposed. England's influence 
here is tremendous, permeating as it does through many 
channels, which we have no means of closing; but the 
Central Government, none the less, is really trying to 
maintain a neutral attitude. It is an astonishing thing, 
no doubt, but well established none the less, that all in- 
fluential Americans who come from New York, Boston, 
and Philadelphia, the English headquarters in this coun- 
try, to Washington, complain about the pro-German feel- 
ing there. I feel sure in my own mind that the Govern- 
ment hopes, by reviving the Mexican question, to dimin- 
ish the export of arms and munitions to Europe. Public 
opinion, apart from the anti-German clique, would prob- 
ably welcome such a move, as it is widely felt that the 
traffic in arms and munitions is hardly consistent with 
the continual appeals to humanity sent out all over the 
world from Washington. My general impression, as will 



THE '^LUSITANIA^' INCIDENT 161 

be seen from the above, is that Mr. Wilson considers his 
best chance of re-election lies in bringing peace to Europe 
and restoring order in Mexico ; for the latter purpose he 
will probably employ General Iturbide, who spent the 
whole of last winter in New York and Washington. He 
was at one time governor of the district of Mexico City, 
where he acquitted himself with courage and credit. He 
impressed me personally as a man of great ability. He 
should be able to find sufficient partisans in Mexico to 
enable him to raise an army, and the bankers of New 
York would be prepared to advance him the necessary 
sums. General Iturbide enjoys the full confidence of the 
present Administration, but only the future can show 
whether he will succeed in establishing a stable Govern- 
ment in Mexico, without the intervention of the United 
States.'' 

(2) Cipher 

*'Cedarhurst, 12th June, 1915. 

"Since the publication of President Wilson's second 
Note on the Imsitania incident, the daily Press has been 
busy with conjectures as to the real reasons for Mr. 
Bryan's resignation. It is generally agreed that the 
Note itself could hardly have been the occasion of the 
Cabinet crisis ; as Bryan had concurred in the first Note, 
and there was no reason, therefore, why he should not 
have assented to the second one as well. On the other 
hand, no one can believe that the controversj^ with Ger- 
many was in reality simply an excuse for a personal trial 
of strength between Wilson and Bryan, after the manner 
of the earlier rivalry between Taft and Roosevelt. 

*^ Bryan has now published in the World a manifesto 
addressed to the German-American community defend- 
ing his attitude in this matter; but it is fortunately 
couched in terms which are unlikely to find favor in the 



162 MY THEEE YEAES IN AMERICA 

eyes of those for whose benefit it was written. It would 
certainly be undesirable from our point of view that 
Bryan should be regarded as the champion of the Ger- 
man cause in this country; no useful result could follow 
from such advocacy. We must use all our efforts to come 
to an understanding with Mr. Wilson, if possible without 
compromising our present point of view; he is undoubt- 
edly at the moment the most influential man in the coun- 
try, and if he is antagonized we shall be powerless against 
himi" 

(3) Cipher 

*'Cedarhurst, July 2nd, 1915. 
**In spite of the English interference with the Ameri- 
can mails reported here to-day, I hope that the reports 
dispatched in the ordinary course of my duty have all 
reached your Excellency safely. In case they have not 
done so, I may report that since my audience with Mr. 
Wilson, the removal of the * agitator* Dernburg, the mis- 
sion of Meyer Gerhardt, and the arrival of the Press tele- 
grams from Berlin giving details of the last-named, 
things have been pretty quiet generally; the situation 
has reverted to the normal, and will remain normal if 
our next Note shows a conciliatory disposition. I might 
even go further, and say that the Lusitania incident, tak- 
ing it all in all, despite the manner in which we dealt 
with it, has exercised and will exercise in the future a 
favorable influence on our mutual relations. Of course 
it has brought us into even greater odium with our avowed 
enemies ; Anglophile * Society' in New York, Philadelphia 
and Boston is infuriated, and the Wall Street magnates 
are little better ; but these two cliques have always been 
inveterate supporters of England. The Government has 
lost ground for the first time as a result of the Lusitania 
incident, and it now fully realizes the importance of these 



THE ''LUSITANIA'* INCIDENT 163 

questions of sea warfare ; whereas when I first spoke in 
February, March and April to various exalted person- 
ages about the submarine campaign and kindred mat- 
ters, no one would listen to me, and the full seriousness 
of the situation was quite unrealized. Now, however, *the 
freedom of the seas' has become the test question of 
American politics. Every preparation has been made to 
take energetic measures with regard to England if our 
answer to the last American Note renders further nego- 
tiations possible. Even the New York Press has become 
more reasonable, and capable of discussing war questions 
impartially ; and this was notably the case over the torpe- 
doing of the Armenian. In a word, at no time since the 
outbreak of war have the omens been so favorable for a 
rational policy on the part of America." 

"Cedarhurst, July 22nd, 1915. 

**If we ask what have been the results of our eleven 
weeks* negotiations over the Lusitania incident, and 
which involved the employment of all our available arts 
of persuasion, we may well reply that we have, despite 
our grave difficulties, averted the severance of diplomatic 
relations, and the inevitable war that must have followed. 
The former possibility, at all events, was at one time 
considerably more probable than most people in Germany 
are aware of. 

** There could have been but one opinion among those 
who saw and felt it as to the popular attitude of mind 
during the first few weeks following the Lusitania inci- 
dent. In such circumstances we had only one possible 
resource left to us, to gain time, and hope for the restor- 
ation of a more friendly disposition in this country. 
The continuation of negotiations rendered this contin- 
gency- possible ; and so matters eventually turned out. 

**We can hope for further results only if the American 



164 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

Government decides to institute simultaneous negotia- 
tians with Berlin and London, with the object of bring- 
ing about a settlement. Our own views and those of 
America are radically divergent, and no mere one-sided 
discussion between us can bridge the gulf. The Ameri- 
can Government went too far in its first Note to allow of 
its withdrawing now; although it admits our submarine 
campaign to have been a legitimate form of reprisal 
against the English hunger blockade, it still persists in 
holding us responsible for damage to American lives and 
limbs resulting from these reprisals. Put briefly the 
demands of the United States are therefore : 

**1. A full apology in some form or other, and indem- 
nification for the lives lost in the Lusitania. 

**2. An undertaking that no passenger ships shall in 
future be sunk without preliminary warning. 

**The latest Note from America, which is already on 
its way to Berlin, will in a sense bring the negotiations 
to a conclusion, as the Government want to have a defi- 
nite basis of agreement which may form the foundation 
of their discussions with England. In my conversations 
with Mr. Lansing I have been given to understand that 
the Government wish to know verbally or in writing 
whether we are in a position to incline somewhat to the 
American point of view, and whether we can see our way 
to assist the present Government to secure by means of 
joint conversations with Germany and England the free- 
dom of the seas, which has always been the main object 
of Mr. Wilson's endeavors." 

Dr. Dernburg returned to Germany in the middle of 
June, having been provided, by request of the American 
Government, with a safe conduct from the Entente. 1 



THE **LUSITANIA'' INCIDENT 165 

went to New York to take leave of Dr. Dernbnrg and 
invited a few friends to dinner in the roof -garden of the 
Ritz-Carlton Hotel on the eve of his departure. One 
incident of our gathering may be regarded as typical of 
the atmosphere of these Lusitania days : a party of people 
for whom the next table to ours had been reserved re- 
fused to take it, as they declined to sit down in the neigh- 
borhood of Germans. 

After Dr. Dernburg's departure I deemed it advisable, 
in view of the popular hostility towards us, to redistrib- 
ute the greater part of Dr. Dernburg's duties. I did so, 
therefore, in agreement with the Foreign Office, and with 
the assistance of Dernburg's former colleague. Council- 
lor Albert took over, in addition to his former business 
with the Central Purchasing Company, all financial and 
economic affairs, and was attached to the Embassy as 
commercial adviser. Dr. Alexander Fuehr became Chief 
of the Press Bureau and Captain Hecker took over the 
duties connected with the German Red Cross. Unfor- 
tunately the generosity of many in America, and partic- 
ularly those of German descent, has not been fully rec- 
ognized or appreciated by the people of Germany. The 
total sum remitted to Germany for our Red Cross and 
other similar societies amounts to over 20,000,000 marks. 
The disillusion of our people at home when they realized 
the slight political influence exercised by the German- 
American element in the United States has led them to 
overlook their great achievements in the cause of char- 
ity, which were inspired by a heartfelt sympathy with 
the sufferings of the German nation. 



CHAPTER VII 
THE "ARABIC" INCIDENT 

A PEW days after the dispatch of the last American 
Note concerning the Lusitania incident, on July 21st, 
1915, Mr. Lansing asked me to caU on him. He then told 
me that the American Government had come to the end 
of its resources, and if any further cases occurred of loss 
of American lives by the torpedoing of merchant ships, 
war must inevitably result. The United States Govern- 
ment intended to write no more Notes, which had been 
proved useless, but would request me to undertake fur- 
ther negotiations in person. My action in the Lusitania 
incident had given proof of my earnest desire to avoid 
war, and the American Government were confident that 
I should succeed, even under such difficult conditions, in 
finding some way out of the present impasse. 

From this time onwards, Mr. Lansing agreed with me 
that, as a regular thing, I should be permitted, whatever 
negotiations were going on, to send cipher dispatches to 
my Government through the channels of the State De- 
partment and the American Embassy in Berlin. It will 
be remembered that a similar privilege had been granted 
me at the time of the Lusitania incident. 

My sole ground of hope for success lay in one passage 
of the American Note of July 21st, which read as follows : 

**The Government of the United States and the Impe- 
rial German Government, contending for the same great 
object, long stood together in urging the very principles 

166 



THE **AEABIG'» INCIDENT 167 

on which the Government of the United States now so 
solemnly insists. They are both contending for the free- 
dom of the seas. The Government of the United States 
will continue to contend for that freedom from whatever 
quarter it is violated, without compromise and at any 
cost. It invites the practical co-operation of the Impe- 
rial German Government at this time, when. co-operation 
may accomplish most, and this great common object can 
be most strikingly and effectively achieved. The Impe- 
rial German Government expresses the hope that this 
object may in some measure be accomplished even before 
the present war ends. It can be. 

**The Government of the United States not only feels 
obliged to insist upon it, by whomsoever it is violated or 
ignored, in the protection of its own citizens, but it is 
also deeply interested in seeing it made practicable be- 
tween the belligerents themselves. It holds itself ready 
at any time to act as a common friend who may be privi- 
leged to suggegt a way." 

It seemed possible to reach some sort of agreement on 
the basis of the above request from America that we 
should co-operate in endeavoring to restore the freedom 
of the seas; but there remained the question of finding 
a formula which should serve as a basis for the settle- 
ment of the Lusitcmia question and prevent any repeti- 
tion of such incidents. 

I was aware that there were two political counter-cur- 
rents in Berlin: the one party desiring at all costs to 
prevent war with the United States, the other preferring 
to risk war for the sake of continuing the submarine 
campaign. I was clearly bound to co-operate with the 
first named, as I was convinced that America 's participa- 
tion in the war would certainly result in our eventual 
defeat; this view was, I knew, that Von Jagow, Secre- 



168 MY THBEE YEARS IN AMERICA 

tary of State for Foreign Affairs, whose opinion on this 
point was identical with mine. Up to January 31st, 
1917, however, I conld never ascertain which of these 
two views was the accepted one in Berlin, although, of 
course, I always hoped that the party of common sense 
would eventually prevail, nor was I able to discover what 
degree of success, if any, Meyer Gerhardt, who had been 
sent to represent my views to the authorities in Berlin, 
or Dr. Dernburg, who was working for the same end, had 
managed to achieve. As will be seen from my account 
of the subsequent course of events, my information on 
this point was very insufficient, and I was not even made 
acquainted with the views of the Berlin Government, on 
the conduct of the submarine campaign, or on the subse- 
quent peace proposals put forward by the President, I 
was never informed beforehand as to the real intentions 
of Berlin, and I cannot understand, even to-day, why I 
was not told, until after the Arabic incident, that the Ger- 
man submarine commanders had been instructed imme- 
diately after the torpedoing of the Lusitania not to at- 
tack liners. A knowledge of this fact at the time would 
have assisted me greatly in my dealings with "Washing- 
ton. I do not intend to assert that in all this there was 
any deliberate neglect on the part of the Berlin Gov- 
ernment, but neither, on the other hand, can I credit the 
commonly accepted explanation that the technical diffi- 
culties of transmitting reports were insuperable. It 
should have been possible to give me definite information 
on these matters by any one of the various channels of 
communication which were available between the Foreign 
Office and the Embassy at Washington. No other ex- 
planation is possible, except that which is to be found in 
the conflict of the two parties in Germany. The head 
of the Foreign Office was well aware that my policy in 
Washington was the same as his omu in Berlin, but he 



THE ''ARABIC" INCIDENT 169 

was frequently unable to send me definite and early in- 
formation because he, himself, could not tell whether 
his own views could be accepted and acted upon. 
At this time I sent the following report to Berlin : 

**Cedarhurst, 28th July, 1915. 
**I have on more than one occasion respectfully begged 
your Excellency to be so good as to wait for my report 
before deciding whether the last American Lusitania 
Note is to be answered, and if a reply is to be sent, in 
what sense it should be drafted. Neither the Govern- 
ment nor public opinion considers such a reply absolutely 
necessary, so that there is no danger in delay; but I re- 
spectfully request that I may be permitted at all events 
to undertake further negotiations here, verbally and con- 
fidentially, even if my instructions have to be sent by 
letter. Experience has proved that negotiations, if they 
are to have any prospect of success with the American 
Government, must be carried on in Washington. Both 
President Wilson and Mr. Lansing are now prepared to 
attempt to reach an agreement by this means. In Ger- 
many, where the tone of the American Note must have 
appeared unnecessarily abrupt, this fact is perhaps not 
realized ; the explanation of course is that Mr. Wilson was 
carried away by the popular excitement over the Lusi- 
tania incident, and was, thus, compelled to adopt an in- 
transigeant attitude, from which he cannot now recede, 
without making his position impossible here. Then 
besides the resignation of Mr. Bryan, and that unfortu- 
nate telegram of Dr. Dumba's, which has become known 
here, has convinced him that we are not in earnest. 
Finally, he wishes to come to some kind of settlement 
with us by means of this exchange of Notes, in order that 
he may then turn his attention to England ; and his well- 
known pride confirms him in the view that only after he 



170 MY THEEE YEARS IN AMERICA 

has concluded Ms negotiations with ns, can he take np the 
matter with her. It should be clearly understood that 
Mr. Wilson does not want war with us, nor does he wish 
to side with England, despite all statements to the con- 
trary in the Press of the Eastern States. This Press, in 
agreement with other powerful and influential circles is 
Anglophile to a degree and not altogether averse to a war 
with Germany; but this view is not shared by Mr. Wilson, 
or the large majority of the American people. 

**The great danger of the present situation is that we 
may be driven to war, either by the efforts of this Press, 
or by a new Lusitania incident. What Mr. Wilson wants 
is to satisfy public opinion here, by the serious tone of 
the Note sent to us, and at the same time to induce us to 
make certain concessions and thus carry out his darling 
project of the freedom of the seas, by finding some middle 
course between the German and English views. In his 
last note, the President has certainly modified his views 
in our favor by his admission that submarine warfare 
is legitimate, whereas he formerly maintained that it 
could not be regarded as permissible from the point of 
view of international law. 

**It is not my business, even were I in possession of all 
the necessary facts, to say whether it would be better 
policy from our point of view, to reply to this Note, or to 
leave it unanswered ; I can only describe the situation, as 
it appears to me at the moment. From that point of view 
the decision must depend very largely on the results 
which we expect to follow from the submarine campaign. 
If this campaign is regarded as an end in itself, and we 
are justified in believing that it can bring about the over- 
throw of England, it would be wiser to leave the American 
note unanswered, and carry on with the submarine cam- 
paign and turn a deaf ear to neutral protests. If, on the 
other hand, this campaign is only a means to an end, the 



THE ''ARABIC' INCIDENT 171 

end being the removal or slackening of the British block- 
ade restrictions, then I beg respectfully to urge that it 
would be worth our while to make some concessions to 
President Wilson's convictions, in the hope of achieving 
our object through his co-operation. He is reported by a 
witness in whom I have complete confidence, to have said : 
*If I receive a favorable answer from Germany I will see 
this thing. through with England to the end.' 

** Before this report reaches your Excellency, "Wilson's 
Note will have been delivered to the English Government. 
If this is couched in as peremptory a tone as the one 
addressed to us, then I urgently recommend that we 
should endeavor to come to an agreement with the Ameri- 
can Government on the basis of the following draft note. 
I hope that your Excellency will send me an authoriza- 
tion by wireless — it should be sent in duplicate for greater 
safety's sake — to enter into negotiations on this basis; I 
believe that I can guarantee to find a satisfactory prin- 
ciple to serve as a weapon for Wilson in his attack on 
England. If we show ourselves ready to help him out of 
his present difficulties, I am sure he for his part will 
energetically prosecute against England his design of 
vindicating the validity of international law. *It can be,' 
said the President himself in his last Note. In these three 
words may be seen the conviction of Mr. Wilson, that he 
can impose his will upon England in this matter. 

**As I have already reported, I earnestly hope that it 
will be decided to reply to the American note ; and a reply 
should, to my mind, deal with these three points : 

** (1) Settlement of the Lusitania incident. In this con- 
nection it would be well to state that from the point of 
view of reprisals we were entirely justified in attacking 
the Lusitania. In so doing, however, we had no intention 
of taking American lives, and deeply regret that through 
a combination of unfortunate circumstances this has 



172 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

actually occurred. If any distress still exists among the 
survivors of the disaster, we should be quite prepared to 
leave the amount of financial compensation to be decided 
by a later agreement. 

** (2) We propose in the future course of the submarine 
campaign to abide by the practice recently adopted. As 
things stand at present, the arrangement is that no liner 
is to be torpedoed without warning. 

** (3) We should be prepared to support to the utmost 
of our power the efforts of President Wilson, to insist on 
the observation of the dictates of international law during 
the present conflict, and leave it to his discretion to enter 
into conversations to this end with the British Govern- 
ment. The Declaration of London might serve as a basis 
for these conversations, more especially as it was drawn 
up at the .time by the American Government. 

"If we act in accordance with these my respectful 
recommendations, the breakdown of the negotiations with 
England is the worst that can happen ; and then it would 
be clear for all the world to see that our enemies were to 
blame for this breakdown, and Mr. Wilson would come 
over to our side. Knowing the President as I do, I have 
not the slightest doubt of this." 

I gather from the account in Karl Helfferich's ** World 
War,'* Vol. IL, p. 322, that the Secretary of the Treasury 
in Berlin was in favor of this policy, which I held to be 
the only possible one. When he stated, as before men- 
tioned, that his proposal had found no support from the 
Foreign Office, I was much astonished. 

I was instructed to commence negotiations verbally and 
confidentially with Mr. Lansing on these lines, and was 
convinced myself that these would lead to nothing, so long 
as we persisted in carrying on our submarine campaign 
on the old lines. Policy should be based on what is 



THE ^'ARABIC' INCIDENT 173 

possible ; now it was not really possible to unite these two 
contradictory method^, and to come to an understanding 
with the United States over the freedom of the seas, and 
at the same time to bring her to agree to the continuation 
of submarine warfare on the existing lines. We were 
bound to decide once for all on the one policy or the other. 
I supposed that Berlin had decided for the former course 
of action, as I knew that our submarine commanders had 
lately been ordered to arrange for the rescue of non- 
combatants before torpedoing merchantmen, and I was 
confirmed in my supposition by the very fact that I had 
been authorized to open conversations with Mr. Lansing. 

Scarcely had these conversations begun, when on 
August 19th the passenger steamer Arabic was sunk, and 
again some American lives were lost. Excitement at once 
attained a high pitch, and once more we seemed to be on 
the brink of war. 

On August 20th I dispatched by one of my usual routes 
the following wire (written for reasons of safety in 
French) to the Foreign Office : 

**I fear I cannot prevent rupture this time if our 
answer in Arabic matter is not conciliatory ; I advise dis- 
patch of instructions to me at once to negotiate whole 
question. Situation may thus perhaps be saved.'* 

At the same time, without writing for instructions, I 
explained both officially and also through the Press that 
on our side the United States would be given full com- 
pensation, if the commander of the Arabic should be 
found to have been treacherously dealt with. It was my 
first preoccupation to calm the public excitement before 
it overflowed all bounds ; and I succeeded in so calming 
it. The action I thus took on my own responsibility 
turned out later to have been well advised, as, although 



174 MY THEEE YEAES IN AMERICA 

I did not know this at tlie time, the submarine com- 
mander's instructions had, in fact, been altered as a 
result of the disaster to the Lusitania. 

On the 24th of August, in accordance with instructions 
from Berlin, I wrote to Mr. Lansing the following letter, 
which was immediately published : 

**I have received instructions from my Government to 
address to you the following observations: Up to the 
present no reliable information has been received as to 
the circumstances of the torpedoing of the Arabic. The 
Imperial Government, therefore, trusts that the Govern- 
ment of the United States will refrain from taking any 
decided steps, so long as it only has before it one-sided 
reports which my Government believe do not in any way 
correspond to the facts. The Imperial Government hopes 
that it may be allowed an opportunity of being heard. It 
has no desire to call in question the good faith of those 
eyewitnesses whose stories have been published by the 
European Press, but it considers that account should be 
taken of the state of emotion, under the influence of which, 
this evidence was given, and which might well give rise 
to false impressions. If American subjects have really 
lost their lives by the torpedoing of this ship, it was 
entirely contrary to the intentions of my Government, 
which has authorized me to express to the Government 
of the United States their deepest regrets, and their most 
heartfelt sympathy." 

Fortunately, as already mentioned, orders had been 
given before the torpedoing of the Arabic, to all sub- 
marine commanders that no liner should be sunk before 
preliminary warning had been given, and the non-com- 
batants had been placed in safety, unless any ships tried 
to escape or offered resistance. At the end of August I 



THE '^ARABIC INCIDENT 175 

received an official statement to this effect, intended for 
my use in the negotiations over the Lusitania question. 
This statement caused the first hitch in these negotia- 
tions. The American Government regarded the term 
"liner'' as comprising every steamer plying on recog- 
nized routes as distinguished from the so-called *' tramp 
steamer." The German Naval authorities, on the other 
hand, averred that their reservation only applied to the 
large ships of the regular passenger services. However, 
this divergence of opinion only became important at a 
later date, and was not for the moment an obstacle to 
our proceedings. 

On the other hand, it was certainly unfortunate for us 
that up to the 31st January, 1917, neither of the two 
contending parties in Berlin were able to gain complete 
control in the matter of policy. I, myself, was never in 
favor of the submarine campaign, because I was con- 
vinced that it could not fulfil its avowed object, and would 
probably involve us in hostilities with the United States ; 
but bad as this policy was, it would have been better to 
follow it consistently than to halt between two opinions. 

The submarine campaign was in the end gradually and 
unwillingly sacrificed, owing to our desire to placate the 
United States. If we had made a clean sweep of it, once 
and for all, after the Lusitania incident, or, at any rate, 
after the sinking of the Arabic, as we actually did after 
the torpedoing of the Sussex, considerable advantages 
would have been gained from the diplomatic point of 
view. To my mind, there was now only one thing to be 
done — to abandon our pretensions that the submarine 
campaign was being conducted in accordance with the 
recognized principles of cruiser warfare, laid down by 
international law, and to offer compensation for the loss 
of the Lusitania and the Arabic. Having done this, we 
could then proceed to recall to the American Government 



176 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

their oft-expressed original view of the freedom of the 
seas. As a matter of fact, immediately after the settle- 
ment of the Arabic incident, Mr. Lansing sent a peremp- 
tory Note to England. But the prospect of any favorable 
result for ourselves from this exchange of Notes was 
never fulfilled, as our methods of war at sea always re- 
sulted in fresh incidents and fresh conflicts. There was, 
of course, a second possibility: that is, while persisting 
in the submarine campaign to recognize that it was in- 
evitably bound to lead to friction with America, and to 
discount all the ensuing consequences. 

Neither of these two courses was consistently followed 
in our policy. We were for ever trying to square the 
circle, and to conduct a submarine campaign which should 
be from a military point of view effective, without at the 
same time leading to a breach with America. The order 
that *' liners" should not be torpedoed under any circum- 
stances, was regarded simply as a piece of red tape, and 
not applicable to war conditions, as the submarine was 
not in a position to distinguish through its periscope be- 
tween ''liners" and other craft. We thus contrived at 
one and the same time to cripple our submarines, and yet 
to fail to give satisfaction to America. Probably the 
German Government did not venture in face of public 
opinion in the country to desist altogether from the use. 
of submarines. 

It has been said that "the freedom of the seas'* was an 
unattainable ideal, a mere phrase, a red herring drawn 
across our track; but it was in reality none of these 
things. America attached to this phrase a definite and 
concrete meaning; namely, the abolition of the law of 
capture at sea, and I am convinced that after the World 
War America will yet fall out with England over this 
question, and will not rest till she has achieved her object. 
Certainly the original sin of the United States against 



THE "AEABIC' INCIDENT 177 

the spirit of neutrality lay in the fact that she suffered the 
violation of her admitted rights by England's interfer- 
ence with the reciprocal trade of the neutral States. 
Messrs. "Wilson and House often talked with me about 
this matter of the law of capture at sea. It would be a 
complete misconception of American policy to deny that 
in this phrase, "the freedom of the seas,'* one of their 
dearest desires found expression. 

When I informed Mr. Lansing confidentially at the end 
of August of the latest instructions to our submarine 
commanders, he was much gratified, but explained at once 
that the fact of its being confidential would deprive the 
information of all its value ; something must, at all costs, 
be done to reassure public opinion. I could not but admit 
that the view of the Secretary of State was correct in this 
respect. The factor of public opinion obviously appeared 
of less importance in Berlin than in Washington ; besides, 
I knew from experience that no secret could be kept in 
Washington for long, and that in a few days this; our 
first sign of yielding, would be common knowledge. I 
thought it best, therefore, to get the full diplomatic 
advantage from the new situation, • and took it upon 
myself, on September 1st, to publish my instructions. 
This exercise of initiative got me a reprimand from 
Berlin, but I attained my object none the less, in that I 
avoided any immediate danger of war. 

Concerning these negotiations the following corre- 
spondence took place with Berlin : 

(1) Cipher 

**Cedarhurst, August 30th, 1915. 

**I have tried to wire reports to your Excellency by the 

route placed at our disposal, and inform you as to the 

progress of the negotiations between myself and Mr. 

Lansing over the Arabic incident. In consequence of the 



178 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

instructions given to me and the information given by 
your Excellency to the Associated Press in Berlin, the 
general situation here has taken a turn for the better. 
The prospect of war is becoming more remote ; there are 
signs of returning confidence on the Stock Exchange, and 
I have even succeeded in inducing the Press to see things 
in a more reasonable light. 

**Thus up to the present, everything seems to be going 
well, and a rupture of diplomatic relations appear^ once 
more to be indefinitely postponed. None the less, our 
diflficulties are really much greater than at the time of the 
Lusitania incident. The American Government's inten- 
tions are undoubtedly peaceful, and the case of the 
Arabic, involving as it did the loss of only two Ameri- 
can lives, may be said to be in itself comparatively un- 
important. There are other factors, however, to be 
considered. Both the Government and the people are be- 
ginning to have shrewd suspicions, which for reasons of 
policy they refrain from expressing at present, that we 
cheated the United States in the matter of the Lusitania, 
that we spun out the discussion as long as possible, and 
then replied to President Wilson's last and most peremp- 
tory Note, by torpedoing the Arabic. 1 am convinced 
that Mr. Lansing, who is an able lawyer, and as a result 
of his American training alive to every possible move of 
an opponent, expects us to follow the same policy over the 
matter of the Arabic. He has thus no great confidence in 
our good faith, though the President, I am told, is more 
optimistic, his friend House having informed him that 
his policy of the 'freedom of the seas' commands general 
assent in Berlin. The facts of the situation, then, are 
that the President will not permit any procrastination in 
the negotiations over the Arabic affair, for should no 
more satisfactory conclusion be reached now than was 
the case after the Ldisita/nia incident, Wilson would 



THE **AEABIC'^ INCIDENT 179 

forfeit the respect of his conntrymen, and would have no 
other resource but to forego his cherished design with 
what face he might, or else break off diplomatic relations 
with Germany. There can be no doubt in the minds of 
any who are well versed in American affairs that he 
would elect for the latter course. The Spanish- American 
War arose out of just such a situation. 

**The following conclusions result from the above: I 
gather from the Berlin reports of the Associated Press 
that your Excellency has decided to settle the present 
dispute with the United States on the lines which I have 
respectfully suggested to you. If this be so I urge the 
utmost expedition in the matter, that confidence here may 
be restored, and the way opened for negotiations with 
England. It is not so much a matter of making apologies 
or giving explanations, but rather of making a full state- 
ment to this Government as to the instructions given to 
our submarine commanders. If we can prove by this 
means that after the Lusitania incident, orders had been 
given to attack no passenger ships while negotiations 
with the United States were going on, or to do so only 
under certain conditions, all outstanding questions could 
be solved without difficulty.'' 

(2) Cipher Dispatch 

*' Berlin, September 10th, 1915. 
''Daily Telegraph of September 2nd publishes what 
purports to be extract from your aforesaid letter to Mr. 
Lansing, informing him of instructions issued to sub- 
marine commanders. Extract ends as follows: 

** *I have no objection to your making any use you 
please of the above information. ' 

**If Daily Telegraph has reproduced your letter cor- 



180 MY THBEE YEAES IN AMEEICA 

rectly, above statement is contrary to instructions, whicli 
authorized yon only to give information confidentially to 
American Government. Premature publication in Ameri- 
can Press places us in difficult position here, especially as 
no official report of actual contents of your communica- 
tion to Mr. Lansing has reached us. I beg that you will 
kindly furnish an explanation. 

(Signed) Jagow." 

(3) Cipher Eeport 

**Cedarhurst, October 2nd, 1915. 

**Eeference your wire No. A 129 of September 10th, I 
ask your Excellency to be kind enough to pardon me for 
having taken upon myself to act on my own responsibility 
over the submarine question. The position at the end of 
August rendered some action to pacify public opinion 
imperative, if a breach were to be avoided. Owing to the 
difficulties of communication with Berlin I could do 
nothing but acquaint Mr. Lansing with a portion of my 
instructions concerning the case of the Lusitania — ^the 
only ones which had then reached me. I at once reported 
my action to your Excellency in my wireless message. No. 
179, and in a previous telegram. No. 165, and requested 
approval of my action; probably these messages have 
been delayed in transit, or have not reached Berlin. In 
further explanation, I may add that in this country, con- 
fidential matter, in the European sense, does not exist, 
and such matter can never be kept a secret from the 
Press. Sometimes I have been able to come to an agree- 
ment with the Government over the wording of their 
comrnvMiques to the Press; that is one of the great 
advantages of conducting the negotiations on the spot. 
Had the whole American Press entirely refused to accept 



THE **ARABIC^' INCIDENT 181 

our official explanations, nothing further could have been 
done with the Government." 

While my negotiations with Mr. Lansing in Washing- 
ton for a simultaneous settlement of the Arabic and 
Lusitania questions were still in progress, a memoran- 
dum was handed to Mr. Gerard, the American Ambassa- 
dor in Berlin, which purported to justify the action of 
the offending submarine commanders. Thus the situation 
once more became acute. The contents of this document 
were as follows : 

"On August 19th a German submarine held up the 
English steamer Dunele about sixty miles south of 
Kinsale, and having ordered the crew to leave the ship, 
were about to sink it by gun-fire when the commander 
observed a large steamer heading directly towards him. 
This latter, which afterwards proved to be the Arabic, 
bore no ensign, or other marks of neutrality, and was 
thus obviously an enemy. Approaching nearer, she 
altered her original course, and again made directly for 
the submarine, thus leading the commander of the latter 
to suppose that she was about to attack and ram him. 
In order to parry this attack, the submarine dived and 
fired a torpedo, which struck the ship. The submarine 
commander observed that those on board got away in 
fifteen boats. 

''According to his instructions, the German commander 
was authorized to attack the Arabic without warning, and 
without allowing time for the rescue of her crew, in case 
of an attempt at flight or resistance. The action of the 
Arabic undoubtedly gave him good grounds for suppos- 
ing that an attack on him was intended. He was the 
more inclined to this belief, by the fact that a few days 
before, on the 14th, he had been fired at from long range 



182 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

by a large passenger steamer, apparently belonging to 
the British Royal Mail Steam Packet Company, which 
he saw in the Irish Sea, but which he had made no attempt 
to attack or hold up. 

"The German Government deeply regrets that loss of 
life should have resulted from the action of this officer, 
and it desires that these sentiments should be conveyed 
more particularly to the Government of the United 
States, as American citizens were among the missing. 
No obligation to make compensation for the damage done 
can, however, be admitted, even on the hypothesis that 
the submarine commander mistook the intentions of the 
'ArahiCf In the event of an insoluble difference arising 
on this point between the German and American Govern- 
ments, the German Government suggests that the matter 
in dispute should be referred to the Hague Tribunal as 
a question of international law, in accordance with Article 
38 of the Hague convention for the peaceful solution of 
differences between nations; but it can do so only with 
this reservation, that the arbitrator's award shall not 
have the validity of a general decision as to the inter- 
national legality or otherwise of the German submarine 
warfare.'' 

The following three reports or telegrams dispatched by 
me to the Imperial Chancellor describe the situation in 
Washington at this juncture : 

(1) Cipher 
"Washington, September 14tK, 1915, 
"Lansing has given me permission to wire you by this 
route, without the messages being seen by him; he will 
also forward your Excellency's reply, and from this it 
appears to be the Government's view, that any further 
exchange of Notes, the subsequent publication of which, 



THE ''ARABIC'* INCIDENT 183 

in both conntries, would merely involve fnrtHer mis- 
understandings, is bonnd to lead to a breach. It considers 
the present system of confidential negotiations with me 
as the only promising method of arriving at an agree- 
ment. The memorandum on the Arabic is not understood 
here, and in so far as it is understood, is considered to be 
a manifestation of German bad faith — a sign that we may 
perhaps give way in principle, but will always in practice 
seek to evade our obligations thus incurred. 

"Lest this telegram should, by its length, give offence 
to the British, Mr. Lansing is forwarding the evidence in 
the Arabic case to Mr. Gerard for transmission to your 
Excellency; he is himself quite convinced that the sub- 
marine commander was not compelled in self-defense to 
torpedo the Arabic, and that his action in so doing was 
therefore unjustified. He hopes that your Excellency 
will, after study of the evidence, agree with him in this. 

**To obtain full and complete agreement it is first of 
all necessary that I should be empowered to publish in 
full those instructions given to our submarine com- 
manders in so far as these were not given in my previous 
summaries on the matter. If we still consider ourselves 
bound to maintain that the officer concerned in the Arabic 
case was only obeying orders, we can never hope to come 
to an agreement, for no one can possibly feel any con- 
fidence in the sincerity of our intentions. In the mean- 
time I shall try to reach a settlement on the matters now 
in dispute by means of arbitration. Finally, the question 
of compensation must, in accordance with my instructions 
for the Lusitania case, be referred to the Hague Tribunal. 

*'I am quite certain that if we fail to reach an agree- 
ment, severance of diplomatic relations cannot but follow. 

** Lansing will not reply to the Arabic memorandum, 
and, as I said before, will conduct the diplomatic ex- 
changes on this matter only through me. He considers 



184 MY THEEE YEAKS IN AMEKICA 

this as the only possible course on the ground that Wilson 
and I are alike committed to the policy of 'the freedom 
of the seas.' 

** Finally, I may observe that everyone here would be 
much gratified if we could see our way to extend the scope 
of our latest instructions to our submarines so as to 
include all merchant shipping. It is argued that these 
vessels are slow moving and could easily be warned ; the 
advantage of acting without warning is only of im- 
portance in the case of swift passenger ships, which we 
have, none the less, undertaken not to attack without 
notice. The suggested proposal, therefore, could not 
harm us; it would, on the other hand, make us very 
popular here and give the United States a very strong 
position in her negotiations with England. Of course, I 
may be able to effect an agreement without this. The 
main point in dispute is the verdict on the action of the 
commander in the Arabic case, because this involves the 
whole question of our good faith. Anyway, there is no 
doubt whatever that a second Arabic case is bound to 
result in war." 

(2) Cipher Telegram 
"Cedarhurst, September 22nd, 1915. 
*' As position is still very difficult, I am carrying on con- 
versations in strict confidence through personal friend of 
Wilson's. Request, therefore, that no directions be sent 
as regards question of responsibility for Arabic incident, 
till your Excellency hears again from me. Lansing at 
present gone on leave. Personally I do not believe that 
I shall manage to secure International Commission of 
Inquiry. According to present view, main point of dis- 
pute is question of disavowing action of submarine com- 
mander. I hope, however, that after reviewing American 
evidence, your Excellency will be able to find formula for 



THE **ARABIC'' INCIDENT 185 

snch disavowal, agreeable to both Governments, especially 
if I can get concurrence of Wilson before press gets hold 
of it. Request, therefore, that American correspondents 
in Germany be told nothing more than that American 
evidence being carefully gone into in Berlin." 

(3) Cipher Report 
*'Cedarhurst, September 28th, 1915. 

**The negotiations about the submarine campaign are 
at a standstill at present. From the fact that Lansing 
has not been recalled from leave and that President 
Wilson does not seem over-eager to give an opinion on 
the proposals which I have put forward for his considera- 
tion, I consider myself justified in concluding that the 
Americans do not consider the situation to be any longer 
critical. Even the Press is no longer agitated, as in 
all recent cases of attack by German submarines. Their 
commanders have acted quite in accordance with our 
assurances. Under these circumstances Mr. Wilson may 
possibly fall in with our proposal that the particular case 
of the Arabic should be dealt with by an International 
Commission of Inquiry. In any case, some means must 
be found of finishing once for all with the Arabic and 
Lusitania incidents; only then shall we be in a position 
to see whether President Wilson will keep his word, and 
take energetic measures vis a vis England. 

**The Anglo-French Loan Commission, assisted by 
their agency, the Morgan group, are working at high 
pressure. Stories of Allied victories in Europe are 
sedulously spread abroad in order to enlist the support of 
public opinion. Despite these efforts the commission 
found Chicago so invincibly hostile that they were com- 
pelled to proceed there in person, but they will probably, 
in any case, manage to raise a loan, as the Morgan group 



186 MY THREE TEARS IN AMERICA 

are quite strong enough for the purpose. The rate of 
interest they are demanding is very high, as tip till now 
they have financed all English purchases here. By these 
means, they are, no doubt, making considerable profits, 
but in order to secure them, they will, of course, con- 
solidate their floating debt and unload it on to the public. 
The only question is to what extent they will be able to 
do this. Opinion varies as to the size of England's 
present debt; a prominent banker here, in close touch 
with the Morgan group, estimated the total to 500,000,000 
dollars; if this estimate is correct, a loan of 500,000,000 
dollars would only just cover the liabilities hitherto 
existing. 

*'The Morgan group certainly had to make two great 
concessions : first, that the proceeds of the new loan shall 
not be employed for the purchase of munitions, and 
second, that Russia shall be excluded from the loan ; only 
by these means could they overcome the opposition of 
the German- Americans and the Jews. Our Jewish friends 
here are in no easy position. Their action, or rather in- 
action, takes the form of what is commonly known as 
* egg-dancing,' or * pussyfooting'; they wish to stand well 
with all sides, but have not the courage of their convic- 
tions, and are very anxious to make money. All this 
is very easily understood, when one remembers the am- 
biguous position of these gentlemen. A regular deviPs 
dance around the ' Golden calf ' is now going on here. All 
the European Governments are coming to buy in the 
American market, and usually paying double for their 
goods, as they only purchase what they urgently need. 
One lesson we may learn for future reference from the 
present state of affairs, and that is that we must not 
allow ourselves again to be left to the tender mercies of 
the German-Jew bankers here. After the war, we must 
have branches of our large banks in New York Just as we 



THE **ARABIC»» INCIDENT 187 

have in London. All evidence goes to show that New 
York will then be the center of world-finance, and we 
should, therefore, take all steps to acton this assumption 
as soon as possible.'' 

The Foreign Office in Berlin, who natntaUy wished to 
avoid a rnptnre with the United States, accordingly dis- 
patched to me the following telegraphic instructions : 

**We have no doubt that in this instance submarine 
commander believed Arabic intended to ram and had 
every reason for. such belief. However, German Govern- 
ment prepared to give credence to sworn evidence of 
English officers of Arabic and agree that in reality no 
such intention existed. 

** Attack of submarine thus was unfortunately not in 
accordance with instructions; conununication to this 
effect will be made to commander. German Government 
is for sake of final settlement by friendly agreement pre- 
pared without admission of responsibility from point of 
view of international law, to give indemnification for 
death of American citizens. Your Excellency is empow- 
ered to notify American Government of abwve, and to 
negotiate with them in case of acceptance concerning 
amount of compensation, subject to our concurrence. 
Confidently expect that incident will thus be finally liqui- 
dated, as above is limit of possible concessions." 

The American Government during verbal negotiations 
with me on this matter considered it essential that a 
phrase expressing Germany's disapproval of the com- 
mander's action should be incorporated in the explana- 
tion which I proposed to publish. I was not sure 
whether I was reaUy authorized by the above instructions 
to comply with this condition, but in view of the fact 
that it was the only hope of avoiding a breach and further 



188 MY THEEE YEARS IN AMERICA 

delay in the negotiations would profit us nothing, as we 
were, bound to make some sort of reply to the American 
demand within a certain definite time, I acted once more 
on. my own responsibility and gave the following explana- 
tion to Mr. Lansing : 

**The Government of his Majesty the Kaiser, in its 
orders with which I previously made you acquainted, has 
so framed its instructions to its submarine* commanders 
as to avoid any repetition of incidents such as that of the 
Arabic. According to the report of the officer who sank 
the Arabic and his sworn evidence, together with that of 
his crew, this commander believed that the Arabic in- 
tended to ram the submarine. On the other hand, the 
Imperial Government does not desire to call in question 
the good faith of the English officers of the Arabic, who 
have given evidence on oath that the Arabic had no in- 
tention of ramming. The action of the submarine was 
therefore contrary to orders, and the Imperial Govern- 
ment both disapproves of it and regrets it. A communi- 
cation to this effect has been made to the officer in ques- 
tion. Under these circumstances my Government is 
prepared to give compensation for the lives of American 
subjects drowned, to their great regret, in the Arabic. I 
am empowered to discuss with you the amount of this 
compensation." 

The above explanation finally resolved the second 
crisis. The German naval authorities naturally com- 
plained of my action, as the ** disapproval" stuck in their 
throats, and I was once more taken to task — a matter 
which weighed little with me. For I felt that my inter- 
pretation of the instructions from the Foreign Office was 
the only one which could have saved us from war, and 
that now the road was open for the final settlement of the 



THE "AEABIC" INCIDENT 18^ 

Ltisitania incident and the discussion of the great ques- 
tion of "the freedom of the seas.*' The outlook for us 
was most promising. Opinion in America as a result of 
the solution of the Arabic question was once more favor- 
able to us. A leading American paper, the New York 
Sun, said at this time in its leading article : 

**The successful issue of the conversations with Ger- 
many over the submarine campaign cannot fail to be of 
benefit to all nations, as a proof of the possibilities of 
diplomacy as against war. It has been a personal tri- 
umph for both the participants, President Wilson and 
Count Bernstorff,'' 

The position of both men has been much strengthened 
thereby, and what they have already achieved is no doubt 
only a presage of still greater results in the future. 

The following four reports to the Foreign Office deal 
with the settlement of the Arabic case: 

(1) Cipher 
**Cedarhurst, October 6th, 1915. 

**The settlement of the Arabic case reported to your 
Excellency in my wire, has caused great satisfaction in 
all circles here. Of course a few avowedly Anglophile 
papers, such as the New York Herald and the New York 
Tribune, reveal the cloven hoof, and are clearly disap- 
pointed that a rupture of diplomatic relations between 
America and Germany has been averted ; for the rest, at 
no time since the outbreak of war have we had such a 
good Press as at this moment. 

''History alone will be in a position to say whether the 
settlement of the Arabic case really prevented a war with 
the United States or not ; but your Excellency knows my 



190 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

views that without this settlement a conflict mnst eventu- 
ally have become inevitable. I respectfully submit that 
the preservation of peace alone was a sufficient motive to 
induce us to come to terms ; but you also know that this 
was by no means my sole object. I wished also to induce 
the Government of the United States to take energetic 
proceedings against England, with the object of trans- 
lating into fact its idea of the freedom of the seas. I 
trust we shall not be disappointed in this regard, and 
I shall, certainly, leave no stone unturned to keep Mr. 
Wilson on the right path. Whatever may be one's per- 
sonal opinion of the President, whether one believes him 
to be really neutrally-minded, or not, his great services 
to the cause of peace cannot be denied. A Republican 
President would certainly not have stood up, as he has 
done, against the united forces of anti- Germanism repre- 
sented by Wall Street, the Press, and so-called Society. 
**At the present moment it looks as if the American 
Government are ready to let the Lusitania matter drop 
altogether, provided we agree to refer the question of 
compensation to the Hague Tribunal after the war. The 
general belief here is that judicial proceedings are out of 
the question during the continuance of hostilities. At 
least I gather as much, indirectly, of course, from one 
of the President's friends." 

(2) Cipher 

*'Cedarhurst, October 15th, 1915. 

"I much regret that owing to a mistake on the part of 
the State Department, your Excellency was not earlier 
informed of the settlement of the submarine question. 
Mr. Lansing left my letter, which should have accom- 
panied the telegram, in his writing-table by mistake, for 
which oversight he afterwards apologized to me. The 
Imperial Embassy was in no way to blame. 



THE ^'ARABIC" INCIDENT 191 

**The importance attached by the President, from the 
very first, to those main points on which we were unable 
to make concessions rendered the task of arriving at an 
agreement by no means an easy one. Thus on three of 
the most important points no agreement has been 
reached, and over these we must, for the present, draw 
the veil. Only a few of the most rabid of the pro-English 
papers venture openly to reproach President Wilson with 
having achieved nothing but the security of passenger- 
ships, but all Americans are prepared to admit in con- 
fidence that the Government has completely departed 
from its original position. 

**The three important questions still in dispute, as 
mentioned above, are the following: 

**(1) The German Government's responsibility for 
American lives lost in the torpedoing of British ships. 

** (2) The responsibility for the payment of compensa- 
tion for the American lives so lost. 

**(3) The American demand that all merchant ships 
should be warned by our submarines before being 
attacked. 

*'This demand was at first so worded as to imply that 
submarines, like other warships, had only the right of 
search. 

"The Government, realizing that we could not make 
concessions on the above three points, had to be content 
with our admission that the case of the Arabic should be 
regarded as exceptional. This very fact rendered it im- 
possible to reach a similar settlement in the case of the 
Lusitania, in which no error on the part of the submarine 
commander concerned could be adduced. However, the 
Government seemed to be only too satisfied to have come 
so well out of their difficulties, and have no wish to raise 



192 MY THEEE YEARS IN AMERICA 

any further obstacles because of the Lusitania incident. 
This matter, as I have already had the honor to report, 
may now well be left to drag on indefinitely, and can be 
referred in the end to the Hague Tribunal after the war. 
Our Press should, therefore, be warned that further 
discussion of the controversy between Germany and 
America over the submarine campaign is undesirable " 

(3) Cipher 

**Cedarhurst, October 20th, 1915. 

**Your Excellency *s last wireless requested me to 
render a report on the settlement of the Arabic question. 
I have already complied with these instructions, and the 
documents are now on their way to you, and should have 
reached you. However, it may be advisable to explain 
briefly the more important points of the matter. 

*'From the date of the sinking of the Lusitania, 
America has always been on the verge of breaking off 
diplomatic relations with us. The German people, I am 
convinced, have no idea of the full danger of the situa- 
tion, at least, if one may judge from our Press. On two 
occasions we were compelled to sacrifice individuals in 
order to avoid a breach, Dernburg and Dumba being our 
scapegoats. Their mistakes would under normal circum- 
stances have been overlooked, but their removal was at 
the time necessary in order to give the American Govern- 
ment the opportunity of showing its strength without 
breaking off diplomatic relations with us. 

"As I have more than once explained in my reports, 
no solution of the Lusitania question, agreeable to the 
Americans, could be found, so long as we were not pre- 
pared to admit the responsibility of the Imperial Govern- 
ment for the disaster, or its obligation to make repara- 
tion, and so long as our views on the principles of 



THE **ARABIC" INCIDENT 193 

submarine warfare differed from those held by the 
American Government. 

*'By dint of drawing out the negotiations as long as 
possible, and by the employment of all my persuasive 
powers, I succeeded in tiding over the moment of acute 
tension. Then came the incident of the Arabic. My 
laboriously constructed diplomatic edifice came tumbling 
about my ears, and things looked blacker than ever. The 
American Government regarded the Arabic incident most 
seriously, believing as they did that it was typical of the 
whole German policy vis-d-vis America. They argued 
that either the whole affair had been prearranged as a 
manifestation of our intention to have our own way in 
the matter of submarine warfare, or else it was a blunder 
which could be dealt with in the ordinary course of 
diplomacy. Negotiation became possible when your Ex- 
cellency notified this Government that satisfaction would 
be given in the event of the submarine commander being 
proved to have acted contrary to his instructions. 
Further negotiations followed on this basis, and it was 
finally agreed that we should admit the exceptional nature 
of the Arabic case, without yielding our ground on the 
main points. Such agreement would have been im- 
possible had President Wilson adhered to his previous 
position, but he wished to have done with the whole busi- 
ness, and could only do so by throwing dust in the eyes of 
the American public. He hoped by these means to get rid 
of the Lusitania incident unostentatiously, and told me, 
through one of his personal friends, *to let it drift.' The 
idea at the back of his mind is that it shall be left to an 
international tribunal sitting after the war, to decide 
whether we shall pay compensation or not. 

**The only really important question as regards the 
settlement of the Arabic case, is whether it is worth while 
for us to risk a rupture of relations with the United 



194 MY THREE YEAES IN AMERICA 

States, for the sake of this affair. I still persist in my 
opinion, that it would infallibly have led us into a new 
war.*' 

(4) Cipher 

"Washington, 1st November, 1915. 

**Your Excellency's last wire on the matter of the sub- 
marine campaign raises two points of the highest im- 
portance. 

*' First, as to Wilson's policy of the * freedom of the 
seas;' this has been the idea underlying all our recent 
negotiations over the submarine warfare. Our agree- 
ment with this policy has been constantly emphasized in 
all my conversations with leading men here ; but it is of 
course necessary carefully to choose our moment for the 
public declaration of our agreement with Wilson's point 
of view, as people here naturally fear that if England 
believes us to be behind any agitation for the freedom of 
the seas she will resist it all the more firmly. I respect- 
fully recommend, therefore, that we should leave Mr. 
Wilson to carry on his present controversy with Eng- 
land, for the present at all events, unaided. We shall lose 
nothing by so doing, and if an opportunity comes for our 
participation, we can make use of it. 

** After this expression of opinion, let me pass on to the 
second point I have always clearly stated here, that we 
reserve to ourselves full liberty of decision, if England 
refuses to receive our advances. At present, now that 
the Arabic case has been recognized as exceptional, this 
* freedom' is only being encroached upon from one direc- 
tion as we have undertaken not to sink passenger ships 
without warning, etc. By this undertaking we must 
abide, unless we wish to go to war with the United States 
of America. Any future destruction of passenger ships 
with Americans on board, especially if such took place 



THE ''ARABIC" INCIDENT 195 

without warniiig, and with the approval of the Imperial 
Govermnent, would inevitably cause a rupture." 

The political sky in the United States was thus becom- 
ing more propitious day by day ; but our enemies ' exer- 
tions for the purpose of undermining the present friendly 
relations, redoubled in proportion. The German Embassy 
became the chief object of attack, owing to the fact being 
clearly realized by our foes, that so long as its influence 
in Washington political circles remained unimpaired, no 
rupture of diplomatic relations could be hoped for. 
Entente diplomacy left no stone unturned which could be 
of service against us ; lies, robbery, personal defamation, 
gossip, were all used to discredit us. 

The conduct of a British officer on duty in Washing- 
ton affords a good example of the unscrupulous policy 
of our foes. According to the evidence of Dr. Fuehr, this 
gentleman, now holding a high position in London, at- 
tempted in the early months of 1916 to corrupt a messen- 
ger of our Press Bureau in New York, one Alfred Hoff, 
whose daily duty it was to take newspaper cuttings to 
Councillor Albert's office. Two of his people stopped 
this boy in the street and invited him to the British 
Consular offices; here he was received by the Cap- 
tain himself, who showed him a bag filled with bank 
notes, and promised him a liberal reward, if he would 
undertake to obtain some letters from Dr. Fuehr 's desk. 
Hoff pretended to fall in with this suggestion, but at once 
informed his employer of the incident. The Captain then 
made a second effort to bribe Hoff by the promise of a 
money reward for every document from the Press 
Bureau, and also a ride in a motor for the letters which it 
was his duty to take from the Bureau to the German 
Embassy at Cedarhurst, during the coming summer. One 
of the British agents told Hoff that he would be well paid 
if he handed over the letters of Dr. Fuehr, which he often 



196 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

nsed to seal and frank, and also certain other documents 
of a specially confidential nature. Dr. Fuehr finally pnt 
an end to this unsavory episode, which had been fully 
investigated by private detectives, by publishing a de- 
tailed account of the whole affair in the Hearst papers. 
At the same time he brought the matter before the Public 
Prosecutor, who, however, was unwilling to interfere in 
the matter unless it should be further discussed in the 
Press. This limited comprehension of duty Dr. Fuehr 
could hardly be expected to agree with. 

During my encounters at this time with the Entente, 
I entirely lost any respect I may previously have felt for 
their moral character, which was reputed to be so high. 
I came then to realize that we could expect nothing better 
from them in the hour of our defeat, than a Peace of 
Versailles, which would make of no account all their 
earlier loftier professions. We, in Washington, were 
therefore, in duty bound, to strain every nerve to avert 
such a catastrophe to our country. Unfortunately the 
activities of the agents dispatched from home invariably 
deranged our plans in a most unfortunate manner, and, 
while affording our foes the desired opportunities for 
damaging our cause, achieved nothing of advantage in 
compensation. The English Secret Police, and all the de- 
tective agencies of the United States which were in their 
pay, were always at our heels, endeavoring to establish 
some collusion on the part of the German Embassy in 
these isolated cases of sabotage. However, all this sub- 
terranean plotting and counter-plotting was but so much 
lost labor. It was the decision on the policy of continuing 
or not continuing the submarine campaign which finally 
turned the scale. 

At the beginning of August one of these agents man- 
aged to steal a portfolio of documents from Councillor 
Albert while he was traveling on the New York elevated 



THE "ARABIC' INCIDENT 197 

railway, and its contents were published in the World 
from the 15th of August onwards. We always thought 
the perpetrator of this theft was an Entente agent, but 
it now appears from Senator Frelinghuysen's evidence 
before the Senate Committee of Enquiry on 13th July, 
1919, that the guilty individual was really a member of 
the American Secret Police. It would certainly have 
been an unheard-of thing for an American agent to have 
robbed a member of the diplomatic corps and s-old the 
proceeds of his deed to the Press. Probably what really 
happened was that the man was in the pay of the Entente. 
The investigations at the Senate Committee disclosed a 
number of cases of corruption and theft which the agents 
of the Entente did not scruple to use in their efforts to 
compromise and discredit the German Embassy; so this 
supposition is in itself by no means improbable. The 
affair was merely a storm in a tea-cup; the papers as 
published afforded no evidence of any action either illegal 
or dishonorable; otherwise the American Government 
would certainly have demanded the recall of Albert as 
they did later in other cases. The Press manufactured 
a considerable sensation out of the contents of the port- 
folio, but generally speaking the efforts of the Entente 
in this affair proved completely without effect. 

The Entente agents, however, were more successful in 
their next attack, to which the Austro-Hungarian Am- 
bassador fell a victim. Dumba had already in the winter 
of 1914-15 recommended to me the American war corre- 
spondent James Archibald, who had been at the Austro- 
Hungarian Front, as having German sympathies. There- 
upon I also recommended this gentleman in Berlin, where 
he was granted all facilities. In the summer of 1915 
Archibald returned to America, to lecture on his experi- 
ences. As he was anti-Entente, these lectures brought us 
financial profit, and therefore we paid Archibald's travel- 



198 MY THEEE YEARS IN AMERICA 

ing expenses. At the beginning of September, 1915, lie 
went once more to Europe, and dined on the eve of his 
departure with Dumba and myself on the roof -garden of 
the Ritz-Carlton Hotel in New York. By this means our 
personal connection with Archibald was openly recog- 
nized. The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, confiding in 
his character and his American nationality, gave him 
certain political reports which were not even in cipher, to 
take to Vienna. Archibald had also offered to take 
papers to Berlin for me. I, however, declined with 
thanks, as I scented danger, and I would have warned 
Dumba also, if I had known that he intended to entrust 
dispatches to Archibald. The English seized the latter 
in KirkwaU and took away all his papers. 

Since then I have never set eyes on Archibald, and I 
could not help suspecting that there was something un- 
canny about the case.- By arresting Archibald the Eng- 
lish undoubtedly thought they would compromise me. I 
cannot prove that there was anything wrong with Archi- 
bald, but in aU the circumstances he could easily have 
destroyed the papers, had he wished to do so. In the 
meanwhile a report was found among the dispatches of 
the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador transmitting to his 
Government a memorandum from the Hungarian jour- 
nalist. Warm. In this note Warm recommended propa- 
ganda to induce a strike among the Hungarian workers 
in arms and munitions factories, and demanded money 
for this object. 

The statement of Dumba 's report that the Ambassador 
had shown the suggestion to Captain von Papen, who had 
thought it very valuable, was very compromising for us. 

The German Military Attache was therefore placed in 
an awkward position; the letter contained several other 
blazing indiscretions. Thus, for instance, in one paper 
Dumba described President Wilson as self-willed> and 



THE *' ARABIC '» INCIDENT 199 

von Papen in a letter to his wife spoke of the ** imbecile 
Yankees." 

As I previously mentioned, the position of the Austro- 
Hungarian Ambassador was much shaken by the Dumba- 
Bryan episode. His defence, that he had only forwarded 
the note of an Hungarian journalist, without identifying 
himself with it, was not favorably received by the Ameri- 
can Government. A few days later his passport was 
presented to him; at the same time the Entente granted 
him a safe conduct. 

Previous to his departure from New York similar 
scenes took place to those which followed the sinking of 
the Lusitania. 

• The Hotel St. Regis, in which the Austro-Hungarian 
Ambassador lived, was surrounded day and night by in- 
numerable reporters. 

When I called on him there to take leave of him, I had 
to make use of a back entrance to the hotel in order to 
avoid numerous impertinent questions. Dumba himself 
was followed at every step by reporters, who among 
other things often chased him for hours on end in 
motor-cars. 

In the meanwhile Rintelen (mentioned in the fifth 
chapter) had been taken prisoner in England. Further, 
the case of Fay led to a disagreeable discussion in pub- 
lic, and lastly action was taken against the Hamburg- 
Amerika Line for supplying our squadron of cruisers 
with coal and provisions. Thus it was easy for the En- 
tente agents to establish connection between these offen- 
ders and the Military and Naval Attaches of the German 
Embassy. How far these gentlemen were really im- 
plicated I did not know at the time, nor do I now. In this 
they must plead their own case. As far as I am con- 
cerned both gentlemen always denied that they in any 
way transgressed against the American law. It cannot, 



200 MY THEEE YEARS IN AMERICA 

however, be denied that they were, in fact, compromised 
by their relations with these guilty parties ; I do not think 
that anything beyond this can be authenticated. 

Captain von Papen^s reputation, therefore, suffered 
from the time of the Dumba- Archibald incident ; both he 
and Captain Boy-Ed were constantly attacked in the anti- 
German Press, and accused of being behind every fire 
and every strike in any munition factory in the United 
States. The New YorJc Herald and the Providence 
Journal took the leading parts in this business. At the 
same time a campaign was begun against the German- 
Americans, who were accused of being practically without 
exception disloyal citizens of the United States. All the 
various incidents, accusations, so-called conspiracies, etc., 
were grist to the Entente's mill, and were exploited to 
the full. Congress was about to assemble, and it was 
therefore to be expected that the Government would take 
steps to strengthen its position. 

Mr. Lansing asked me on 1st December to call on him 
and informed me that the American Government had re- 
quested that von Papen and Boy-Ed should be recalled, 
as they were no longer personce gratce! 

To my inquiry as to the reasons for this action, Lansing 
refused to reply; he merely remarked that any Govern- 
ment was within its rights in simply stating that a mem- 
ber of a diplomatic corps was not persona grata. In the 
course of further conversation, however, I discovered one 
thing at least, that Capt. Boy-Ed was supposed to have 
been conspiring with the Mexican General Huerta — an 
obviously baseless charge, considering that Boy-Ed had 
never made the acquaintance of the ex-President. It is 
true, however, that Rintelen had had dealings with 
Huerta, and it was known that Rintelen had received 
from Boy-Ed the sum of half a million dollars previously 
mentioned. 



THE *' ARABIC" INCIDENT 201 

My first message — written in English — to Berlin on 
this affair ran as follows : 

Cipher Message 

** Washington, 4th December, 1915. 
**In an official Note of to-day's date American Govern- 
ment, as stated in previous conversations with me, 
request immediate recall of Military and Naval Attaches, 
on the ground of various facts brought to notice of Gov- 
ernment, particularly implication of these Attaches in 
illegal and doubtful activities of certain individuals 
within United States. Government deeply regrets neces- 
sity for this step, and trusts Imperial Government will 
understand that no other course seems to them to be 
compatible with the interests of the two Governments 
and their reciprocal friendly relations." 

I also telegraphed as follows to my Government on 
September 5th: 

"Explanations of von Papen and Boy-Ed herewith as 
requested by Military and Naval Authorities : 

** * State Department request my recall. Reasons for 
this given to Ambassador. Case of Stegler and my two 
supposed meetings with Huerta. Stegler case settled 
since March. Stegler in matter of his pass proved a liar. 
Had nothing to do with his transactions; not the least 
proof that I ever had; see my report No. 4605, March 
20th, and others. I have never in my life met Huerta; 
I have never concerned myself with Mexican affairs in 
any way; I have never to my knowledge acted contrary 
to the interests or laws of the United States. Conjectures 
and absurd newspaper stories about me result of English 



202 MY THEEE YEARS IN AMERICA 

influence and money. Must therefore request my recall 
be considered unjustifiable. 

" *Boy-Ed/ 

*' *No illegal action can be laid to my charge; demand 
for recall unjustified. Importance of military interests of 
our enemies here renders necessary effective representa- 
tion of Central Powers, so long as America officially 
neutral. Therefore it should be insisted on that Ameri- 
can Government secure safe-conduct for my successor. 

** *Papen.' " 

In view of the approaching session of Congress, the 
Government, on December 5th, published the fact that 
they had demanded the recall of the Attaches. This fact, 
with slight foundation for the American Government's 
suspicions, made a bad impression in Berlin; I went, 
therefore, to see Mr. Lansing on December 8th, and ob- 
tained from him this letter : 

**As I have already stated, the demand for recall of the 
two Attaches of your Embassy was made as a result of 
the careful investigation of a number of facts and cir- 
cumstances, which convinced this Government that they 
could no longer consider these two officers as personce 
gratcB, and that their continued residence in the United 
States was, therefore, no longer compatible with diplo- 
matic propriety. This being the considered and deliber- 
ate view of this Government, it would seem that the mere 
fact of Captains von Papen and Boy-Ed being no longer 
acceptable, should have been sufficient justification for 
their immediate recall by the German Government with- 
out further discussion. The expectations of the United 
States Government, in this respect, were in accordance I 
with all diplomatic precedent in cases where such requests j 



THE **AEABIC" INCIDENT 203 

have been made, and there seemed to be, therefore, no 
reason why this demand shonld have been kept a secret. 
It is regretted that the Imperial Government shonld have 
regarded the publication of the American request as an 
act of discourtesy towards itself. The United States 
Government does not share this view of its action, and, 
therefore, cannot be expected to express its regret for 
having acted as it has done. 

**This Government is surprised that the Imperial 
Government should not have complied at once with its 
request for the recall of the two Attaches, who are no 
longer personce gratce here. It seems to me obvious that 
whatever may have been the reasons for such request, it 
is for this Government, and not for the German Govern- 
ment, to say whether the charges alleged against the 
members of a German diplomatic mission appear suffi- 
ciently well-founded to justify action such as that now 
taken. In other words, the causes of the demand are 
legitimate and sufficient, as being based on suppositions 
or suspicions of undesirable activities on the part of these 
two officers. 

"In any case, the fact remains, that Boy-Ed and von 
Papen are no longer acceptable to this Government. 

**As I already apprised you by word of mouth, and in 
my letter of 4th of this month, the relations of the two 
Attaches with individuals who participated in illegal and 
questionable activities, are established. The names of 
von Wedell, Rintelen, Stegler, Burode, Archibald and Fay 
may be mentioned as some of those who have transgressed 
against our laws. I could also name other men and cite 
other examples of their activities, but as these are at 
present the object of an official inquiry, I, by this means, 
should only prevent the arrest of those who violated our 
laws and still continue to violate them. 

** Although I have already said that this Government 



204 MY THEEE YEARS IN AMERICA 

does not want to do anything further than to request the 
recall of Boy-Ed and von Papen, since they are no 
longer personce grates, I, nevertheless, do not desire to go 
beyond the above declaration; so that your Government 
may be in a position to institute an inquiry into the 
manner of dealing with your Attaches, should it wish to 
do so. If I should go into further details on this matter I 
might interfere with the inquiry which is now being taken 
up by this Government, dry up very valuable sources of 
information, and thus hinder the course of justice. On 
the other hand there might thus be raised other grounds 
for suspicion, serving rather to disturb than to improve 
the present friendly relations between the two countries. 
I need not tell your Excellency, that it is the sincere wish 
of this Government to avoid difficulties of this kind, so 
far as may be consistent with its dignity and its respon- 
sibilities." 

Besides dispatching a copy of the above letter, I wired 
to Berlin on 8th December, as f oUows : 

Cipher 

** Convinced that Rintelen is the main cause of the 
Attaches' recall. Immediate categorical disavowal is 
absolutely necessary. Only possible connection with us 
is matter of 500,000 dollars, received from the Naval 
Attache and demanded for the exportation of goods.'' 

Thereupon I received the following wireless message in 
English : 

CrPHBR 

"You are empowered to disclaim connection with 
Rintelen, who had no orders to do anything whatsoever, 
which was an offence against the American law. 

''Jagow." 



THE ''ARABIC INCIDENT 205 

The peculiar relations of the Naval and Military 
Attaches with the Embassy had, even in times of peace, 
often led to diplomatic difficulties. For instance, it has 
often happened to us and to other countries to have to 
recall Military or Naval Attaches for spying. The diplo- 
matic standing of the head of the Mission would not 
generally be affected thereby, but, in view of the passions 
of wartime, and the general tension of nerves, I realized 
that I might be compromised by the demand for the recall 
of the Attaches. I questioned Lansing outright on this 
point, and added that I should immediately hand in to 
my Government my resignation, if I was considered to 
be myself "tarred with the same brush. '^ The Secretary 
of State assured me that I was by no means involved, and 
that I should not on any account give up my post, since 
I had to carry on the momentous negotiations now in 
course, and the American Government had full confidence 
in me. Under the circumstances I saw no reason why the 
enforced recall of the Attaches should have any further 
results, and I was confirmed in this view a few days later 
when House repeated to me Lansing's assurance with 
even greater emphasis. His exact words were as f oUows : 

**You must not dream of going home before peace is 
declared. You are the one tie that still binds us to Ger- 
many. If this tie should break, war would be inevitable. *' 

Both Attaches returned to Berlin under safe-conduct 
from the Entente at the end of December, 1915. Their 
offices were taken over by their representatives, but only 
for the purpose of settling up any outstanding matters. 

At the beginning of 1916, there was in the United 
States no single German organization which merited the 
name of "propaganda." Thus no activities which could 
compromise us in any way ensued henceforward. 



206 MY THREE YEAES IN AMERICA 

Tlie political situation kad become so serene that we 
had. no need for propaganda. The pacifist elements in the 
United States did this work for us. The only question 
was as to whether we would remain reaUy at one with 
them, or whether we meant to persist in submarine war- 
fare, which must inevitably lead us into war. 

President Wilson opened Congress on 7th December, 
1915, with a message, in which he set forth the new pro- 
gramme for national defence. * 'Preparedness^' became 
the order of the day in the United States. The message 
demanded that the Army and Navy should be increased, 
and added: 

**The urgent question of our mercantile and passenger 
shipping is closely connected with the problem of national 
supply. The full development of our national industries, 
which is of such vital importance to the nation, pressing- 
ly calls for a large commercial fleet. It is high time to 
make good our deficiencies on this head and to restore 
the independence of our commerce on the high seas.'* 

In this message may be recognized the second im- 
portant point in the Presidential programme for the next 
election. ** Peace and Preparedness" was to be the 
battle-cry of the Democratic Party. The Mexican im- 
broglio of 1913-14 had proved that the armed forces of 
the United States were unequal even to the demands of 
a comparatively small campaign ; and the American Gov- 
ernment, for lack of means, had been unable to impose its 
will on Mexico. Now the European War stirred all im- 
aginations and offered a favorable occasion for over- 
coming the prejudices of the pacifist section against mili- 
tary armaments. It was not so long since the song *'I 
didn't raise my boy to be a soldier," was sung with 
fervor all the land over ; but now events had too clearly 
proved the powerlessness of any but well-armed nations 



THE ''ARABIC" INCIDENT 207 

even to follow their own lines of policy ; and the necessity 
of a mercantile marine of their own grew daily clearer 
to the people of the United States. Hitherto the Ameri- 
cans had always found enongh of foreign vessels for the 
transport of their goods, had fonnd it cheaper to make 
use of these facilities than to supply their own under the 
conditions existing in the States. Now, however, the 
shortage of merchant tonnage was acute, and American 
goods were piled roof high in all the warehouses of New 
York harbor. It was clear that now or never was the 
time to seize the chance afforded by the war of persuading 
Congress to sanction the provision of a strong Army and 
Fleet. 

The Presidential message also touched on the ** con- 
spiracies," but without any mention of the German 
Embassy's supposed share in them. The period of these 
so-called "conspiracies" thus closed with a sharp repri- 
mand addressed by Mr. Wilson to the German- Americans, 
and with my official recommendation to the Germans in 
the United States to abstain from all forms of illegal 
action. The after-effects of this period, however, may be 
traced in the subsequent lengthy trials of the various 
offenders. I cannot be sure that since the beginning of 
1916, not one single incident which could be comprised 
under the term ''conspiracy" came to light; but these 
trials and Entente propaganda kept the recollection of 
such affairs alive, and the American war propaganda 
service had no difficulty subsequently in retelling the old 
tales which, but for the entry of the United States into 
the war, would have passed into oblivion. 

The paragraphs of the message dealing with this sub- 
ject ran as follows : 

*'We are at peace with aU the nations of the world, and 
there is reason to hope that no question in controversy 



208 MY THBEE YEARS IN AMEEICA 

between this and other Governments will lead to any 
serious breach of amicable relations, grave as some dif- 
ferences of attitude and policy have been and may yet 
turn out to be. I am sorry to say that the gravest threats 
against our national peace and safety have been uttered 
within our own borders. There are citizens of the United 
States, I blush to admit, born under other flags, but wel- 
comed under our generous naturalization laws to the full 
freedom and opportunity of America, who have poured 
the poison of disloyalty into the very arteries of our 
national life ; who have sought to bring the authority and 
good name of our Government into contempt, to destroy 
our industries wherever they thought it effective for their 
vindictive purposes to strike at them, and to debase our 
politics to the uses of foreign intrigue. Their number is 
not great as compared with the whole number of those 
sturdy hosts by which* our nation has been enriched in 
recent generations out of virile foreign stocks ; but it is 
great enough to have brought .deep disgrace upon us and 
to have made it necessary that we should promptly make 
use of processes- of law .by which we may be purged of 
their corrupt.distempers. 

**But the ugly and incredible thing has actually come 
about and we are without adequate federal laws to deal 
with it. I urge you to enact such laws at the earliest 
possible moment, and feel that in doing so I am urging 
you to do nothing less than save the honor and self-respect 
of the nation. Such creatures of passion, disloyalty and 
anarchy must be crushed out. They are not many, but 
they are infinitely malignant, and the hand of our power 
should close over them at once. They have formed plots 
to destroy property, they have entered into conspiracies 
against the neutrality of the Government, they have 
sought to pry into every confidential transaction of the 
Government in order to serve interests alien to our own. 



THE ^'ARABIC" INCIDENT 209 

It is possible to deal with these things very effectually. I 
need not suggest the terms in which they may be dealt 
with.'' 

The message, up to a point, maintained an impartial 
attitude, for it not only blamed the German- Americans 
but continued in the following words, aimed solely at the 
many Americans in London and Paris who disapproved 
of Wilson's policy of peace and neutrality: 

**I wish that it could be said that only a few men, misled 
by mistaken sentiments of allegiance to the governments 
under which they were born, had been guilty of disturb- 
ing the self-possession and misrepresenting the temper 
and principles of the country during these days of terrible 
war, when it would seem that every man who was truly 
an American would instinctively make it his duty and 
his pride to keep the scales of judgment even and prove 
himself a partisan of no nation but his own. But it can- 
not. There are some men among us, and many resident 
abroad who, though born and bred in the United States 
and calling themselves Americans, have so forgotten 
themselves and their honor as citizens as to put their 
passionate sympathy with one or the other side in the 
great European conflict above their regard for the peace 
and dignity of the United States. They also preach and 
practise disloyalty. No laws, I suppose, can reach cor- 
ruptions of the mind and heart ; but I should not speak 
of others without also speaking of these and expressing 
the even deeper humiliation and scorn which every self- 
possessed and thoughtfully patriotic American must feel 
when he thinks of them and of the discredit they are daily 
bringing upon us." 

About the turn of the year 1915-16, the severance of 
diplomatic relations between the American and Austro- 



210 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

Hungarian Governments had become imminent. The 
Italian liner Ancona was torpedoed on November 7th in 
the Mediterranean Sea by an Anstro-Hungarian sub- 
marine, and went down before all the passengers could 
succeed in escaping; many lives were lost, American 
citizens being among them. In consequence, the Wash- 
ington Government dispatched to Vienna a Note couched 
in far stronger terms than any it had yet sent ; demand- 
ing that the action should be admitted to be unlawful and 
inexcusable, that compensation should be made, and that 
the officer responsible should be punished for his deed, 
which would be branded by the whole world as inhuman 
and barbarous, and would incur the abhorrence of all 
civilized nations. 

The Austro-Hungarian representative. Baron Zwiede- 
neck von Suedenhorst, found himself in an extremely 
difficult position. Owing to the fact that he only ranked 
as charge d'affaires, and that his .appointment only dated 
from Dr. Dumba's departure, he was not empowered to 
enter into negotiations. He had always proved himself 
a very loyal colleague and acted in close co-operation with 
me, but in this instance, as the matter was one solely for 
Vienna's decision, I could be of little service to him. I 
counselled him to telegraph frankly to his Government, 
that if the American demands were not conceded, a breach 
was to be expected. I was myself inclined to believe that, 
as in the case of our Naval and Military Attaches, Mr. 
Wilson's real purpose was to give the lie to those accusa- 
tions of weakness which the Entente party was constantly 
casting in his teeth, and this, I thought, accounted for the 
unwonted sternness of the American Note, which seemed 
absolutely to challenge a rupture. It was not conceivable 
that the Austrian Government could swallow this bitter 
pill, while from the point of view of the American Gov- 
ernment, the breaking-off of relations would be a real 



THE ''ARABIC" INCIDENT 211 

diplomatic victory ; for on the one hand the political sit- 
uation would remain unchanged so long as the German 
Embassy was in Washington, and on the other hand, Mr. 
Wilson would have achieved his object and shown the 
Berlin Government that his threats of war were seriously 
meant. 

However, the Austro-Hungarian Government, after a 
short further exchange of Notes, complied under protest 
with the American demands. I learned after my return 
home that in so doing, they acted under pressure from 
the German Foreign Office. Thus, this crisis also blew 
over, not, however, without a serious loss of prestige for 
the Central Powers, who had been compelled to yield to 
demands generally regarded as utterly unacceptable. 
Nothing could be more fatal to our position in the world 
than this alternation of defiance and submission, which 
served no diplomatic object and merely betrayed infirmity 
of purpose. 



CHAPTER VIII 
THE SECOND ''LUSITANIA" CRISIS 

In Germany, and particularly before the Committee of 
the National Assembly, the American Govermnent has 
been reproached with mala fides for having unnecessarily 
reopened the Lusitania question. The line of argmnent 
is approximately as follows: 

After the settlement of the Arabic case one can suspect 
the obstinate harping on the Lusitania affair, which had 
really died'down, as a sign of mala fides. Did the Ameri- 
cans want to secure a fresh diplomatic success against usf 
They had already carried their principle with the settle- 
ment of the Arabic case ; was their object now to make a 
still greater splash? The continued possibility of a con- 
flict with Germany — ^which was quite within practical 
politics if nothing intervened — made a very favorable 
background to make clear to American public opinion, in 
conjunction with a campaign on the same lines by Wilson 
himself, the following point: ''We must get ourselves 
out of this situation pregnant with war by vindicating 
our right with both sides.*' 

Apart from the fact that the negotiations on the Lusi- 
tania question had been allowed to hang fire for about six 
weeks I believe that in this case we have again under- 
estimated the significance of hostile public opinion in 
America. The best way of making clear the situation in 
the United States will probably be for me to reproduce 
here the telegrams and reports in which I informed Berlin 
of the reopening of the Lusitania negotiations. 

212 



THE SECOND "LUSITANIA" CRISIS 213 

; 1. Repokt in Cipher 

Washington, 23rd November, 1915. 

Secretary of State Lansing after long hesitation took 
up the Lusitania question again with me. At the begin- 
ning of October I had handed to him a draft of a letter 
which, contained what I thought myself able to write to 
him within the scope of my instructions. This draft was 
merely intended to serve as a basis for more detailed 
negotiations and was only to be regarded as official in 
case the American Government should regard the whole 
incident as satisfactorily settled. There was nothing to 
be gained by stirring up public opinion again here by 
publishing documents which were regarded from the be- 
ginning as unsatisfactory. 

As I have several times had the honor to report, there 
is, in my opinion, no hope of settling the Lusitania ques- 
tion, as the American Government does not think that it 
can agree to refer it to a court of arbitration now. They 
are, however, counting here on a decision at a later date 
by such a court, which would be sure to award the Ameri- 
cans an indemnity, because the Hague court of arbitration 
from its very nature is obliged to stand for the protection 
of neutral non-combatants. Consequently, Mr. Lansing 
cannot understand why we do not pay the indemnity of 
our own accord and so settle the whole matter, especially 
as, in view of our pledge for the future, it is of no practi- 
cal importance to us. Mr. Lansing is primarily*concerned 
with the indemnity, whereas President Wilson now, as 
formerly, lays the chief weight on the pledge for the 
future and the humanitarian aspect of the question. Mr. 
Wilson always keeps his eye fixed on the two closely con- 
nected goals : the development of international law with 
regard to the freedom of the seas and the restoration of 
peace. 



214 MY THREE YEAES IN AMERICA 

Mr. Lansing now reopens the Lusitania question for 
the following reasons, part of which he has himself openly 
stated, and the rest have become known to me through 
other channels. In the first place the Government is 
afraid of attacks in the impending Congress. It was, 
therefore, eminently desirable that it should be able to 
inform Congress that something had been done in the 
Lusitania affair. Even if nothing comes of it they could 
answer that they are waiting for a reply from Germany. 
President Wilson himself does not believe in the possi- 
bility of the question being solved, and hopes to keep the 
matter in the air until the conclusion of peace, provided 
that public opinion does not become restive or new 
eventualities occur. The Ancona affair has had an un- 
favorable effect in this respect. Even though it has not 
aroused any great excitement, it has caused the whole 
question to be reopened, and everyone on this side lays 
at our door the responsibility for the Austrian act; for 
they base their reasoning on the assumption that the war 
is directed entirely from Berlin. "Whenever mention is 
made of the Ancona incident it recalls the fact that the 
Lusitania question still remains unsettled. 

It is a well known fact that we are faced here with an 
anti-German ring of great influence. I have repeatedly 
pointed this out in my reports. This ring is trying to 
exploit the Ancona and Lusitania questions with a view 
to driving into the background the American Note to 
England and the British infringements of international 
law. The Government is treating this anti-German ring 
with the same weakness as are the majority of American 
private citizens. They are submitting patiently to terror- 
ization as well as continual baiting and sneering. The 
recluse at the White House has, indeed, great plans, but 
his freedom of decision is seriously compromised by his 
anxiety to be re-elected. He refuses to allow himself to 



THE SECOND ''LUSITANIA'' CRISIS 215 

be drawn into too serious extravagances ; and so he cer- 
tainly deserves the credit for having prevented war with 
Germany, but he aUows himself, nevertheless, to be in- 
fluenced by the anti-German ring and hampered in the 
pursuit of his plans. 

2. Telegram in Cipher 

* 'Washington, 2nd Decembef, 1915. 
**The Government here have lost their nerve as a result 
of the impending Congress, the Hapag case, the Ancona 
incident, and the explosions and fires in munition and 
powder works, and like all private individuals here are 
allomng themselves to be terrorized by the anti-German 
ring. Hence the anxiety for the recall of Papen and 
Boy-Ed. The Government fear that Congress will take 
the above questions, as well as the Lnisitania affair, into 
their own hands, and deal with them in more radical 
fashion than the Government. This is the reason for the 
present demand for the recall — ^which is intended to 
serve as a safety-valve — ^lest Congress should break off 
diplomatic relations with us. Whether there is any real 
danger of this happening it is difficult to say. Lansing 
thinks there is. In any case everything is possible in the 
present state of public feeling. They have not the cour- 
age to swim against the stream. Perhaps the recall of 
the attaches will still the storm for a time, as was the case 
with Dernburg and Dumba ; meanwhile everything turns 
on the attitude of Congress, who, it is to be hoped, will 
not be anxious to declare war on us. Colonel House, who 
is a good reader of the barometer here, sees no danger. 
I, personally, also do not believe that Congress wiU de- 
cide to resort to extremes on one side, — i.e., without 
attacking England — for the breaking-off of diplomatic 
relations would certainly be quickly followed by war. 



216 MY THEEE YEARS IN AMERICA 

"In any case it is my sacred duty to inform your Ex- 
cellency that Congress may produce unpleasant surprises, 
and that we must, therefore, be prepared to do something 
with regard to the Lusitania question. How far we can 
approach the Lansing draft it is difficult to judge from 
here. It depends in the first place on the state of public 
opinion in Germany, for the matter has no further prac- 
tical importance since we have pledged ourselves to spare 
passenger-ships. 

** Hitherto my personal relations with the American 
Government have been so good that it was always possible 
to prevent the worst happening. Lansing volunteered 
yesterday to send this telegram. But if the matter once 
gets into the hands of Congress it will be much more 
difficult to exert influence, especially as nothing can be 
kept secret here. It is not yet possible to say when Con- 
gress will ask for the Lusitania documents, but it will 
probably be in a few weeks' time, provided that no diplo- 
matic understanding can be reached meanwhile." 

3. Report in Cipher 

"Washington, 7th December, 1915. 
"The action that Congress will take with regard to the 
Lusitania question is of primary importance for us. It 
is my opinion that President Wilson, when he asked for 
the recall of our two attaches, had the thought in the back 
of his mind that Congress would let the Lusitania ques- 
tion rest for a time, because relations with Germany are 
already sufficiently strained and only the rabid pro- 
English want war. One cannot, however, count on any- 
thing now, because the anti-German ring are seeking to 
terrorize all who do not agree with them. The senators 
and members of Congress from the west are certainly 
more difficult to influence, as their constituents have only 



THE SECOND "LUSITANIA" CBISIS 217 

a slight economic interest in the cause of onr enemies. 
It is also probable that the senators from the south will 
all stand by us, because they are very much embittered 
against England on account of the cotton question. 
Nevertheless, we must, as I have already pointed out by 
telegram, be fully prepared for further negotiations on 
the subject of the Lusitania. If we refuse to give way 
at all, the breaking of diplomatic relations, followed by 
war, is inevitable. In my opinion it is out of the question 
to find a formula that will satisfy public opinion on both 
sides. It may, however, be possible to find a formula 
that will skim over the points of contention, as was done 
in the Arabic case. In spite of all the outcry over here 
there is no doubt that the American Government and the 
greater part of public opinion would be only too delighted 
if we could find a graceful way of settling the Lusitania 
question without a conflict. What is required in the first 
place is : 

"1. K declaration on our side that the attack on the 
Lusitania should be regarded as an act of reprisal and, 
therefore, not within the scope of existing international 
law. 

*'2. The payment of an indemnity, which in my opin- 
ion could be made without committing ourselves on the 
question of responsibility. 

"President Wilson had hoped that the whole question 
could be shelved until after the end of the war. Now the 
war still drags on, and Mr. Wilson is afraid of radical 
intervention on the part of Congress. Over here it is 
quite impossible to prophesy. The unexpected is the only 
thing that consistently recurs. No one can say what Con- 
gress will do. Meanwhile, it is my duty to describe the 
situation as I see it to-day. Whether the Lusitania ques- 



218 MY THEEE YEARS IN AMEEICA 

tion is of snfficient practical importance to allow it to 
bring upon ns the breaking-off of diplomatic relations 
and war with the United States I must leave it to the 
exalted judgment of your Excellency to decide.'* 



The American Government had established a basis for 
the negotiations with regard to the Lusitania and "the 
Freedom of the Seas'* which was in our favor when, on 
the 21st October, they sent a very circumstantial Note to 
London in which they demonstrated that the English 
blockade was a breach of international law and definitely 
stated that this blockade was neither effective, legal nor 
defensible. Further, that the United States could not, 
therefore, submit to an infringement of her rights as a 
neutral through measures which were admittedly re- 
prisals, and, consequently, contrary to international law. 
That she could not with equanimity allow her rights to 
be subordinated to the plea that the peculiar geographical 
position of the enemies of Great Britain justified meas- 
ures contrary to international law. 

The conclusion of the Note read as follows : 

*'It is of the highest importance to neutrals not only of 
the present day, but of the future, that the principles of 
international right be maintained unimpaired. 

**This task of championing the integrity of neutral 
rights, which have received the sanction of the civilized 
world against the lawless conduct of belligerents arising 
out of the bitterness of the great conflict which is now 
wasting the countries of Europe, the United States un- 
hesitatingly assumes, and to the accomplishment of that 
task it will devote its energies, exercising always that 
impartiality which from the outbreak of the war it has 



THE SECOND "LUSITANIA*' CRISIS 219 

sought to exercise in its relations with the warring 
nations." 

The above programme was in accordance with the pro- 
posal of the American Note of 21st Jnly, which had 
touched on the subject of co-operation in realizing the 
"Freedom of the Seas.'' It was, however, clear to me, 
apart from anything else, that the United States would 
not expend energy in championing the rights of neutrals 
so long as a conflict with Germany threatened. The 
settlement of the Arabic question gave grounds for hope 
that the views of the two Governments on the question 
of submarine warfare would coincide. This appeared to 
me to be the most important point ; the American Govern- 
ment, however, insisted on the settlement of the Lusitania 
incident, which I foresaw was going to prove a very diffi- 
cult problem. Even in the Arabic affair it was only by 
my own independent action that it was possible to avoid 
a break. The Lusitania question, however, was much 
more unfavorable to us because at that time the old in- 
structions to submarine captains were still in force. I 
should, therefore, have been glad to avoid negotiations on 
the Lusitania question, but Mr. Lansing insisted on a 
settlement before he spoke on the future ''Freedom of 
the Seas." The reason for this attitude of the Secretary 
of State, as appears in my reports reproduced above, lay 
in the state of public opinion. It was unfortunately im- 
possible for the American Government to carry through 
the policy they had adopted in respect to England so long 
as the Lusitania question was brought forward daily in 
the American Press. 

The negotiations should have been carried through 
orally and confidentially between Mr. Lansing and my- 
self. Unfortunately, however, it was impossible to keep 
anything confidential in Washington, particularly as, very 



220 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

much against my wishes, the conversations were pro- 
tracted for weeks. The state department was continually 
besieged by journalists, who reported in their papers a 
medley of truth and fiction about each of my visits. In 
this way they provoked denials, and so ended by getting 
a good idea of how the situation stood. In addition to 
this, authoritative persons in Berlin gave interviews to 
American journalists, who reported to the United States 
papers everything that they did not already know. Con- 
sequently, the negotiations did not progress in the way 
Mr. Lansing and I had expected. We wanted to arrive 
quickly at a formula and make it known at once. Pub- 
lic opinion in both countries would then have been set at 
rest, and the past would have been buried so long as no 
fresh differences of opinion and conflict arose out of the 
submarine war. The formula, however, was not so easy 
to arrive at. The wording of the Memorandum which I 
was to present to the American Government had to be 
repeatedly cabled to Berlin, where each time some altera- 
tion was required in the text that Mr. Lansing wanted. 

The American Government held to the point of view 
which they had formulated in the Note of the 21st July, 
as follows: 

". . . for a belligerent act of retaliation is per se an 
act beyond the law and the defense of an act as retalia- 
tory is an admission that it is illegal." 

The standpoint of the American Note of the 21st July, 
1915, shows clearly the mistake of treating the submarine 
war as reprisals. It sho^wts how every surrender of a 
position compromises the next. 

The German Government, on the other hand, refused 
under any circumstances to admit the illegality of the 
submarine warfare within the war-zone, because they 
regarded the right to make reprisals as a recognized part 



THE SECOND "LUSITANIA" CRISIS 221 

of the existing international law. Further, the American 
demand was regarded in Germany as a deliberate hmnil- 
iation, as well as an attempt to coerce us unconditionally 
to renounce unrestricted submarine warfare once and for 
all. To have admitted that the submarine war was a 
breach of international law would have involved us in the 
same unpleasant consequences to which now, after our 
defeat, we are compelled to submit. If we admitted the 
illegality of the submarine campaign we should have been 
obliged, on the conclusion of peace, to meet all the de- 
mands for damages arising out of it. 

For the third time, then, the word ** illegal" brought us 
face to face with a crisis which was within an ace of 
causing a rupture of diplomatic relations. The last days 
of the negotiations turned out very unfortunately for us. 
Mr. Lansing and I had agreed upon a formula in which 
the word "illegal" did not occur, because my instructions 
categorically prohibited its use. In Berlin it was not 
yet known that we had arrived at the desired agreement, 
and it was there thought necessary to call public atten- 
tion to the danger of the situation, and explain the seri- 
ousness of the position in the hope that by this means the 
American Government might be moved to adopt a more 
conciliatory attitude. 

On 5th February, Under-Secretary of State Zimmer- 
mann gave an interview to the Associated Press in which 
he said he did not wish to conceal the seriousness of the 
position. That Germany could under no circumstances 
admit the illegality of the submarine campaign within the 
war-zone. The whole crisis arose from the new demand 
of America that Germany should admit the sinking of the 
Lusitania to be an act infringing the law of nations. Ger- 
many could not renounce the submarine as a weapon. If 
the United States insisted on bringing about a break 
Germany could do nothing further to avoid it. The 



222 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

Imperial Chancellor confirmed these statements in a 
conversation with the Berlin correspondent of The 
World. 

These interviews compromised once more the settle- 
ment of the negotiations, because the American Govern- 
ment were doubtful as to whether they could allow the 
word ''illegal" to be omitted, after the sharp difference 
of opinion between the two Governments had become 
public property. The agreement which had been reached 
voluntarily now looked like a weak surrender before a 
German threat. In the end, however, a compromise was 
arrived at. I handed to Mr. Lansing in writing a declara- 
tion amounting to an admission that reprisals were ad- 
missible, but that they should not be allowed to injure 
neutrals, and that therefore the German Government 
regretted the incident and were prepared to offer satis- 
faction and compensation. The American Government 
were willing to confirm the receipt of this Memorandum 
and declare themselves satisfied. Fate, however, had 
decreed that I should play the role of Sisyphus at Wash- 
ington. Scarcely were the negotiations terminated when 
the German Government, on the 8th February, declared 
the so-called ''ruthless submarine war," i.e. announced 
to the sea powers their intention of sinking armed 
merchantmen without warning and without regard to 
crew or passengers. In view of this the American Gov- 
ernment refused to complete the exchange of letters on 
the subject of the Lusitania. Instead of this there began 
a new controversy on the question of "armed merchant- 
men." My hope of settling the Lusitania question and 
then passing on to the discussion of "Freedom of the 
Seas" was shattered. This hit me all the harder as I was 
convinced that the conversations on the latter question 
would have developed into peace negotiations. 

The opinion has been expressed in Germany that the 



THE SECOND **LUSITANIA'^ CEISIS 223 

breaking-off of diplomatic relations at this stage was re- 
garded, even in America, as precipitate, since no really 
acute provocation had been given. That it was a shame- 
lessly engineered break after we had in principle yielded 
on every point. That the Americans had apparently been 
bluffing and continually increasing their demands with 
a view of enhancing their own prestige by scoring further 
diplomatic successes against us which, in view of the 
previous course of events, they could regard as certain. 
In this case I do not myself believe that the American 
Government were really thinking seriously of breaking 
off diplomatic relations. They only wanted to pacify 
public opinion by a settlement of the Lusitania question, 
which was essential before passing on to negotiations 
with regard to the ''Freedom of the Seas" or to steps for 
peace. Threats of war arose only because the negotia- 
tions were protracted for weeks, and the word "illegal" 
was discussed in the Press in every possible tone. It 
was a misfortune that these negotiations were not carried 
on — like the subsequent conversations with regard to 
peace — in secret. I had actually persuaded the American 
Government to give way on the word ''illegal," which 
had become much more difficult for them owing to the 
publicity that was given to the negotiations. Had it not 
been for the ruthless submarine campaign the Lusitania 
question would have been finally buried and the negotia- 
tions could have been continued in a friendly spirit. 
Moreover, the so-called ruthless submarine campaign 
was, according to the opinion of Admiral von Tirpitz, 
who was at that time still in office, although he was not 
consulted until the decision w^s taken, a military farce. 
He declared the order to be technically nonsense, and 
the pompous way in which it was issued as unnecessa- 
rily provocative and a challenge. The whole thing was 
neither "fish nor flesh." 



224 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

The controversy over the *' armed merchantmen" had 
a prologue which could only be described as a comedy of 
errors, were the matter not so serious. It is well known 
that the constitution of the United States allows the 
President the right of independent political action. He 
alone is responsible, and his Secretary of State and the 
other Ministers are only his assistants, without personal 
responsibility. Mr. Wilson has made much greater use 
of his rights in this respect than even Mr. Rioosevelt. 
From the very beginning his administration was a one- 
man Government. 

In general terms the development of democracy in 
America amounts to this, that the electors vest unlimited 
rights in one man for a short time, and after that they 
re-elect or replace him according to whether he has won 
or lost their confidence. 

Thus arises a sort of temporary autocracy which com- 
bines the advantages of a monarchy and a democracy. 
Whether this historically developed system really coin- 
cides with our idea of formal democracy is another 
question. 

However this may be, the political life of a nation is 
not to be ruled by catch-words. History is the only 
builder of state organisms. No one can foretell in what 
direction our young democracy will develop. In view 
of the indifference of the German people to politics it 
may be assumed, however, that it will develop on similar 
lines to that of America when we have once accepted the 
principle of the election of the President by the people. 
Such a President will always possess great power and 
authority in his relation to other bodies, while it is prob- 
able that the German people will be willing to leave 
political affairs in the hands of the man they have elected, 
and will even give him charge of their economic affairs. 
The German President of the future will certainly find 



THE SECOND "LUSITANIA'' CEISIS 225 

himself involved in the same differences with the Min- 
isters responsible to the majority in the Reichstag as the 
American President has had so frequently with the 
Senate. In such cases the American people nearly 
always support the President, directly chosen by them, 
and so bring corresponding pressure to bear on the 
Senate. 

The brief constitutional diversion from the question 
of ** armed merchantmen" was to give an opportunity for 
announcing the surprising catastrophes which had oc- 
curred in the course of the development of this question. 
About the end of the year 1915 Mr. Wilson had married 
for the second time and was absent for a time from Wash- 
ington. Consequently the President seems not to have 
exerted the same close control as usual over the political 
actions of his Ministers. In any case he had not read, or 
only hastily glanced through, a Memorandum on the sub- 
marine campaign which Mr. Lansing had handed on the 
18th January, 1916, to the representatives of the Entente, 
and had not therefore realized its far-reaching impor- 
tance. This Memorandum only came to the knowledge of 
the Central Powers at a later date, through the medium 
of the Press, which had got to know of it from one of the 
Entente representatives or through some indiscretion. 

The Memorandum went even further than the Note of 
the 21st July, 1915, and recognized that the use of sub- 
marines could not be prohibited to the combatants after 
they had proved their value in attacking enemy com- 
merce. It laid down, however, that the submarine cam- 
paign must, without interfering with its effectiveness, be 
brought into harmony with the general provisions of in- 
ternational law and with the principles of humanity. It 
was, therefore, necessary on the one side that the sub- 
marines should be instructed to conduct their campaign 
within the limits laid down for cruiser-warfare against 



226 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

merchant shipping, i.e., they must not sink without first 
stopping and examining the ship and giving the passen- 
gers and crew a chance to save themselves. On the 
other side, the merchant ships were not to carry arms, 
since, owing to the nature of the submarines, it would be 
impossible for them to conduct their operations on the 
lines of cruiser-warfare if the merchantmen were even 
lightly armed, as had hitherto been permitted by the 
principles of international law for purposes of defense. 
Under the prevailing circumstances any arming of a 
merchant ship would have an offensive character. 
The Memorandum concluded as f oUows : 

"I should add fhat my Government is impressed with 
the reasonableness of the argument that a merchant 
vessel carrying an armament of any sort, in view of the 
character of submarine warfare and the defensive weak- 
ness of undersea craft, should be held to be an auxiliary 
cruiser and so treated by a neutral as well as by a 
belligerent Government, and is seriously considering in- 
structing its officials accordingly." 

Although this Memorandum bears no historical weight 
I deal with it in detail here because it played a leading 
part before the Committee of the National Assembly as 
a proof that no confidence could be placed in Mr. "Wilson 
as a peace mediator. 

I have no doubt that the Memorandum was intended to 
carry on the policy of the American Notes of the 21st 
July and 21st October, 1915, which had given rise to the 
American struggle for the *' Freedom of the Seas." It 
was not, however, in keeping with Mr. Wilson's usual 
methods to make such a sharp thrust at the Entente aS 
the concluding paragraph of the Memorandum repre- 



THE SECOND '^LUSITANIA^' CRISIS 227 

sented, so long as the negotiations with me on the subject 
of the Lusitania incident were not yet concluded and so 
long as it was not absolutely sure of the support of public 
opinion. Just as the Note of the 21st October, 1915, was 
not sent to London until the President thought he had 
cleared the way with respect to us by the settlement of 
the Arabic question, so in January, 1916, he wanted to 
keep his hands free until the chance of a conflict with us 
was past. The popular saying in America is that Wilson 
has a single-line brain and only deals with one matter 
at a time. Moreover, out of regard for the state of 
public feeling in the country the President wanted to take 
each political step without being openly coerced by us. 
It is not my intention to defend Mr. Wilson's conception 
of neutrality to-day, after I have opposed it for years, 
but I will only attempt, without any personal ill-will, to 
contribute to Klio's work of discovering the real truth. 
To me personally the matter of paramount interest to- 
day, as at that time, is not what Mr. Wilson did or did 
not do, but the question what we ought ito have done in 
the interest of Germany. 

I shall often have to return to the developments which, 
after the 31st January, 1917, made the President our 
open enemy. If we wish to be lovers of truth we must 
distinguish sharply between the two periods before and 
after the 31st January, 1917. It is certain that Mr. 
Wilson was never even near to being pro-German. By 
descent, education and training he was unconsciously 
much too much under the English influence already men- 
tioned. But until the 31st January, 1917, the President 
had striven to be neutral. All his speeches testify to this. 
No un-neutral remark of Mr. Wilson, even in private, 
has ever reached my ears. He always resisted the pres- 
sure of the Entente party, in spite of the fact that he 
was almost entirely surrounded by anti-Germans. The 



228 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

only one I could mention whose advice to the President 
was always definitely neutral was Mr. House. For the 
rest, in the east of the United States we found ourselves 
morally in an enemy country. Every neutral step taken 
by Mr. Wilson was immediately hailed as ' ' pro-German. ' * 
For instance, I am convinced that the President could 
never have carried out the threat contained in the final 
clause of the Memorandum of the 18th January, Gradu- 
ally all the Entente merchantmen were armed. If these 
were to be treated in American ports as auxiliary cruisers 
the whole of American commerce would of necessity have 
come to a standstill, for it was already suffering seri- 
ously from lack of freight space. The Entente knew 
exactly how much value all Americans placed on their 
commerce, and could therefore reject the proposal of the 
United States with equanimity. 

Nevertheless, it is well worthy of notice that in the 
Memorandum of the 18th January, 1916, the legally 
trained and legally minded Secretary of State Lansing, 
as well as Mr. Bryan, brought forward or attempted to 
bring forward a di:tferent kind of neutrality from that 
of the President. The only question is whether Mr. 
Wilson could at that time have carried through the Lans- 
ing policy. I do not think so. This does not in itself 
relieve the President of the responsibility of not wishing 
to make such a sharp thrust against the Entente as was 
represented by the Memorandum so long as the negotia- 
tions on the Lusitania affair still remained unsettled. Yet 
throughout the whole war Holland has never followed the 
regulations of the Memorandum. This fact remains. Mr. 
Wilson did not enforce the Memorandum because he 
could not do so without prejudicing the interests of 
American commerce. In this case Mr. Lansing was the 
neutral advocate and the President the American poli- 
tician, whose decisions on foreign questions, as usually 



THE SECOND **LUSITANIA'' CRISIS 229 

happens in the United States, were actuated by domestic 
politics. 

After the issue of Mr. Wilson ^s protest against the 
English blockade, and in view of the turn that the Lansing 
action against armed merchantmen had taken, it can be 
understood that the German Imperial Government hence- 
forward was suspicious of the good-will and power of 
the President as a peace mediator. Meanwhile there 
came a change in the domestic situation, and this, as I 
have already mentioned, is always the decisive factor 
in the United States in all questions of foreign policy. 

It would have been a good move on our part to wait 
for the result of the Lusitania negotiations, and then to 
give Mr. Wilson time to take in hand his policy with re- 
gard to the ** Freedom of the Seas" on his own initiative. 
Berlin, however, was always in a hurry to bring in the 
new measures of submarine warfare, although the dis- 
advantages that this would cause us always outweighed 
the advantages. However, the Americans themselves 
will perhaps some day have occasion to regret that they 
did not seize the opportunity of the war to insure the 
** Freedom of the Seas." If during the five years of war 
— from the mobilization to the peace offer and the armis- 
tice — we Germans were always in too great a hurry with 
our decisions, the American Government, on the other 
hand, lost through hesitation many an opportunity of 
keeping out of the war. There could be no doubt that 
the United States could, as a neutral power, have brought 
about a better peace than they have done as the decisive 
combatant power. 

In January, 1916, there occurred an unfortunate mis- 
understanding, which must have strengthened the Ger- 
man Government in their intention of declaring the un- 
restricted submarine war. The Austrian representative 
had an interview with Mr. Lansing with reference to the 



230 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

Ancona incident, in which he understood the Secretary 
of State to say that it would be agreeable to the Ameri- 
can Government if the Central Powers in future regarded 
armed enemy merchantmen as auxiliary cruisers. Baron 
Zwiedineck sent a wireless report of this interview to his 
Government via Nauen. As has already been mentioned, 
all our wireless messages were read by the American 
Government departments, and it had often occurred that 
objection had been raised. As this message of Baron 
Zwiedineck was sent without protest I assumed that Mr. 
Lansing had agreed to its contents. Later a confidential 
discussion took place between the Secretary of State, 
Baron Zwiedineck and myself, on the subject of this inci- 
dent. Mr. Lansing said that he had not read the wireless 
message, as such messages were only examined by the 
censor, with a view to seeing that they did not compro- 
mise the neutrality of the United States. Further, he 
maintained, that Baron Zwiedineck must have misunder- 
stood him, as he had not made the statement imputed to 
him in the message. We did not treat the conversation as 
ofi&cial, in order not to put any greater difficulties in Mr. 
Lansing 's way than he already had to face as a result of 
his Memorandum of 18th January. 

The German Memorandum of 8th February, 1915, pro- 
claiming the unrestricted submarine campaign, was 
handed to Mr. Gerard in Berlin. I had for the moment 
no further negotiations to conduct, as the Lusitania ques- 
tion was never again reopened and the question of the 
*' Freedom of the Seas" had been quashed by the un- 
restricted submarine campaign. 

Meanwhile Colonel House had gone for a second time 
to Europe, this time as the official representative of the 
President. He was in Berlin just at the time when the 
second Lusitania crisis reached its apogee. 

I had announced his visit to Berlin, and prepared 



THE SECOND **LUSITANIA'^ CRISIS 231 

everything so that he might have every opportunity for 
conversation with the authoritative political personages. 

When Colonel House returned to America, he told me 
that the time had not yet come for the mediation of the 
United States. He had, however, had the opportunity to 
state his views in London, Paris and Berlin, and had met 
with the greatest opposition in Paris, because France had 
suffered so seriously in the war that she had little more 
to lose by prolonging it. 

In Berlin, on the other hand, he had found a disposition 
to agree to mediation by Mr. Wilson when a favorable 
opportunity occurred. 

In accordance with the wish of the President, I had 
discussed the peace question exclusively with Colonel 
House since his second visit to Europe. This made it 
possible for the conversations to be kept strictly confi- 
dential. I could call on Colonel House at his private 
residence in New York at any time without attracting 
attention, whereas the State Dpartment and the White 
House were always besieged by journalists, as I have 
already mentioned. As a rule, I took the night train to 
New York and called on Colonel House in the morning, 
before the Press were aware that I had left Washington. 

On the 8th March, according to my instructions, I 
handed to the American Government a further Memo- 
randum, which set out in concise terms the German 
standpoint. 

After recapitulating the various phases of the negotia- 
tions which are already known to the reader, it defined 
the existing situation with regard to the war at sea as 
f oUows : 

England was making it impossible for the submarines 
to carry on their campaign against commerce in accord- 
ance with the provisions of international law by arming 



232 " MY THREE YEARS. IN AMERICA 

practically all merchantmen, and ordering the nse of 
their guns for offence. Photographs of the English 
orders had been sent to the neutral Governments, with 
the Memorandum of the 8th February, 1916. These 
orders are directly contrary to the declarations of the 
English Ambassador in Washington on the 25th August, 
1914. The Imperial German Government had hoped that 
these facts would prompt the neutral Governments to 
carry out the disarmament of merchant vessels on the 
lines of the proposals for disarmament made by the 
United States Government on 23rd January, 1916. 
Actually, however, the arming of these ships with guns 
provided by our enemies has been energetically pursued. 

Advantage was taken by England and her Allies of the 
American Government's decision not to keep her citizens 
off enemy merchant ships to arm merchantmen for attack. 
This makes it easy for merchantmen to destroy the sub- 
marines, and, in case of the failure of their attack, to 
count themselves secure owing to the presence on board 
of American citizens. 

The order as to the use of arms was supplemented by 
instructions given to the masters of the merchant vessels 
to fly false colors and to ram the submarines. The news 
that prize-money was paid to successful captains of 
merchant ships and honors conferred upon them in- 
creased the effectiveness of these orders. The Allies have 
associated themselves with these English measures. 

Germany now finds herself faced with the following 
facts : 

(a) That for a year a blockade contrary to inter- 
national law has kept neutral commerce away from Ger- 
man ports and made export from Germany impossible. 

(h) That for six months an extension, contrary to in- 
ternational law, of the laws of contraband has hampered 



THE SECOND "LUSITANIA" CRISIS 233 

the maritime commerce of neutral neighbors in respect 
of Germany. 

(c) That interference with the post, contrary to inter- 
national law, is striving to cut Germany off from all 
communication with the outside world. 

{d) That systematically increased coercion of neutrals, 
on the principle that '* Might is right," is stopping trade 
with Germany across the land frontiers, with a view to 
completing the starvation blockade of the non-combatant 
population of the Central Powers. 

(e) That Germans who are found at sea by our enemies 
are robbed of their liberty regardless of whether they are 
combatants or non-combatants. 

(/) That our enemies have armed their merchant ships 
for attack, and have thus made impossible the use of sub- 
marines in accordance with the principles of the Declara- 
tion of London. 

The English White Book, of the 5th January, 1916, 
with regard to the restriction of German commerce, 
boasts that through these measures Germany's export 
trade has been almost completely stopped, and that her 
imports have been made dependent on the good-will of 
England. 

The Imperial Government may hope that, in view of 
the friendly relations that have existed between the two 
countries for a hundred years, the standpoint herein laid 
down will meet with the sympathy of the people of the 
United States, in spite of the increased difficulty of 
mutual understanding brought about by the conduct of 
our enemies. 

The last words of this Memorandum were vigorously 
commented on by the American Press as a proof that we 
wished to appeal, not to the American Government, but 
to the American people, as a result of the movement 



234 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

which had been set on foot in Congress, and especially in 
the Senate, that American citizens should be prohibited 
from travelling on the armed merchant vessels of com- 
batant States. 

The struggle which was at that time being waged in 
Congress has been greatly exaggerated in Germany. At 
home it was thought that the weight of opinion in Con- 
gress in favor of the warning of passengers was very 
great. On the pro-German side in New York it was 
thought that Congress was anxious to avert danger of a 
conflict. If this could have happened through a yielding 
on the part of Germany, it would, of course, have made 
things much easier for the Americans ; if, however, Ger- 
many refused to give way, they thought the United States 
would have found a more conciliatory formula, as the 
country was seeking before all things to avert war. They 
believed that the re-election of 1916 had been largely won 
through the battle-cry, *'He kept us out of the war," 
which showed that Congress, with its love of freedom, 
reflected the general opinion. It was, moreover, doubted 
in the same quarter whether Wilson, as a pacifist candi- 
date for the Presidency, could declare war at that time, 
when there was as yet no definite provocation — as, for 
example, the Mexico Dispatch. The theory of this small 
pro-German group in New York was that Congress would 
at that time have done anything to avoid war, and that 
they had only accepted the Gore resolution in order to 
humiliate the President in the eyes of the world as no 
head of a State had ever been disavowed before. 

In the same quarter — as also happened before the 
Committee of the German National Assembly — the whole 
question aroused indignation. It was said that when the 
Germans read that it had been pompously brought for- 
ward as a point of honor whether a few Americans should 



THE SECOND "LUSITANIA" CEISIS 235 

travel by enemy armed vessels, they bristled with anger. 
It looked to them as though the alternatives were 
whether these few Americans should travel in the war- 
zone on neutral ships, or whether a great civilized nation 
like Germany should go under! The matter developed 
from the ''too proud to fight'* attitude — ^when Wilson 
really believed there was a danger of war, and so drew 
back — to the tone of February, 1916 — ^when he no longer 
believed in the possibility of war, but felt sure that he 
could subdue us with hard words. They thought it 
strange, moreover, to hear Wilson speaking of the 
gradual breakdown of the delicate structure of inter- 
national law. That had resulted from England's at- 
titude, and in 1812 America had declared war on the 
English because of an illegal blockade. 

Politics are not to be carried on by indignation, but 
only vntlci a cool head and a clear vision for political 
realities. We could not alter the American situation, but 
must strive to conduct ourselves in such a way as to 
prejudice the position of the United States as little as 
possible. 

I had from the beginning little doubt that Mr. Wilson 
would make his will prevail, because the domestic 
position in the United States made any other issue im- 
possible. The presidential election was imminent, and 
the Democratic party had no likely candidate apart from 
Mr. Wilson. If a split occurred within the party the 
Eepublicans would be bound to win. Senators Stone and 
Gore were the leaders of the Democratic Opposition, 
while the Republicans in this case supported the policy of 
the President, partly because they were on the side of the 
Entente, partly because they wanted to assure the in- 
terests of American commerce. As has already been 
mentioned. Senator Stone had always maintained a 
neutral attitude to the last, chiefly because he was one 



236 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

of the two representatives of Missouri, and could not 
ignore the large number of Germans among his con- 
stituents. For this reason he was called by the pro- 
Entente Press, like the New York Herald^ "pro-German 
Mr. Stone." Senator Gore was a Pacifist on principle, 
and thought that the resolution for which he was respon- 
sible, to prohibit Americans from travelling on armed 
merchantmen, would avert the danger of war. 

The whole Congress story can only be read as a 
domestic party skirmish, with a view to the approaching 
Presidential election; one section of the Democratic 
party wanted a candidate other than Wilson. Just as it 
was at that time a mistake to expect any advantage from 
the Congress Opposition, so to-day a similar mistake is 
made in Germany, when it is assumed that the struggle 
in the Senate over the ratification of the Peace Treaty 
has a pro-German background. 

The debate in Congress was not in any way connected 
with an acute German-American situation. It seems 
necessary to give here a short survey of the negotiations, 
as they appeared from my point of view. Our first con- 
cession occurred after the Arabic incident, our second 
later, after the Sussex incident. Between these two there 
was never any concession to America on the part of 
Germany, for the shelving of the second Lusitania crisis 
constituted a compromise. Between February, 1915, and 
the Lusitania incident we were conducting an unre- 
stricted submarine campaign, subsequently a limited one, 
though this was not known to America until after the 
sinking of the Arabic; after February, 1916, the un- 
restricted campaign was renewed until the Sussex inci- 
dent, after which cruiser warfare was begun. This is 
all that concerned me in this connection. Internal differ- 
ences of opinion within the German Government, such as 
occurred after February, 1915, did not make their way 



THE SECOND '^LUSITANIA'^ CRISIS 237 

across the Atlantic; for instance, the resumption of the 
unrestricted submarine campaign in February, 1916, was 
discussed with me as little as it was with the American 
Government itself. 

From these facts it is evident that the action of Con- 
gress was of no practical importance for us, for when, 
after this debate, the Sussex incident occurred — ^when, 
moreover, it was a question of an unarmed ship — Mr. 
"Wilson was free to issue his ultimatum, and could also 
have broken off diplomatic relations, if we had refused 
to give way. The American Government had then no 
thought of a complete defeat of Germany, such as later 
occurred, for otherwise they could easily have found an 
excuse for coming into the war. At that time Mr. Wilson 
was convinced that the war would end in a peace without 
victory, for which he intended to use his influence. The 
whole question was merely whether we realized these 
facts and would avail ourselves of them or not. Our one 
asset in America was the disinclination of the majority of 
the people for war, for otherwise — as appeared later — it 
would have been only too easy for the United States to 
make war upon us with success. 

The President wanted to continue the policy he had 
adopted hitherto, by standing firm to the point of view 
that the submarine war must be conducted according to 
the principles of international law, and, further, was 
waiting to see whether the unrestricted submarine cam- 
paign would, give rise to any further incidents. 

In a letter written to Senator Stone, on the 24th Feb- 
ruary, the President defined his policy in the following 
terms : 

"You are right in assuming that I shall do everything 
in my power to keep the United States out of the war. 
I think the country will feel no anxiety about my line of 



238 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

action in tMs respect. I have devoted many anxious 
months to this task under much greater difficulties than 
appeared on the surface, and so far with success. The 
course which the Central Powers intend to adopt in 
future with regard to submarine warfare, as shown by 
their Memorandum, seems at the moment to raise in- 
superable difficulties ; but its contents are at first sight so 
difficult to reconcile with the specific assurances which 
the Central Powers have recently given us as to the treat- 
ment of merchant shipping on the high seas, that I think 
that explanations wiU shortly be forthcoming which wiU 
throw a different light on the matter. We have in the 
past had no reason to doubt their good faith, or the sin- 
cerity of their promises, and I, for my part, am confident 
that we shall have none in the future. 

**But in any event our duty is clear. No nation, no 
group of nations, has the right, while war is in progress, 
to alter or disregard the principles which aU nations have 
agreed upon in mitigation of the horrors and sufferings 
of war; and if the clear rights of American citizens 
should ever unhappily be abridged or denied by any such 
action, we should, it seems to me, have in honor no choice 
as to what our own course should be. 

**For my own part, I cannot consent to any abridg- 
ment of the rights of American citizens in any respect. 
The honor and self-respect of the Nation is involved. 
We covet peace, and shall preserve it at any cost but the 
loss of honor. 

"To forbid our people to exercise their rights for fear 
we might be called upon to vindicate them would be a 
deep humiliation indeed. It would be an implicit, all but 
an explicit, acquiescence in the violation of the rights 
of mankind everywhere and of whatever nation or 
allegiance. It would be a deliberate abdication of our 
hitherto proud position as spokesmen, even amid the 



THE SECOND ''LUSITANIA'^ CRISIS 239 

turmoil of war, for the law and the right. It would make 
everything this Government has attempted and every- 
thing that it has accomplished during this terrible 
struggle of nations meaningless and futile. 

*'It is important to reflect that if in this instance we 
allowed expediency to take the place of principle the 
door would inevitably be opened to still further con- 
cessions. Once accept a single abatement of right, and 
many other humiliations would certainly follow, and the 
whole fine fabric of international law might crumble 
under our hands piece by piece. What we are contending 
for in this matter is of the very essence of the things that 
have made America a sovereign nation. She cannot yield 
them without conceding her own impotency as a Nation 
and making virtual surrender of her independent position 
among the nations of the world. '* 

Soon afterwards — on the 3rd March — the Senate de- 
cided by 68 votes to 14 to postpone the discussion of the 
Gore resolution sine die. The struggle had then already 
ended in a victory for Mr. "Wilson when I handed over 
the above-mentioned Memorandum. 

Regarded from our own point of view, the declaration 
of the ** unrestricted submarine war" was a serious po- 
litical mistake, which was not even justified by the results 
of the measure. The least we could have done was to wait 
for the settlement of the Lusitania question and the sub- 
sequent action of Mr. Wilson. The ''unrestricted sub- 
marine war" was not the right way to improve our situa- 
tion, but was bound inevitably to lead to a new conflict 
with America. It was absolutely impossible for the 
submarine captains to ascertain with certainty through 
the periscope whether an enemy merchant ship was 
armed or not. Mistakes, therefore, were sure to arise 
sooner or later. On the other hand, the Americans would 



240 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

not refrain from travelling on enemy passenger ships, as 
their business took them mostly to England and France, 
and there were not enough of their own or neutral ships 
at their disposal. 

The one hope for the continued avoidance of a conflict 
was that the Imperial Government should not withdraw 
the concessions they had made on the 5th October, 1915, 
with regard to ''liners," and that enemy passenger ships 
should not be unarmed out of regard for their neutral 
passengers. 

There were, as a rule, no Americans on cargo ships, for 
there were at that time few sailors in the United States. 
From the above-mentioned letter of Mr. Wilson to Mr. 
Stone, however, it appeared that the American Govern- 
ment regarded our concessions as applying to all mer- 
chant vessels, while, as I have already stated, the German 
naval authorities had only intended to include passenger 
steamers. 

This misunderstanding might now give rise to a fresh 
conflict, even if mistakes on the part of submarine 
captains were by special good fortune avoided. 



CHAPTER IX 

THE "SUSSEX"' INCIDENT 

On" the 24th March the unarmed passenger-ship Sussex 
was torpedoed without warning, and several Americans 
lost their lives. The first information about this incident 
was so vague that the matter was at first treated in a 
dilatory fashion in Washington. At the time I sent the 
following report to Berlin : 

^^ Report in Cipher 

** Washington, 4th April, 1916. 
''During the fourteen months that have passed since 
the opening of the submarine campaign there have been 
intermittent periods in which the American Government 
have shown themselves aggressive towards us, and 
others in which the now proverbial expression * watchful 
waiting* formed the Leit-motif of their attitude. The 
past month belonged to the second category until the 
sinking of the Sussex and other similar incidents stirred 
American public opinion to fresh excitement. Officially 
I have, during the last four weeks, heard nothing further 
from the American side on the subject of the submarine 
campaign. During this time Mr. Lansing even allowed 
himself a fortnight's holiday for recuperation. On my 
side there was no occasion to reopen the submarine ques- 
tion as a complete understanding with the American 
Government cannot be attained,* and in my opinion it is 
advisable to avoid as far as possible any new crisis in our 

•i.e., Without inatructions from Berlin. 
241 



242 MY THREE YEAES IN AMEEICA 

relations with the United States. I therefore contented 
myself with keeping in touch with Colonel Honse so that 
I should not be taken by surprise by any volte-face on 
the part of the American Government. As soon as a new 
crisis arises Mr. Wilson will, as usual, be in a fearful 
hurry and bring us to the brink of war. Whether such a 
crisis will be precipitated by the Sussex incident, and 
whether the President in that case will shrink from war 
at the last moment, it is difficult to foretell, as this ques- 
tion — like all others at the present moment — ^will be 
viewed exclusively from the standpoint of the approach- 
ing presidential election. 

** Except for the surprises that are usual over here, 
things are at present quite calm. This is due, in the first 
place, to the desire for peace shown by the population, 
who are not anxious to be disturbed in their congenial 
occupation of money-making, and secondly, to the de- 
velopment of the Mexican question. This latter question 
stands in the forefront of public interest, and it seems 
to be increasingly probable that the punitive expedition 
against Villa will lead to a full-dress intervention. A 
few days ago it was reported that Villa was defeated, 
then wounded, and finally even a prisoner. All this good 
news proved later to be false and now Villa is said to have 
escaped south and won over fresh supporters. So long 
as the Mexican question holds the stage here we are, I 
believe, safe from an act of aggression on the part of the 
American Government 

**0n the other hand it looks as though Mr. Wilson were 
looking for a fresh way out of the impasse into which 
his attitude on the question of the submarine campaign 
has led him. As I have already had the honor to cable, 
Colonel House holds out the prospect of an early move 
towards peace by the President. The view is entertained 
here, and strengthened by the impressions gathered from 



THE '^ SUSSEX'' INCIDENT 243 

Colonel House, that gradually the stress of circumstances 
will force all the neutral Powers into the war. If this 
happens there will be no further prospect of the conclu- 
sion of peace, as there will be no one available to set the 
ball rolling. It is therefore essential that the foundations 
of peace should be laid before the world conflagration 
spreads any further and finally destroys the prosperity 
of every nation. This view may sound like pure theory, 
but it gains substance from the fact that it can very well 
be made to harmonize with Mr. Wilson's election cam- 
paign. In his capacity of founder of peace in Europe, 
and peace-maker — i.e., indirectly conqueror — of Mexico, 
it would be difficult, if not impossible, to vanquish Mr. 
Wilson in the election. Mr. Theodore Roosevelt would 
then shout himself hoarse to no purpose and Mr. Charles 
Hughes, the strongest Republican candidate, would per- 
haps not even go so far as nomination if his position 
seemed hopeless.'^ 

In that report I announced for the first time that Mr. 
Wilson had so far changed his policy as now to put peace 
mediation in the foreground and to give the question of 
the * Freedom of the Seas' second place. I shall return 
later to this political development. 

When news reached Washington which left no doubt 
that the Sussex had been torpedoed by a German sub- 
marine, I immediately cabled to Berlin for instructions 
in order to be in a position to give an official disavowal 
of the act. It required nothing further to convince me 
that it was now a question of bend or break. I had no 
means of knowing whether the supporters of the sub- 
marine campaign or the partisans of an understanding 
with the United States would win the day. In the former 
case war was inevitable. To provide for the second alter- 
native I recommended in my cablegram that there should 
be no question of an official exchange of Notes, because I 



244 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

was anxious that our withdrawal should not be accom- 
panied by a humiliation. If our Government were pre- 
pared to give way I regarded as the most appropriate 
modus procedenti the immediate issue of instructions to 
me, empowering me to offer the American Government 
satisfaction and compensation for this fresh incident. 
There was no hope of purchasing immunity from a break 
with any less concession than a pledge to carry on the 
submarine campaign for the future in accordance with 
the principles laid down by international law for cruiser 
warfare. I recommended, however, a provisional cessa- 
tion of the submarine war on the basis of an oral agree- 
ment with the American Government. If this proposal 
had been acted on, the American Government would have 
been obliged to follow suit and there would have been no 
sharp exchange of Notes, which still further prejudiced 
the position on both sides. If, after such a pause in the 
submarine war and the establishment of a really clear 
diplomatic situation, Mr. Wilson failed us and made no 
positive progress either with regard to his programme 
for the * Freedom of the Seas' or the conclusion of peace, 
we should have held quite a different position from which 
— if we really thought it desirable — to reopen unrestricted 
submarine warfare. We had always made the mistake 
of dealing in half-hearted concessions. In my opinion 
it was essential for us to strive for a complete under- 
standing with America if we were not prepared to carry 
on the submarine campaign without regard to con- 
sequences. 

No attention was paid to my suggestion in Berlin at 
the time. Admiral von Tirpitz had just resigned and the 
decision had been taken against the continuance of un- 
restricted submarine warfare. I do not know why the 
dispatch of an official Note was preferred to the oral 
negotiations I had suggested, but I think that the decid- 



THE ** SUSSEX" INCIDENT 245 

ing factor was consideration for public opinion in Ger- 
many. 

A few days later I cabled the following to Berlin : 

Telegram in Cipher 

** Washington, 8th April, 1916. 

** House gave me a very gloomy view of the position 
with regard to the Sussex. At the WMte House the 
situation is regarded as hopeless because the view is held 
that, in spite of Tirpitz's resignation, the German Gov- 
ernment, with the best will in the world, cannot curb the 
submarine campaign. It has hitherto been merely due to 
good luck that no American has lost his life and any 
moment might precipitate a crisis which would be bound 
to lead to a break. The American Government are con- 
vinced that the Sussex was torpedoed by a German sub- 
marine. A repetition of such mistakes would be bound 
to drive the United States of America into war with us, 
which Wilson would greatly regret, as he is anxious — 
as I have already reported — to lay the foundations of 
peace in a few months. If the United States were drawn 
into the war all hope of an early peace would be at an 
end. 

'*I request to be furnished with instructions on the 
basis of which I can pacify the Government here, which 
now has doubts of our bona fides.^' 

After Mr. Gerard, apart from other questions concern- 
ing doubtful cases of torpedoing, had also submitted a 
similar inquiry to the Foreign Office on the subject of the 
Sussex incident, an official reply was handed to him on 
the 10th April which read in the following terms : 

** A decision as to whether the Channel steamer Sussex 
was damaged by a German submarine or not is made 
extraordinarily difficult owing to the fact that no exact 



246 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

information is known as to the place, time and accom- 
panying circmnstances of the sinking, and moreover a 
picture of this ship conld not be obtained until the 6th 
April. Consequently the inquiry has had to be extended 
to all submarine enterprises which took place on the day 
in question, 24th March, in the Channel anywhere on the 
course between Folkestone and Dieppe. 

**In this area on the 24th March, in the middle of the 
English Channel, a long, black vessel, flying no flags, with 
a gray funnel, small gray superstructure and two high 
masts was hit by a German submarine. The German 
captain was definitely convinced that she was a ship of 
war, and indeed a mine-layer of the newly-built English 
Arabic class. He was led to this conviction : 

**1. By the flush deck of the ship. 

"2. By the shape of the stern, which sloped outwards. 

"3. By the paintwork, which was that of a ship of war. 

"4. By the high speed of about eighteen knots which 
the ship developed. 

**5. By the fact that the ship was not steering the 
course north of the Light buoys between Dungeness and 
Beachy Head within which frequent observation had led 
the German submarines to keep a look out for merchant 
shipping, but was in mid-Channel, heading almost for 
Le Havre. 

** Consequently, the submarine fired a torepdo at 3.55 
p.m. Central European time, li^ knots southeast of the 
BuU Rock. The torpedo struck, and so heavy an ex- 
plosion occurred that the whole of the ship forward of 
the bridge broke away. The uimsually heavy explosion 
leaves no doubt that there were large stores of ammuni- 
tion on board. 

*'The German captain has prepared a sketch of the 
ship he attacked, of which two copies are sent herewith. 
The two copies of pictures of the Sussex, also enclosed, 



THE '* SUSSEX" INCIDENT 247 

were photographed from the English newspaper The 
Daily Graphic, of the 27th inst. A comparison of the 
sketches and the photograph shows that the vessel at- 
tacked is not identical with the Sussex; particularly strik- 
ing is the difference in the position of the funnel and the 
shape of the stern. No other attack was made by a Ger- 
man submarine on the course between Folkestone and 
Dieppe at the time of the Sussex incident. 

'*From this the German Government are obliged to 
assume that the ^sinking of the Sussex is to be set down 
to other causes than attack by a German submarine. 
Some light may be thrown on the incident by the fact 
that on the 1st and 2nd April alone no less than twenty- 
^^^jj^Hsisp- English mines were destroyed in the Channel by 
German naval forces. In general the whole of that area 
is rendered dangerous by drifting mines and not tor- 
pedoes. Off the English coast the Channel is also made 
increasingly dangerous by German mines which have 
been laid for the enemy naval forces. 

*'If the American Government should have at their 
disposal any further data that may help to elucidate the 
Sussex incident, the German Government beg that it may 
be communicated to them so that they may subject it to 
examination. In the event of differences of opinion 
arising between the two Governments the German Gov- 
ernment now declare themselves ready to submit the 
whole incident to an International Commission in ac- 
cordance with tho third clause of the ' Hague Convention 
for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes of 
the 18th October, 1907.' " 

I have reproduced this Note in full because its influence 
was quite particularly fateful and because it was probably 
the most unfortunate document that ever passed from 
Berlin to Washington. Mr. Wilson thought he detected 



248 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

a direct untruth, and the mixture of an uneasy conscience 
and clumsiness which the German Note appeared to be- 
tray prompted the sharp tone of the President's reply. 
For the sake of his prestige Mr. Wilson was now com- 
pelled by the recent course of events to take action, 
although the excitement of public opinion was this time 
undoubtedly less than was the case after the torpedoing 
of the Lusitania and the Arabic. The American Govern- 
ment, therefore, couched the Note which they dispatched 
on the 18th April in the terms of an ultimatum. In the 
meantime, the discovery in the hull of the Sussex of a 
piece of a German torpedo placed the matter beyond all 
doubt. Additional importance was given to the ulti- 
matum by the fact that before dispatching it Mr. Wilson 
laid it personally before Congress at a special sitting. 

It is my firm conviction that had it not been for this 
ultimatum diplomatic relations would not have been 
broken off immediately, even in 1917. In the increased 
tension of the situation resulting from the exchange of 
Notes on the subject of the Sussex I see, therefore, one of 
the immediate germs of the war with America. After 
this exchange of Notes a challenge in the form of our 
formal declaration of the 31st January, 1917, could no 
longer be tolerated. The clumsiness of such formal 
declarations was, as I have said, only surpassed by the 
regrettable impression of a juristic argument produced 
by our first Lusitania Note. 

As the American ultimatum later formed the basis on 
which the American Government, immediately after the 
declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare, broke off 
diplomatic relations, I here give the vital contents of the 
American Note of the 18th April verbatim : 

"Again and again the Imperial Government has given 
its solemn assurances to the Government of the United 



THE "SUSSEX'^ INCIDENT 249 

States that at least passenger ships would not be dealt 
thus with, and yet it has repeatedly permitted its under- 
sea commanders to disregard those assurances with 
entire impunity. As recently as February last it gave 
notice that it would regard all armed merchantmen owned 
by its enemies as part of the armed naval forces of its 
adversaries, and deal with them as with men-of-war, 
thus, at least by implication, pledging itself to give warn- 
ing to vessels which were not armed and to accord 
security of life to their passengers and crews; but even 
this limitation their submarine commanders have reck- 
lessly ignored. 

"The Government of the United States has been very 
patient. At every stage of this distressing experience of 
tragedy after tragedy it has sought to be governed by the 
most thoughtful consideration of the extraordinary cir- 
cumstances of an unprecedented war, and to be guided 
by sentiments of very genuine friendship for the people 
and Government of Germany. It has accepted the suc- 
cessive explanations and assurances of the Imperial 
Government as of course given in entire sincerity and 
good faith, and has hoped, even against hope, that it 
would prove to be possible for the Imperial Government 
so to order and control the acts of its naval commanders 
as to square its policy with the recognized principles of 
humanity as embodied in the law of nations. It has made 
every allowance for unprecedented conditions and has 
been willing to wait until the facts became unmistakable 
and were susceptible of only one interpretation. 

**If it is still the purpose of the Imperial Government 
to prosecute an indiscriminate warfare against vessels of 
commerce by the use of submarines without regard to 
what the Government of the United States must consider 
the sacred and indisputable rules of international law 
and the universally recognized dictates of humanity, the 



250 MY THREE YEAES IN AMERICA 

Government of the United States is at last forced to the 
conclusion that there is but one eonrse to pnrsne. Unless 
the Imperial Government shonld now immediately de- 
clare and effect an abandonment of its present methods 
of submarine warfare against passenger and freight- 
carrying vessels, the Government of the United States 
can have no choice but to sever diplomatic relations with 
the German Empire altogether. This action the Govern- 
ment of the United States contemplates with the greatest 
reluctance, but feels constrained to take in behalf of 
humanity and the rights of neutral nations." 

After this Note it is obvious that there was no longer 
any doubt in Berlin, that persistence in the point of view 
they had hitherto adopted would bring about a break with 
the United States, for I received instructions to make all 
preparations for German merchant ships lying in Ameri- 
can ports to be rendered useless by the destruction of 
their engines. 

I also received orders to arrange that Mr. Gerard, who 
had not been informed of the minimum demands of the 
American Government, should be instructed accordingly. 

My reply was as f oUows : 

Cablegram m Cipher 

^'Washington, Ist May, 1916. 
"House has informed me that at his request Gerard^ 
has already been informed of the minimum demands of 
the American Government. "Wilson is strongly influenced 
by peace votes. Even the anti-German ring desires the 
end of the war, as otherwise they fear financial loss. My 
suggestions are based on the view that submarine war- 
fare, according to international law, is valueless, and in 
any case, the opening of peace negotiations is more im- 
portant. It would be advisable in the Note of reply to 
touch only on the principal points, to talk much of inter- 



THE ^'SUSSEX'' INCIDENT 251 

national law and humanity, and to leave details to be 
settled at a later date. I fear that the continuance of the 
submarine campaign, on the lines of cruiser warfare, only 
means the postponement of the rupture as fresh incidents 
are bound to occur/' 

On the 4th May followed the German reply, which 
averted the fourth serious crisis, by declaring that the 
submarine campaign would return to the recognized laws 
of cruiser-warfare. The Note began by opposing, in 
strong terms, the American view, and concluded with 
the following sentences : 

*'The German Government feel themselves justified in 
declaring that it would be impossible to answer to 
humanity and history, if, after twenty-one months of war 
the contention over the submarine war were allowed to 
develop into a serious menace to peace between the Ger- 
man and American peoples. Such a development the 
German Government will do everything in their power to 
prevent. They desire, at the same time, to make a final 
contribution towards confining — so long as the war lasts 
— the war to the present combatant Powers, an aim 
which includes the freedom of the seas, and in which the 
German Government believe themselves still to be in 
agreement with the Government of the United States. 

**0n this assumption the German Government beg to 
inform the Government of the United States that instruc- 
tions have been issued to the German naval forces to 
observe the general principles of international law, with 
regard to the holding up, searching and destruction of 
merchant vessels, and not to sink any merchant vessel, 
even within the war zone, without warning and rescue of 
the passengers and crew, unless they attempt to escape 
or offer resistance. 

**The German Government hope and expect that these 



252 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

new instrnetions to the naval forces will also remove in 
the eyes of the United States Government every obstacle 
that might stand in the way of the realization of the offer 
of co-operation contained in the Note of the 23rd Jnly, 
1915, towards restoring the freedom of the seas during 
the war, and they do not donbt that the United States 
Government wiU now insist with all possible emphasis 
on the immediate observation by the British Government 
of those international rules which were universally ac- 
cepted before the war, and which are specifically stated in 
the Notes of the American Government to the British 
Government of the 28th December, 1914, and the 5th 
November, 1915. Should it happen that the steps taken 
by the Government of the United States do not meet with 
the desired result of insuring recognition of the laws of 
humanity by all the combatant nations, the German Gov- 
ernment would consider themselves faced by a new situa- 
tion, for which they must reserve for themselves full 
freedom of decision." 

The German Note reached the German Embassy piece- 
meal, and while the first part was being deciphered, its 
harsh tone produced in an increasing degree the im- 
pression : * ' Then it is war, ' ' which was not relieved until 
we came to the conclusion of the text. 

The attempt made by the Imperial Government to 
reserve to themselves the right to resume the submarine 
campaign at a later date was not accepted by Mr. Wilson, 
and so the difference of opinion remained, which was 
bound to become a casus belli if we reverted to un- 
restricted submarine warfare. This reservation led to a 
further Note from Washington, which I give here : 

**The Note of the Imperial German Government under 
date of May 4th, 1916, has received careful consideration 
by the Government of the United States. It is especially 



THE ^'SUSSEX" INCIDENT 253 

noted, as indicating the purpose of the Imperial Govern- 
ment as to the future, and that it *is prepared to do its 
utmost to confine the operations of the war for the rest 
of its duration to the fighting forces of the belligerents,' 
and that it is determined to impose on all its commanders 
at sea the limitations of the recognized rules of inter- 
national law upon which the Government of the United 
States has insisted. Throughout the months which have 
elapsed since the Imperial Government announced on 
February 4th, 1915, its submarine policy, now happily 
abandoned, the Government of the United States has 
been co^^istantly guided and restrained by motives of 
friendship in its patient efforts to bring to an amicable 
settlement the critical questions arising from that policy. 
Accepting the Imperial Government's declaration of its 
abandonment of the policy which has so seriously men- 
aced the good relations between the two countries, the 
Government of the United States will rely upon a scrupu- 
lous execution henceforth of the now altered policy of 
the Imperial Government, such as will remove the prin- 
cipal danger to an interruption of the good relations 
existing between the United States and Germany. 

**The Government of the United States feels it neces- 
sary to state that it takes it for granted that the Imperial 
German Government does not intend to imply that the 
maintenance of its newly-announced policy is in any way 
contingent upon the course or result of diplomatic nego- 
tiations between the Government of the United States 
and any other belligerent Government, notwithstanding 
the fact that certain passages in the Imperial Govern- 
ment's Note of the 4th instant might appear to be suscep- 
tible of that construction. In order, however, to avoid 
any possible misunderstanding, the Government of the 
United States notifies the Imperial Government that it 
cannot for a moment entertain, much less discuss, a sug- 



254 MY THEEE YEAES IN AMERICA 

gestion that respect by German naval anthorities for tlie 
rights of citizens of the United States npon the high 
seas shonld in any way or in the slightest degree be made 
contingent npon the conduct of any other Government 
affecting the rights of neutrals and non-combatants. 
Responsibility in such matters is single, not joint ; abso- 
lute, not relative." 

This American Note, however, in no way affected the 
peaceful conclusion of the negotiations. 

As a direct result of the Sussex incident, a step forward 
was taken in the question of American peace mediation. 
When I called on Colonel House, during the last days of 
the crisis, we had a long conversation on this question. 
As always, Colonel House had used his influence on the 
side of peace with regard to the Siissex incident. He 
took this opportunity to convey to me the pleasing news 
contained in a cablegram from Mr. Gerard, that the Ger- 
man Government were now ready to agree to American 
mediation. 

This cablegram was the outcome of the following facts : 
Mr. Gerard, on account of his anti-German tendency, was 
not popular in Berlin. He regarded it as a personal 
slight that the most important negotiations should have 
been carried on partly in Washington, and partly by 
Colonel House in Berlin. The Ambassador wanted, 
therefore, to use the opportunity of the Sussex incident 
to assert himself, and expressed a desire to visit G.H.Q. 
and explain the American point of view in person to the 
Emperor. On the 1st May, Mr. Gerard was received by 
the Emperor, in the presence of the Imperial Chancellor, 
on which occasion he received the assurance contained 
in his telegram. Karl Helfferich's account in WeltJcrieg 
gives the impression that the question of American 
mediation was mentioned for the first time on the 1st 



THE ''SUSSEX" INCIDENT 255 

May. The two journeys of Colonel House, which were of 
far greater importance than Mr. Gerard's visit to G.H.Q., 
are not mentioned in the Helff erich account. For the rest 
I have to rely for my information about events in Ger- 
many on this and other publications, in addition to the 
evidence given before the Commission of the National 
Assembly, In any case, Colonel House regarded the tele- 
gram from Berlin as the sequel of his own negotiations 
there, which point was placed beyond all doubt by the 
text of the information he communicated to me. In order 
to inform myself on my side also as to the attitude of our 
Government, I sent the following telegram to Berlin, to 
ascertain whether the information from the American 
Ambassador was in accordance with the facts : 

Telegram in Cipher 

''Washington, No. 26, 4th May. 

*' House informs me that Gerard has cabled that we 
would agree to the President 's mediation, and that a visit 
from House to Berlin, with this object, w(!iuld be wel- 
comed. Nothing known here about solution of Lusitania 
question. Mediation naturally depends on this running 
smoothly, which would be most easily assured by cessa- 
tion of submarine campaign during negotiations." 

I received the following reply from the Imperial 
ChancelloEr: 

Telegram in Cipher 

*' Berlin, 6th May, 1916. 
"Reply to telegram No. 26. 
**For Your Excellency's information. 

**We hope that our Note and great concession finally 
removes cause of mistrust, and opens era of greater 



256 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

mutual confidence. Animosity of public opinion here 
against Wilson, as result of tone and contents of his 
Note and impression of parti pris against us, however, 
so great that he must take open and unmistakable action 
with regard to England before he would be accepted as 
unbiassed mediator by German people. To this extent 
Gerard/s telegram is premature. If Wilson neglects to 
take such action, there is danger that the animosity may 
become irremediable and possibility of mediation driven 
into distant future. Smoothing the way for peace, of 
course, always desired. Action against England, how- 
ever, seems necessary to encourage conciliatory attitude 
there, if a peace exclusively favorable to England is to 
be avoided. 

*'If it is found impossible to induce England to discuss 
peace with us, even though unofficially perhaps at first, 
we shall, as England refuses to return to the provisions 
of the Declaration of London, be placed in an absolutely 
free position with regard to our great concession amount- 
ing to abandonment of submarine campaign. A visit 
from House very welcome here at any time. 

* ' Bethmaff-Hollweg. ' ' 

Karl Helfferich^s account confirms the view I held at 
that time, that our concessions in respect of the sub- 
marine campaign were essentially prompted by the hope 
of mediation by Mr. Wilson. The following words of the 
Emperor make this plain: 

*'In politics it is necessary, before all things, to know 
the other party's point of view; for politics are a ques- 
tion of give and take. Gerard's utterances had made it 
clear that Wilson was seeking a ladder for re-election. It 
was better, then, that we should offer him the ladder of 



THE ^'SUSSEX'' INCIDENT 257 

peace than the ladder of war, which will eventually fall 
on our own heads." 

Moreover, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg has declared 
before the Commission of the National Assembly that he 
had expressed to Mr. Gerard the hope that the President 
would now take steps to bring about the restoration of 
peace. 

"When, at that time. Colonel House was discussing with 
me the German reservation in the Note of the 4th May, 
in connection with the questions of the ** Freedom of the 
Seas" and peace, he said that the circumstances were 
then such that the President no longer possessed the 
power to compel England to observe international law. 
England would only give way before the menace of war. 
In view, however, of the state of natural feeling in the 
United States, and the development of trade relations 
between America and the Entente, war with England was 
out of the question. On the other hand, Mr. Wilson 
possessed the power to bring about peace, because on this 
question he could rely on the support of the majority of 
the American nation. When the time was ripe, the Presi- 
dent would take the desired steps, but a neutral act of 
this nature would be cried down by the very active En- 
tente party in the United States as pro-German, and 
could only be carried through if the national feeling 
towards Germany took a more friendly turn. It was, 
therefore, necessary that there should be a period of lull, 
during which Germany should possibly not be discussed 
at all. The approaching hot season and the usual exodus 
of political personages from Washington to the country 
would offer a favorable opportunity to let all negotia- 
tions rest, especially as, after the settlement of the 
Sussex question, no new incidents were to be expected. 
Colonel House *s remarks accurately reflected the actual 



258 MY THEEE YEARS IN AMEEICA 

position in the United States at the time. I could not but 
express my agreement, and felt no doubt that the Ameri- 
can mediation would begin in the late summer. After 
our giving way on the submarine question, in order to 
avoid a break with the United States, I regarded it as 
certain that we would not directly bring about the rupture 
which had just been averted with such difficulty by re- 
opening the unrestricted submarine campaign, for in 
view of the American ultimatum of the 18th April, 1916, 
there was no alternative. 

I should like to take this opportunity of making clear 
that I always regarded American mediation as the only 
possible way out of the war. -I had no faith in the sub- 
marine campaign as likely to save the situation, because 
the entry of the United States into the war would more 
than outweigh all the advantages that the submarines 
could bring us. On the other hand, I was convinced that, 
if the American Government established a peace con- 
ference, this would be sure to lead to peace itself. It 
could not be imagined that, in view of the nations* need 
of peace, such a conference could break up without having 
reached any result. Moreover, after the meeting of a 
conference, the United States would no longer be in a 
position to enter the war, because American public opin- 
ion would not have allowed it. But without the help of 
the United States, the Entente could not win. It resolved 
itself, therefore, into a question of the skill of our nego- 
tiators to ensure a tolerable peace for us, as the result of 
the conference. Diplomatic negotiations have a way of 
ending owing to general weariness, in which case the 
party which holds the best cards secures the greatest 
advantages. If this happened, we should have the ad- 
vantage of the position as our military gains would give 
us a strong lever in the negotiations. 

Here I may touch on another question which was en- 



THE ^'SUSSEX'' INCIDENT 259 

gaging my attention at that time. Since the Lusitania 
catastrophe I had adopted the principle, and pnt it into 
practice as far as possible, of leaving the propaganda to 
our American friends, who were in a position to get an 
earlier hearing than we, and in any case understood the 
psychology of the Americans better than the Imperial 
German agents. Indeed, the words *' German propagan- 
dist had already become a term of abuse in America. 
We were reproached there with being too indulgent, while 
in Germany the opposite criticism was levelled at us. In 
spite of the difficulty of the situation, however, there were 
Americans of German and other origin, who had the 
courage openly to champion our cause and to swim 
against the stream. Among others, a "Citizens' Com- 
mittee for Food Shipments" was formed, whose activities 
spread through the whole country, and were avowedly 
pro-German. A special function of the committee with 
Dr. von Mach as executive chief, was a month of propa- 
ganda throughout the country, with the object of obtain- 
ing the means to supply the children of Germany with 
milk. The English control of the post even led to the 
bold plan of building a submarine to run the milk through 
the English blockade. The propaganda was very vigor- 
ously attacked by the greater part of the American Press, 
but pursued its course unafraid, collected money, sub- 
mitted protests to the State Department against the 
attitude of the Entente, and so on. 

Dr. von Mach succeeded in bringing the matter to the 
notice of the President who actively interested himself in 
it, and promised to see that the milk should pass the 
English blockade and reach Germany in safety. Accord- 
ingly, the State Department instructed the American 
Embassy in Berlin to issue a statement. Meanwhile, the 
well-known American journalist, McClure, returned from 
a tour of investigation in Germany, where he had been 



260 MY THEEE YEARS IN AMERICA 

supported in every way by the German Government de- 
partments. He gave a very favorable account of the 
milk question, as of the feeding of infants in general, and 
this gave rise to the first disagreeable controversy. Mr. 
McClure took up an unyielding attitude. Unfortunately, 
however, the State Department then published an equally 
favorable report, which, coming from the American Em- 
bassy and published with the approval of the Foreign 
Office in Berlin, caused the complete collapse of Dr. 
von Mach. This incident made a very painful impres- 
sion in America, and led to a series of bitter attacks 
on Dr. von Mach and the whole movement, which was 
thus exposed in a most unfortunate light. The favorable 
report on the milk question was drawn up by a Dr. E. A. 
Taylor, and definitely confirmed, and, indeed, inspired, 
by the German authorities. 

I mention this incident to show that our propaganda 
was not by any means made easier by Germany, although 
our Press Bureau repeatedly brought up this very ques- 
tion in Berlin. This movement was particularly dear 
to us, because the Americans are most easily won over 
when an appeal is made to their humanity. Moreover, the 
favorable reports on the question of supplies in Germany 
did not coincide in any way with our defence of the sub- 
marine campaign as an act of reprisal. This method of 
propaganda from home lost us our best argument. Even 
to-day the majority of Americans certainly have no idea 
how many children have been murdered by the blockade. 

At the time of which I am speaking occurred also the 
much discussed Bolo affair. It is quite astonishing how 
many lies were told before the commission of inquiry of 
the American Senate with regard to this affair. Among 
others, hotel servants, chauffeurs, etc., were sworn, and 
gave evidence that I had met Bolo in the apartments of 
Mr. Hearst. True, I have often visited Mr. Hearst, which 



THE " SUSSEX '^ INCIDENT 261 

goes without saying, as he was the only important 
newspaper proprietor who maintained a nentral attitude 
throughout the war. I did not, however, meet Bolo, 
either there or anywhere else; I have never made his 
acquaintance, or even seen him in the distance. I heard 
his name for the first time when he was brought up for 
trial in Paris. 

If the statements made before the commission of in- 
quiry are to be relied on in any point at all, it is to be 
assumed that Bolo first came to America to arrange a 
combine between the Journal and the Hearst Press. This 
combine was to support the cause of Pacifism after the 
war. Who Bolo's principal was I do not know, but so 
much seems to be established, that he was connected with 
the Journal. Apparently, Bolo wanted to sell shares in 
this paper to Mr. Hearst, in order to acquire funds for 
the Pacifist agitation. This theory seems justified since 
Bolo, on the voyage to America, got into touch with Mr. 
Bartelli, Hearst 's representative in Paris. The latter did 
fall in with Bolo's ideas. 

Later — whether intentionally or not I do not know — 
Bolo met the co-proprietor of the firm Amsinck and Co., 
Herr Pavenstedt, who was one of the most respected, if 
not the most respected. Imperial German in New York, 
and intimately acquainted with all the members of the 
Embassy. Herr Pavenstedt, who as a private citizen was 
not in a position to accept Bolo's suggestions, then 
travelled to Washington to lay the matter before me. 
He gave me to understand that a French acquaintance of 
long standing, for whose good faith he could vouch, had 
come to America to raise funds for a Pacifist agitation in 
France. He said that national feeling in that country 
had reached a point which promised success for such a 
movement, if the prospect could be held out of a peace 
by negotiation. Herr Pavenstedt said that he could not, 



262 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

under any circnmstances, disclose the gentleman's name. 
As the plans of the Frenchman recommended by Herr 
Pavenstedt coincided with my policy for bringing abont 
a peace by negotiation, and I had absolute confidence in 
Herr Pavenstedt, I commnnicated the matter to Berlin, 
where the necessary money was granted. Later, the 
breaking off of diplomatic relations with the United 
States interrupted the policy I had initiated, and also put 
an end to any prospect of effecting a change of feeling 
in France, where the hope of American assistance re- 
vived enthusiasm for the war. 

I do not know how Bolo's enterprise came to the knowl- 
edge of the French Government. In any case this cannot 
have been due to the deciphering of my telegrams to 
Berlin, as I did not know Bolo's name. Owing to this 
ignorance on my part it was arranged between Herr 
Pavenstedt and myself, at a second interview, that the 
anonymous Frenchman should at a given time address 
further communications on the progress of the move- 
ment to our Embassy at Bern under the pseudonym **St. 
Regis.'' 

At the time of the Sussex crisis a further awkward 
incident occurred which took us back to the days of con- 
spiracies. In consequence of the Welland Canal case the 
American secret police came down upon Herr von Igel, 
the representative of the Military Attache, in his New 
York office, for alleged complicity, arrested him by force 
and seized papers which were found on his table. I im- 
mediately laid a protest before the State Department, 
whereupon Herr von Igel was set at liberty and a long 
international controversy arose which had not come to an 
end when Herr von Igel returned with me to Germany. 
The American Law Department maintained that Herr 
von Igel was suspected of complicity in a legal offence, 
that he could not therefore plead extra-territoriality, and 



THE '* SUSSEX" INCIDENT 263 

must stand his trial before an American Court. The 
State Department, it is true, had doubts as to whether 
an ofl5ce in New York could be recognized as extra- 
territorial, but for the rest maintained a correct attitude 
and refused to agree to the opening of proceedings 
against Herr von Igel, 

The seized documents were handed over to the State 
Department, where they probably still lie. The State 
Department declared to me their readiness to hand back 
the papers if I wished to declare them Embassy docu- 
ments. I, however, thoiight that an attempt might be 
made later to use such a declaration against me as a trap 
and I rejected the offer to return the papers on these 
conditions, as they were of no further importance to us. 
If there was among them material which could be used 
against the former Attaches it might be assumed that the 
Law Department would long ago have had the documents 
copied. 

The Igel affair had no definite political result, as the 
American Government dropped all controversies when 
they began to take up the question of mediation. 

To return to the settlement of the Sussex incident, it 
should be mentioned that our surrender on the submarine 
question was widely resented in Germany. Further, it 
caused a check in submarine construction. At least, 
Secretary of State von Capelle has declared before the 
Commission of the National Assembly that an extensive 
submarine construction programme had to be abandoned 
because it would have been too sharp a contrast with 
Germany *s attitude after the settlement of the Sussex 
affair. As a matter of fact, submarine construction was 
never carried on with full vigor after 1916, as has been 
pointed out by Messrs. Struve, Gothein and Co. In the 
light of this the gravity of the decision in 1917 to resort 
to unrestricted submarine warfare is doubled. It will 



264 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

be seen clearly here how our divided policy on the one 
hand permanently crippled the submarine policy and on 
the other that of mediation. 

To conclude the Sussex question, I will add one more 
telegram which I sent to the Foreign Office after Secre- 
tary of State Lansing had publicly mentioned an Anglo- 
American agreement — a remark which in Berlin was 
taken to mean that America had formed an alliance with 
England. It is well knowm that during the war such a 
statement has frequently been made. 

Telegram in Cipher 

** Washington, 21st May, 1916. 

"I am working confidentially in co-operation with 
House for the settlement of such still unsettled questions 
as the Lusitania and the Igel cases, so as to clear the air 
completely. Feeling here now more favorable owing to 
the influence of the Irish executions. Wilson regards 
conflict with us as a thing of the past and desires to let 
things rest and soon to lay the foundations of peace. 
Lansing *s speech as to Anglo-American agreement refers 
to the Bryan agreement. He desired to make clear that 
war with England because of the blockade is out of the 
question, and therefore there is no means of bringing 
pressure to bear. The speech coincides with the Ameri- 
can view I have already reported that it would be easier 
to bring the war to an end than to force England to raise 
the blockade.'* 

Hitherto I have not mentioned the different German 
vessels which visited United States ports during the war. 
Besides their history is well known. I will therefore 
only describe their psychological influence and my own 
experiences. 



THE **SUSSEX" INCIDENT 265 

The auxiliary cruisers Kronprinz FriedrioJi Wilhelm 
and Eitel FriedricJi were the first German ships to enter 
Hampton Eoads, there to be interned. 

Much more interest was aroused by the arrival on the 
15th February, 1916, of the Appam, because it was then a 
long time since the German flag had been seen on the 
American side of the Atlantic. The facts are familiar 
to German readers from Count Dohna's Move book. 
Lieutenant Berg's exploit met with general appreciation 
in the United States, especially as his conduct was com- 
pletely in accord with the American conception of inter- 
national law. Even to-day I can hear the tone of abso- 
lute conviction in which Secretary of State Lansing told 
me at the Metropolitan Club that the voyage of the 
Appam was a "marvellous achievement.** 

In the far-off future, students of international law will 
quote the Appam case as a classic. At the German Em- 
bassy in Washington volumes were filled with the opin- 
ions of eminent lawyers, for the incident was not treated 
politically by the American Government, but submitted 
to the courts. Meanwhile the Appam remained interned 
in Hampton Eoads as a prize. The case was not settled 
until after the breaking-off of diplomatic relations, when 
it was no longer of any importance to us. 

The interest roused by the Appam shrank into nothing 
before the excitement caused by the arrival of the sub- 
marine Deutschland on the 8th July, 1916. Apart from 
those that followed the agreement on the Arabic incident, 
the few days after the arrival of the Deutschland were 
the pleasantest I experienced in America during the war. 
Feeling on all sides was openly friendly, and Captain 
Konig was the most popular man in the United States. 
If we had sent ten such merchant submarines to America 
and for the rest had carried on the submarine campaign 
according to the principles laid down for cruiser warfare, 



266 MY THEEE YEAHS IN AMERICA 

we should have attained far greater political results than 
has been the case. 

The arrival of the submarine Beutschland at Baltimore 
and Captain Konig's first visit to the town resembled a 
triumphal procession. I had intended to go there at once 
to welcome the hero of the day and his bold seamen, but 
thought it better to wait and see what would be the Amer- 
ican attitude towards the protests of the English and 
French Ambassadors, who had both claimed that the 
DeutscJiland, as a submarine, should be regarded without 
hesitation as a ship of war. On the 13th July a most 
minute inspection of the DeutscJiland was made by an 
American Government Commission consisting of three 
naval officers, and she was recognized as a genuine mer- 
chant vessel. In consequence the DeutscJiland had a right 
to lie at Baltimore as long as was necessary to take a 
cargo on board for the return journey. It was now 
possible for me to pay an official visit to Baltimore and 
to view the DeutscJiland. The Mayor of the town accom- 
panied me and went down with me, in spite of the terrific 
heat of about 40° centigrade, into the lowest parts of the 
submarine, which cost the stoutly-built gentleman consid- 
erable effort and a good deal of perspiration. In the 
evening the Mayor gave a banquet which passed off as 
in the good days before the war. The rooms were deco- 
rated with German and American flags, the band played 
the **Wacht am Ehein,*' and many speeches were made 
on the good relations between the two countries. 

Again on her second visit, which took place in October 
in New London (Connecticut), the DeutscJiland met with 
a very friendly reception, even though the atmosphere 
was appreciably cooler. Feeling in the New England 
state has always been particularly unfavorable to us. 
But there, too, I passed a very pleasant day with Captain 
Konig, 



THE *' SUSSEX" INCIDENT 267 

In contrast to the moral gain of the visit of the Deutsch- 
land was the generally unfavorable impression created 
by the visit at the same time of the U53. Quite unexpect- 
edly I received the news that a German submarine had 
arrived at Newport, the captain of which had reported 
himself to the American commandant and had handed, 
him a letter addressed to me. The letter attracted a good 
deal of attention in the Press, but it actually contained 
nothing further than the introduction of the captain. The 
episode of the U53 was, from a political point of view, 
most undesirable and of no military value. When, more- 
over, a few days later the news arrived that the U53 had 
sunk several ships off the American coast — always, it is 
true, according to international law — the incident as- 
sumed a fairly serious aspect. Meanwhile I travelled 
direct to Shadow Lawn, the President's beautiful summer 
residence on the New Jersey coast, to hand to Mr. Wilson 
a letter from the Emperor. The President had appealed 
to the Heads of all the combatant States to urge them to 
permit relief to starving Poland, as had been done for 
Belgium. As was to be expected, the Entente rejected 
the proposal while the Central Powers agreed to it. The 
Emperor's approval was contained in the letter which 
I brought to Mr. Wilson. 

The President took this opportunity to speak to me 
very seriously on the cruise of the U53, and urged me to 
see to it that this incident was not repeated. Otherwise 
he could not be responsible for public feeling in the 
United States, which might again become very bitter. 
The affair was very disagreeable to me personally, be- 
cause I was building hopes on Mr. Wilson's mediation 
and because I feared that the cruise of the U53 would 
be interpreted as an attempt on our part to put difficulties 
in the way of the President's re-election. It might be 
assumed that his Republican opponents would say that 



268 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

Germany could now do what she liked, as Mr. Wilson 
had never adopted energetic measures. 

On the subject of this conversation with Mr. Wilson 
I sent the following telegram to the foreign office : 

Telegram in Cipher 

"Washington, 11th October, 1916. 

**I had a conversation with Mr. Wilson on the occasion 
of handing over the Emperor's autograph letter with 
regard to Polish relief. The President is anxious to 
carry the matter further and asked me how this could 
best be done. 1 replied that the difficulties lay exclu- 
sively on the English side. 

"The cruiser warfare undertaken by our submarines 
off the American coast is naturally regarded by Mr. Wil- 
son with anxiety, because all his hopes of re-election are 
based exclusively on the fact that according to the opinion 
held over here he has kept the United States out of the 
war and in spite of that has put an end to our so-called 
illegal attacks on American lives. His whole position 
falls to pieces if American lives are lost now, or if indig- 
nation is aroused by a submarine campaign off the Amer- 
ican coast. So far this has not occurred. The exploit 
of U53 is even hailed as a sporting achievement. This 
view will, however, be changed if the incident is repeated. 
For this reason Wilson spoke plainly about a continuance 
of the submarine campaign off the American coast. He 
regarded as particularly serious the fact that two neutral 
ships were sunk, as well as a Canadian passenger vessel 
making for the United States. He said that such inci- 
dents could not be understood by the American public.^' 

To this telegram I received from the Imperial Chan- 
cellor the following reply: 



THE ''SUSSEX'* INCIDENT 269 

Telegram in Ciphee 

"Berlin, 4th October, 1916. 

** England entirely responsible for difficulties with re- 
gard to Polish relief. For Your Excellency's exclusive 
information it is not intended to continue submarine cam- 
paign off American coast. Final decision as to activity 
of U53 not possible until she returns. Our concessions 
to America are being strictly observed and will be until 
explicitly revoked. 

* * Bethmann-Hollweq. ' ' 



CHAPTER X 
AMERICAN MEDIATION 

At midsnmmer, 1916, the political Inll desired by 
Colonel House actually set in. The Colonel betook him- 
self to one of the beautiful lakes of New Hampshire, in 
the far north of the United States, where in the ordinary 
way I could only reach him by letter or telegram. How 
secret we kept our communications is shown by the fact 
that, according to agreement, I wrote and telegraphed to 
Colonel House under the pseudonym *' Martin." This 
caution proved to be fully justified, as the inquiry by the 
Senate Committee has shown that the letters from the 
Embassy were frequently opened by agents of the En- 
tente propaganda, whether Avith or without the connivance 
of the American secret police I will not definitely say. I 
have already had occasion to mention this question in 
connection with the robbing of Mr. Albert. There are in 
the secret police of all countries men of doubtful honor. 
It might be taken as certain that there were such men in 
the pay of the Entente agents. 

Soon after the settlement of the Sussex incident — on 
27th May — Mr. Wilson made public, for the first time, 
his plan fo:^ the League of Nations. This Idea was to 
constitute the foundation-stone of his mediation and 
fulfil all the hopes of the American pacifists for a com- 
pulsory court of arbitration in international disputes and 
general disarmament. Before the war many shrewd men 
in the United States thought that the arbitration system 

270 



' AMERICAN MEDIATION 271 

initiated by the American Government would exclude the 
possibility of great wars. The outbreak of the World War 
showed that this was an illusion, and the question arose 
what precautions could be taken to prevent a recurrence 
of the world catastrophe. Mr. Wilson was one of the 
first in whom the idea matured that the scheme, hitherto 
regarded as Utopian, of a league binding all civilized 
nations to a peaceful settlement of their disputes was 
capable of being made a practical proposition if backed, 
as a means of compulsion, by a commercial boycott, simi- 
lar to that which the Entente, in contravention of inter- 
national law, employed with such terrible results against 
Germany. 

The most important sentences of the speech which the 
President addressed to the American peace league ran as 
follows : 

"When the invitation for me to be here to-night came 
to me, I was glad to accept, — not because it offered me 
an opportunity to discuss the, programme of the League, 
— that you will, I am sure, not expect of me, — but because 
the desire of the whole world now turns eagerly towards 
the hope of peace, and there is just reason why we should 
take our part in counsel upon this great theme. . . . 

''With its causes and its objects we are not concerned. 
The obscure fountains from which its stupendous flood 
has burst forth we are not interested to search for or 
explore. . . . 

"And the lesson which the shock of being taken by sur- 
prise in a matter so deeply vital to all the nations of the 
world has made poignantly clear is, that the peace of the 
world must henceforth depend upon a new and more 
wholesome diplomacy. Only when the great nations of 
the world have -reached some sort of agreement as to 
^vhat they hold to be fundamental to their common in- 



272 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

terest, and as to some feasible method of acting in concert 
when any nation or group of nations seek to disturb 
those fundamental things, can we feel that civilization is 
at least in a way of justifying its existence and claiming 
to be finally established. It is clear that nations must 
in future be governed by the same high code of honor 
that we demand of individuals. . . . 

** Repeated utterances of the leading statesmen of most 
of the great nations now engaged in the war have made 
it plain that their thought has come to this, that the 
principle of the public right must henceforth take 
precedence over the individual interests of particular 
nations, and that the nations of the world must in some 
way band themselves together to see that right prevails 
as against any sort of selfish aggression ; that henceforth 
alliance must not be set up against alliance, understand- 
ing against understanding, but that there must be a 
common agreement for a common object, and that at the 
heart of that common object must lie the inviolable rights 
of peoples and mankind. . . . 

"This is undoubtedly the thought of America. This is 
what we ourselves will say when there comes a proper 
occasion to say it. . . . 

**We believe these fundamental things: First, that 
every people has a right to choose the sovereignty under 
which they shall live. Like other nations, we have our- 
selves no doubt once and again offended that principle 
when for a little while controlled by selfish passion, as 
our franker historians have been honorable enough to 
admit ; but it has become more and more our rule of life 
and action. Second, that the small States of the world 
have a right to enjoy the same respect for their 
sovereignty and for their territorial integrity that great 
and powerful nations expect and insist upon. And, third, 
that the world has a right to be free from every disturb- 



AMERICAN MEDIATION 273 

ance of its peace that has its origin in aggression and 
disregard of the rights of peoples and nations. 

**So sincerely do we believe in these things that I am 
sure that I speak the mind and wish of the people of 
America when I say that the United States is willing to 
become a partner in any feasible association of nations 
formed in order to realize these objects and make them 
secure against violation. . . . 

**But I did not come here, let me repeat, to discuss a 
programme. I came only to avow a creed and give ex- 
pression to the confidence I feel that the world is even 
now upon the eve of a great consummation, when some 
common force will be brought into existence which shall 
safeguard right as the first and most fundamental in- 
terests of all peoples and all governments, where coercion 
shall be summoned, not to the service of political ambi- 
tion or selfish hostility, but to the service of a common 
order, a common justice, and a common peace. God grant 
that the dawn of that day of frank dealing and of settled 
peace, concord, and co-operation may be near at hand!*' 

This speech displayed all the characteristics of Mr. 
Wilson's oratory: brilliant command of the English 
language, dazzling wealth of vocabulary and nebulous 
sentence construction which made the purpose clear only 
to the initiated. Nevertheless, the vital points of the 
speech could not be misunderstood. It prepared the 
world for American mediation by strong emphasis of 
the League of Nations idea. 

The political lull of midsummer brought an important 
improvement in public feeling towards us. This change 
for the better was reflected with special clearness in the 
reception given to the merchant submarine Deutschlandt 
as I have already described. 



274 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

At tlie time of this speech of Mr. Wilson's, I sent the 
following report : 

Repoet in Cipher 

** Washington, 28th May, 1916. 

**The placation of American public opinion is pro- 
gressing. Hardly any mention is now made in the Press 
of German-American relations. Only two persons are 
still wavering. The American Government are delaying 
the publication of my letter on the subject of the Lusi- 
tania settlement, because they think that it will not satisfy 
public opinion here. It may be assumed that its publica- 
tion will take place at the beginning of June, during the 
Republican National Convention, so that it may pass as 
far as possible unnoticed in the general excitement about 
domestic politics. The American Government's delay in 
this matter shows clearly how great the opposition has 
been. While we thought to have made important con- 
cessions, the American Government here consider that 
they have not attained the objective prescribed for them 
by public opinion. 

*' Further, the Igel incident is not yet settled. On this 
question there is a difference of opinion between the 
State and Law Departments. The former confirming our 
standpoint that the seizure of the papers was illegitimate 
and that they must be returned. The Law Department, 
on the other hand, holds that Herr von Igel has been 
guilty of a legal offence and so has forfeited his diplo- 
matic privileges. Consequently I get no further, and the 
case is continually deferred. It is to be hoped that the 
State Department will soon bestir itself to make a de- 
cision which will, however, in any case, necessitate the 
recall of Herr Igel. 

*'Mr. Wilson's peace plans are becoming more and 
more tangible. The only question is whether he possesses 



AMERICAN MEDIATION 275 

sufficient authority to force our enemies to agree to nego- 
tiations. Colonel House is convinced that Mr. "Wilson 
will succeed. The President is considering the plan of 
calling together a conference at the Hague, in which the 
neutrals will only participate so far as the * Freedom of 
the Seas^ is concerned. If the project materializes, 
Colonel House is sure to take part in the conference, even 
though he may not be the official American representative. 
His influence, however, would be sure to be great, for no 
one else is so completely in touch with Mr. Wilson's 
views. The latter is still of the opinion that the United 
States should under no circumstances take part in the 
actual settlement of the peace conditions. He and his 
alter ego are meanwhile very much afraid that our 
enemies might remain obdurate, since they are under the 
impression, or are trying to spread the impression, that 
the President, in opening the peace negotiations, is act- 
ing for Germany. Certainly England continually drags 
this idea into the discussion. At one time it is said that 
Prince Biilow is coming here to submit the German peace 
conditions to Mr. Wilson; at another, that Germany is 
on the brink of starvation and must therefore sue for 
peace. We ought as far as possible to counteract this 
propaganda of our enemies. It is to be hoped that it will 
not do serious harm, because the peace vote in America 
continues to grow and Mr. "Wilson can count with cer- 
tainty on re-election if he establishes a peace conference. 
We shall therefore dailj^ gain ground here so long as we 
appear to be ready to encourage the American peace 
movement, while our enemies adopt an unfavorable atti- 
tude. The American people is now pacifically minded. 
It becomes clearer every day how difficult it is to arouse 
enthusiasm for war preparedness, etc. No one who has 
lived here for any length of time can help coming to the 
conclusion that peaceful money-making is the Americans* 



276 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

chief interest in life. Only when they think that their 
rights have been seriously infringed do they lash them- 
selves into an hysterical war-fever. Why should war 
passion smoulder in the hearts of a people whose boun- 
daries are so secure that no enemy has ever been seen 
inside them, nor in all human probability ever wiU be ? " 

After the settlement of the Sussex incident the Im- 
perial Government naturally hoped that Mr. Wilson 
would take steps to justify our concessions with regard 
to the submarine question. Accordingly I received the 
following general instructions : 

"Berlin, 7th June, 1916. 

"Order A. 56. 

'' Confidential. 

"More than a month has passed since our last Note to 
the United States without President Wilson making up 
his mind to approach the English Government on the 
question of the blockade. True I do not expect that Eng- 
land would allow herself to be influenced by the United 
States to abandon her infringement of international law ; 
nor do I imagine that a rejection of the American de- 
mands by England would lead to a serious disturbance of 
the relations between these two countries. The existing 
arbitration treaty, which makes it possible in extreme 
cases to delay the settlement of the points of contention 
indefinitely, rules this out. But the complete passivity 
of Mr. Wilson, which could be understood so long as he 
wished to avoid giving the impression that he was acting 
under German coercion, but which cannot continue to be 
justified on these grounds, is bound to re-act very un- 
favorably on public opinion here and puts the Imperial 
Government in an extremely difficult position. 



AMERICAN MEDIATION 277 

**From the information which has reached you, Your 
Excellency will already realize that our surrender to 
America on the submarine question has met with ap- 
proval in wide and influential circles in Germany. If 
President Wilson persists in his passive attitude towards 
England, it is to be feared that the section of German 
public opinion whose attitude has so far been favorable 
to the Government will ally themselves with the oppo- 
nents of the Government policy, and that the whole of 
public opinion in Germany will clamor for the resumption 
of the submarine campaign on the old lines. In that case, 
the Imperial Government would be all the less in a posi- 
tion to resist this demand for any length of time, as all 
the military authorities have always been unanimous in 
regarding and urging unrestricted submarine warfare as 
the only effective means to bring about the defeat of Eng- 
land. Moreover, as we have received secret information 
that the Entente have decided on a drastic tightening of 
the blockade, and at the same time have agreed in future 
to meet the protests of the neutrals, and particularly 
America, with the argument that only in this way can the 
end of the war, which is also in the interests of the neu- 
tral countries, be brought about. Your Excellency will 
therefore bring to the notice of President Wilson and 
Mr. House the serious dangers which his passivity to- 
wards England involves. 

"With regard to Mr. Wilson's plans for mediation, 
they are meanwhile meeting with vigorous opposition in 
England. If they are rejected by England, the result 
cannot but be favorable to us, for we are naturally scep- 
tical of mediation on the part of a statesman so partial 
to England, and at the same time so naive as President 
Wilson. This necessarily follows on the consideration 
that the President would primarily be concerned to con- 
struct peace on the basis of the status quo ante, and par- 



278 MY THBEE YEAES IN AMERICA 

ticularly in respect of Belgium. Although there is to-day 
little on which to form an estimate as to how far we shall 
he in a position to bring about a solution in conformity 
with our own interests to the Belgian questioii, which is 
the direct result of the war, so much is certain, that if 
the war continues in our favor, a peace on the basis of 
the absolute status quo ante would not be acceptable to 
us. So, as the President interprets his role as the chosen 
champion of all that, in his opinion, is right and just, it 
is to be feared that a refusal on our part to make peace 
on this basis might induce him to go over openly to the 
enemy ^s camp. It is not, however, out of the question 
that public opinion in England may in time again turn to 
Mr. Wilson and his desire for mediation. As soon, there- 
fore, as Mr. Wilson's mediation plans threaten to assume 
a more concrete form and there is evidence of an inclina- 
tion on the part of England to faU in with them, it will 
be Your Excellency's duty to prevent President Wilson 
from approaching us with a positive proposal of media- 
tion. The choice of means for attaining this object with- 
out endangering our relations with the United States I 
think I may leave to Your Excellency's diplomatic skill, 
as from here I am not in a position to get a clear insight 
into the position of affairs in America. 

**VoN Jagow." 

I have already mentioned that Mr. Wilson had for some 
time past subordinated the question of the "Freedom of 
the Seas," i.e., in this concrete instance the English 
blockade, to his desire for mediation. Regarded from his 
point of view, this new ordering of his plans was based 
on an entirely correct political train of thought. The 
President gave first place to the attainable, with a view 
to taking up later what was for the time being unattain- 
able. In view of the fact that we could bring no pressure 



AMERICAN MEDIATION 279 

to bear to change Mr. "Wilson's point of view, it only re- 
mained for us to exploit his plans as far as possible in 
the interests of German policy. 

As my instructions on the most important point — the 
question of mediation — did not appear to me sufficiently 
clear, I asked in the following report, dated from the 
summer quarters of the Embassy, for a more detailed 
explanation : 

Report in Cipher 

**In reply to Order A. 56, 
**Rye,13th July, 1916. 

*'The inactivity of Mr. Wilson, who has only one 
thought, re-election, is due in the first place to the fact 
that no pressure is being put upon him by American 
public opinion to take action with regard to England. It 
is obvious that conditions here are not favorable to such 
action. Those American circles which are suffering 
financial l.osses as a result of the English blockade, have 
no weight in face of the tremendous stream of gold which 
our enemies have poured lavishly over this country, not 
haggling over details, and conniving at * graft.' For the 
rest, Mr. Wilson's train of thought with regard to action 
in respect of England practically coincides with that 
expressed by Your Excellency. He does not think at 
present that it is likely to meet with any success, as he 
has no means of bringing pressure to bear. No one would 
take him seriously if he threatened England with war. 

"The position is quite different with the President's 
well-kno"v\Ti anxiety to bring about peace in Europe. In 
this matter he now has the whole of American public 
opinion behind him. He also believes that, after the ex- 
pected failure of their present offensives, our enemies 
will be ready to open peace negotiations. If this assump- 



280 MY THEEE YEARS IN AMERICA 

tion proves unfounded, and our enemies reject an Ameri- 
can invitation on these lines, the main question dealt with 
in Your Excellency's instructions to me will be settled. 
Meanwhile, he is sure to make an attempt to negotiate 
peace, if only for election purposes. I therefore venture 
to request Your Excellency to cable me further brief in- 
structions as to how I am to interpret the words *more 
concrete form of mediation plans,' and * positive proposal 
of mediation. ' I am assuming that the main part of my 
respectful reports will only reach Your Excellency at the 
same time as this. Therefore, Mr. Gerard, when Your 
Excellency spoke with him at the beginning of May, on 
the question of mediation, would not have received de- 
tailed instructions as to the President's intentions. In 
any case, he was mistaken as to the attitude Your Ex- 
cellency should adopt with regard to an American peace- 
movement. On the strength of a telegram received at 
that time from Mr. Gerard, Mr. Wilson believed that the 
Imperial Government was ready to accept his mediation, 
and I accordingly contradicted this assumption as in- 
structed. As far as I know, Mr. Wilson refuses definitely 
to take any part in the discussion of territorial questions, 
but confines his interest to * disarmament' and 'Freedom 
of the Seas. ' His idea is that there should be a confer- 
ence at the Hague, in which the United States and other 
neutral Powers would only take part in so far as these 
two questions are concerned. * Disarmament' may cer- 
tainly be very undesirable for us, but, on the other hand, 
the 'Freedom of the Seas,' ought, without -a doubt, to 
bring us on the side of the United States. If it once 
comes to peace negotiations between the combatants, I 
regard it as out of the question — even were they to fail — 
that the United States would enter the war against us. 
American public feeling in favor of peace is too strong 
for that. It required the hysterical excitement roused by 



AMERICAN MEDIATION 281 

the Lusitania qnestion, and the incidents connected with 
it, to produce a state of mind among Americans which 
at times made war seem inevitable. In the absence of 
similar incidents, snch a state of public feeling could not 
be aroused. The admiration with which the cruise of 
the submarine DeutscMcmd was regarded showed plainly 
which way the wind blows now. 

**I made the above mentioned request because I con- 
sider it out of the question to prevent Mr. Wilson from 
taking action with regard to peace. I am in doubt, how- 
ever, whether by a 'positive proposal of mediation' your 
Excellency means such a proposal as that made by Mr. 
Eoosevelt after the Russo-Japanese War. On that occa- 
sion it is well known that the negotiations were carried 
on under direct American influence. This, as I have 
already said, is not what Mr. Wilson wants. He only 
wants to play the part of peace-instigator ; he would like 
to deserve the credit for having brought the combatants 
to negotiate one with the other. Such a success would, 
in view of the state of feeling here, probably assure his 
re-election. 

**I am therefore convinced that within the next few 
weeks the President will institute proceedings with 
regard to peace, provided that the enemy offensive con- 
tinues to prove abortive. Mr. Wilson will then tell 
England that he has been obliged on the grounds of 
domestic politics to make a sharp protest against the 
blockade, provided that peace negotiations have not been 
opened. For me the question now arises whether I am 
to try to stand in the way of these proceedings. Of 
course I could exert strong influence on Colonel House. 
Wilson, however, would immediately suspect that we 
were attempting to deal with his successor, and to give 
Mr. Hughes the honor of instigating peace proceedings. 



282 MY THEEE YEARS IN AMERICA 

**As far as I can judge from here, there seem to be 
three possibilities: 

"1. That the Wilson peace movement shonld fail in 
consequence of the obduracy of our enemies. In that 
case, if we were to reopen the submarine campaign to 
bring England to her knees, the situation would at least 
be more favorable to us than before. 

**2. That the peace movement should fail through us, 
and that we should resume the submarine war. 

"3. That the peace movement should be accepted by 
both sides. 

*'In the first case, I consider war with the United 
States probable; in the second, certain. This is the 
reason for my request for more definite instructions as 
to whether I am to impede a peace movement, or only a 
positive proposal that would bind us in respect of terri- 
torial conditions." 

To this report I received the following reply, contain- 
ing quite clear instructions, emphatically to encourage 
Mr. "Wilson in whatever course he might take : 

.Telegram in Cipher 

''Berlin, 18th August, 1916. 
**In reply to report A. 350 of the 13th inst. 

"Mediation by the President intended lead to the 
opening of peace negotiations between the combatants 
we are gladly ready to accept. Please encourage em- 
phatically the President's efforts in this direction. 
Naturally it must not be imagined that in accepting such 
mediation we bind ourselves to any concrete peace con- 
ditions. A general peace conference with participation 
of neutrals only tolerable on the lines of previous 
successful peace-negotiations between combatants with 



AMERICAN MEDIATION 283 

regard to general and international questions of Freedom 
of the Seas and Disarmament. 

* ' Bethmann-Hollweq. ' ' 

In close connection with the above exchange of letters 
with Berlin, stood an interchange of telegrams dealing 
with the eventual reopening of the unrestricted sub- 
marine campaign. I received the following telegrams : 

Telegram in Cipher 

** (Strictly confidential.) 

'^Berlin, 12th June, 1916. 
**The Army and Navy are again urging submarine 
warfare as the only weapon against England, and par- 
ticularly against her blockade, to which President Wilson 
has never, nor can very well, take exception. 
' ' It now remains to be decided : 

**1. Whether after his nomination Wilson would still 
be prepared to press matters as far as a rupture and 
war, even if we spare human life in the new submarine 
war? 

*'2. What attitude the Republican candidate would 
adopt on this matter ? 

** Public opinion in England is opposed to mediation 
by Wilson, which is also not wanted on principle here, 
because too unpopular. 

''Vou Jagow.'' 

I dispatched as quickly as possible to Berlin the fol- 
lomng telegram: 

Telegram in Cipher 

"Washington, 19th June, 1916. 
"Assuming that it is intended that the resumption of 
the submarine campaign be accompanied by the official 



284 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

or clandestine withdrawal of the concessions granted in 
our Note of the 4th May, such a withdrawal or modifica- 
tion of onr concessions would in my opinion lead to a 
ruptnre and Americans entry into the war. By condon- 
ing such a move Wilson would forfeit all hope of being 
re-elected and Hughes, who is already suspected of being 
the German candidate, could not afford to recommend a 
surrender. With regard to mediation and blockade I am 
in constant communication with House. The former to 
be expected in course of summer, for election reasons; 
probably Wilson wiU inform our enemies that he will 
have to resort to sharp measures if peace is not 
attained." 

From the orders and telegrams here reproduced I 
gathered that the political situation was, as far as I was 
concerned, to be regarded as a kind of race between the 
unrestricted submarine campaign on the one hand and 
the American peace mediation on the other. There was 
apparently no third possibility. 

On the 1st September I saw Colonel House again. In 
order that this visit should not attract notice I went to 
stay with other friends in New Hampshire for the cus- 
tomary American September holidays (Labor Day). 
From there I motored to New London, where Colonel 
House had been spending the summer. The conversation 
brought out that the President considered a postpone- 
ment of mediation unavoidable, because the Entente 
were now filled with hopes of victory in consequence of 
Rumania's entry into the war. In all my conversations 
with Colonel House we both proceeded from the assump- 
tion that an attempt to bring about American mediation 
could only succeed provided that the Entente had given 
up hope of victory without the entry into the war of the 
United States. For this reason Colonel House repeated 



AMERICAN MEDIATION 285 

his advice that there should be less public talk in Berlin 
of an early peace than had hitherto been the case, since 
in this way we were betraying weakness aiid making 
America's task more difficult. 

Colonel House also said that the President now in- 
tended to await the further development of the war, and, 
if he should be re-elected, immediately to take steps to- 
wards mediation. Before the presidential election the 
time was too short for any action, for the Entente 
would pay no heed to the mediation of a problematical 
candidate. 

Looking back, I am still convinced even to-day that 
Colonel House's estimate of the situation with regard to 
the President was entirely correct from the American 
point of view. Mr. Wilson could only afford to offer his 
mediation provided that he was sure of success. For us 
the position was in my opinion different. For Germany 
American mediation would have been welcome at any 
time. It would either succeed and bring about an accept- 
able peace, or the Entente would reject Wilson's pro- 
posal after we had accepted it. In the latter case we 
should score a diplomatic success in Washington which 
would make it very difficult for the American Govern- 
ment to enter the war. The third possibility, that the 
German Government, after all that had passed, might 
refuse Mr. Wilson's mediation, I did not even consider. 

Immediately after my return from New Hampshire I 
telegraphed the following to the Foreign Office : 

Telegram in Cipher No'. 100 

' ' Rye, 6th September, 1916. 
** Wilson's mediation postponed until further notice 
because for the moment out of question, owing to Ru- 
mania's entry into war and consequent renewed prospect 



286 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

of victory for onr enemies. Wilson thinks he cannot 
now mediate before the election, because England might 
pay little attention to him until after the election, and 
if he were not elected would have nothing further to do 
with him. If, however, "Wilson wins at the poUs, for 
which the prospect is at present favorable, and if the war 
meanwhile remains at a standstill, the President will at 
once take steps towards mediation. He thinks in that 
case to be strong enough to compel a peace conference. 
** Wilson regards it as in the interest of America that 
neither of the combatants should gain a decisive victory." 

This telegraphic report of my conversation with 
Colonel House reached Berlin when they were beginning 
to grow impatient of the delay in the peace movement. 
According to Karl Helfferich's account the question was 
discussed at the time between himself, the Imperial 
Chancellor and Herr von Jagow. Thereupon, according 
to General Ludendorff's *'War Memories," "the Chan- 
cellor proposed to His Majesty that instructions should 
be given to Ambassador Count Bernstorff to induce the 
President at the earliest possible moment, and in any 
case before the presidential election, to make a peace 
offer to the Powers." Herr Helfferich then goes on to 
report that the Chancellor cabled to me to question me 
quite personally as to my opinion of Wilson as a peace 
mediator. The accounts of both these gentlemen are 
doubtless accurate, but they do not mention that the in- 
quiry addressed to me did not, nor was intended to, 
create a new situation, but had as its sole object to obtain 
my opinion as to the prospects of a movement which had 
long been set on foot. In the inquiry, as Herr Helfferich 
also reports, I was informed that we would evacuate Bel- 
gium. This was of course a necessary preliminary to 
Mr. Wilson's mediation, which otherwise, in view of the 



AMERICAN MEDIATION 287 

feeling prevailing in America, would have been entirely 
out of the question. 

The Chancellor 's inquiry read as follows : 
Telegram in Cipher No. 74 

** Berlin, 2nd September, 1916. 
^^ConfidentiaL 

"Our West Front stands firm. East Front naturally 
threatened somewhat by Rumanians declaration of war. 
Rolling up of front or collapse of Austria, however, not 
to be feared. Turkey and Bulgaria to be relied on. 
Greece uncertain. Hopes of peace before winter, as 
result of Russian or French war-weariness, diminished 
by this development Apparently, if no great catastrophe 
occurs in East, Wilson ^s mediation possible and success- 
ful if we guarantee required restoration of Belgium.' 
Otherwise, unrestricted submarine warfare would have 
to be seriously considered. Request you give purely per- 
sonal opinion without inquiry in any quarter. 

* ' Bethmann-Hollweg. ' ' 

To this inquiry I replied as follows-: 

Telegram in Cipher No. 101 

*'Rye, 8th September, 1916. 
"In reply to Telegram No. 74. 
"Your question answered in substance by my telegram 
No. 100. I take it then that your Excellency intends 
yourself to invite Wilson's mediation. In so far as the 
United States of America concerns itself with territorial 
questions — which hitherto I have always categorically 
opposed — restoration of Belgium should constitute 
America's principal interest, since public opinion is 
almost exclusively favorable to this. 



288 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

"If Wilson is re-elected, I think there is good prospect 
of his mediation before the end of the year. 

"From this point of view the attainment of peace 
through unrestricted submarine war seems hopeless, 
since the United States wonld inevitably be drawn into 
the war — ^no matter what may be the result of the elec- 
tion — and consequently the war would be prolonged." 

I should like particularly to draw the reader's atten- 
tion to this telegram, because it expresses definitely my 
opinion that the submarine campaign could not bring 
us peace. 

Soon afterwards I was again instructed by the Chan- 
cellor to hasten Mr. Wilson's peace movement. His tele- 
gram is here reproduced: 

Telegram m Cipher 

"Berlin, 26th September, 1916. 
"For Your Excellency's personal information. 
"The enemy's intention of breaking through our 
fronts has not, so far, succeeded, and will not succeed, 
any more than his Salonika and Dobrudja offensives. On 
the other hand, the operations of the Central Powers 
against Rumania are making encouraging progress. 
Whether we shall succeed this year in gaining a victory 
there that will bring the war to an end is still doubtful ; 
therefore, for the present we must be prepared for a 
further prolonging of the war. Meanwhile, the Imperial 
navy is confident that by the unrestricted employment 
of large numbers of submarines they could in view of 
England's economic position, meet with a success which 
would in a few months make our principal enemy, Eng- 
land, more disposed to entertain thoughts of peace. It 
is therefore essential that G.H.Q. should include a sub- 
marine campaign among their other measures to relieve 
the situation on the Somme Front, by impeding the trans- 



AMEKICAN MEDIATION 289 

port of munitions, and so making clear to the Entente the 
futility of their efforts in this area. 

**The whole situation would change if President "Wil- 
son, following out the plans he has already indicated, 
were to make an offer of mediation to the Powers. This 
would, of course, not have to include any definite pro- 
posals of a territorial nature, as these questions should 
form part of the agenda of the peace negotiations. Such 
a move, however, would have to be made soon, as other- 
wise we could not continue to stand calmly aside and 
watch England, realizing as she does the many difficulties 
to be reckoned with, exert with impunity increasingly 
strong pressure on the neutrals, with a view to improv- 
ing her military and economic position at our expense, 
and we should have to claim the renewed liberty of action 
for which we stipulated in the Note of the 4th of May of 
this year. Should Mr. Wilson insist on waiting until 
immediately before or after the election, he would lose 
the opportunity for such a step. Also the negotiations 
should not at first aim at the conclusion of an armistice, 
but should be carried on solely by the combatant parties, 
and within a short period directly bring about the pre- 
liminary peace. A further prolongation would be un- 
favorable to Germany's military situation, and would 
result in further preparations being made by the Powers 
for the continuance of the war into next year, so that 
there would be no further prospect of peace within a 
reasonable time. 

"Your Excellency should discuss the position cau- 
tiously with Colonel House, and find out the intentions 
of Mr. Wilson. A peace movement on the part of the 
President which bore the outward appearance of spon- 
taneity would be seriously considered by us, and this 
would also mean success for Mr. Wilson's election 
campaign. 



290 MY THEEE YEAES IN AMEEICA 

"Gerard has applied for leave, as the result of a 
private letter from Colonel House, but he has received 
no reply from the State Department. 

* * Bethmann-Hollweg. " 

The explanation of the final sentence of the above tele- 
gram is as follows. I have already mentioned that Mr. 
Gerard was not popular in Berlin, owing to his very 
highly-strung temperament, his impetuosity and his want 
of tact. His recall was eagerly desired. Consequently, I 
had received instructions to arrange, if possible, for the 
replacement of Mr. Gerard, and in any case that the 
Ambassador should be recalled for a time to Washington, 
so that his nerves might have a chance to rest. As al- 
ways, in strictly confidential matters, I referred this to 
Colonel House, who told me that in view of the existing 
political situation there could be no question of a recall 
of Gerard. He would, however, arrange for the Am- 
bassador to be summoned at once to Washington for 
fresh instructions. If once Mr. Gerard learned that the 
President now had the definite intention of mediating 
with a view of peace. Colonel House thought he would 
be received in a more friendly manner in Berlin. 

I answered the Chancellor 's last telegram as follows : 

Telegram in" Cipher 

''Washington, 5th October, 1916. 

''No. 121. 

"Telegram No. 89 discussed according to instructions. 

"No change here in the situation reported in telegrams 
Nos. 100 and 101. 

"In view of possibility of surprises in war and elec- 
tion, Wilson, for reasons already stated, refuses to at- 
tempt mediation until re-elected. Eesult of election. 



I 

i 



AMERICAN MEDIATION 291 

whicli is being fought exclusively on foreign politics, 
uncertain. President showing surprising firmness. If 
unrestricted submarine campaign unavoidable, advise 
emphatically, postpone at least until after election. Now, 
immediate rupture with United States would be certain ; 
after election Wilson's mediation probable on the 
one hand; on the other hand at least slight possibility 
of finding modus vivendi by negotiation with United 
States." 

The instructions from Berlin gave me occasion for re- 
peated conversations with Colonel House. The Imperial 
Government were now ready to accept Mr. "Wilson's 
League of Nations programme, which provided for gen- 
eral disarmament, freedom of the seas, and compulsory 
arbitration. My reports to Berlin on this question had 
the result that on 9th November the Chancellor in a 
speech publicly espoused this programme, and that I, at 
my oAvn suggestion, received permission to communicate 
officially the Chancellor's speech to the American Peace 
League, which published my communication. 

On the other hand, the Imperial Government desired 
that the territorial questions should be regulated by di- 
rect negotiations between the combatant Powers. Mr. 
Wilson, as Colonel House told me, was in agreement with 
this. Mr. Wilson had already expressed himself to this 
effect in the above mentioned speech of the 27th May, 
and in general adopted the point of view that the United 
States had no interest in the details of territorial adjust- 
ment ; but that it was of equally fundamental importance 
for America as for Europe that in future wars should 
be avoided. The President was only willing to intervene 
in so far as he was certain of having American public 
opinion behind him. In my conversations with Colonel 
House we never spoke of the evacuation of any German 



292 MY THREE YEAES IN AMERICA 

territory. We always confined ourselves exclusively to 
a real peace by negotiation on the basis of the status quo 
ante. With such a peace Germany's position in the world 
would have remained unimpaired. The freedom of the 
seas, a principal point in the Wilson programme, could 
not but be welcome to us. The President and Colonel 
House have been the sponsors of this idea in America. 
Both were indefatigable in their efforts to materialize 
this idea in such a way that war on commerce should be 
abolished and that all commerce, even in war-time, should 
be declared free. As a necessary result of this develop- 
ment of the laws of naval warfare Mr. Wilson hoped to 
bring about general naval disarmament, since navies 
would lose their raison d'etre if they could only be used 
against each other and no longer against commerce and 
for purposes of blockade. It is a regrettable fact that at 
the Hague Conference we iaccepted the English stand- 
point on the question of war on commerce, and not the 
American. 

In October I was again instructed from Berlin to speed 
up Mr. Wilson's peace movement. With regard to this 
new urgency Herr von Jagow, on the 14th April, 1919, 
granted an interview to the Berlin representative of the 
New York Sun, the substance of which was as follows : 

**In the autumn of 1916 the Emperor, Count Bernstorff 
and I opposed the resumption of unrestricted submarine 
warfare, which was urged with increasing vigor by our 
military and naval departments, as being the only means 
of bringing the war to an early conclusion. Week after 
week we watched for the hoped-for peace move of Presi- 
dent Wilson, which, however, did not come. At last, in 
October, the Emperor, upon whom increasing pressure 
was being brought to bear to give his consent to the un- 
restricted submarine campaign, sent a memorandum to 



AMERICAN MEDIATION 293 

the American Government, reminding them of certain 
mediation promises which had been made at the time of 
the Sussex crisis. 

*'When this memorandum, addressed to Mr. Gerard, 
reached Berlin Mr. Gerard had already left for America. 
I, therefore, cabled the text to Washington and in- 
structed Count Bernstorff to hand the memorandum to 
Mr. Gerard on his arrival in New York. Count Bern- 
storff, who had been made fully aware that the Emperor 
wished to avert the submarine campaign and a rupture 
with the United States, was also informed by me that 
the memorandum had been written by the Emperor in 
person. For reasons which there is no need for me to 
mention here. Count Bernstorff handed the memoran- 
dum, not to Mr. Gerard, but to Colonel House, who cer- 
tainly communicated it to the President." 

The telegram in which the Emperor's memorandum 
was communicated to me read as follows : 

Telegram iisr Cipher 

** Berlin, 9th October, 1916. 

**His Majesty the Emperor desires that the following 
memorandum should be handed to Ambassador Gerard 
on the latter 's arrival. 

"Your Excellency should do this in strict confidence 
and say that the memoir is not intended to convey a threat 
of submarine warfare. I should only like you to remind 
the Ambassador before his interview with the President 
of the expectations we based in the spring on Wilson and 
to call his attention to the increasing ruthlessness with 
which the enemy is carrying on the war. I take it for 
granted that Gerard will treat my memoir as strictly 
confidential and will not publish it. 

*' Should Your Excellency, however, regard the deliv- 



294 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

ery of the memorandum as indiscreet, I request that it 
may be deferred. 

"For Your Excellency's information (strictly confiden- 
tial) : 

''1. The memorandum is written personally by His 
Majesty. 

"2. Unrestricted submarine warfare is for the present 
deferred. 

** Memorandum 

**Your Excellency hinted to His Majesty in your last 
conversation at Charleville in April that President Wil- 
son possibly would try towards the end of summer to 
offer his good services to the belligerents for the promo- 
tion of peace. The German Government has no informa- 
tion as to whether the President adheres to this idea, and 
as to the eventual date at which his step would take place. 
Meanwhile the constellation of war has taken such a 
form, that the German Government foresees the time at 
which it will be forced to regain the freedom of action 
that it has reserved to itself in the Note of May 4th last, 
and thus the President's steps may be jeopardized." 

Mr. Gerard arrived in New York a few days after I 
had received the Emperor's memorandum. He was ac- 
companied by the American journalist, Herbert Swope, 
a correspondent of The World, who had spent a consid- 
erable time in Berlin. This gentleman professed to be 
Mr. Gerard's confidant, and even from the ship sent wire- 
less messages to his paper in which he reported that the 
unrestricted submarine campaign was imminent. The 
Ambassador also, after landing in New York, expressed 
himself, as I at once learned, to the same effect, and 
Mr. Swope continued his open Press-campaign in this 
direction. 



AMERICAN MEDIATION 295 

Under these circumstances I considered it inopportune 
to give Mr. Gerard the Emperor 's memorandum, as I as- 
sumed that he would read into it merely a confirmation 
of his view, and would discuss it in that light. If, how- 
ever, the idea spread abroad that we were about to begin 
the unrestricted submarine campaign all prospect of suc- 
cess for peace mediation was lost. It was indeed clear 
that the Entente would not accept American mediation if 
they could hope for the submarine campaign and conse- 
quent declaration of war by the United States. It must 
continually be repeated that mediation could only succeed 
if the Entente had already abandoned all hope of Ameri- 
can assistance. On these considerations I handed the 
memorandum to Colonel House, of whose discretion I had 
two years ' experience. In this way it came into the hands 
of the equally unusually discreet President, without any- 
one else learning anything about it. The memorandum 
at once produced a great effect, as now the American 
authorities had no further doubt that the Imperial Gov- 
ernment would accept the intended mediation. This 
could, however, not be speeded up because Mr. Wilson 
did not want to undertake a great political movement so 
; shortly before the election. 

At this time I sent the following report to the Chan- 
cellor : 

Report in Cipher 
** Washington, 17th October, 1916. 
**For a week there has again been some excitement 
here about foreign policy. This is due to a variety of 
causes. At first the rumor was that Ambassador Gerard 
was bringing with him a peace proposal from the German 
Government. In spite of all denials this rumor was be- 
lieved for a time, because it was started by one of the 
first bankers of New York. Unfortunately Mr. Gerard 



296 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

heard of this canard while he was still on the ship, and 
as he was travelling with Herbert Swope a denial, sent 
by wireless, appeared in The World, which was worse 
than the rumor itself. In this Swope reported that Mr. 
Gerard was coming over to announce the approaching 
beginning of ruthless submarine war. Just at this mo- 
ment the U53 appeared at Newport, and two days later 
I had an audience of the President, which had been ar- 
ranged a long time before, that I might hand to Mr. 
Wilson the reply of His Majesty the Emperor and King 
on the question of Polish relief. 

''Colonel House, with whom, as is known, I am in con- 
stant communication, expected that on his landing Mr. 
Gerard would let fall some intentional or unintentional 
diplomatic lapsus linguce, and therefore went in the early 
morning to the quarantine station in order to protect 
Gerard from the reporters. Mr. Gerard received a very 
hearty reception, which, however, had certainly been en- 
gineered for election purposes, because it is to the interest 
of the Democratic Administration to extol their ambas- 
sador and their foreign policy. Immediately after the 
reception Gerard breakfasted with House, and there 
everything was denied that had been actually said or 
implied. 

*' As I have known Mr. and Mrs. Gerard for many years 
I had a longish conversation with them on the day after 
their arrival. The quintessence of the ambassador's re- 
marks was that he was completely neutral, but that Berlin 
expected more than that* 

*'Now everything has calmed down again here, and 
nothing is talked about except the election, which will 
be decided in three weeks ' time. As I have several times 
had the honor to report, the result is most uncertain. 
"While four months ago a Republican victory seemed cer- 
tain, to-day Wilson's success is very possible. This is 



AMERICAN MEDIATION 297 

explained by the fact that Mr. Hughes has made no per- 
manent impression as a speaker, whereas Roosevelt blew 
the war trumpet in his usual bombastic fashion. If 
Hughes should be defeated he can thank Roosevelt. The 
average American is, and remains a pacifist, *Er segnet 
Friede und Friedensseiten/ and can only be drawn into 
war by passionate popular excitement.'* 

"With the facts contained in the above report the fol- 
lowing telegram is also concerned, which I despatched 
after the visit to the President mentioned above : 

Telegram in Cipher 

** Washington, 11th October, 1916. 

"Wilson gave particular force to his remarks by point* 
ing out that the leaders of the opposition, Roosevelt, 
Lodge and Co., desired war with Germany, which he was 
quite unable to understand. His only desire was to re- 
main neutral, and to help to bring the war to an end, as 
a decision by force of arms seemed to him out of the 
question. He thought that neither of the belligerent 
parties would be able to gain a decisive victory. There- 
fore it was better to make peace to-day than to-morrow. 
But all prospect of ending the war would vanish if the 
United States were also drawn in. 

**As Wilson always spoke as though he was holding 
himself in readiness, in case his services as mediator 
were required, I told him that in my opinion there was 
no. prospect of any advances being made by the bellig- 
erent Powers. 

*'It w^as obvious that Wilson would have preferred to 
be directly encouraged to make peace before the election 
because in that case he would have been sure of being 
re-elected. If, however, he were re-elected without this, 
he would have to make up his mind to take the initiative 



298 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

himself- Result of the poll still very doubtful. Wilson 
surprisingly strong, as Hughes has little success as a 
speaker and Roosevelt does more harm than good." 

To this I received the following reply from the Chan- 
cellor : 

Cipher Telegram 

*' Berlin, 14th October, 1916. 

*' Demand for unrestricted submarine campaign in- 
creasing here with prolongation of war and improbability 
of decisive military blow, without, however, shaking the 
Government 's attitude. 

''Direct request for Wilson's mediation still impos- 
sible, in view of favor hitherto shown to Entente, and 
after last speeches of Asquith and Lloyd George. Spon- 
taneous appeal for peace, towards which I again ask you 
to encourage him, would be gladly accepted by us. You 
should point out Wilson's power, and consequently his 
duty, to put a stop to slaughter. If he cannot make up 
his mind to act alone he should get into communication 
with Pope, King of Spain and European neutrals. Such 
joint action, since it cannot be rejected by Entente, would 
insure him re-election and historical fame. 

' ' Bethmann-Hollweg. ' ' 

The incident of the Emperor's memorandum closed 
with the following telegram sent by me : 

Cipher Telegram 
''Washington, 20th October, 1916. 
"I thought it better to give memorandum to Gerard 
for House, as in this way greater discretion is assured. 
Latter was incautious in his utterances to Press here. 
House will speak with Gerard. Both gentlemen see Wil- 
son shortly, and are accordingly in constant touch. 

"It is still not to be expected that Wilson will make 
peace advances before the election. Nor that he will get 



AMERICAN MEDIATION 299 

into comiminication with Pope or King of Spain as hith- 
erto every suggestion of joint action has met with im- 
movable opposition, chiefly based on tradition. Mean- 
while prospect of Wilson's re-election becomes obviously 
greater every day. Should this occur I believe that "Wil- 
son will very soon attempt mediation and with success, 
chiefly because the feeling against England has greatly 
increased, which England is seeking to hide. If peace is 
not concluded serious Anglo-American differences of 
opinion are to be expected. Until now every fresh dis- 
pute with Germany with regard to the submarine ques- 
tion has always been exploited by our enemies here to 
bridge the differences with England. Already the agita- 
tion in the German Press for unrestricted submarine 
warfare is persistently used for this purpose.'' 

After a hard struggle Mr. Wilson was re-elected Pres- 
ident. The pacifist tendency in the United States had 
won, for the battle was fought under the watchword that 
Mr. Wilson had preserved peace for the United States. 
*'He kept us out of the war" had been the battle-cry of 
the Democrats. The few electioneering speeches made 
by the President breathed the spirit of neutrality and 
love of peace. It is particularly to be noticed that at that 
time, Mr. Wilson, in an address, dealt in a thoroughly 
objective way with the question of guilt for the origin of 
the war, which was later to be the determining factor in 
his attitude towards us. The way was now cleared for 
the opening of the peace movement. Public feeling had 
also become more favorable to us, inasmuch as the Amer- 
ican war industry no longer attached so much importance 
to the prolongation of the war after the victorious Demo- 
cratic party had drawn up an extensive armament pro- 
gramme and so indicated to the industry the prospect of 
great State contracts. 



300 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

On the subject of my own attitude with regard to the 
election, innumerable legends have been spread through 
Germany. The few German- Americans who shared the 
views of the so-called " German- American Chamber of 
Commerce" have reproached me with having brought 
about Mr. Wilson's election by influencing the German- 
Americans. Anti-German-American newspapers main- 
tained, on the other hand, that I had usfed every lever to 
bring about the election of the Republican candidate, Mr. 
Hughes, so as to punish Mr. "Wilson for his attitude 
towards the submarine campaign. My position was an 
extraordinarily difficult one, as I could neither take part 
in the election nor give up the relations which naturally 
and in the course of my duty bound me to the German- 
Americans and pacifists. In general I may say that the 
vast majority of German-Americans had absolute confi- 
dence in me throughout. A splendid testimony of this 
was given at the great German bazaar which was held in 
New York in aid of the Red Cross. This undertaking 
made the astounding net profit of 800,000 dollars. At 
the opening nearly 30,000 people were present, who gave 
me an indescribably enthusiastic ovation simply because 
they believed that I had prevented war between Germany 
and the United States. 

I never for a moment denied that I personally should 
be glad to see Mr. Wilson re-elected, as I was convinced 
that he had the determination and the power to bring 
about peace. It was at that time impossible for me to 
foresee that our Government would change its attitude 
to this question. All American pacifists belonged to the 
Democratic camp, all militarists belonged to the Repub- 
lican party. 

A change in our favor was, therefore, not to be ex- 
pected from the election of Mr. Hughes. Apart from the 
usual relations with the pacifists and German- Americans 



AMERICAN MEDIATION 301 

already mentioned, which were in no way altered during 
the election, I held myself aloof as my position demanded. 
If it had been possible to accuse me of taking sides, the 
agents of the Entente would not have missed the oppor- 
tunity of bringing me to book, as this they regarded as 
their object in life. I continually received letters from 
agents provocateurs, asking for my opinion on the elec- 
tions. Of course I never replied to these. Neither were 
the false statements of anti-German newspapers any more 
successful which announced that on the day of the elec- 
tion I had openly shown my support of Mr. Hughes. 

New York at night after the polling is one of the sights 
of America. All streets, squares, theatres and restau- 
rants are filled to overflowing. The election results are 
displayed everywhere by electric light and cinemato- 
graph. Particularly when the result is very uncertain, 
as in 1916, the crowd are tremendously excited. At 11 
p.m. the election of Mr. Hughes seemed certain, as the 
Eastern States had voted for him almost to a man, and it 
was said that a Democratic candidate can only gain the 
victory if he wins over New York State. Next day the 
picture changed, after the results had come gradually 
from the West, where the Democratic party w^as every- 
where triumphant. The majority, however, was so slight 
that it was several days before Mr. Wilson's election was 
secure. 

The malcontents among the German-Americans already 
mentioned maintain that if Mr. Hughes had been elected. 
Congress would have used the four months between the 
election and the 4th March, during which Mr. Wilson 
was powerless and Mr. Hughes had not yet got the reins 
into his hands, to rush through the warning of American 
citizens against travelling on British passenger-ships. In 
that case, Mr. Hughes, on assuming office, would have 
found himself faced with a situation which would have 



302 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA ' 

prevented him from entering tlie war, in view of the na- 
tional inclination towards peace. Therefore, the German- 
Americans ought to have supported Hughes. This had 
been clear to the Germans in the East. They maintained 
that Wilson's re-election was due to the German votes 
in the Western States which had obeyed a more or less 
clear order from the German Embassy. 

This line of argument is yet another proof that the 
Germans in question had no idea of the situation in 
America. They kept exclusively to themselves in the 
Deutscher Verein, and scarcely ever saw a real, true-bred 
American. To begin with, it is difficult to see why the 
Germans in the West should obey the alleged order from 
me if the Germans in the East did not do so. But the 
important thing is that Wilson had firmly made up his 
mind, in case Mr. Hughes was elected, to appoint him 
Secretary of State immediately and, after Hughes had 
informed himself on the political position in this office, 
to hand over the presidency and himself retire. Mr. 
Wilson considered it impossible to leave the country 
without firm leadership at such a dangerous moment. 

Immediately after the official announcement of his re- 
election, Mr. Wilson wrote a Peace-Note, but unfortu- 
nately kept it in his desk, because, unhappily, just at that 
time a new anti-German wave swept over the country on 
account of the Belgian deportations. Mr. Wilson was at 
that time in the habit of typing the drafts of his Notes and 
speeches himself, and only submitting them to his ad- 
visers on points of law or other technicalities. Whether 
he still works in this way I do not know. If the un- 
happy measure of the Belgian deportations had not been 
adopted, and particularly just as we had informed the 
President that we did not want to annex Belgium, the 
history of the world would probably have taken a differ- 
ent course. The American mediation would have antici- 



AMERICAN MEDIATION 303 

pated our peace offer and, therefore, would probably have 
succeeded, because we could not then have reopened the 
unrestricted submarine campaign without letting the 
mediation run its course. 

In November several submarine incidents occurred in 
which there was a doubt as to whether the rules of cruiser 
warfare had been followed. The ships Marina and Ara- 
bia came under particular consideration. I will not go 
into these cases as they had no political importance. 
President Wilson caused the investigations to be carried 
on in a dilatory fashion because he did not want to see 
his peace move disturbed by controversies. 

Of greater importance was the wish that was again 
cropping up in Berlin to open the so-called ''intensified 
submarine campaign.'^ I learned this in the following 
from Secretary of State von Jagow: 

Cipher Telegram No. 112. 

"Berlin, 8th November, 1916. 
"Navy wishes at least torpedo armed enemy cargo- 
vessels without warning. Does Your Excellency consider 
this dangerous, apart from probable mistakes, particu- 
larly in view of fact that now many Americans are lured 
to travel on such steamers? 

"VoN Jagow." 

As the "intensified submarine campaign" would have 
destroyed all prospect of American intervention, I ad- 
vised strongly against it in the two following telegrams : 

(1) Cipher Telegram No, 152 

"Washington, 17th November, 1916. 
"It is urgently desirable not to reopen disputes about 
armed merchantmen, especially in view of Wilson's peace 
plan." 



304 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

(2) Cipher Telegram 
"Washington, 20th November, 1916. 
**In reply to telegram No. 112 which was delayed. 
** Pursuant to Telegram No. 152. 
**Urge no change in submarine war, until decided 
whether Wilson will open mediation. I consider this 
imminent'' 

At the same time I received the first news of the in- 
tended peace offer of the German Government. To begin 
with, the following telegram arrived from Secretary of 
State von Jagow: 

Cipher Telegram 

** Berlin, 16th November, 1916. 
** Desirable to know whether President willing to take 
steps towards mediation, and if so, which and when? 
Question important for decision of possible steps in same 
direction elsewhere. 
*'How does Mexican question stand? 

"Von Jagow.'' 

Then followed a further telegram which read as fol- 
lows: 

Cipher Telegram 

"Berlin, 22nd November, 1916. 
"Strictly confidential. 
"For Your Excellency's strictly personal information. 
So far as favorable military position permits we intend, 
in conjunction with our AUies, immediately to announce 
our readiness to enter into peace negotiations. 

"VoN Jagow." 



AMERICAN MEDIATION 305 

To the first of these two telegrams I sent the following 
reply: 

CiPHEE Telegram 
"Washington, 21st November, 1916. 

** Wilson spontaneously commissioned House to tell me 
in strict confidence that he is anxious to take steps 
towards mediation as soon as possible, probably between 
now and the New Year. He makes it a condition, how- 
ever, that until then, mediation should be spoken and 
written of as little as possible, and further, that we should 
conduct the submarine war strictly according to our 
promises and not allow any fresh controversies to arise. 

** Wilson's reasons for the above conditions are as fol- 
lows: He believes that he can only resort to mediation 
provided that public opinion over here remains as favor- 
able to us as it has been during the last few months. On 
this account he deplores the so-called Belgian deporta- 
tions. Any new submarine controversy would again af- 
fect public feeling adversely for us, whereas if this ques- 
tion can be eliminated the tension with regard to England 
will increase. The British reply on the subject of the 
black lists and the English Press utterances on Wilson's 
election have created a bad impression in Government 
circles over here. The submarine question, however, will 
always divert this resentment against us again. 

** Wilson still hesitates to intervene because the State 
Department expects a refusal on the part of our enemies, 
while House urges it strongly and is very hopeful. I 
have, according to instructions, encouraged him as much 
as possible, by telling him, that in my opinion, our ene- 
mies would be quite unable to refuse to enter into negotia- 
tions, and that is all that Wilson has in view. House 
seemed very much impressed when I reminded him how, 
throughout the whole war, the English Government had 



306 MY THEEE YEARS IN AMERICA 

tried by lying and diplomatic trickery to bring public 
opinion on to their side. This house of cards, built on 
lies and deception, would immediately collapse if our ene- 
mies were now to refuse negotiations and thus would 
have to admit openly their desire for conquest. I am 
rather afraid that England may make a pretense of en- 
tering into negotiations and then try to put us in the 
wrong. 

**I chose this line of argument because Wilson fears 
above all things the humiliation of a refusal. If it does 
come to negotiations, even unsuccessful, Wilson will have 
scored a great success. Whether the negotiations will 
lead to a definite result I cannot judge from here. In 
any case, if it should come to negotiations, strong press- 
ure wiU be exerted by the Government over here in the 
direction of peace. 

**The Mexican question is still in a state of stagnation 
as a result of diplomatic negotiations. This affair inter- 
ests practically no one any more and proved to have no 
influence on the election. 

*'If Your Excellency still desires Wilson to intervene 
it is necessary, in view of the above, to get rid as soon as 
possible of the Marina and Arabia incidents without fur- 
ther controversy and not to allow any fresh controversies 
to arise. I think that, with the help of House, I can bury 
these two incidents without attracting much attention, as 
this is the wish of Wilson himself. As House said, the 
President takes a tragic view of these incidents, because, 
after the Sussex Note, he could not possibly write an- 
other Note, and therefore, there is nothing left but to 
break off diplomatic negotiations, should it be impossible 
to dispose of the matter privately and confidentially with 
me. 

"Next week Gerard will be in Washington for a day or 
two : he will lunch with me and dine with Lansing. House 



AMERICAN MEDIATION 307 

keeps him in strict control. In case Gerard *s return to 
Berlin is not desired, please send me instructions. 
Otherwise he should be there again at the end of the 
year.*' 

To this telegram, which announced very definitely the 
American mediation, I received from the Foreign Office 
the following reply: 

Cipher Telegram No. 121 

*' Berlin, 26th November, 1916. 

** Replacement, or at least further retention, of Gerard 
in America desired in Berlin, provided that it is possible 
without wounding his vanity and sensitiveness to our dis- 
advantage, that it is certain that this hint from our side 
will not become known in America and that a suitable 
successor is available. 

**We should prefer Wilson's peace move to the step on 
our part mentioned in our telegram No. 116 of the 22nd 
November. For this reason it is eminently desirable that 
"Wilson should make up his mind for immediate action 
if possible at the opening of congress or inunediately 
afterwards. If it is put off until the New Year or later, 
the lull in military operations during the winter cam- 
paign would moderate the desire of public opinion for 
peace, and on the other hand would make preparations 
for the spring offensive necessary which would probably 
strengthen the military opposition of a peace movement. 
Please place this point of view cautiously and without 
empressement before House as your personal opinion 
and keep me closely instructed by telegram as to the 
position. 

**ZlMMERMANN." 



308 MY THEEE YEARS IN AMERICA 
To this telegram I sent the two following replies : 

Cipher Telegram No. 164 
Beply to Telegram No. 121 

"Washington, 1st. December, 1916. 

"To-morrow I shall see House in New York and will 
try to arrange that Gerard, who is to sail on 5th Decem- 
ber, is kept back. 

*' Lansing expressed himself very strongly to me on 
the subject of the American protest with regard to the 
Belgian deportations. These have endangered the whole 
Belgian relief movement; in addition, feeling here has 
been poisoned against us, and that just at a moment when 
it looked as though peace negotiations might be begun. 
Lansing expressed the view that, if the Imperial Gov- 
ernment could find a way of yielding to the protests of 
the neutrals, this would make a strong impression in our 
favor and that it would probably be possible immediately 
afterwards to propose the opening of peace negotiations. 
Hitherto, unfortunately, something has always inter- 
vened. 

**The Federal Reserve Board's warning to the banks 
against unsecured promissory notes of foreign States is 
the first sign that the Government here wishes to put 
pressure on our enemies. 

Cipher Telegram 
** Washington, 4th December, 1916. 
"Pursuant to Telegram No. 164 of the 1st inst. 
"House told me in strict confidence question of Mr. 
Gerard's return has been thoroughly discussed by him 
with Mr. Wilson and Mr. Lansing. Mr. Gerard's unpop- 
ularity in Berlin and his unfriendly manner were well 
known here. However, no satisfactory successor was 



AMERICAN MEDIATION 309 

available, and Mr Gerard is at least straightforward and 
does exactly what he is told. He has received very de- 
tailed instructions here, and is even quite enthusiastic 
over th^ idea of assisting in bringing about peace. In 
addition, Mr. Gerard was so pleased at the appointment 
of the Secretary of State that he is sure to adopt a more 
friendly attitude in future. 

**As a matter of fact, Mr. Gerard has everywhere 
described the changes in the personnel at the Foreign 
Office as extraordinarily favorable for German- American 
relations, and laid particular stress on his personal 
friendship with, the Secretary of State. 

*' Everything is prepared for a peace move, but with 
Mr. Wilson still hesitating, it is still doubtful when he 
will take action. All the authorities here have now been 
won over to favor such a step. This may then come at 
any time, especially if it is possible for us to adopt a 
conciliatory attitude on the Belgian question. Mr. Wilson 
believes that he is so hated in England that he won't be 
listened to. This train of thought largely explains his 
eagerness in the Belgian question. In any case, so much 
is certain, that House is continually urging Mr. Wilson 
to take action ; moreover, peace propaganda here is stead- 
ily increasing, notwithstanding that it is for the moment 
very seriously hampered by the Belgian question. If Mr. 
Wilson — as is to be expected — finds a strong feeling for 
peace in Congress, he should at last make up his mind." 

After a stay of about two months in America, Mr. 
Gerard, furnished with fresh instructions, left for Berlin 
on the 5th December. When later the Ambassador, at 
the much discussed Adlon dinner, declared that the re- 
lations between the United States and Germany had 
never been so good as at that moment since the beginning 
of the war, this speech was the keynote of his instruc- 



310 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

tions. If on the other hand Herr Helfferich said that the 
exuberance of the Ambassador astonished him, this is 
explained by the fact that Berlin never believed in Mr. 
Wilson's intention to bring about peace. Why such in- 
credulity should persist notwithstanding that Colonel 
House had twice travelled to Berlin for this very pur- 
pose, and that the President's peace policy had been the 
burden of all my reports, I shall never be able to under- 
stand, while, on the other hand, I can quite understand 
that Mr. Wilson's passivity with regard to the English 
breaches of international law had engendered strong dis- 
trust of him in Germany. 

For the rest, Mr. Gerard seemed to be imperfectly in- 
formed about the situation in Berlin. He was certainly 
right in his prediction of the unrestricted submarine 
campaign, but in this case the wish was father to the 
thought. It accorded with Mr. Gerard's anti-German 
feeling, to which he gave expression later in his gossipy 
literature and film production, that he should welcome 
the submarine campaign, and with it the rupture with 
the United States, as well as our defeat. But after all, 
the Ambassador proved at the Adlon dinner that he 
could * ' sing another tune. ' ' 

When Mr. Gerard lunched with me in Washington, I 
Had just learned by cable from Berlin that Herr von 
Jagow had resigned and had been replaced by Herr Zim- 
mermann. On hearing this news, the Ambassador said 
that now there would be no rupture between Germany 
and the United States, for Herr Zimmermann was his 
personal friend and was opposed to war, while Herr von 
Jagow, as an aristocrat, did not love the Americans, and 
looked down on bourgeois Gerard. A grosser misreading 
of the actual situation in Berlin can scarcely be conceived, 
as the unrestricted submarine campaign was only made 
possible by the resignation of Herr von Jagow, who was 



AMERICAN MEDIATION 311 

the chief opponent in Berlin of the submarine campaign, 
and the pillar on which the idea of American intervention 
rested. As long as Herr von Jagow remained Secretary 
of State, a breach with the United States was regarded 
as impossible. One of his last official acts was to write 
a private letter to me on the 20th November, 1916, con- 
cluding with the following sentence : 

**As you have seen from your instructions, we are 
thoroughly in sympathy with the peace tendencies of 
President Wilson. His activity in this direction is to be 
strongly encouraged. Naturally his mediation tendencies 
must not extend to concrete proposals (because these 
would be unfavorable to us.) '^ 

We now come to the moment in this account when the 
peace offer of the Imperial Government got involved with 
Mr. Wilson ^s plans for mediation. It is not my intention 
to go closely into the events that occurred in Berlin or 
the considerations that took effect there, as I only know 
them through their reaction on the instructions sent to 
me. I will only mention briefly, that, according to the 
statement of Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg before the 
Commission of the National Assembly, the peace offer of 
the Imperial Government was made with a view to in- 
fluencing the pacifist minorities in the Entente countries, 
and working, through the people, on the Governments. 
Beyond this there was no intention of cutting out Mr. 
Wilson *s peace move, but the Imperial Government 
wanted to have **two irons in the fire." Finally, all the 
utterances of the Imperial Government, which do not 
seem to tally with these two principles of their policy, are 
to be regarded as based on purely tactical motives. Ac- 
cordingly, the decisive turn in our policy did not occur 
until the 9th January, 1917, when the decision to resort 



312 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

to the unrestricted submarine war was taken. Until then 
the policy followed was that of "two irons in the fire." 

This is the way in which I read the situation in Wash- 
ington at the time. If I had been convinced that the 
resignation of Herr von Jagow and the German peace 
offer meant a definite departure from the policy which 
we had hitherto followed with regard to Mr. Wilson's 
peace step, I should have immediately sent in my resigna- 
tion, as I was completely identified with this policy. 
However, I shall return to this side of the question later. 

The following telegram from the Foreign Office gave 
me the official information of our peace offer : 

Cipher Telegram No. 128 

** Berlin, 9th December, 1916. 
*' Confidential, for your personal information. 

**We have decided to make use of the favorable posi- 
tion created by the fall of Bukarest in order, according 
to telegram number 116 of the 21st November, to make a 
peace offer in conjunction with our Allies, probably on 
Thursday, the 12th December. We do not at the present 
moment run any risk of damaging our prestige or show- 
ing signs of weakness. Should the enemy reject the offer 
the odium of continuing the war will fall upon them. 
For reasons stated in telegram number 121 we could not 
wait any longer for President Wilson to make up his 
mind to take action. 

**The American Embassy here will at the given 
moment receive a Note in which the American Govern- 
ment wiU be requested to communicate our peace offer to 
those of our enemies with whom they represent our in- 
terests. Our other enemies will be informed through the 
medium of Switzerland and Spain respectively. Ameri- 
can reprsentative in conversation with Chancellor on 5th 



AMERICAN MEDIATION 313 

December expressed himself, in confidence, on tlie Presi- 
dent's mission, among other things, as follows: *What 
the President now most earnestly desires is practical co- 
operation on the part of German authorities in bringing 
about a favorable opportunity for soon and affirmative 
action by the President looking to an early restoration of 
peace.' Chancellor replied to American representative, 
he was * extremely gratified to see from the President's 
message that in the given momient he could count upon 
the sinceire and practical 30-operation of the President in 
the restoration of peace, as much as the President could 
count upon the practical 3o- operation of German authori- 
ties.' We think we may assume that our action meets 
the wishes of the President. 

** Please interpret it in any case in this sense to the 
President and House. 

**VoN Stumm." 

To this telegram I replied as follows : 

Cipher Telegram 
*' Washington, 13th December, 1916. 
"In reply to Telegram No. 128. 
"Have carried out instructions with House, who is at 
present staying at the White House. I have not yet re- 
ceived answer from Wilson, but it is generally believed 
here that he will strongly support peace proposals. 

**Mr. Gerard, in a speech at a farewell dinner given to 
him in New York, declared that Germany had won, and 
could not be robbed of her victory. Although not pub- 
lished, this speech attracted attention, especially as Mr. 
Gerard emphasized the fact that he had reported to Mr. 
Wilson in this sense." 

Before the Commission of the National Assembly I 



314 MY THREE YEARS TN A.MERICA 

Was asked whether I had made an attempt to stand in 
the way of our peace offer, lest it should interfere with 
Mr. Wilson's action. I took no such steps, because I 
thought that I was faced with a firm resolve of the Im- 
perial Government, and because I did not think that our 
peace offer would substantially compromise Mr. Wilson's 
action. 

It was also stated before the commission that I might 
have helped my policy to prevail in Berlin if I had in- 
sisted on it more strongly. With regard to this, I must 
say at once, that I did not consider stronger influence on 
my side really called for, as my instructions had always 
categorically laid down that I was to encourage Mr. 
Wilson to take peace action. I had also been informed 
that the Imperial Government would prefer such action 
to a peace offer from our side, and that the correct 
moment for the latter would have to depend on the mili- 
tary situation. I was, therefore, until the arrival of the 
Berlin telegram, number 128, not clear as to which of the 
actions would come first, especially as, according to my 
instructions, I was to keep our peace offer secret and 
could not discuss it with Colonel House. 

Under ordinary circumstances, I should have travelled 
to Berlin several times during the war to confer with the 
authorities. Unfortunately, however, that was impos- 
sible, as the English would never have allowed me to 
travel to and fro. If I had had the ways and means 
to enlighten German public opinion on the situation in 
America, it would certainly have done a lot of good. Ac- 
cording to the evidence given before the Commission of 
the National Assembly, the chief reason for our rejection 
of mediation was distrust of Mr. Wilson. Nevertheless, 
I still believe that ignorance and undervaluation of 
America was a stronger influence. At least I cannot 
conceive that all the authorities concerned would have 



AMERICAN MEDIATION 315 

voted for unrestricted submarine war if they had been 
firmly convinced that the United States would come into 
the war with aU her military and economic power. How- 
ever that may be, I tried at least to do what I could and 
I made an attempt to send Herr Albert, who was com- 
pletely in accord with me, to Berlin on the submarine 
Deutschland. The captain of the DeutscMand, however, 
had scruples against carrying passengers, and Herr 
Albert ^s voyage had therefore to be given up. After my 
experience of the journeys of Herren Meyer Gerhardt 
and Dernburg, I certainly do not think that Herr Albert 
would have done very much in Berlin. Even I could 
hardly have hindered the opening of the unrestricted 
submarine campaign where Herr von Jagow, Herr von 
Kiihlmann and others had failed, and after all, that was 
the main point. 

Mr. Wilson's intention of bringing about peace had 
been reported to me so definitely and so often that I took 
it for granted that the President would carry through 
his plan in spite of our peace offer. As I had received 
no instructions to the contrary, I held to my previous 
interpretation of the situation, and assumed that, al- 
though it was true that we had ourselves made a peace 
offer because Wilson's action was so long in coming, we 
should nevertheless still be glad to avail ourselves of the 
President's help. In my opinion, this was the only in- 
terpretation that could be put on the Foreign Office tele- 
gram number 128, given above. The President himself, 
as Colonel House told me, was very disappointed when 
he received the news of our peace offer. Colonel House 
told me that he would naturally have liked to take the 
first step himself. Apart from this, he had always 
warned us against mentioning peace, because this would 
be interpreted by the Entente as weakness. He there- 
fore regarded our peace offer as an obstacle to action on 



316 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

his part, as it was bound to diminish the enemy's readi- 
ness to enter into negotiations. On the other hand, the 
step of the Imperial Government exerted a favorable 
influence on American public opinion, and this influence 
would have been even more favorable if the offer had 
been made less in the tone of a victor. The attitude of 
American public opinion, and the fear lest peace negotia- 
tions might be opened without his co-operation, must 
have been the chief reasons that influenced Mr. Wilson 
publicly to support our peace offer. In connection with 
this I sent the following information to Berlin : 

Cipher Telegram 
** "Washington, 16th December, 1916. 

* 'Lansing tells me the following statement, which I 
could not send by wireless to-day, comes from Wilson 
personally. 

** President Wilson has decided that the Notes of the 
Central Powers, proposing a discussion of peace to the 
Entente Allies, will be sent forward by the American 
Government acting as intermediary without any accom- 
panying offer of his own. He has not determined whether 
any action on behalf of peace will be taken later by the 
United States on its own account, but is holding himself 
in readiness to serve in any possible way towards bring- 
ing the warring nations together." 

**From Lansing's remarks I gather that he is convinced 
that our enemies will agree to a conference and that then 
the American Government will have an opportunity to 
speak in favor of peace. As the Press here is also in 
general of the opinion that our enemies cannot refuse a 
conference without turning public opinion against them- 
selves, I have grounds for assuming that the American 



AMERICAN MEDIATION 317 

Embassy in London, in spite of the official statement 
mentioned above, will assert this view. 

As I expected, the President did not allow himself to 
be turned from his purpose, and on the 18th December 
dispatched the Note which had long been ready, with 
certain alterations, to the belligerent Powers. He cer- 
tainly would not have taken this step if he had not 
reckoned on certain success. Mr. Wilson's Note could not 
help but bear out our peace plans, and was therefore re- 
garded throughout America as ** pro-German." For this 
very reason it caused a sensation. On the New York 
Exchange it was followed by a slump in war industry 
values. A few anti-German newspapers, which began to 
suspect that I was the only diplomatist in Washington 
who knew anything of the President's intentions, de- 
clared that I had made millions by speculating on this 
probability. I had already been accused of every other 
imaginable crime by the Jingo and Entente Press. Mr. 
Wilson's son-in-law. Secretary of the Treasury McAdoo, 
was also suspected of having abused his political infor- 
mation to speculate on the Exchange. Soon afterwards, 
when I was dining with the President, he asked me in jest 
w^hat I had to say to the accusation of the American Press 
that I had made millions in this way. I replied that I had 
gradually got used to such attacks, and they only amused 
me. Mr. Wilson replied : **That is right. My son-in-law 
takes the matter much too seriously. I tell him *If you 
get so angry, people will think the story is true. ' ' ' 

The American Press was thrown into the greatest ex- 
citement by the President's Note and stormed the State 
Department. Mr. Lansing was surrounded by questioners 
and remarked that the United States had the greatest 
interest in bringing the war to an end, because otherwise 
she would be drawn in herself. As of late, as has already 
been mentioned, several doubtful submarine incidents 



318 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

had occurred, the Press took this remark to mean that 
the United States would enter the war against us if the 
intervention move came to nothing. Mr. Wilson im- 
mediately, realized that such an interpretation of Mr. 
Lansing's words would seriously jeopardize his peace 
move. If the Entente could hope for American partici- 
pation in the war, there would be no prospect of their 
consenting to a * 'peace without victory." In that case 
the direction of their policy was defined beforehand. 
They only required to reject the offer of mediation to 
reach the goal of their long-cherished hopes. The Presi- 
dent therefore at once requested Mr. Lansing to con- 
tradict the statements of the Press. This was done, with 
the observation that there was no probability of the 
United States entering the war. The harm could not, 
however, be completely wiped out, as denials are always 
regarded with doubt. 
The vital parts of Mr. "Wilson's Note read as follows: 

*'The President suggests that an early occasion be 
sought to call out from all the nations now at war such 
an avowal of their respective views as to the terms upon 
which the war might be concluded and the arrangements 
which would be deemed satisfactory as a guaranty 
against its renewal or the kindling of any similar con- 
flict in the future, as would make it possible frankly to 
compare them. He is indifferent as to the means taken 
to accomplish this. He would be happy himself to serve, 
or even to take the initiative in its accomplishment, in 
any way that might prove acceptable, but he has no desire 
to determine the method or the instrumentality. One 
way will be as acceptable to him as another if only the 
great object he has in mind be attained. 

*'In the measures taken to secure the future peace of 
the world the people and the Government of the United 



AMERICAN MEDIATION 319 

States are as vitally and as directly interested as the 
Governments now at war. 

**Tlie President does not feel that it is right and his 
duty to point out their intimate interest in its conclusion, 
lest it should presently be too late to accomplish the 
greater things which lie beyond its conclusion, lest the 
situation of neutral nations, now exceedingly hard to en- 
dure, be rendered altogether intolerable, and lest, more 
than all, an inquiry be done civilization itself which can 
never be atoned for, or repaired. 

"Yet the concrete objects for which it is being waged 
have never been definitely stated. 

**The leaders of the several belligerents have, as has 
been said, stated those objects in general terms. But, 
stated in general terms, they seem the same on both sides. 
Never yet have the authoritative spokesmen of either side 
avowed the precise objects which would, if attained, 
satisfy them and their people that the war had been 
fought out. The world has been left to conjecture what 
definite results, what actual exchange of guaranties, what 
political or territorial changes or readjustments, what 
stage of military success even, would bring the war to 
an end. 

**It may be that peace is nearer than we know; that the 
terms which the belligerents on the one side and on the 
other would deem it necessary to insist upon are not so 
irreconcilable as some have feared; that an interchange 
of views would clear the way at least for conference and 
make the permanent concord of the nations a hope of 
the immediate future, a concert of nations immediately 
practicable. 

**The President is not proposing peace; he is not even 
offering mediation. He is merely proposing that sound- 
ings be taken in order that we may learn, the neutral 
with the belligerent, how near the haven of peace may 



320 M^ THREE YEAES IN AMERICA 

be for which all mankind longs with an intense and in- 
creasing longing. He believes that the spirit in which he 
speaks and the objects which he seeks will be understood 
by all concerned, and he confidently hopes for a response 
which will bring a new light into the affairs of the 
world." 

As this Note in its positive proposals was considered 
rather tentative and obscure — with the intention, of 
course, of making a direct negative answer impossible — 
I asked Mr. Lansing what procedure the President would 
like. With regard to this conversation I reported to 
Berlin in the following telegram: 

Cipher Telegeam No. 188 

"Washington, 21st December, 1916. 

"Lansing informed me a few days ago of Wilson's 
Peace Note, and said that the American Government were 
becoming more and more involved in an intolerable posi- 
tion as a result of repeated infringements of their rights. 
Therefore they hoped for frank statements from the 
belligerent Powers on their peace conditions. I gave it 
as my personal opinion that this would be difficult except 
through a conference because of the press, etc. Lansing 
replied that the statements could be confidential, and 
might gradually lead to a conference. This seems to bear 
out the view, widely held here, that Wilson would like 
to act as a * clearing house' for the further steps towards 
peace. He has American public opinion behind him with 
the exception of our inveterate enemies, who regard 
Wilson's Note as pro-German." 

My conversation with Mr. Lansing, and the wording of 
the American Note, made it perfectly clear that the Presi- 
dent, in the first place, only wished to be informed of the 
peace conditions of both sides. This was just what the 



AMERICAN MEDIATION 321 

Berlin Govermnent did not want, because it would have 
aroused a bitter struggle between the different shades of 
public opinion as to the "war aims.'' My telegram 
therefore received the following negative reply : 

Cipher Telegram No. 142 

' ' BerUn, 26th December, 1916. 
**In reply to Telegram No. 188. 

**I would reply to the American Peace Note that a 
direct interchange of ideas seems to us most likely to 
attain the desired result. We should, therefore, propose 
immediate conference of delegates of belligerent States 
in neutral place. We share President's view that work 
of preventing tuture wars could only begin after con- 
clusion of present war. 

*'For your exclusive personal information: as place 
for possible conference of delegates only neutral Europe 
can be considered Apart from the difficulty of getting 
to and from America, the Portsmouth experiences ieadh 
that American indiscretion and interference make 
appropriate negotiations impossible. Interference by 
President, even in form of * clearing house,' would be 
detrimental to our interests and is, therefore, to be pre- 
vented. The basis for future conclusion of peace we must 
decide in direct conference with our enemies if we are 
not to run the risk of being robbed of our gains by neutral 
pressure. We, therefore, reject the idea of a conference. 
On the other hand, there is no objection, after conclusion 
of peace, to sending delegates to an international con- 
gress to confer on problem of safeguarding future world 
peace. 

* * ZiMMERMANN". " 

From this telegram it might be assumed that the Im- 
perial Government wished to limit Mr. Wilson's activity 



322 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

to bringing the belligerent parties to the conference table. 
We might also very well have gone on working with the 
President if the unrestricted submarine campaign had 
not intervened. It was, however, understandable that the 
Imperial Government, on grounds of domestic politics, 
should not want to name our peace terms at once. Ac- 
cordingly the answer to the Wilson Note, which reached 
Berlin with extraordinary promptness on the 26th De- 
cember, amounted to a friendly negative. 
The German Note ran as follows : 

*'The Imperial Government have received and con- 
sidered the President 's magnanimous suggestion, that the 
foundation should be laid on which to build a lasting 
peace, in the friendly spirit which permeates the Presi- 
dent's communication. The President points to the goal 
which is dear to his heart, and leaves the choice of the 
way open. To the Imperial Government a direct inter- 
change of ideas would seem the most appropriate way of 
attaining the desired result. They, therefore, have the 
honor to suggest, in the sense of their statement of the 
12th inst., in which they offered the hand to peace nego- 
tiations, an immediate conference of delegates of the 
belligerent States in a neutral place. 

**The Imperial Government are also of the opinion that 
the great work of preventing future wars cannot be begun 
until after the conclusion of the present struggle of the 
nations. When this time has come they will gladly be 
ready to co-operate with the United States of America 
in this noble work." 

The reasons of domestic politics which prevented the 
Imperial Government from naming our peace conditions 
were not understood in America. When Secretary of 



AMEEICAN MEDIATION 323 

State Lansing discussed with me the German Note of 
26th December he said that he did not understand why we 
refused to name our conditions. If both the belligerent 
parties communicated their conditions a compromise 
would eventually be reached. To my objection that our 
demands were so moderate that they would be inter- 
preted as weakness he replied that we ought to ask for 
more, indeed, ask for anything at all so long as we said 
something that would provide a starting-point from 
which negotiations could be opened and settled. 

This conversation had no immediate practical results, 
as Colonel House asked me on the same day to call on 
him in New York With regard to the result of our con- 
versation I telegraphed to Berlin as follows : 

Cipher Telegram No. 192 

** Washington, 29th December, 1916. 

"House told me it is Wilson's opinion that a confer- 
-ence will not come about without previous confidential 
negotiations, for our enemies, as things are at present, 
would refuse the invitation or make their consent de- 
pendent on conditions. These words of Colonel House 
were accompanied by an invitation to strictly confidential 
negotiations, of which only he and Mr. Wilson should 
know. Under these circumstances complete discretion 
was assured, as Wilson and House, unlike most Ameri- 
cans, are both fairly clever at keeping secrets. 

*'I beg for early instructions as to whether I should 
reject such negotiations, or whether your Excellency 
wishes to authorize me to accept and will furnish me 
with instructions accordingly. As I have always re- 
ported, Wilson lays comparatively little importance on 
the territorial side of the peace conditions. I am still of 
the opinion that the chief emphasis should be laid on 
what are here called the guarantees for the future. If 



324 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

we could give Wilson these as fully as possible he thinks 
he could bring about a conference, for with that the chief 
argument of our enemies would be disposed of. The 
latter maintain that we would like to make peace now in 
order to begin the war when a more favorable oppor- 
tunity occurs, while our enemies are obliged to hold 
together the coalition that has been formed against us 
in order to attain a lasting peace. Wilson's ideas about 
such guarantees are known to Your Excellency. They 
consist, in the first place, of disarmament by land and sea 
(freedom of the seas), provisions for arbitration and a 
peace league. I think, from Your Excellency's speech in 
the Reichstag, that the Imperial Government would give 
such guarantees on condition that peace was restored. 

*'With House I adopted chiefly a listening attitude in 
order not to compromise Your Excellency in any way. 
However, I agree with Colonel House's view that a peace 
conference cannot be brought about without the help of 
the United States. Our enemies will try to put us in the 
wrong by saying that we did, indeed, propose a confer- 
ence but would not breathe a word about our conditions 
or guarantees. I can, of course, only judge from the 
American standpoint. We have, by our peace offer, 
brought about a great .change in public opinion over here. 
This advantage we shall lose entirely if the idea spread 
by our enemies that we have only made a deliberately 
theatrical peace gesture for the benefit of German public 
opinion is confirmed. What steps Wilson will take should 
Your Excellency empower me to enter upon such negotia- 
tions is not yet certain and depends entirely on Your 
Excellency's instructions. House had an idea of travel- 
ling to England in person. The more detailed the in- 
formation Your Excellency can give me as to our con- 
ditions and readiness to give guarantees the better from 
my point of view. However, I do not know whether Your 



AMERICAN MEDIATION 325 

Excellency may not perhaps prefer to let the negotiations 
break down rather than accept American help. In my 
opinion it is not necessary that the United States should 
take part in all the negotiations. All that is necessary 
would be for ns to pledge ourselves to the guarantees, 
which would be settled in detail at a general conference, 
after a conference of the belligerents had concluded a 
preliminary peace. 

*'I submit to Your Excellency the above proposal be- 
cause I am convinced that our enemies will not consent 
to negotiations unless strong pressure is brought to bear. 
This, however, will, in my opinion, occur if Your Excel- 
lency thinks it possible to accept American intervention. 
With the exception of the Belgian question the American 
Government ought to bring us more advantage than dis- 
advantage, as the Americans have only just come to real- 
ize what England ^s mastery of the seas means." 

This telegram I consider the most important of the 
entire negotiations, inasmuch as it reached Berlin on the 
3rd January, therefore six days before the decision in 
favor of unrestricted submarine war. When I re-read 
my telegrams to-day, I still — even after the evidence 
given before the Commission of the National Assembly — 
have the same impression as at that time, that Mr. Wilson 
agreed with our wishes and regarded it as his principal 
task to bring about a conference of the belligerent par- 
ties. I cannot, therefore, understand how it was possible 
to regard this American offer as anything but an offer 
of peace mediation, and how the Foreign Office could 
declare to G. H. Q. that there had never been any question 
of peace mediation by Mr. Wilson. On the other hand, 
I quite understand that Bethmann-Hollweg, as he stated 
before the Commission of the National Assembly, was 
very sceptical with regard to the President's policy. 



326 MY THEEE YEARS IN AMERICA 

Nevertheless, an offer of mediation was made which had 
to be accepted or refused. In the first case it was neces- 
sary to bring forward the submarine war as little as 
possible; in the other we should have to create a clear 
diplomatic situation in Washington, if we were to avoid 
the reproach of having negotiated with Wilson on the 
subject of peace while at the same time planning the 
submarine campaign, which was bound to bring about a 
rupture with the United States. 

When I spoke with Colonel House at that time I as- 
sumed that the principal aim of the German Note of the 
26th December was to lay particular emphasis on our 
old point of view, already known to Mr. Wilson, accord- 
ing to which the regulation of territory was to be dealt 
with by the belligerent Powers, and the League of Na- 
tions question in a world conference under the American 
presidency. At the time Colonel House himself always 
spoke of two conferences which the President hoped to 
bring together at the Hague. The one was to consist only 
of the belligerent Powers and settle the territorial ques- 
tions, the other was to be a world conference to found 
the League of Nations. Mr. Wilson did not wish to in- 
vite the conference to Washington because of the great 
distance from Europe and the peculiar position of the 
American Press. 

As I have already mentioned, their opening of the *' in- 
tensified submarine campaign'* had been planned weeks 
before. This question had now become acute, and I re- 
ceived the two following Foreign Office telegrams on this 
subject: 

CiPHEK Telegram No. 145 

** Berlin, 4th January, 1917. 
"Question of armed merchantmen in opinion of navy 
and G. H. Q. cannot be further postponed. 



AMERICAN MEDIATION 327 

"Request you discuss with Lansing following memo- 
randum which is closely connected with American mem- 
orandum of 25th March and leave with him as aide- 
memoire. Our action against armed merchantmen, which 
will follow the lines of the memorandum, does not, of 
course, imply any withdrawal of our assurance in the 
Note of 4th May, 1916, as to sinking of merchantmen. 

* ' ZiMMEEMANN. " 



Cipher Telegram No. 148 

** Berlin, 5th January, 1917. 
* * Pursuant to Telegram No. 145 of 4th January. 

** Please telegraph to me immediately Your Excel- 
lency's personal opinion as to impression and consequent 
action with regard to Telegram No. 145. This must, not, 
however, be discussed with Lansing, as, for your own 
strictly personal information, action against armed ships 
will begin immediately. 

**VoN Stumm.'* 



As the question of the "intensified submarine war,'' in 
consequence of the further course of events, became of 
no importance, there is no need for me to go into detail, 
and I mil confine myself to giving my two answers as 
follows : 

(1) Coded Wireless Telegram 

"Washington, 9th January, 1917. 

"Telegrams Nos. 145 and 148 received to-day. 
"Request most urgently to postpone further steps till 
you have received my answer." 



328 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

(2) Cipher Telegram 

"Washington, lOth January, 1917. 
''In reply to Telegram 1488. 

** Memorandum Lansing received. In my opinion steps 
in sense of this memorandum will cause collapse of Wil- 
son's peace mediation, and bring about instead a rupture 
with America, unless action is postponed at least until 
agreement is reached with American Government. It 
may perhaps be possible to arrange that Americans 
should be warned against serving on ships armed for 
attack. In any case, however, time must be allowed the 
Government here to bring this about. As everything 
is decided by Wilson, discussion with Lansing is mere 
formality. He never gives an answer until he has re- 
ceived instructions from Wilson. In present case latter 
must read memorandum first. 

*'How much importance Your Excellency attaches to 
Wilson's peace mediation I cannot judge from here. 
Apart from that it is my duty to state clearly that I con- 
sider rupture with the United States inevitable if im- 
mediate action be taken on the lines of the memorandum." 

At the time of sending the telegram I received, in the 
following telegram, the reply of the Foreign Office to Mr. 
Wilson's last proposals, which had been communicated 
to me through Colonel House : 

Cipher Telegram No. 149 

"Berlin, 7th January, 1917. 
"In reply to Telegram No. 192 of 29th December. 
"For your personal information. 
"American intervention for definite peace negotiations 
is entirely undesirable to us owing to public opinion here. 
Also at the present moment we must avoid anything that 



AMERICAN MEDIATION 329 

might deepen the impression among our enemies that our 
peace offer is in any way the result of our finding our- 
selves in a desperate position. That is not the case. 
We are convinced that economically and from a military 
point of view, we can bring the war to victorious conclu- 
sion. The question of stating our conditions, therefore. 
Your Excellency will handle dilatorily. On the other 
hand, I authorize you to state now our readiness to co- 
operate in that part of the programme in which the Pres- 
ident is particularly interesting himself, and which seems 
to be identical with the so-called * Second Convention' out- 
lined by Colonel House here. In this we include arbitra- 
tion machinery, peace league, and examination of the 
question of disarmament and of the freedom of the seas. 
We are, therefore, in principle, prepared for those guar- 
antees which could be settled in detail in a general con- 
ference after a conference of the belligerents has brought 
about a preliminary peace. To prove our bona fides in 
this direction, we are also ready in principle to open im- 
mediate negotiations with the United States. 

**Your Excellency will be so good as to inform the 
President of this, and request him to work out the pro- 
gramme for the conference to secure world peace, and 
to communicate it to us as soon as possible. 

** Please also emphasize to Colonel House and Presi- 
dent Wilson that our actual peace conditions are very 
moderate, and, in contrast to those of the Entente, are 
kept within thoroughly reasonable limits; this is also 
particularly the case with regard to Belgium, which we 
do not wish to annex. Moreover, we desire regulation of 
commercial and traffic communications after the war 
without any idea of a boycott, a demand which we think 
will be understood at once by all sane people. On the 
other hand, the question of Alsace and Lorraine we can- 
not consent to discuss. 



330 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

*'I should like to know how Your Excellency thinks that 
pressure could be brought to bear by President "Wilson 
to incline the Entente to peace negotiations. In the light 
of our experience during the two years of war, it seems 
to us that a prohibition of the export of war material 
and foodstuffs, which would be the step most likely to 
bring the Entente into line and would also be the best for 
us, is unfortunately little likely to be realized. Only an 
effective pressure in this direction could relieve us on 
our side of the urgent necessity of resorting again to 
unrestricted submarine warfare. Should Your Excel- 
lency have proposals to make as to how the unrestricted 
submarine warfare can be conducted without causing a 
rupture with America, I request you to report immedi- 
ately by telegram. 



I understood from this telegram that I was to continue 
the negotiations with Colonel House. The refusal con- 
tained in this telegram was only concerned with a de- 
mand which had never been made by the United States. 
Moreover, I have never personally had much faith in the 
appeal to public opinion which would have nothing to 
do with Mr. Wilson. If the Imperial Government had 
a few weeks before desired such intervention, they must 
have believed that German public opinion would agree to 
it. In my opinion, too, an agitation in favor of American 
intervention would have set in in Germany quite on its 
own account if the German people had known that such 
action by President Wilson offered good prospects of 
leading to a peace by understanding. Later, when I re- 
turned from America to Germany, I was struck by the 
small number of my countrymen who privately favored 
the submarine war. I therefore still think that German 



AMERICAN MEDIATION 331 

public opinion conld easily have been persuaded to accept 
Mr. Wilson's mediation, if the terrorism of the support- 
ers of submarine war had been dealt with in time. Herr 
von Bethmann-Hollweg has spoken before the Commis- 
sion of the National Assembly of the hypnotic effect ex- 
erted on German public opinion by the submarine war. 

Though the Foreign Office telegram of the 7th January 
mentions the ways in which President Wilson could bring 
pressure to bear on the Entente, it had already struck 
me at that time that the first step taken by the United 
States to force the conclusion of peace had not made 
the impression in Germany that its importance war- 
ranted. 

The various "War Memories" that have now been 
published in Germany do not touch on this point. As 
has already been mentioned, the ** Federal Reserve 
Board,'* which corresponds to our Reichsbank, had issued 
a warning against the raising of loans for belligerent 
States. In this way the American source of funds was 
practically cut off. Already foreign securities were in 
general unwillingly handled. If the loans had been com- 
pletely forbidden, such results would not have transpired, 
as the American avails himself of bank credit to a far 
greater extent than is usual in other countries. It is well 
known that the Government of the United States, after 
they had entered the war, themselves raised "Liberty 
loans," and advanced money to their Allies because this 
procedure accorded much more closely with American 
inclinations than the raising of foreign loans. 

As is well known, after the German peace action had 
failed, the definite decision to declare unrestricted sub- 
marine war was taken in Pless on the 9th January. In 
this way, as the Chancellor said, the Rubicon was crossed. 
War with the United States seemed inevitable, unless it 
were found possible at the eleventh hour to annul the 



332 MY THEEE YEAES IN AMERICA 

decision of the German Government. Herr von Beth- 
mann-HoUweg has declared before the Commission of the 
National Assembly that he had not sufficient faith in Mr. 
Wilson's peace intervention to advise the Emperor to 
oppose the demand of G. H. Q. for the declaration of un- 
restricted submarine war. 

At the end of this chapter I give a report which I drew 
up on the attitude of American public opinion towards 
intervention. 

I should like once more to emphasize that in judging 
and estimating American politics I have always given 
more weight to public opinion than to the views or inten- 
tions of any individual statesman. 

"Washington, 11th December, 1916. 
"During the last phases of the presidential elections 
the American Press used to be so much occupied with 
questions of domestic policy that there was little space 
left for the discussion of foreign events. In contrast with 
this, in this year's campaign the Press politics on ques- 
tions of foreign policy played a very important part, but 
the discussion was naturally so much under the influence 
of the aims and considerations of party politics that a 
report on the attitude of the Press towards the European 
belligerents at that time could not have given a true pic- 
ture. This was quite particularly the case with regard 
to Germany. On one hand the Republican organs, out 
of regard for the votes of the German- Americans, found 
it necessary considerably to moderate their speech, while 
on the other the Democratic Press branded the Republi- 
can candidate as a *Kaiserite,' owing to his German- 
American following, and at the same time threw more 
mud than ever over Germany and everything German; 
until in the last weeks of the election campaign the dawn- 
ing hope of bringing over great masses of Bindestrichler 



AMERICAN MEDIATION 333 

into the Democratic camp brought about a sudden mod- 
eration in the tone of this organ. 

**Only now, after the absurdities of the presidential 
election are over, is it again possil^le to arrive at an 
approximately clear judgment as to the attitude of the 
Press towards Germany and the other belligerent na- 
tions. 

**This judgment may be briefly stated as follows: 

**The American Press in general takes sides less pas- 
sionately with either party than was formerly the case, 
and is heartily tired of the war. This does not in any 
way imply that our enemies have not still the support 
of a number of very influential partisans, who are all 
the time fighting loyally for the * Cause of the Allies,* let 
slip no opportunity to malign Germany and, in the event 
of a threatened crisis, form an element of danger for us 
which should not be underestimated. It may even be 
admitted that the tone which the organs of this tendency, 
particularly strongly represented in New York, Boston 
and Philadelphia, adopt against Germany has become, if 
possible, more bitter during the last few months. But it 
is questionable whether the great mass of the influential 
papers, particularly in the remoter districts of the At- 
lantic coast, have become more impartial. They don*t 
like us and don't trust us, but have also gradually got 
to know but not to esteem England. 

"The present attitude of America towards the cause 
of the Entente Powers, with which that of the greater 
part of the independent Press coincide, was defined as 
follows by the New York Tribune, one of the most invet- 
erate champions of our enemies at the present time: 
'Despite a very widespread sympathy for France and a 
well-defined affection for Great Britain in a limited circle 
of Americans, there has been no acceptance of the Allied 



334 MY THKEE YEARS IN AMERICA 

points of view as to the war, and there is not now the 
smallest chance that this will be the case. . . . The thing 
that the British have failed to get before the American 
people is the belief that the war was one in which the 
question of humanity and of civilization was uppermost 
for the British. The Germans have succeeded in making 
Americans in very great numbers believe that it is purely 
and simply a war of trade and commerce between the 
British and the Germans, and the various economic con- 
ference proposals have served to emphasize this idea.* 

"The violation of Greece, the ruthless procedure 
against Ireland since the Easter rebellion — on which a 
well-directed Press service of American-Irish, in spite 
of the strict English censorship, keeps public opinion 
constantly informed — the selfish sacrifice of Serbia, Mon- 
tenegro and Rumania, as well as the illegal economic 
measures against Holland and Scandinavia, have seri- 
ously shaken England's reputation here as the protec- 
tress of the small nations. 

** Certain remarks of the English Press of altogether 
too free a nature on the American Government, their dis- 
paraging cartoons of the President and the patronizing 
air adopted by many English war journals and often in 
the English daily Press towards America — as, for exam- 
ple, in a recent number of the Morning Post, alleged 
former German hankerings for colonies in South Amer- 
ica, from the realization of which the Union is said to 
have been protected by England — are arousing increas- 
ing dissatisfaction here. The persistent and systematic 
attempts of the British Press Bureau to sow dissension 
between America and Germany on the question of the 
submarine war are resented. The sharp British replies 
to American representations on the question of the * black 
list' and the * post-blockade,' and, England's latest pia- 
prick, the refusal of the request for a free passage for 



AMERICAN MEDIATION 335 

the Austrian Ambassador, condemned even by such a 
pro-British paper as the Philadelphian Public Ledger as 
a * British affront,' have created a very bad impression. 
*It is unmistakable,' says the pro-Entente Evening Sun, 
*that American opinion has been irritated and sympathy 
estranged by many acts which have damaged our inter- 
ests and wounded our national self-respect.' 

** Above all, however, the serious shortcomings of the 
enemy General Staffs, which are criticised here with un- 
professional exaggeration, and their ineffectiveness — *a 
lamentable succession of false moves,' as they are called 
by the respected Springfield Republican — ^have produced 
a general disillusionment as to the efficiency of our ene- 
mies, which has damped even the old enthusiasm over the 
heroic bearing of the French army and its commander- 
in-chief, who is very popular over here. *We give thanks 
for Joffre,' was the heading of a typical leading article 
in the New York Sun on Thanksgiving Day. The recent 
warning of the American banks by the Federal Board 
against accepting through the post large quantities of 
unsecured foreign treasury notes — a warning which could 
only refer to the issue by the Morgan bank of English 
and French short-dated securities — has also shattered 
the belief in the inexhaustible economic resources of 
France and England. With a quite exceptional expendi- 
ture of effort the newspapers under British or French 
influence, of which the most important are the New York 
Times, New York Herald and Evening Telegram; the 
Philadelphian Public Ledger, the Chicago Herald, and the 
Providence Journal, in addition to a number of other 
sworn partisans of the Entente Powers, among which 
may be mentioned particularly the New York Tribune, 
New York Sum, and Evening Sun; New York Evening 
Post, Journal of Commerce, New York Globe; Brooklyn 
Daily Eagle, Boston Evening Transcript and Philadel- 



336 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

phian Inquirer, have lately been trying to raise our ene- 
mies in the esteem of public opinion here. This is shown 
particularly in the headlines and the arrangement of the 
war news in these papers. All news that is detrimental 
to the German cause, even when it comes from an unre- 
liable source, is printed in heavy type in the most striking 
position. Every gain of ground by the Allies, however, 
slight, is hailed as a great victory, and even the commu- 
nications of private agencies which are in contradiction 
to the official reports of the enemy, and obviously in- 
ventions, appear as accomplished facts in the headlines 
of the papers. Their leading articles pour out hatred 
and malice against Germany. Their letter boxes are 
filled with contributions which are full of venom and gall 
against Germany and her allies, and their f euilletons or 
Sunday supplements contain about the strongest attacks 
that have ever been brought against us even in the Amer- 
ican Press. But it looks as though their tactics no longer 
have the same success as of old. Their utterances, apart 
from such as deal with the Belgian or Lusitania themes, 
no longer make any impression. 

**0n the other side the consistently friendly attitude 
of the ten papers of the Hearst syndicate, which come 
daily into the hands of more than three million readers 
in all parts of the country, has of late become even much 
more friendly as a result of the English boycott of the 
International News Service and the exclusion of all the 
Hearst publications from circulation in Canada. Mr. 
Hearst has replied to the inconceivably shortsighted pol- 
icy of the British authorities towards his news service 
in a series of forcible, full-page leading articles against 
the British censorship which must have seriously shaken 
the confidence, apart from this already weakened long 
ago, of the American Press in all news coming from Eng- 
land. Not only did the articles in question contain a 



AMERICAN MEDIATION 337 

crushing criticism of the English system of suppressing 
and distorting the truth, but they also proved that for 
years America had been misled systematically from Lon- 
don in its judgment of foreign nations — e.g., the 'degen- 
erate^ French. Apart from this the Hearst newspapers 
repeatedly explained in detail how in the autumn of 1916 
the position of the Central Powers was excellent, while 
that of England and her allies was completely hopeless. 
It should be emphasized that the Hearst newspapers are, 
nevertheless, not to be regarded as blindly pro-German, 
for they publish a good deal that can hardly be desirable 
for us — e.g., occasional articles on the * German Peril,* 
for which new food was provided by the exploits of the 
Beutschland, and more especially TJ53, and was exploited 
here to support the idea of increasing the army and navy. 
The papers named are based on a sound American pol- 
icy, but with their sharp, anti-English tendency do us 
much more good than papers with admitted pro-German 
bias. The chief value of the pro-German attitude of the 
organs of the Hearst syndicate lies in the fact that their 
influence is not limited to any particular town or district, 
but extends over the whole Union. An English critic, 
S. K. Ratcliffe, recently wrote about American newspa- 
pers in the Manchester Guardian. , . . * Northern papers 
are of no account in the South ; the most influential New 
York journals do not exist for the people of the Pacific 
coast, and carry little weight in the Middle States. 
Hence, summaries of opinion — confined to a small num- 
ber of papers published east of the Mississippi — are im- 
perfectly representative of the Republic' This accu- 
rately observed geographical limitation of the influence of 
the leading American newspapers is substantially over- 
come by the Hearst organization, for the leading articles 
which appear in the New York American to-day will ap- 
pear to-morrow in the allied papers of Boston, Chicago 



338 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

and Atlanta, and the day after in San Francisco and 
Los Angeles. 

"Another factor that has improved the attitude of the 
American Press towards Germany is the recent impor- 
tant development of the \dreless news service. By this 
I do not mean so much the extension of the trans- Atlantic 
service, in the communications of which a considerable 
part of the Press here seems unfortunately to take little 
interest, but the radiographic transmission of the full 
reports of American correspondents in Berlin and on the 
German fronts to the American newspapers or news 
agencies. Among the interesting reports that have been 
received direct and unmutilated in this way those of 
Messrs. William B. Hale, Karl von Wiegand, Cyril Brown 
and Karl W. Ackerman have exerted a particularly fa- 
vorable influence for us, especially at the critical mo- 
ments of the break-through in southern Galicia and the 
battles of the Somme, when, without the special news 
service via Nauen, the American Press would have been 
completely misled by the mass of reports that were flow- 
ing in from London. Among American journalists who 
worked in Germany, Herbert Swope should be particu- 
larly mentioned, who, after his return, published in The 
World and other Pulitzer papers, a series of fourteen 
articles on the situation and feeling in Germany which 
attracted the attention of both the Press and the reading 
public. In a most undesirable way Mr. Swope in his first 
articles, which appeared immediately before the election 
— it was simply an electioneering monoeuvre — emphasized 
the deep hatred of the German people for the United 
States, and the alleged general wish of all German circles 
to see Mr. Wilson defeated at the election as a punish- 
ment for his unneutral attitude. To compensate for this 
he performed a very valuable service for us in his later 
articles by giving a convincing account of the economic 



AMERICAN MEDIATION 339 

situation in Germany at that time, which removed all 
doubt over here as to the ability of our enemies to starve 
Germany out, and revived public respect for Germany's 
efl&ciency and organizing-power. 

* ' The great and respectful tribute which the American 
Press pays to German * efficiency* at every opportxmity — 
and during the last few months there have been many 
such opportunities — can, however, do little or nothing to 
alter the deep * sentiment * against Germany. As soon as 
the above-mentioned themes of Belgium and the LusitOr' 
nia are mentioned, there are few papers that do not in- 
dulge, either in aggressive or more moderate terms, in 
expressions of horror at German *f rightfulness' and 
*ruthlessness.' 

**This deep-rooted feeling of the whole Press has been 
once more revived in very regrettable fashion by the re- 
cent Belgian deportations. The indignation of the Press 
at this 'slavery' which is being imposed on Belgium is 
general, deep-rooted and genuine. Even newspapers 
which express themselves in pretty harsh terms on the 
subject of the English illegalities condemn these depor- 
tations in no measured terms. The interview given by 
Governor-General von Bissing to the journalist Cyril 
Brown on the subject of these deportations, published on 
the front page of the New Yorh Times, has unfortunately 
not made the slightest impression here. General von 
Bissing 's second statement on the same subject in which, 
among other things, he emphatically declared it his duty 
to see that as few Germans as possible should be kept 
out of the firing line to guard Belgium, was grist for the 
mill of the enemy Press. *The cat is out of the bag,' 
writes the New Yorh Times, which does not miss the op- 
portunity of reminding its readers of General von Bis- 
sing 's responsibility for the shooting of Edith Cavell. 
'Not a word about economic necessity, Germany needs 



340 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

men at the front. Simple, almost crude in fact, and com- 
pletely German. ' The Philadelphian Public Ledger says : 
*The original offence, the invasion of Belgian territory, 
regardless of treaty obligations, has almost been obliter- 
ated by the crnelty which is now depopulating the land, 
stripping it of all its resources, sending its people into 
exile and slavery, making a wilderness and calling it 
order. There has not been such a tragedy since the fierce 
barbarian tribes swept over Europe; none would have 
believed two years ago that it could be enacted.' Such 
expressions as *Huns,' *Attila,' *Hohenzollern slave 
trade,' and others of a similar nature are the order of 
the day, and the excitement is further fanned by reports 
from London and Le Havre, which no one here can verify, 
and provocative interviews, among which special mention 
must be made of that of Herr Carton de Wiart with the 
World correspondent. The news that Mr. Lansing had 
forwarded to Berlin a protest against the Belgian depor- 
tations was received with great applause by the whole 
of the Press. The resulting official statement that this 
protest had been made not in the name of the United 
States but in the name of the Kingdom of Belgium, rep- 
resented by the American Government, caused dissatis- 
faction and a demand that the United States Government 
should also protest to Berlin on its own account. Reso- 
lutions of protest were sent to the President and pub- 
lished in the Press, and indignation meetings on a large 
scale are announced to take place in Boston and New 
York which will offer the Press further opportunities 
for anti-German demonstrations. 

"With regard to the question of submarine warfare 
the American Press are quite unanimous on one point, 
that a withdrawal of the assurances given by Germany 
after the Sussex incident, or even an intentional breach 
of these, is bound to bring about, as it were, automati- 



AMERICAN MEDIATION 341 

cally, a breaking-off of diplomatic relations with Ger- 
many ; and it is also clear that such a rupture would only 
be the first step towards open war. The great majority 
of the leading American newspapers express at every 
opportunity the genuine hope that such a contingency 
will not arise. Only the chauvinistic, anti-German ele- 
ment in the Press holds that the casus ruptionis has 
actually arisen and devotes itself to publishing and com- 
menting on, in the most sensational manner, the alleged 
crimes of the German submarines. The newspapers of 
this order are abundantly supplied with pertinent mate- 
rial, particularly news of alleged sinkings without warn- 
ings, of which they on their side — probably with the 
co-operation of the British authorities here — know how 
to increase the effect by means of exaggerated reports 
of out-of-date * sacrifices to German f rightfulness,' which 
are eagerly swallowed here. In spite of the masterly skill 
with which this working on public feeling against the 
handling of our submarine war is managed, it may be 
taken for granted that it does not get a hold. However 
deep and however genuine may be the horror with which 
the American people regard such incidents as the sinking 
of the Lusitania — a fact that must be continually empha- 
sized — equally great is obviously their indifference to- 
wards the destruction of non- American neutral shipping, 
so long as the rules of cruiser warfare continue to he 
observed. People over here have gradually got accus- 
tomed to reading daily reports of the sinking of another 
half dozen British or other vessels. The daily papers 
print them quite as a matter of course, and only in a 
prominent position when the bag reaches an unusually 
high figure. In the editorial columns of many papers a 
certain malicious joy is even observable, that England, 
who boasts of having mastered the submarine, should 
now be so mercilessly and persistently bled. 



342 MY THEEE YEARS IN AMERICA 

"One phase of the submarine war has, indeed, thrown 
nearly the whole of the American Press into a state of 
excitement, namely, the piratic exploits of U53 off the 
coast of New England. The destruction wrought by this 
boat so close at hand, and the consequent paralysis for 
several days of all merchant shipping, was too much 
even for the moderate papers, and resulted in strong 
outbursts against our *ruthlessness.' Apparently this 
circumstance has recently been exploited by our enemies 
as a new way of influencing public opinion against us. 
Mysterious British battleships off the Atlantic coast are 
supposed to send out wireless warnings against the al- 
leged approach of German submarines, and these are 
published in the American Press partly under panic 
headlines, and arouse indignation. This shady proced- 
ure, in which the pro-English press naturally takes the 
lead, recently aroused Mr. Lansing to make a forceful 
speech against the unknown originators of these rumors. 
It may be particularly emphasized, speaking quite gener- 
ally, that the great influence exerted by the State De- 
partment on the Washington correspondents of the lead- 
ing newspapers during the last few months, during which 
there has been a constant threat of the submarine ques- 
tion coming to a head, has always been on the side of 
peace, with the result that in more than one case, and 
particularly in the cases of the sinking of the Marina and 
Arabia, any serious agitation on the part of the Press has 
been avoided. With regard to the general war situation, 
the conviction has for some time been gaining ground 
with the great majority of the leading American news- 
papers, that a decisive victory by either of the two bel- 
ligerent groups of Powers is no longer to be expected. 
With the exception of a continually dwindling minority 
which even to-day still promise their readers the 'ulti- 
mate victory' of the Entente Powers, the verdict of the 



AMERICAN MEDIATION 343 

American Press on the probable result of the war is *a 
draw,' *a stalemate.' Only a few newspapers, to which 
belong those of the Hearst Syndicate, confess to the be- 
lief in 'a stalemate, or a victory of the Teutonic Allies/ 
How those newspapers which are at the service of our 
enemies, and which still hold to the legend of a miscarried 
German war of aggression, really judge the situation is 
only seen occasionally from incidental statements like the 
following confession of the New York Tribune, which 
preaches against a peace on the basis of the present po- 
sition; this paper says that the American people should 
see that if the Allies were to conclude peace now the 
result would be a tremendous victory for Germany. Such 
isolated, misleading views as this do not, however, suc- 
ceed in affecting in any way the general impression that 
by far the greater part of the leading newspapers regard 
the war as indecisive, especially after the fruitless con- 
clusion of our operations before Verdun, the collapse of 
the great offensives on the Somme and in southern Gali- 
cia, as well as in view of the fact, confirmed on many 
sides, that the British blockade has not attained its end, 
the starvation of Germany. 

*'Our recent feats of arms in Rumania have hardly 
affected this opinion. In view of the great hopes, placed 
by our enemies and the newspapers in their service, on 
Rumania's entry into the war, these successes are recog- 
nized on all sides readily or grudgingly and without any 
spark of sympathy for the defeated country, and in some 
cases are even hailed as brilliant military achievements of 
the first rank. The preponderating opinion of the Press, 
however, passes over the fact that the conquest of Ru- 
mania, although opening up to Germany important new 
resources, is scarcely likely to influence to any consider- 
able degree the situation which has resulted from the war 



344 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

of positions in East and West, and the still unbroken 
British mastery of the seas. 

**The view that the war has reached a stalemate which, 
since President Wilson's speech at Charlotte in May of 
this year, had been maintained by several papers, bnt 
which has recently become general, apart from the defi- 
nitely pro-Ally organs, is closely connected with the dis- 
cussion of the question of peace restoration which for the 
American Press is in many cases synonymous with the 
question of intervention by the United States or all 
the neutral nations. 

* * There was a time when a very important part of the 
American Press seemed to stand on the level of the catch- 
phrase which was going the round at that time: *Wall 
Street now fears nothing except the outbreak of peace.' 
These times, however, are long since past. The desire 
for a speedy end of the hostilities in Europe is to-day 
genuine, and shared by almost the whole Press. From 
the enemy camp we get the following testimony in the 
New York Tribmie, which would like to convert its read- 
ers to less humane views: *For millions of Americans 
this war is a tragedy, a crime, the offspring of collective 
madness,' and in its view the greatest service that Amer- 
ica can render to the world — an allusion to the catch- 
phrase coined by Henry Ford for his ill-starred peace 
mission is — Ho fetch the lads out of the trenches.' The 
discussion of the premises for the conclusion of peace, 
therefore, has for some time occupied an important place 
in the daily papers, and also to some extent in the re- 
views. Reports on the meetings of the many American 
peace societies are given with the greatest fulness, and 
anything in the overseas news connected with the question 
of a restoration of peace is printed in a prominent posi- 
tion and duly discussed in the leading articles. 

**It would lead me too far to give even an approxi- 



AMEEICAN MEDIATION 345 

mately complete picture of this discussion with which 
the whole Press is occupied. But one point demands 
closer examination: the attitude of the leading papers 
to the German readiness for peace, publicly expressed 
by Your Excellency on three different occasions in the 
last few weeks. 

**Your Excellency's great speech before the Budget 
Committee of the Eeichstag unfortunately reached here 
at a time when the whole interest of the Press and pub- 
lic was directed to the at first uncertain result of the 
presidential election. Though generally printed, in the 
evening papers for the most part only in extracts, it was 
practically passed over in the editorial columns. An 
attempt to start a belated Press discussion of the speech 
by circulating it in the form of specially printed bro- 
chures, or at least to induce those papers which had only 
given extracts to publish the whole text, unfortunately 
failed ; only the Current History, a special war magazine 
of the New York Times, felt itself called upon to reprint 
the speech in extenso in its December number. On the 
other hand, the passage of the speech which stated our 
readiness after this war to take a part in international 
organizations for insuring peace was widely circulated 
here, and attracted corresponding attention. As I, ac- 
cording to instructions, communicated this p'assage to the 
'League to Enforce Peace' as the official German message 
for their banquet held here on the 24th inst., it was cir- 
culated throughout the country in the detailed Press re- 
ports on this association, which is greatly respected here, 
and commented on by many newspapers with all the more 
sympathy since Germany's sceptical reserve hitherto 
towards the question of a peaceful settlement of inter- 
national differences has always worked strongly against 
us here. 

"The interview granted by Your Excellency to the 



346 MY THEEE YEAES IN AMERICA 

American journalist Hale has been printed particularly 
fully by the ten Hearst newspapers, and further by all 
the other subscribers to the International News Service. 
In the New York American on Thanksgiving Day it oc- 
cupied, together with a portrait of Your Excellency, the 
whole front page. At special request from many quar- 
ters the paper repeated the report three days later. 

** Germany's readiness to enter into peace negotiations, 
expressed once more by Your Excellency at this inter- 
view, as well as Your Excellency's statement in the 
Reichstag on the 29th inst., that Germany is ready for 
any peace that will guarantee her existence and future, 
have during the last few days been fairly thoroughly 
discussed in the New York papers, which particularly 
dwell on the words *a peace guaranteeing our existence 
and future,' and agree unanimously as to the urgent 
desirability of a further and more exact formulation of 
the German peace conditions. 

**The New York Times says: *A11 depends on what 
guarantees of the existence and the future of Germany 
are expected.' The paper goes on to ask how Germany 
could imagine her future assured from a territorial point 
of view, but points out in conclusion that these are only 
external details, and concludes, returning to its favorite 
theme, as follows: * Deeper than all, fundamental in any 
discussion of peace, is the question of the German politi- 
cal ideals, of German MacMpolitik and Weltpolitik, of 
Prussian militarism.' . . . *The fear, the practical cer- 
tainty, that Von Bethmann-Hollweg's guarantees would 
be not merely guarantees of the existence and future of 
Germany, but of new and not distant wars with her, 
stands in the way of any serious discussion of his re- 
marks. ' 

' ' The Evening Sun remarks sarcastically that obviously 
no such guarantees as Deutschland iiher Alles should be 



AMERICAN MEDIATION 347 

given to any country. Its verdict, too, is that : *The peace 
that Germany craves still is a peace that will enable her 
to begin the next war in five or ten years, with a certainty 
of immediate victory and complete conquest of the over- 
lordship of Europe, if not America. ' The Brooklyn Daily 
Eagle writes: 'If an inconclusive peace, a peace based 
upon the theory that the war is a draw, a peace fertile 
in the liabilities to future trouble, is not in the mind of 
the German Chancellor, what is in his mind? He should 
speak out. He will never have a better opportunity to be 
specific. The whole neutral world is listening, ready to 
give careful and intelligent consideration to his words. * 
"More important than these and other utterances of 
the papers which follow in our enemies* wake is the 
trenchant leading article of the World, which on foreign 
questions generally expresses the point of view of the 
Administration. This paper says: *If Germany is ready 
to end the war, the first thing for the Imperial Govern- 
ment to do is to make definite proposals for peace. Those 
proposals need not be made officially to the Allies, to the 
United States, or any other intermediary. They could 
be made to the world at large. The Chancellor could 
describe to the Reichstag the conditions under which Ger- 
many would regard her Existence and Future assured.* 
* Germany began the war. It is proper that Germany 
should take the first steps towards ending the war, but 
something more than vague generalizations is necessary. 
At present there is nothing to talk about. There are 
no terms, not even extravagant and ridiculous terms, 
that can be discussed as a possible basis of settlement. 
Thus far there has been no evidence of good faith in the 
repeated German professions of a desire for peace. In 
consequence nobody takes them seriously until there is 
at least a tentative proposal of terms. When that is 
made, the responsible Ministers of other belligerent Gov- 



348 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

ernments will be forced to meet the issue. Public opinioii 
in Great Britain and France, no less than in Germany 
and Austria-Hungary, will have a chance to make itself 
heard. When peace comes it cannot be merely the peace 
of diplomats and of Governments. It must be a peace 
in which popular sentiment has the final word, and pop- 
ular sentiment has no means of expression until there is 
something tangible to discuss.' 

*'The general impression left by the utterances of the 
American Press on the subject of peace is that on the 
one hand — apart from a small number of influential pa- 
pers — it is anxious for peace, from which anxiety it is 
obvious that it intends to pass over the extravagant war 
aims so often heard from the Entente statesmen ; but that 
on the other hand it cannot as yet find any practicable 
way of bringing about an early conclusion of peace, and 
also that it cannot see any advance in this direction in 
the last statements of Your Excellency, which only a few 
papers have discussed to any extent. 

**The change in the direction of the Foreign Office has 
been discussed at comparative length in the leading arti- 
cles of the important newspapers, which, as a rule, deal 
with European Ministerial changes only in their news 
columns — ^less with regard to the personality of the retir- 
ing Minister, who was not very well known here, than 
that of the new Secretary of State, The only paper which 
devoted a few friendly words to Herr von Jagow was 
the New York Times, which described him, in connection 
with his conferences with Baron Beyens and Sir Edward 
Goschen at the outbreak of war, as a * Gentleman in War 
and Peace,' and also recognized his sympathetic attitude 
during the negotiations on the submarine war contro- 
versy. Herr Zimmermann's appointment as Secretary 
of State, on the other hand, was greeted by many papers, 
and indeed by the Press in general — only a few papers 



AMERICAN MEDIATION 349 

were made somewhat uneasy by the news received lately 
by telegram, of his attitude towards the question of 
armed merchantmen — with great applause. The tone of 
these comments must have been set by the flattering and 
sympathetic utterances of Ambassador Gerard and the 
journalist Swope, on the subject of the new Secretary of 
State, and a longer article by Gilbert Hirsch published 
by the New York Evening Post and other papers under 
the heading * Our Friend Zimmermann. ' The note struck 
by this article and by the German Press comments trans- 
mitted and printed everywhere over here, that Herr Zim- 
mermann is a particularly warm friend of the United 
States, was joyfully echoed by the whole American Press. 
Also the fact was everywhere emphasized that in Herr 
Zimmermann the important post of chief of the Foreign 
Office, hitherto reserved for * Prussian Junkerdom,' had 
been given to a member, not of the diplomatic, but of the 
humbler consular service, and indeed, to a bourgeois. 
Here and there speculation was indulged in as to whether 
this appointment might not be interpreted as the first 
step towards a 'Liberal regime,' in which a not unimpor- 
tant section of the American Press still sees the future 
salvation of Germany and of the world. 

**The announcement of autonomy for Poland is, to say 
the least of it, received with scepticism by the American 
Press, which is comparatively well informed on the Po- 
lish question. The words of the virtuoso Paderewski, who 
is working here in the interests of the Polish sufferers 
through the war: *This means only more suffering for 
my people; it means that another army will be raised, 
and that there will be more killing and more devastat- 
ing, ' were reproduced by many newspapers and regarded 
as an authoritative statement of what might be expected 
from the German- Austrian proclamations. Many papers 
declared it to be simply a move to raise more recruits. 



350 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

Others sarcastically pointed out that the proclamation 
left the most vital questions, such as the boundaries of 
the new State and its form of government, to be settled 
later. Only a few of the leading newspapers, among 
them the New York Evening Post and the Philadelphia 
North American, allowed the Allied Governments a cer- 
tain modicum of recognition, for, as they pointed out, in 
no case could the heavy hand of Russia, which had so 
long oppressed the country, be forgotten. The Polish 
Press here was at first very reserved. Their point of 
view is represented by the following leading article of 
the weekly paper Free Poland, founded since the war and 
published by the Polish National Council of America: 
*What the Poles desire is an independent Poland. The 
Powers have acknowledged Poland's right to live, but 
either with a limitation of independence or diminution 
of territory. The Russians would fain lop off eastern 
Galicia. And now the Germans grant Poland an auton- 
omy, but without Posen, West Prussia, or Silesia, in re- 
turn demanding a Polish army to take up their cause 
against Russia. Though this move on the part of Ger- 
many will at least draw the world's attention to the in- 
alienable rights of Poland as a nation, and make of the 
Polish question an international one, yet it must not be 
forgotten that the Poles in Europe will vehemently pro- 
test against any curtailment of their national aims and 
aspirations. 

"The impression, on the whole unfavorable, made by 
the Polish measures on the American Press was gradually 
in part balanced by the announcement that the Polish 
Jews had been recognized as an independent religious 
community. Since it was thought in many quarters that 
this might be taken to be the first step towards cultural 
and political emancipation of the Eastern Jews, it was 
discussed with great interest, in view of the strong influ- 



AMERICAN MEDIATION 351 

ence exerted by the American Jewish community on an 
important section of the American Press, particularly 
that of New York. 

*' Finally, there remains to be examined the attitude of 
the Press towards one question, in itself of a purely do- 
mestic, economic interest, but which promises to become 
of the most wide-reaching importance for foreign poli- 
tics, namely, that of an embargo on com. The price of 
most articles of food has risen to such an abnormal 
height during the last few months that the New York Sun 
can say without too great exaggeration, that if the war 
had lasted two more years the cost of living in Berlin 
and Vienna would have risen to the level of that of New 
York. In particular the serious position of the wheat 
market and the fairly certain prospect of an acute rise in 
the price of wheat in the course of the winter or next 
spring prompt the Press to constant discussion, the bur- 
den of which is the question whether the Government of 
the United States should or should not prohibit the ex- 
portation of corn. The opponents of such a measure, 
among which are the World, New York Times, New York 
Evening Post, Journal of Commerce, the Boston Evening 
Transcript, the Philadelphia Public Ledger, the Saint 
Louis Glohe-Democrat, the Pittsburg Post, the Saint Paul 
Pioneer Press, the Indianapolis News and many others, 
maintain that the supporters of the embargo, whose main 
object is to injure the Allies, represent the situation as 
much more threatening than it is in reality. The World 
tries to console its readers by explaining that the high 
price of food represents the American people *s contribu- 
tion to the cost of the greatest war of destruction in the 
history of the world; while the New York Times points 
out the danger of estranging the Allies through an em- 
bargo. The newspapers which are friendly to Germany, 
particularly the Hearst newspapers, and the Milwaukee 



352 MY THBEE YEARS IN AMERICA 

Free Press, energetically urge an embargo on all articles 
of food, by which, as they more or less openly allow it to 
appear, England would be forced to make peace. But in 
addition a number of the most bitter opponents of Ger- 
many, for example the Philadelphia Inquirer, favor an 
early embargo for purely material reasons. It is to be 
expected that this question will be one of the first to come 
up at the opening of the approaching session of Congress, 
when the Press polemics of the opponents of the embargo, 
with the arriere pensee of protecting England's interests 
and those of her Allies, should reach their cHmax.** 



CHAPTER XI 

THE RUPTURE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 

Before I received official notice of the opening of 
the unrestricted U-boat campaign, I had a further inter- 
view with Mr. House, concerning the peace activities of 
the President, and the telegram describing it which I sent 
to the Foreign Office, Berlin, is reproduced below: 

Cipher Telegram No. 212 
"(Answer to Telegram No. 149 of*the 7th January.) 

** "Washington, January 16th, 1917. 
"Your Excellency's authority in regard to Mr. House 
duly availed of. He told me Wilson considered this pro- 
nouncement of Imperial Government supremely valuable. 
As regards further developments of Wilson's efforts for 
peace, I can say nothing definite. This much only is cer- 
tain, that at present moment President has no other 
thought than that of bringing about peace, and will en- 
deavor to achieve this end with the utmost energy and 
all means in his power. A further pronouncement of 
Wilson's is expected almost immediately; it will proba- 
bly take form of a communication to Congress. Appar- 
ently it will consist of an appeal to the American people 
to help him to enforce peace; in any case both he and 
House praise the Hearst Press article, which is written 
from that point of view. Whether means adopted will 
be to place an embargo on all exports is difficult to say. 

353 



354 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

Maybe the threat of an embargo will be enough to force 
our enemies to a conference. 

**From the above it is clear that we cannot afford to 
have any difficulties over the old U-boat question. As 
regards the question of armed merchant vessels, I hope 
to arrive at a modus vivendi. But we must be careful 
not to act hastily and carelessly, so as not to create con- 
flict before President has taken further steps. Remark- 
able as this may sound to German ears, Wilson is re- 
garded here very generally as pro-German. His Note was 
traced to our influence, and Gerard^s speech strength- 
ened this impression. This speech is in accordance with 
instructions which Mr. Gerard is receiving. Our present 
enemies have gone literally raving mad, and leave no 
stone unturned in order to put obstacles in Wilson's way. 
This explains the attacks against the President, as also 
the scurrilous attempt engineered by the Republicans to 
charge the Administration with Stock Exchange specu- 
lations. Without any justification, of course, my name 
also was mentioned in this regard. The German Em- 
bassy, as is well known, is held responsible for everything 
by our enemies in this country." 

At the same time as the above telegram, I wrote the 
following report describing the prevailing political atti- 
tude in Washington: 

CrPHEE Report 

"Washington, 14th January, 1917. 

"Ever since the Presidential election the political sit- 
uation here has not changed. Apart from the question 
of ending the world-war, the public mind has not been 
constantly or earnestly concerned with any matter. 

** Congress has dealt with the customary Budget pro- 



BUPTURE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 355 

posals, and the fruitless negotiations about the Mexican 
question drag slowly on. 

"Meanwhile, the attitude towards ourselves, which, 
after the Sussex incident took a decided turn for the good, 
has slowly improved. This change in the public temper 
can be observed on all sides. It is true that it is only 
very slightly noticeable, if at aU, in the Press, and our 
most rabid opponents are driven, owing to the general 
improvement in German- Americans * relations, to ever 
more violent attacks against us.- Since President Wilson 
dispatched his Peace Note, our enemies' fury knows no 
bounds. "Without exaggeration, it can be said that this 
note voices the spirit of almost the whole American 
people. 

**Only Wall Street and the anti-German ring, as also 
their friends in the press, are dissatisfied and are en- 
deavoring to put obstacles in the President's way. In 
these circles, which are always under English influence, 
the belief has taken root, that Mr. Wilson has fallen 
under German spell. The well-known anti-German Re- 
publican, Senator Lodge, boldly expressed this view in 
the Senate; but he could not prevent the Senate from 
voting in favor of Mr. Wilson's Peace Note, by a huge 
majority. 

**The public mind is engaged principally with the ques- 
tion why precisely the President dispatched his note 
immediately after the German offer of peace. It is well- 
known that this Note had been prepared for some time, 
and would have been sent off at Christmas, quite irre- 
spective of our own proposals, although, in view of Mr. 
Wilson's inclination to temporize, and to treat all ques- 
tions somewhat dilatorily, this is by no means certain. I 
believe that the President's principal motive was his 
pressing desire to play the role of mediator — a prospect 
which seemed to be imperilled if our enemies agreed to 



356 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

deal directly with ns. This may possibly explain why 
that particular moment was chosen, for which our 
enemies regard Mr. Wilson so unfavorably. A cartoon 
published by that most anti-German paper, the New York 
Herald, depicts Mr. Wilson's dove of peace as a parrot, 
faithfully babbling out the German proposals. 

*' Apart from the choice of this particular moment for 
its expression, the President's desire to bring about 
peace is in any case very comprehensible, seeing that he 
was re-elected principally on the basis of this programme. 
Furthermore, the Americans are genuinely alarmed by 
the extension of Japanese power in the Far East, and 
finally, since our Rumanian victories, Mr. Wilson has 
ultimately come to the conclusion that our enemies are 
no longer able to defeat us. One is constantly hearing 
the opinion expressed, both by members of the Cabinet 
and other friends of the President, who enjoy his con- 
fidence, that neither of the belligerent parties will now 
be able to achieve a decisive victory, and that further 
bloodshed is therefore useless. 

**As already stated above, the anti-German party is 
doing its utmost to put every possible obstacle in Mr. 
Wilson's way, while the Press does not cease from re- 
peating that the Peace Note is to be regarded as a 
menace against Germany. It is thus hoped to stiffen our 
enemies ' backs, by dazzling them with the expectation of 
America's entry into the war; much, too, is made of the 
argument — and this was particularly so in the Senate — 
that Mr. Wilson's intervention was imperilling the tra- 
ditional policy of the United States, which rests primarily 
upon the Monroe Doctrine, and upon the principle of 
non-interference with European affairs. Finally, a scur- 
rilous attempt has been made by the Republican party to 
attack Wilson in the flank, by getting a notorious Stock 
Exchange speculator publicly to proclaim that members 



EUPTUEE OF DIPLOMATIC EELATIONS 357 

of the Administration, who knew beforehand of Wilson's 
action, had taken advantage to speculate heavily upon it. 
As this man could, however, produce no proofs, he simply 
made himself ridiculous. 

**I have already frequently called attention in my 
report to the fact that the prolonged war hysteria over 
here has created an atmosphere of gossip and tittle-tattle, 
w^hich at other times would have been regarded as im- 
possible. For instance, even quite responsible people 
believe that I have obtained for cash certain compromis- 
ing letters of Wilson's in order to be able to get a hold 
over him by this means. Senator Lodge, in his own 
house, privately expressed the view that this was a 
credible rumor, and then turned it to account in the 
Senate. The President is so terribly put out by this and 
other similar machinations on the part of the Eepubli- 
cans, who refuse to grant him the fame of the peace- 
maker, that he recently kept away from a public festival, 
because Mr. Lodge was to be the principal speaker there. 

** Owing to the incredible rumors which are bandied 
from mouth to mouth here, I regarded it as necessary 
to bring an action against one notorious swindler and 
blackmailer. I wanted to convince public opinion that 
the Embassy had nothing to fear. I intend doing the 
same thing in the case of all future attempts at black- 
mail, once we have got a clean slate in regard to all 
compromising questions. Our enemies will, however, 
persist in leaving no stone unturned in order to cast a 
slur upon the Embassy, for their principal object is to 
succeed in bringing about my recall, or the rupture of 
diplomatic relations with Germany. Once they have ac- 
complished this, they are convinced that it will be an 
easy matter to draw the United States into the war. 

**As is well known, President Wilson received a reply 
from the Entente, in response to his peace move, which 



358 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

contained conditions utterly unacceptable to us. Messrs. 
Wilson and House regarded these conditions as 'bluff,' 
and were as convinced, as they had previously been, that 
the Entente would accede to a peace by arrangement. 
People frequently alluded in those days to the fact that 
in the last Anglo- American "War of 1812-1814, the Eng- 
lish, very shortly before the peace settlement, had pro- 
posed unacceptable peace terms which they suddenly 
allowed to drop later. I also believed, and believe still, 
that the Entente were perfectly well acquainted with the 
political situation in Germany, and wished by proposing 
such conditions to strike panic amongst us and compel 
us to declare an unrestricted U-boat war. The Entente 
never diverged from its one object, which was to draw 
the United States into the war, and thus to bring about 
a decision. Moreover, the negative reply sent to our 
Government by the Entente had sufficed to achieve this 
object ; for the final resolution to declare an unrestricted 
U-boat war was formed before the peace conditions 
framed by the Entente became known in Berlin." 

On the 19th of January I received official notice that 
the unrestricted U-boat campaign would begin on Feb- 
ruary 1st, and I was to give the American Government 
notice accordingly on the evening of the 31st January. 
After all that had happened, I could but regard this in- 
timation as a declaration of war against the United 
States, and one which, in addition, put us in the wrong; 
because it put an end to the peace overtures made by Mr. 
Wilson, which had been started with our approval. I 
did my utmost to try to get the Berlin resolution can- 
celled, or at least to obtain a postponement of the date on 
which it was to come into force, and with this end in view 
I sent the following telegram to Berlin : 



RUPTURE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 359 

Cipher Telegram 

** Washington, 19th January, 1917. 

**War inevitable in view of the proposed action. 
Danger of rupture could be mitigated by the fixing of a 
definite interval of time, say one month, so that neutral 
vessels and passengers may be spared, as any prelim- 
inary and timely warning seems impossible if present 
programme is carried out. I shall have to give the pass- 
word for unnavigable German steamers on February 1st, 
as effect of carrying out of my instructions here will be 
like declaration of war, and strict guard will be kept. In 
any case an incident like that of the Lusitania may be 
expected soon. 

**If military reasons are not absolutely imperative, in 
view of my Telegram 212, postponement most urgently 
desirable. Wilson believes he can obtain peace on the 
basis of our proposed equal rights of all nations. House 
told me again yesterday, that Wilson proposed to take 
action very shortly, for in view of our declaration re- 
garding future Peace League, etc., he regards prospects 
of a Peace Conference as favorable." 

In my efforts to avoid a breach with the United States, 
the President helped me to the extent of making a com- 
munication to the Senate on January 22nd, which he 
personally read to them in solemn session. In this 
conununication, Mr. Wilson exhaustively developed his 
programme of a "Peace without Conquest." As the 
President officially communicated this proposal to all the 
belligerent Powers on the same day, it was to be regarded 
as a fresh and most solemn step towards peace. As, on 
the other hand, it is also a document which expresses 
most plainly Mr. Wilson's desires and intentions before 
his entry into the war, I quote it verbatim below. Those 



360 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

who read it to-day cannot help feeling that certainly no 
more scathing criticism of the Versailles Peace has ever 
been written, — a peace which contained all the signs of 
having been imposed npon the vanquished, and against 
which the President's communication was a warning. 

**0n the eighteenth of December last I addressed an 
identical note to the governments of the nations now at 
war requesting them to state, more definitely than they 
had yet been stated by either group of belligerents, the 
terms upon which they would deem it possible to make 
peace. I spoke on behalf of humanity and of the rights of 
all neutral nations like our own, many of whose most vital 
interests the war puts in constant jeopardy. The Central 
Powers united in a reply which stated merely that they 
were ready to meet their antagonists in conference to 
discuss terms of peace. The Entente Powers have re- 
plied much more definitely and have stated, in general 
terms, indeed, but with sufficient definiteness to imply 
details, the arrangements, guarantees, and acts of re- 
paration which they deem to be the indispensable condi- 
tions of a satisfactory settlement. We are that much 
nearer a definite discussion of the peace which shall end 
the present war. We are that much nearer the discussion 
of the international concert which must thereafter hold 
the world at peace. In every discussion of the peace that 
must end this war it is taken for granted that that peace 
must be followed by some definite concert of power which 
will make it virtually impossible that any such catas- 
trophe should ever overwhelm us again. Every lover of 
mankind, every sane and thoughtful man must take that 
for granted. 

**I have sought this opportunity to address yon be- 
cause I thought that I owed it to you, as the council 
associated with me in the final determination of our 



RUPTURE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 361 

international obligations, to disclose to you without re- 
serve the thought and purpose that have been taking form 
in my mind in regard to the duty of our Government in 
the days to come when it will be necessary to lay afresh 
and upon a new plan the foundations of peace among the 
nations. 

"It is inconceivable that the people of the United 
States should play no part in that great enterprise. To 
take part in such a service will be the opportunity for 
which they have sought to prepare themselves by the 
very principles and purposes of their polity and the ap- 
proved practices of their Government ever since the days 
when they set up a new nation in the high and honorable 
hope that it might in all that it was and did show man- 
kind the way to liberty. They cannot in honor withhold 
the service to which they are now about to be challenged. 
They do not wish to withhold it. But they owe it to 
themselves and to the other nations of the world to state 
the conditions under which they will feel free to render it. 

*'That service is nothing less than this, to add their 
authority and their power to the authority and force of 
other nations to guarantee peace and justice throughout 
the world. Such a settlement cannot now be long post- 
poned. It is right that before it comes this Government 
should frankly formulate the conditions upon which it 
would feel justified in asking our people to approve its 
formal and solemn adherence to a League for Peace. I 
am here to attempt to state those conditions. 

* ' The present war must first be ended ; but we owe it to 
candor and to a just regard for the opinion of mankind 
to say that, so far as our participation in guarantees of 
future peace is concerned, it makes a great deal of differ- 
ence in what way and upon what terms it is ended. The 
treaties and agreements which bring it to an end must 
embody terms which will create a peace that is worth 



362 MY THBEE YEAES IN AMEBICA 

guaranteeing and preserving, a peace that will win the 
approval of mankind, not merely a peace that will serve 
the several interests and immediate aims of the nations 
engaged. We shall have no voice in determining what 
those terms shall be, but we shall, I feel snre, have a 
voice in determining whether they shall be made lasting 
or not by the guarantees of a universal covenant; and 
our judgment upon what is fimdamental and essential as 
a condition precedent to permanency should be spoken 
now, not afterwards when it may be too late. 

*'No covenant of co-operative peace that does not in- 
clude the peoples of the New "World can suffice to keep the 
future safe against war ; and yet there is only one sort of 
peace that the peoples of America could join in guaran- 
teeing. The elements of that peace must be elements that 
engage the confidence and satisfy the principles of the 
American governments, elements consistent with their 
political faith and with the practical convictions which 
the peoples of America have once for all embraced and 
undertake to defend. 

"I do not mean to say that any American government 
would throw any obstacle in the way of any terms of 
peace the governments now at war might agree upon, or 
seek to upset them when made, whatever they might be. 
I only take it for granted that mere terms of peace be- 
tween the belligerents will not satisfy even the belliger- 
ents themselves. Mere agreements may not make peace 
secure. It will be absolutely necessary that a force be 
created as a guarantor of the permanency of the settle- 
ment so much greater than the force of any nation now 
engaged or any alliance hitherto formed or projected 
that no nation, no probable combination of nations could 
face or withstand it. If the peace presently to be made 
is to endure, it must be a peace made secure by the or- 
ganized major force of mankind. 



RUPTURE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 363 

**The terms of the immediate peace agreed upon will 
determine whether it is a peace for which snch a guar- 
antee can be secured. The question upon which the whole 
future peace and policy of the world depends is this : Is 
the present war a struggle for a just and secure peace, or 
only for a new balance of power ? If it be only a struggle 
for a new balance of power, who will guarantee, who can 
guarantee, the stable equilibrium of the new arrange- 
ment? Only a tranquil Europe can be a stable Europe. 
There must be, not a balance of power, but a community 
of power ; not organized rivalries, but an organized com- 
mon peace. 

** Fortunately we have received very explicit assur- 
ances on this point. The statesmen of both of the groups 
of nations now arrayed against one another have said, in 
terms that could not be misinterpreted, that it was no 
part of the purpose they had in mind to crush their 
antagonists. But the implications of these assurances 
may not be equally clear to all, — ^may not be the same on 
both sides of the water. I think it will be serviceable if 
I attempt to set forth what we understand them to be. 

**They imply, first of all, that it must be a peace with- 
out victory. It is not pleasant to say this. I beg that I 
may be permitted to put my own interpretation upon it 
and that it may be understood that no other interpreta- 
tion was in my thought. I am seeking only to face 
realities and to face them without soft concealmeiats. 
Victory would mean peace forced upon the loser, a vic- 
tor's terms imposed upon the vanquished. It would be 
accepted in humiliation, under duress, at an intolerable 
sacrifice, and would leave a sting, a resentment, a bitter 
memory upon which terms of peace would rest, not per- 
manently, but only as upon quicksand. Only a peace 
between equals can last. Only a peace the very principle 
of which is equality and a common participation in a 



364 MY THEEE YEARS IN AMERICA 

common benefit. The right state of mind, the right feel- 
ing between nations, is as necessary for a lasting peace 
as is the just settlement of vexed questions of territory 
or of racial and national allegiance. 

**The equality of nations upon which peace must* be 
founded if it is to last must be an equality of rights ; the 
guarantees exchanged must neither recognize nor imply 
a difference between big nations and small, between those 
that are powerful and those that are weak. Right must 
be based upon the common strength, not upon the in- 
dividual strength, of the nations upon whose concert 
peace will depend. Equality of territory or of resources 
there of course cannot be ; nor any other sort of equality 
not gained in the ordinary peaceful and legitimate de- 
velopment of the peoples themselves. But no one asks 
or expects anything more than an equality of rights. 
Mankind is looking now for freedom of life, not for 
equipoises of power. 

*'And there is a deeper thing involved than even 
equality of right among organized nations. No peace 
can last, or ought to last, which does not recognize and 
accept the principle that governments derive all their just 
powers from the consent of the governed, and that no 
right anywhere exists to hand peoples about from sov- 
ereignty to sovereignty as if they were property. I take 
it for granted, for instance, if I may venture upon a 
single example, that statesmen everywhere are agreed 
that there should be a united, independent, and auton- 
omous Poland, and that henceforth inviolable security 
of life, of worship, and of industrial and social develop- 
ment should be guaranteed to all peoples who have lived 
hitherto under the power of governments devoted to a 
faith and purpose hostile to their own. 

*'I speak of this, not because of any desire to exalt an 
abstract political principle which has always been held 



EUPTUEE OF DIPLOMATIC EELATIONS 365 

very dear by those who have sought to build up liberty in 
America, but for the same reason that I have spoken of 
the other conditions of peace which seem to me clearly 
indispensable, — ^because I wish frankly to uncover reali- 
ties. Any peace which does not recognize and accept this 
principle will inevitably be upset. It will not rest upon 
the affections or the convictions of mankind. The fer- 
ment of spirit of whole populations will fight subtly and 
constantly against it, and all the world will sympathize. 
The world can be at peace only if its life is stable, and 
there can be no stability where the will is in rebellion, 
where there is not tranquillity of spirit and a sense of 
justice, of freedom, and of right. 

*'So far as practicable, moreover, every great people 
now struggling towards a full development of its re- 
sources and of its powers should be assured a direct out- 
let to the great highways of the sea. Where this cannot 
be done by the cession of territory, it can no doubt be 
done by the neutralization of direct rights of way under 
the general guarantee which will assure the peace itself. 
With a right comity of arrangement no nation need be 
shut away from a free access to the open paths of the 
world's commerce. 

** And the paths of the sea must alike in law and in fact 
be free. The freedom of the seas is the sine qua non of 
peace, equality, and co-operation. No doubt a somewhat 
radical reconsideration of many of the rules of inter- 
national practice hitherto thought to be established may 
be necessary in order to make the seas indeed free and 
common in practically all circumstances for the use of 
mankind, but the motive for such changes is convincing 
and compelling. There can be no trust or intimacy be- 
tween the peoples of the world without them. The free, 
constant, unthreatened intercourse of nations is an essen- 
tial part of the process of peace and of development. It 



366 MY THEEE YEARS IN AMERICA 

need not be difficult either to define or to secure the free- 
dom of the seas if the governments of the world sincerely 
desire to come to an agreement concerning it. 

**It is a problem closely connected with the limitation 
of naval armaments and the co-operation of the navies of 
the world in keeping the seas at once free and safe. And 
the question of limiting naval armaments opens the wider 
and perhaps more difficult question of the limitation of 
armies and of all programmes of military preparation. 
Difficult and delicate as these questions are, they must be 
faced with the utmost candor and decided in a spirit of 
real accommodation if peace is to come with healing in its 
wings, and come to stay. Peace cannot be had without 
concession and sacrifice. There can be no sense of safety 
and equality among the nations if great preponderating 
armaments are henceforth to continue here and there to 
be built up and maintained. The statesmen of the world 
must plan for peace and nations must adjust and accom- 
modate their policy to it as they have planned for war 
and made ready for pitiless contest and rivalry. The 
question of armaments, whether on land or sea, is the 
most immediately and intensely practical question 
connected with the future fortunes of nations and of 
mankind. 

*'I have spoken upon these great matters without re- 
serve and with the utmost explicitness because it has 
seemed to me to be necessary if the world's yearning 
desire for peace was anywhere to find free voice 
and utterance. Perhaps I am the only person in high 
authority amongst all the peoples of the world who is at 
liberty to speak and hold nothing back. I am speaking 
as an individual, and yet I am speaking also, of course, 
as the responsible head of a great government, and I feel 
confident that I have said what the people of the United 
States would wish me to say. May I not add that I hope 



RUPTUEE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 367 

and believe that I am in effect speaking for liberals and 
friends of humanity in every nation and of every pro- 
gramme of liberty? I would fain believe that I am speak- 
ing for the silent mass of mankind everywhere who have 
as yet had no place or opportunity to speak their real 
hearts out concerning the death and ruin they see to have 
come already upon the persons and the homes they hold 
most dear. 

"And in holding out the expectation that the people 
and Government of the United States will join the other 
civilized nations of the world in guaranteeing the perma- 
nence of peace upon such terms as I have named I speak 
with the greater boldness and confidence because it is 
clear to every man who can think that there is in this 
promise no breach in either our traditions or our policy 
as a nation, but a fulfilment, rather, of all that we have 
professed or striven for. 

**I am proposing, as it were, that the nations should 
with one accord adopt the doctrine of President Monroe 
as the doctrine of the world : that no nation should seek 
to extend its polity over any other nation or people, but 
that every people should be left free to determine its own 
polity, its own way of development, unhindered, un- 
threatened, unafraid, the little along with the great and 
powerful. 

**I am proposing that all nations henceforth avoid 
entangling alliances which would draw them into com- 
petitions of power, catch them in a net of intrigue and 
selfish rivalry, and disturb their own affairs with in- 
fluences intruded from without. There is no entangling 
alliance in a concert of power. When aU unite to act in 
the same sense and with the same purpose all act in the 
common interest and are free to live their own lives under 
a common protection. 

**I am proposing government by the consent of the 



368 MY THEEE YEAES IN AMEEICA 

governed ; that freedom of the seas which in international 
conference after conference representatives of the United 
States have urged with the eloquence of those who are the 
convinced disciples of liberty; and that moderation of 
armaments which makes of armies and navies a power 
for order merely, not an instrument of aggression or of 
selfish violence. 

*' These are American principles, American policies. 
We could stand for no others. And they are also the 
principles and policies of forward looking men and 
women everywhere, of every modem nation, of every 
enlightened community. They are the principles of 
mankind and must prevail.*' 

In Helfferich's account of these matters, the author 
charges this appeal of Mr. "Wilson's with having favored 
the Entente side, because in it the conditions laid down 
are regarded as an acceptable basis for peace. When I 
returned to Germany the Imperial Chancellor advanced 
the same argument in my presence; I have heard it re- 
peated again and again at home, and among other places, 
before the Examination Committee of the National 
Assembly. It seems to me that this view is rather a 
Berlin fahle convenue. There is no word in the docu- 
ment which would justify one in drawing such a conclu- 
sion. The President stated simply that he had invited 
both belligerent parties to define the conditions under 
which they would make peace, and that the Entente had 
replied fully to the invitation, whereas the Central 
Powers had not submitted their terms. He then pro- 
ceeded to say that in so far as the conditions insisted 
upon by one side had become known, we had advanced a 
step nearer to the discussion of peace. If we read the 
wording of the document without prejudice, and in con- 
nection with the views expressed by American statesmen, 



EUPTURE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 369 

it becomes abundantly clear that the President regarded 
the terms laid down by our enemies as maximum condi- 
tions, and further, that he believed that we also would 
submit our maximum terms, and finally come to an agree- 
ment by adopting a middle course. 

Herr Helfferich makes a similar charge against Wil- 
son ^s Note of the 18th December, owing to the threats 
that it contained. But this charge strikes me as being 
just as gratuitous as the first. The threats were uttered 
in London quite as plainly as they were in Berlin. The 
charge of partiality would have been justified only if the 
threats had been contained simply in the version of the 
Note which was sent to Berlin. 

Besides, in all Entente countries, it was maintained 
that both the Note of the 18th December and the appeal 
of the 22nd January revealed partiality for the Central 
Powers. The diplomats of the Entente in Washington 
were quite beside themselves with anger, and plainly 
revealed their displeasure to Mr. Wilson. I am not 
concerned now with criticizing the President's efforts for 
peace in retrospect. The fact that Mr. Wilson became 
our personal enemy after the 31st January, 1917, and 
that he consented to the Peace of Versailles, is no proof 
of the contention that, before the 31st January, 1917, he 
would have proved a similar failure as a peacemaker. 
The President's spiteful censure and treatment of us, 
both during the war and at Versailles, may be explained 
psychologically, by the fact that we rejected his efforts 
as a mediator, and declared the U-boat war. 

Mr. Wilson's personal sensitiveness and egocentric 
nature played an essential part in all the negotiations. 
When the French and English Press derided the Presi- 
dent, in November, 1916, after the first cables had 
announced the election of Mr. Hughes, Mr, Wilson was 
deeply mortified. A further improvement in his attitude 



370 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

towards us followed, when we showed that we were favor- 
ably disposed to his mediation for peace. The fact that 
Germany relied on him, stimulated his self-esteem to such 
an extent that he became, to a certain degree, interested 
in bringing about* a peace that would be satisfactory to 
Germany. Nor should the interest he showed in this 
matter be underrated. I openly confess that it was also 
my ambition to assist in restoring peace, in order to save 
our country from the catastrophe that threatened to 
overtake it, and to spare the world any further suffering. 
To this day I am still convinced that, had the Germans 
skilfully conducted their share in these peace negotia- 
tions, we should have achieved all we wanted to achieve. 
The happy personal relations which, in that case, would 
have prevailed between Mr. Wilson and the German 
representatives at the Peace Conference, would, in view 
of the element of chance, which is so conspicuous at such 
congresses, have turned the scales in our favor to a sur- 
prising extent. On the other hand, I was, and am still, 
of the opinion that the peace which would have been 
settled at that time, would not have satisfied the public 
opinion of the moment in Germany, But I attached no 
importance whatever to this consideration. He who prac- 
tises politics in the interests of his native country, must 
be ready at any moment to plunge like Curtius into the 
abyss, in order to save his nation. This, however, is what 
made Curtius immortal. Besides, in a few years, if not 
sooner, the German people would surely have realized 
that ** Peace without Victory" constituted a victory for 
Germany. 

After the 31st January, 1917, Mr. Wilson was incapable 
of an impartial attitude towards Germany. He saw red 
whenever he thought of the Imperial Government, and 
his repugnance against it knew no bounds. Even to-day 
the bitter feeling still rankle§ within himj that the Ger- 



RUPTURE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 371 

man Government deprived him of the glory of being the 
premier political personage on the world's stage. It goes 
without saying, that at Versailles the Entente exploited 
with a vengeance both this attitude on the part of the 
President, and his peculiar idiosyncrasies. Intercepted 
wireless messages from Paris had made ns aware of 
the fact that the original American interpretation of the 
fourteen points entirely agreed with our own; and thus 
we in Berlin were filled, not without reason, with certain 
hopes of Americans help. But Mr. Wilson, who would 
have acted more wisely had he never gone to Versailles, 
sat there alone, facing three European statesmen, for 
whom he was no match. They played upon his weakest 
point, by suggesting to him the view that, in addition to 
the German Government, the German people, who were 
guilty, too, should also be punished, and that the obliga- 
tion to punish the guilty took precedence of the fourteen 
points. Had Mr. Wilson, after January, 1917, really 
come to the definite conclusion that he held the proofs of 
Germany's war guilt and lust of world empire! Whereas, 
theretofore he had considered the question of war guilt 
impartially, he now agreed that the Germans would have 
been able to obtain a reasonable peace through his media- 
tion, but had rejected it and chosen to declare the U-boat 
war instead, in order to achieve a complete victory. Con- 
sequently, the Germans had not been concerned all this 
time with bringing about a reasonable peace, but with 
gaining the empire of the world, a conclusion from which 
their war guilt was also to be inferred. It was as the 
result of these ideas that Mr. Wilson preached the cru- 
sade against militaristic and autocratic Germany, who 
wanted to achieve the mastery of the world. Only by 
means of the belief in a crusade could the peace-loving 
American people be prevailed upon to wage war. 
Regarding the effect upon the Senate of the Presi- 



372 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

dent's appeal, I sent the following telegram to the 
Foreign Office: 

Cipher Telegram 

"Washington, January 23rd, 1917. 

"Wilson's appeal has met with general approval in 
Senate, and is regarded as a further energetic step in 
peace movement. Only our witdest opponents have again 
attacked President as a pro-German. Almost throughout 
views expressed about appeal contain the wish that 
Central Powers will also state their peace terms now. 
House also begged me urgently that this might be done, 
either publicly or secretly. Then Wilson would imme- 
diately propose Peace Conference ; President also seenis 
inclined to conclude the Bryan Treaty with us. Time is 
now, alas, too short, otherwise treaty might perhaps have 
helped us to avert war. 

"As result of proposed unrestricted U-boat war, peace 
movement will presumably come to an end. Neverthe- 
less, it is possible on the other hand that Wilson will 
make redoubled efforts for peace, if a time-limit be al- 
lowed. I should like to leave no stone unturned in order 
to avert war with United States. As I understand the 
situation, our refusal to submit our peace terms arises 
out of the fear that they may appear too moderate to 
public opinion in Germany. Would it perhaps be pos- 
sible, before opening the unrestricted U-boat war, to 
state the peace terms, which we should have submitted 
at the Peace Conference we proposed, and to add, that, 
in view of our enemies' insolent rejection of our scheme, 
we could no longer abide by these moderate terms ? And 
then we might hint that, as victors, we should demand 
an independent Ireland. A declaration of this sort would 
win over public opinion on this side, as far as this is 



RUPTURE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 373 

possible, and might perhaps also satisfy public opinion 
in Germany." 

The day after the President had read his appeal to the 
Senate, I received a telegram inviting me to visit Mr. 
House in New York. During the interview the Colonel 
read me a memorandum of Mr. Wilson's, in which the 
President formally offered us to act as mediator, in order 
to bring about a peace by arrangement. The memoran- 
dum left me in no doubt whatever that Mr. Wilson was 
certain of being able to achieve this end. With the utmost 
possible speed I sent the following telegrams about my 
interview with Mr. House, by three different routes to 
Berlin, on the assumption that it was impossible for us 
to abide by our former resolve : 

(1) Cipher Wieeless Telegram 
(Most urgent) 
"Washington, 27th January, 1917. 
** After having had very important conference request 
most urgently postponement till my next two messages 
received. Suggest reply by wireless." 

(2) Cipher Telegram 

*' Washington, 26th January, 1917. 

"Wilson offered officially, but in first place privately, 
to mediate for peace, on basis of his appeal to Senate, 
that means without interference with territorial terms of 
peace. Wilson's simultaneous request for communica- 
tion of our peace terms not to be regarded as private. 

"I am wiring with full particulars through State 
Department. To begin U-boat war without previous 
negotiations regarding above proposals would among 
other things put us seriously in the wrong, and owing to 



374 MY THEEE YEARS IN AMERICA 

Wilson's personal sensitiveness, would make prevention 
of rupture quite impossible." 

(3) Cipher Telegram 

** Washington, 27tli January, 1917. 
"House suddenly invited me to visit him on behalf of 
Wilson, and told me the following as an official message 
from President : 

** First of all, Wilson offers privately to mediate for 
peace on basis of his appeal to Senate, i.e., therefore 
without interference in territorial terms of peace. Wil- 
son's simultaneous request to us to submit our terms of 
peace is not to be regarded as private. House revealed to 
me following thoughts of the President. Our enemies 
had openly expressed their impossible peace terms. 
Thereupon President had, as a direct contrast to these, 
developed his programme. Now we are also morally 
bound to make our peace terms known, because our desire 
for peace would otherwise appear insincere. After Your 
Excellency had informed Mr. Wilson that our peace 
terms were moderate, and that we agreed to second 
Peace Conference, President thought he had given ex- 
pression to our wishes in his appeal to the Senate. 

"Wilson hopes that we shall communicate our peace 
terms to him, which might he published both in Germany 
and over here, so that they could become known imme- 
diately all over the world. If only we had confidence in 
him. President was convinced that he would be able to 
bring about both Peace Conferences. He would be par- 
ticularly pleased if Your Excellency were at the same 
time to declare that we are prepared to enter the second 
Peace Conference on the basis of his appeal. Our declar- 
ation might be shown to have been actuated by Wilson's 
having sent us a direct request for our peace terms. 



RUPTUEE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 375 

President is of opinion that Note sent to him by the 
Entente was a piece of blnff which need not be taken 
seriously. He hopes definitely to bring abont Peace Con- 
ferences, and quickly too, so that the unnecessary blood- 
shed of the Spring Offensive may be averted. 

"To what extent Your Excellency will and can meet 
Wilson, it is impossible to tell from this side. Meanwhile 
I urgently beg leave to submit the following remarks for 
your consideration. If the U-boat campaign is opened 
now without any further ado, the President will regard 
this as a smack in the face, aiid war with the United 
States will be inevitable. The war party here will gain 
the upper hand, and the end of the war will be quite out 
of sight, as, whatever people may say to the contrary, the 
resources of the United States are enormous. On the 
other hand, if we acquiesce in Wilson ^s proposal, but the 
scheme nevertheless comes to grief owing to the stub- 
bornness of our enemies, it would be very hard for the 
President to come into the war against us, even if by that 
time we began our unrestricted U-boat war. At present, 
therefore it is only a matter of postponing the declara- 
tion for a little while so that we may improve our diplo- 
matic position. For my own part, I confess that I am of 
opinion that we shall obtain a better peace now by means 
of conferences, than we should if the United States joined 
the ranks of our enemies. 

**As cables always take several days, please send in- 
structions by wireless, in case telegraphic privileges 157 
cannot be used on February 1st." 

I had hoped that the communication of the President's 
appeal through Mr. Gerard, would have led to a post- 
ponement of the unrestricted U-boat war. This, however, 
was not the case. I can pass over all that happened in 
Berlin at that time, and all the deliberations which led to 



376 MY THEEE YEARS IN AMERICA 

the ultimate decision, for not only did I not take part in 
them, but they have also become general knowledge since 
the taking of the evidence before the Examination Com- 
mittee of the National Assembly. I need only mention 
here that I received the following reply to my proposals, 
from the Imperial Chancellor:- 

CrPHEE Telegram 

* * Berlin, 29th Jannary,- 1917. 

"Please thank President on behalf of Imperial Govern- 
ment for his communication. We trust him completely, 
and beg' him to trust us likewise. Germany is ready to 
accept his secret offer* of mediation for the purpose of 
bringing about a direct Conference of the belligerents, 
and will recommend, similar course to her Allies. We 
wish our acceptance of offer, as well as offer itself, to be 
treated as quite secret. 

**A public announcement of our peace terms is at 
present impossible, now that Entente has published their 
peace terms which aim at the degradation and annihila- 
tion of Germany and her Allies, and have been character- 
ized by President himself as impossible. We cannot 
regard them as bluff, as they entirely agree with pro- 
fessed opinions of enemy Powers expressed not only 
before, but afterwards. They also correspond exactly 
with the objects for which Italy and Rumania entered 
the war, and as regards Turkey, with the assurances made 
on behalf of Russia by both England and France. So 
long as these war aims of our enemies are publicly main- 
tained, it would be impossible to interpret public an- 
nouncement of our own peace terms, as anything else 
than a sign of weakness which at present does not exist, 
and would only lead to a prolongation of the war. In 
order to give President Wilson a proof of our confi- 
dence, however, t^U him just for his own private infor- 



RUPTURE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 377 

mation the terms on which we should have been prepared 
to take part in peace negotiations, if the Entente had 
accepted onr offer of peace on the 12th December, 1916. 

"The restitution to France of that part of Upper 
Alsace occupied by her. The acquisition of a strategical 
and economic safety-frontier-zone, separating Germany 
and Poland from Russia. 

"Colonial restitution in the form of an understanding 
which would secure Germany colonial possessions com- 
patible with the size of her population and the importance 
of her economic interests. 

"Restoration of those parts of France occupied by 
Germany, on condition that certain strategic and eco- 
nomic modifications of the frontier be allowed, as also 
financial compensation. 

"Restitution of Belgium under definite guarantees for 
the safety of Germany, which would have to be deter- 
mined by means of negotiations with the Belgian 
Government. 

"Economic and financial settlement, on the basis of 
exchange, of the territory invaded by both sides, and to 
be restituted by the conclusion of peace. 

"Compensation for German undertakings and private 
persons who have suffered damage through the war. 

"Renunciation of all economic arrangements and 
measures, which after the peace would constitute an 
obstacle in the way of normal commerce and trade, with 
the conclusion of corresponding commercial treaties. 

"The Freedom of the Seas to be placed on a secure 
basis. 

"The peace terms of our Allies coincide with our own 
views, and observe the same limits. 

"We are, moreover, prepared to enter the Interna- 
tional Conference which he wishes to invoke after the 
war, on the basis of his communication to the Senate. 



378 MY THREE TEAES IN AMERICA 

''Your Excellency will give President these details at 
the same time as yon hand him Note relating unrestricted 
U-boat war, and will inform him as follows : 

**If his offer had only reached ns a few days earlier, 
we should have been able to postpone opening of the new 
U-boat war. Now, however, in spite of best will in the 
world, it is, owing to technical reasons, unfortunately too 
late, as far-reaching military preparations have already 
been made which cannot be undone, and U-boats have 
already sailed with new instructions. Form and content 
of enemy's reply to our offer of peace, and the Note of 
the President, were so abrupt and harsh, that, in view 
of the life and death struggle which has once again been 
proclaimed against us, we cannot any longer delay the 
use of those means which appear to us best calculated to 
end the war quickly, and for the relinquishment of which 
we could not have taken the responsibility in the face of 
our whole nation. 

**As the order regarding the unrestricted U-boat war 
shows, we are prepared, at any moment, to make every 
possible allowances for America's needs. We would beg 
the President to prosecute — that is to say, pursue, his 
plan notwithstanding, and declare ourselves ready to 
discontinue the unrestricted U-boat war the moment we 
are completely assured that the President's efforts will 
lead to a peace that would be acceptable to us. 

* ' Bethmann-Hollweg. " 

I immediately communicated the peace terms contained 
in this telegram to Mr. House, and I still cherished a 
small hope that he would, after all, perhaps, be able to 
exercise a favorable influence over the President. Truth 
to tell, he actually went to Washington in order to take 
part in the deliberations which were to decide the atti- 
tude which America was henceforth to adopt towards ns. 



RUPTURE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 379 

Apart from the fact that the secrecy covering the com- 
munication of our peace terms deprived them of all 
diplomatic value, the simultaneous declaration of the 
unrestricted U-boat war gave the death-blow to all hope 
of maintaining peace. As Herr von Bethmann-HoUweg 
declared before the Examination Committee of the 
National Assembly: **It was perfectly clear to the 
authorities in Germany, that the decision to prosecute 
the unrestricted U-boat war would destroy all chance of 
further efforts on the part of the President to bring 
about peace. The U-boat war meant rupture, and ulti- 
mately war with America. The discussions between 
General Head Quarters and the Political Leaders had 
turned upon this question for years. That which led to 
the decisive step being taken was, that General Head- 
quarters was firmly resolved to face even the risk of 
Americans entry into the war, and that it wished to use 
the circumstances as a trial of strength with the political 
leaders.*' 

On January 31st, at 5 o'clock in the afternoon, I 
handed Mr. Lansing the official communication about the 
U-boat war. This was my last political interview in 
America. We both knew that the end had come, but we 
did not admit the fact to each other. The Secretary of 
State contented himself with replying that he would sub- 
mit my communication to the President. I cherished no 
illusions regarding the expected outcome of this inter- 
view, for the Ultimatum of April 18th, 1916, no longer 
allowed of any chance of preventing the rupture of diplo- 
matic relations. Consequently on the morning of the 
31st January, I had already given the order that the 
engines of all ships lying in American harbors were to be 
destroyed. I had already been given instructions to this 
effect at the time of the Sussex crisis, and these instruc- 
tions had now been repeated from Berlin. As a matter 



380 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

of fact it was dangerons to allow of any delay, for on 
the evening of January 31st our ships were already 
seized by the American police. As far as I know, how- 
ever, all of them without exception were made unfit for 
use before this occurred. 

On the 3rd February, at twelve midday, Mr. Wilson 
announced to a joint meeting of both Houses of Congress, 
the rupture of all diplomatic relations with Germany, 
and at the same time my pass was brought to me by a 
higher official of the Department of State. 

Thus war was decided upon, even if it was not imme- 
diately declared. Everything that followed amounted 
only to preparation for war or war propaganda. Nothing 
except the abandonment of the U-boat campaign could 
have prevented war. 

It has frequently been asserted that the notorious 
Mexico telegram led to the war with the United States. 
I do not believe this is correct. The telegram was used 
with great success as propaganda against us; but the 
rupture of diplomatic relations — as I have already 
pointed out — ^was, in view of the situation, equivalent in 
all circumstances to war. I had nothing to do with the 
Mexico telegram, which took me completely by surprise. 
It was addressed, in the usual way, direct to the legation 
in Mexico, and passed through the Embassy at Washing- 
ton on the same day on which I received the notification 
that the unrestricted U-boat war was to be declared. I 
had neither the right, nor was it my duty, to hold up the 
telegram, although I disapproved of its contents. But 
even if I had held it up, I should have served no useful 
purpose. As I afterwards heard from a certain English- 
man, there was an office in England which deciphered all 
the telegrams which we sent over the English cable, and 
this office placed all their intercepts at the disposal of the 
American Government after the rupture of diplomatic 



KUPTURE OF DIPLOMATIC EELATIONS 381 

relations. There is nothing surprising in this, for we 
also deciphered all enemy telegrams which we were able 
to intercept. Nowadays there is no cipher which is abso- 
lutely safe, if it has been in use for some time. At that 
time, however, I did not know that all our cipher tele- 
grams were being read by the English. If, therefore, I 
had held up the Mexico telegram in Washington, its con- 
tents would have been revealed to the American Govern- 
ment by the English, notwithstanding, and no one would 
have believed that the message had not been forwarded 
in some way to Mexico. Moreover the telegram, as is 
well-known, was only conditional; the instructions it 
contained were only to hold good if the United States 
came into the war. I strained every nerve, at that 
moment, to prevent this from taking place. If I had been 
successful, the Mexico telegram would have served no 
purpose. I am therefore able to say, with a clean con- 
science, that I did everything that stood in my power, 
to remedy the error committed in the dispatch of the 
telegram. 

In Helfferich's account of these events, the author 
says: 

"If Count Bernstorff was, and apparently is still, of 
the opinion, that Wilson was actually engaged in trying 
to bring about a peace which would have been acceptable 
and tolerable to us, and with a promise of success, this 
can only be explained as the result of the enduring effect 
of suggestion, which, acting upon him for two years, had 
had no really adequate knowledge of home opinion to 
counteract it. As the communication between Berlin and 
the German Embassy in Washington was completely cut 
off, it is not surprising that our representatives on the 
other side of the vast ocean should have lost touch with 
their fellow-countrymen struggling for their lives, and 



382 MY THEEE YEAES IN AMEEICA 

should have failed to retain the proper standpoint in 
regard to what was either necessary or tolerable." 

To this I should like to reply, in the first place, that 
the unrestricted U-boat war did not in the least bring 
the German people either what was necessary or toler- 
able. Furthermore, not only I myself, but almost all 
those gentlemen who returned with me to Germany, had 
the feeling, On reaching home, that we in America had 
formed a much clearer notion of the true state of Ger- 
many, than those of our fellow-countrymen who had been 
living at home ; for they had been completely cut off from 
the world by the Blockade. After we had seen the con- 
ditions prevailing in Germany, we could understand even 
less than we had before, why the Imperial Government 
had not snatched with joy at the chance of making peace. 

As to the question whether we should have obtained an 
acceptable and tolerable peace through Mr. Wilson's 
efforts, I am still firmly convinced to-day, that this would 
have been the case. The President would not have of- 
fered to mediate if he had not been able to reckon with 
certainty upon success, and he was better situated than 
any German, to know the attitude of the Entente. In his 
farewell letter to me, Mr. House wrote : 

"It is too sad that your Government should have 
declared the unrestricted U-boat war at a moment when 
we were so near to peace. The day will come when people 
in Germany will see how much you have done for your 
country in America." 

Moreover, later on, Mr. Bonar Law publicly admitted 
in the English Parliament that Great Britain would have 
collapsed financially, if American help had not saved her. 
The war-spirit in France, during the year 1917, was 
simply upheld by the hope of American help, and finally, 



BUPTURE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 383 

in March, the Russian Revolution broke out. If we had 
accepted Wilson's mediation, the whole of American in- 
fluence in Russia would have been exercised in favor of 
peace, and not, as events ultimately proved, against 
ourselves. Out of Wilson's and Kerensky's Peace pro- 
gramme, we might, by means of diplomatic negotiations, 
easily have achieved all that we regarded as necessary. 
My conviction that we could in the year 1917 have ob- 
tained a peace which would have been acceptable to 
ourselves, is based not so much on Wilson's good will, as 
upon the fact that, without American help, the Entente 
could not possibly have achieved a victory. 

Against this view, the argument is advanced that the 
United States would in any case have entered the war, 
in order to avoid a German victory. I have already 
pointed out, that according to my view, no "German 
Peace" was any longer possible after the first battle of 
the Marne. Besides, it was precisely the object of the 
policy which was idirected at American mediation, to 
prevent the United States from entering the war. 

At the present time, even Mr. Wilson himself is pro- 
duced as crown-witness in support of the view that 
America would have entered the war against us whatever 
might have happened. In the discussions about the Peace 
Treaty, which the President held in the White House on 
the 19th August, 1919, much stress is laid upon a certain 
passage in particular, which gives the impression that 
Mr. Wilson would have wished America to enter the war, 
even if Germany had not declared the unrestricted U-boat 
campaign. Almost without exception, all the German 
national newspapers interpreted the short dialogue in 
question between the President and Senator McCumber 
in this way, and the Deutsche Tageszeitwng even went so 
far as to regard it as a striking proof of what they called 
Wilson's **o 'priori resolve to have war with Germany." 



384 MY THEEE YEARS IN AMERICA 

I must most emphatically reject this interpretation of 
the passage imder discussion, which was turned to 
account by some papers in America in the political 
fight. 

In the first place I should like to point out that it is 
obviously inadmissible to take the above-mentioned pas- 
sage out of the context, and to regard it in itself as an 
interchange of Views between Mr. Wilson and Mr. Mc- 
Cumber. It ought, on the contrary, to be judged in 
conjunction with the passage that precedes it. 

The proposition for discussion was the President's 
motion that the League of Nations made it obligatory 
upon all States united, under it, to take common action 
against any country guilty of a breach of international 
law. Senator Harding, one of the keenest opponents of 
the League of Nations, suggested the idea in the debate 
that it was impossible for a sovereign State like the 
United States of America to have her moral obligation 
in any international conflict dictated to her by an external 
body consisting of the Council of the League of Nations. 
Driven into a corner, Mr. Wilson had to acknowledge this 
fact; but he emphasized the point that in spite of this 
the value of the League of Nations was in no way im- 
paired. He said : 

"The American Republic is not in need of any advice 
from any quarter, in order to fulfil her moral duty; but 
she stabilizes the whole world by promising in advance 
that she will stand by other nations who regard matters 
in the same light as herself, in order to uphold Justice 
in the world." 

Following upon this, Senator McCumber then tried to 
confute the President's theory, by applying it practically 
to the most recent events in the world's history. He 



RUPTURE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 385 

referred to the last war, at the outbreak of which there 
was no League of Nations in existence, and the following 
discussion took place : 

McCumher: Would our moral conviction of the in- 
justice of the German war have drawn us into this war, 
if Germany had been guilty of no aggressive acts, and, 
what is more, without the League of Nations, for of 
course we had no League of Nations then? 

Wilson: As things turned out, I hope that it would 
finally have done so, Mr. Senator. 

McCumber: Do you believe that, if Germany had 
been guilty of no act of injustice against our own citizens, 
we should have come into this war ? 

Wilson: 1 believe it. 

McCumher: You believe that we should have come 
in whatever happened? 

Wilson: Yes. 

It is abundantly clear that with his first answer, **as 
things turned out, I hope that it" — that is to say, 
America's moral conviction of the injustice of the Ger- 
man war — * Vould finally have drawn us into the war"— 
the President lays the emphasis on the words '*as things 
turned out." There can be no doubt that he meant to say: 
"As things turned out in regard to his efforts for peace," 
the first ready concurrence of the Imperial Governmentj 
notwithstanding, was thwarted at the decisive moment. 
With such a Government, Mr. Wilson seems to imply, 
it was impossible in the long run for America to remain 
on terms of peace. From that time henceforward — there 
can be no question of any earlier period, because up to 
that moment he had been in constant negotiation with us 
— he regarded the Imperial Government as morally con- 
demned. Then, however, he calls to mind very clearly 



386 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

tlie feeble war-spirit of the American people in the spring 
of 1917, which, as is well known, had to be whipped into 
the war by propaganda on a prodigious scale. That is 
why the President says he "hopes," that the moral 
conviction of the American people regarding the injustice 
of Germany's cause would finally have triumphed over 
his readiness for peace expressed so brilliantly as late 
as November, 1916. His words are, therefore, to be 
regarded as a reflection in retrospect, not as a proof of 
an a priori intention to urge the United States into the 
war in any circumstances. 

Truth to tell, if Mr. Wilson had really been striving to 
declare war against us, he would, of course, only have 
needed to nod in order to induce his whole country to 
fight after the Lusitania incident, so great was the war 
feeling at that critical time. Later on, the President 
concentrated all his efforts upon the idea of being the 
Peacemaker of the world, and even made such prominent 
use of the motto, "He kept us out of the war,'* in the 
campaign for his re-election, that it is quite unthinkable 
that all this time he should have secretly cherished the 
intention, ultimately, to enter the war against Germany. 
In this matter, the fact that after the rupture of diplo- 
matic relations between America and Germany, Mr. Wil- 
son really did urge on the war by every means in his 
power, proves nothing. For, after January 31st, 1917, 
Wilson himself was a different man. Our rejection 
of his proposal to mediate, by our announcement of 
the unrestricted U-boat war, which was to him utterly 
incomprehensible, turned him into an embittered enemy 
of the Imperial Government. But this is by no means a 
proof of the contention that, before the date named, he 
was secretly watching for an opportunity to make war 
upon Germany. Neither does it excuse the President for 
having allowed himself at Versailles to be convinced of 



RUPTURE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 387 

the alleged complicity of the German people in the gen- 
eral war-guilt. Theretofore he had certainly always 
differentiated between the autocracy, as also Militarism, 
on the one hand, and the German people on the other. 
At Versailles he suddenly advanced the theory that the 
Germans must be punished for their crimes, and not only 
those among them who were responsible, but also the 
innocent German people, who neither desired the breach 
of Belgium *s neutrality, nor imderstood the moral con- 
sequences of the U-boat war, nor were aware of Mr. 
Wilson *s mediation for peace. 

The above dialogue is also interesting from the stand- 
point that the President is most clearly convinced that 
the Entente could not have conquered without American 
help. If to-day he concludes therefrom that America 
would have been obliged ultimately to join in the war, 
in order to punish Germany, in former days he concluded 
that his duty was to bring about a Peace without victory. 
If he had succeeded in doing this, all of us, friend and foe 
alike, would now be living in a better world than the 
present one. It would be the world as we had been shown 
it in a vision of the future on the 22nd January, 1917, and 
not the world of the Peace of Versailles, blooming with 
starvation, Bolshevism and nationalistic hatred. 

In his Memoirs, Herr von Tirpitz says that of all the 
practical advantages which I declared would follow from 
a compliant attitude on our part, not one had fallen to 
our lot. But I must confess, I was not aware that the 
U-boat war had brought us any advantages either. Its 
results have been a heavy moral debt and a huge bill of 
costs that the German people must pay. And how could 
the policy which I recommended have yielded practical 
results, seeing that I was never able, or even allowed, to 
carry it through? Never at any time was the U-boat war 
really given up. Every time a diplomatic success was in 



388 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

view, an incident occurred whicli made it necessary to 
start one 's labors all over again. 

Other people have said that as I was not in agreement 
with the policy of the Imperial Government, I ought to 
have resigned my office. This view does not take into 
account aU the facts of the case. As long as Herr von 
Jagow was Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, I 
worked in complete harmony with him. We both worked 
together in trying to avert war with the United States. 
I knew as little as Herr von Jagow himself did, whether 
we should succeed in scoring every point in the policy 
we pursued, for the Secretary of State was in perpetual 
conflict with the Military and Naval Authorities. If I 
had heard in time that Herr von Jagow 's resignation had 
occurred in connection with the question of the U-boat 
war, and was the result of it, I should have resigned at 
the same time as he did ; because my name was identified 
with the idea of American mediation for peace. More- 
over, up to the 9th, or rather the 19th, January, 1917, I 
was completely in accord with the Imperial Chancellor; 
for Herr von Bethmann-HoUweg declared before the 
Examination Committee of the National Assembly: 

"The whole of my work in connection with Wilson's 
efforts for peace was, indeed, directed towards render- 
ing the threat of a U-boat war unnecessary, by bringing 
about- a peace movement which would, of course, have 
some promise of proving successful." 

These words amount to a complete approval of the 
policy which I pursued in Washington. When, therefore, 
on the 19th January, I received the Note informing me 
of the intended, opening of the unrestricted U-boat cam- 
paign, I could not tender my resignation, for I regarded 
it as my duty to the German people, to resist until the 



EUPTURE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 389 

last the unrestricted U-boat war, and, if possible, to avert 
a breach* with the United States. When, on the 31st Jan- 
uary, 1917, the U-boat policy had definitely triumphed, I 
had no further chance of resigning my office, seeing that 
owing to the immediate rupture of diplomatic relations it 
was lost to me. 

The various reasons, for and against Mr. Wilson's 
mediation, were all thrashed out in great detail in this 
country, before the Examination Committee of the 
National Assembly, in the winter of 1916-17. And, ac- 
cording to the evidence given, the decisive cause of the 
failure of the scheme was the distrust which the most 
influential' statesmen felt towards the President. If any 
confidence had been felt in Mr. Wilson, Herr von Beth- 
mann-Hollweg would have opposed the adoption of the 
U-boat war, and would have allowed the President's 
efforts for mediation to pursue their course. As a wit- 
ness before the Committee, he himself said : 

** There can be no doubt, now that we can look back 
upon events, that we should have done better had we 
placed our fate in President Wilson's hands, and had 
accepted his offers of mediation." 

As I have already pointed out, the factor which in my 
opinion was largely responsible for determining the 
course we ultimately adopted was the under-estimation 
and ignorance of America which was so widespread in 
Germany. From the very first moment the problem was 
not properly understood by the German nation. The fact 
was overlooked that the most important battle of the 
war was taking place in Washington, and when the 
tragedy reached its climax, no one believed that, with all 
her political, military and economic power, the United 
States of America would ever enter into the war. 



390 MY THEEE TEABS IN AMERICA 

Finally, it has been pointed ont as an objection to my 
view, that, after all, the Entente would have rejected 
Wilson's efforts at mediation. I am no longer in a posi- 
tion to prove the contrary to-day, and it is, of course, 
just possible, that the President* and Mr. House were 
mistaken in assuming as much as they did. If at that 
time, however, we expected the Entente to reject Mr. 
Wilson's offer of mediation, we should at all events have 
postponed the U-boat war, and accepted American inter- 
vention, in order to improve our diplomatic position in 
Washington, before having recourse to the ultima ratio. 
It seems to have been our destiny that all our most im- 
portant decisions of the war were the outcome of military 
and not of political considerations. On the Entente side, 
the converse was always true, and that is why, though it 
suffered many military reverses, the Entente won the 
war. 

In pursuing the policy I advocated, I was influenced 
by considerations, which now, in conclusion, I should like 
to sum up as follows : 

(1) It was no longer possible to achieve a decisive 
German victory after the first Battle of the Marne, that 
is why German policy should have been directed towards 
obtaining ** Peace without Victory"; and, as things 
turned out, such a victory was only to be obtained by 
means of American mediation. 

(2) The personality of Mr. Wilson played no decisive 
part in determining my attitude. I never once reckoned 
upon his personal friendliness towards ourselves ; for I 
knew him too well to suppose him capable of pro-German 
tendencies. I expected nothing more from him than that 
he would play America's game— America's and no other 
country's — supported by the public opinion of the United 
States. American policy, however, pursued the object 



RUPTURE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 391 

of a '* Peace without Victory," from the standpoint of 
practical politics, in order that, neither Germany nor 
England should attain to a superlatively powerful posi- 
tion. A ** Peace without Victory'* of this sort, under 
American patronage, would have left the United States 
in the undisputed position of the first political power in 
the world. To this, there was added certain other reasons 
of an ideal political nature, owing to the fact that both 
Mr. Wilson and the great majority of the American 
people wished to put an end to all the bloodshed and 
misery. 

(3) The beginning of the unrestricted U-boat war was 
bound, as things had developed, to lead automatically to 
the rupture of diplomatic relations with the United 
States. 

(4) As matters stood in America, the rupture of diplo- 
matic relations was equally bound automatically to bring 
about war with the United States. 

(5) War with the United States had to be averted at 
all costs, because Americans help meant giving our enemy 
such an overwhelming preponderance of power, that a 
German defeat became an absolute certainty. 

(6) The political situation was such that, the accept- 
ance of the American offer of mediation was the only 
means of preventing the United States from entering the 
war. 

(7) If America did not enter the war, the Entente 
were not in a position to beat us. 

(8) If Mr. Wilson had succeeded in bringing both 
belligerent parties to the conference table, a sort of 
Hubertsburg Peace* would have been concluded. In 

*This refers to the Treaty of Hubertsburg, which was one of the 
treaties that put an end to the Seven Years War on the 15th February, 
1763. It was concluded between the States of Prussia, Austria and 
Saxony. Nobody seems to have derived any advantage from the treaty, 
except perhaps Frederick II., on whose province of Silesia Marie-Th6rfeBe 
renounced all further claim. 



392 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

view of the situation, a peace unfavorable to ourselves 
was unthinkable. Who, at that time, could have com- 
pelled us to accept terms which we regarded as incom- 
patible with Germany's position in the world? Herr 
Helfferich, before the Examination Committee of the 
National Assembly, expressed the view that in the end 
Mr. Wilson would have forced peace upon us with the 
butt-end of a rifle. But whence would he have obtained 
this butt-end ? He had not one, and it took him a year to 
create an army. No one who is familiar with the United 
States can believe that it would ever have been possible 
to drive the Americans into the war, once a Peace Con- 
ference had assembled. For then it would only have been 
a matter of deciding the fate of one or two pieces of 
territory or colonies, in which the Americans would not 
have felt the slightest interest. Naturally, we should 
have had to restore Belgium and accept the disarmament 
programme, etc. But we had already declared ourselves 
ready to take these measures, and, as regards disarma- 
ment, etc., this reform was inevitable, in view of the 
economic position of all the countries concerned. If 
America had not entered the war, no one could have 
forced us to accept less advantageous terms than the 
status quo ante, with possibly some mutual compensation. 



CHAPTER Xn 
THE RETURN HOME 

After the rupture of diplomatic relations, I entrnsted 
the care of our interests to the Swiss Legation, and from 
that time I did not speak a word to any American official 
except to the Assistant Secretary of State, Breckenridge 
Long, who accompanied ns as far as the boat at New 
York. From the majority of those gentlemen with whom 
I had official relations, however, I received very friendly 
letters of farewell. 

The principal passage in the letter from Lansing, the 
Secretary of State, was as follows: 

**I shall bear in mind all yonr earnest efforts in the 
cause of peace, and will gladly recall our personal rela- 
tions, which, in spite of the difficulties of the situation, 
were always a pleasure to me.*' 

In view of the conditions prevailing at the time, the 
preparations for our departure took a long time. It was 
only with difficulty that we were able to obtain the neces- 
sary accommodation for the large number of German 
officials and their families on the Danish ship Friedrich 
VIII. The business of getting the necessary papers — 
such, for instance, as the Entente's safe conduct — also 
necessitated lengthy negotiations, which were conducted 
by the Swiss Legation with the assistance of Prince 
Hatzf eldt, the Secretary of the Embassy. Our departure 
could only take place on the 14th February. 

It was not pleasant to be obliged to remain eleven days 
longer in Washington. The moment the rupture of diplo- 

393 



394 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

matic relations occurred, the secret police took possession 
of the Embassy, and shadowed every one of my move- 
ments. These precautionary measures were supposed to 
guarantee my personal safety; but I should have been 
quite safe without them, for all Americans behaved to- 
wards me with perfect propriety and courtesy. Our 
personal friends did not allow the rupture of diplomatic 
relations to make any difference in their attitude towards 
us. Until the very day of our departure, my wife and I 
were the daily guests of American friends. Even the 
Press, with but a few exceptions, maintaihed a friendly 
attitude ; for all the journalists knew that I had worked 
hard to maintain peace. As an example of this, I repro- 
duce below an article from the New York Tribune, which 
is one of the leading anti-German papers in America. I 
give the article, somewhat abbreviated, in the original, 
in order to preserve its American character: 

"Diplomacy and Friendship twin arts of Bernstorff. 

"Departing German Envoy, target of critics here and 
at home, quits post with brilliant record and many per- 
sonal friends. 

"The sailing of Friedrich VIII. invites the cordial 
obituary style, though diplomatic deaths are supposed to 
warrant no sadness. And yet, curiously enough, Count 
Bernstorff probably finds himself leaving when more 
people are personally for him and fewer against him than 
at any time in the last two years. A less distinguished 
diplomat would not have had the art to stay so long. 

"A letter from Washington, dated June, 1915, is in my 
desk. It tells incidentally about the visit of a friend to 
the Ambassador shortly after his interview with the 
President. *It*s coming out all right,' the Count said , 
cheerfully, his melancholy eyes lighting up, and the \ 
anxious lines etched in his face during the months past 



THE RETURN HOME 395 

lightening. *No, they're not going to get rid of me yet 
for a while/ referring to the Press clamor for his 
dismissal. 

* * ' I 'm glad of that, ' answered the friend. * Then you '11 
stay and get some more degrees.' (Eight American uni- 
versities had honored him.) *0h,' he answered with a 
gesture, *I may leave by degrees.' It is winning to catch 
an Excellency at puns. 

*'At his departure many persons — close friends of the 
last eight years and newspaper correspondents — are 
going to miss his amazing charm and the easy candor of 
his talk. He has had an intimate directness in his deal- 
ings with all sorts and conditions of people, that only a 
personage of magnetic personality can adopt. 

** Sheer charm alone can forget caste consciousness. 
Count Bernstorff has had none of the patent heavy regard 
for himself that makes three-quarters of official Germany 
a chore to meet. 'I'll put you through,' the little tele- 
phone girl, at his favorite New York hotel, used to say 
promptly, when his Excellency was asked for, and knew 
that she was safe. 

** Reporters will miss seeing him teeter informally by 
the Embassy fireplace as he interviewed them, or gave 
out a significant something from behind a hastily-raised 
newspaper. 

"The insistent friends of Germany, heavily friendly 
and advisory, will miss his English, very soft with an 
attractive ghost, now and then, of a lisp. He learned it 
in London, his first language, for he was bom there fifty- 
five years ago. His father. Count Albrecht, was on 
service as Ambassador to the Court of St. James'. 

*' Count Bernstorif came to America from his post as 
Consul-General in Cairo. He was stationed there in the 
trying diplomatic period of Anglo-French rapprochement 
and the rise of naval competition between the English 



396 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

and the German empires. By many, Count Bernstorff is 
credited with saving Turkish Egypt and most of the 
Moslem world to the German balance. They say he did 
it over coffee with Khedive Abbas Hilmy, who never, 
never was bored by his wit, nor failed to appreciate the 
graces bred down from thirteenth-century Mecklenburg 
of the tall Herr Consul-General. And in return from the 
Moslem Count Bernstorff may have caught some of his 
comforting regard for kismet. 

**The man is more than a little fatalist. *"Wliat hap- 
pens must happen,' he was wont to say, as he sorted the 
threatening letters from his morning correspondence. 
And again: 'What difference does it make? They've 
killed so many that one more can make no difference.' 

**He goes back to Berlin now, there as here different 
things to different people. A rank Social Democrat I 
have heard him called in drawing-rooms, where news of 
his earnest plea to his Government for a liberal Lusitania 
Note had leaked out. 

**It has not been easy for him to construe and weigh 
the American situation for his Government, and have his 
judgment taken, any more than it has been easy for Mr. 
Gerard to convince the German Foreign Office that the 
American Notes were really meant. Often the same 
agent knocked both men and got in ahead of either as the 
authority on what America would do. 

"A certain American Baroness, Egeria to the Ameri- 
can journalists in Berlin, who has no use for Bernstorff 
or Gerard or Zimmermann, has been one of his many 
cockle burrs. Most of the German- Americans who chose 
to protest about the shipment of munitions and all of 
pro-submarine Germany plus an aspirant or two for his 
post — all of these have been busy against him. And the 
Americans are legion who have seconded the hate. He 
himself has been silent, with an occasional wry smile over 



THE EETURN HOME 397 

it all. He has never excused himself when attacks on 
him, personally, followed German actions against which 
he had counselled. 

*'He has tried over and over again to explain to the 
German Foreign Office the temper of the American 
people, whose sentimentality is so different from that 
which prevails in the Hanover-Bremen-Leipzig breast. 
The Hamhurger-Nachricliten has reviled him. It has 
been hard to see with Hamburg eyes what Count Bern- 
storff must know — that hardly a diplomat alive could 
have stayed so long on friendly terms with Washington, 
through these two years, or reaped so heavy a harvest of 
understanding from his study of poker and baseball as 
well as American commerce and institutions. People like 
to write — I, too — of his melancholy eyes, his gently 
cynical estimates of most dreamers' hopes. Over one 
circumstance he has been always hopeful. He has clung 
always to the hope that America neutral would be a 
leader in the erection of peace machinery, eager that 
every diplomatic transaction should perhaps have the 
possibility of an instrument. His real object in leaving, 
I am sure, is that not again will he turn over a communi- 
cation from the American State Department to read a 
faint hope of peace between lines." 

Apart from the measures taken for our security, our 
departure from Washington and New York was not very 
different from what it would have been in ordinary times, 
had I been moving to take up my duties in another coun- 
try. Many friends came to the railway station at Wash- 
ington, and on the boat at New York. Telegrams and 
letters of farewell came in hundreds, and our cabins were 
full of presents, consisting of baskets of fruit, flowers, 
cigars, books, beverages of all kinds, which are the cus- 
tom at leavetakings in America. In these circumstances. 



398 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

and after all that I liave described in the foregoing pages, 
I was not a little astonished when, about a year later, the 
American War-Propaganda Department began to hold 
me responsible for proceedings which were partly simply 
fiction, and for the rest of a kind that had occurred with- 
out any assistance from me whatever. I can understand 
perfectly the wish of the American Propaganda Depart- 
ment to create a war spirit, just as the same department 
in all belligerent countries strove to do; nevertheless, it 
was not necessary to adorn the war propaganda with un- 
justifiable personal attacks. Nothing happened after my 
departure from America to prompt such attacks. A few 
of my telegrams were, to be sure, deciphered and pub- 
lished in order to prove that I had hatched a conspiracy. 
When the Military and Naval Attaches were compelled 
to leave the United States, I could not very well avoid 
discharging the whole of the naval and military business 
myself. But this does not prove that I had previously 
had any dealings with these matters, even admitting that 
the Naval and Military Attaches had been guilty of illegal 
practices, which, despite all the uproar created by enemy 
propaganda, I do not believe to have been proved. Once 
the fever of war has died down, no one, presumably, will 
feel any interest in devoting any attention to such ques- 
tions. If, however, later on, anyone should feel inclined 
to investigate the *' German conspiracies," and *' German 
propaganda,'' in the United States, in an impartial spirit, 
he will be astonished to find how many fantastic fictions 
were brought to the notice of the Investigation Com- 
mittee of the Senate, and what small justification lay at 
the bottom of the charges made against the German 
Embassy. 

When, on the afternoon of the 14th of February, we 
took to sea, we had no idea that we were to enjoy the 
hospitality of the gallant steamer Friedrich VIII., and 



THE EETURN HOME 399 

its amiable captain, for four long weeks. Ever since the 
establishment of regular lines of passenger steamers 
between America and Europe, we must certainly have 
broken all records in regard to the length of time we took 
to complete the journey. There were on board the Fried- 
rich VIII., in addition to the whole of the staff of the 
Embassy, together with their wives and children, the 
complete personnel of the consulates, as also a few native 
Germans, who for some reason or other, happened to be 
in America and had not yet had an opportunity of return- 
ing home. A few Scandinavians completed the list of the 
passengers. The total number of Germans was approxi- 
mately two hundred. According to the wording of the 
Safe Conduct which we had been granted, we were al- 
lowed to take with us our personal belongings and **a 
reasonable amount of money. '* We were expressly for- 
bidden to carry any papers. 

The first twenty-four hours of the journey were the 
most pleasant. The sea was calm and the weather was 
not too cold, and on the following evening we reached 
Halifax, which was the port at which we were to be 
examined. It was selected in order that we might not 
have to enter the war zone. Here we had the first taste 
of the vexations of the journey. Our captain wanted to 
enter the port; but he was ordered to anchor outside. 
On the following morning the authorities allowed us to 
enter. "We were placed under the supervision of the 
English cruiser Devonshire, and I cannot help admitting 
that the English naval officers discharged the undignified 
and distasteful duties imposed upon them with great 
courtesy. The Canadian officials, on the other hand, be- 
haved with the utmost disrespect and boorishness. They 
appeared to be accustomed to dealing only with immi- 
grants and stowaways. 

I do not know to this day, why, in spite of our Safe 



400 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

Conduct, we were held up twelve days in the Bedford 
Basin, which, with its encircling snow-clad hills, was com- 
pletely shut off from the rest of the world. The examina- 
tion in itself could not* adequately account for this 
strange and uncustomary behavior, particularly towards 
an Ambassador: for although the ship's coal was ulti- 
mately sifted in the search for contraband goods, if any 
good-will had been shown, the examination could have 
been finished in three to four days at the outside. I 
suppose, however, that the delay was intended to serve 
political ends. The English probably wanted to keep us 
shut up in Halifax until the United States had entered 
into the war. They were perfectly well aware of my 
views, and feared that in Berlin I might after all succeed 
in effecting an understanding with the American Govern- 
ment. As, however, developments in the United States 
dragged on very slowly, and at first only an armed neu- 
trality was contemplated, the English were ultimately 
obliged to allow us to continue our journey, because they 
could not very well keep us confined for weeks. 

Personally, I cannot complain of the treatment to 
which I was subjected at Halifax, for I was the only one 
among all my fellow passengers of German nationality 
who had not to submit to having my person searched, and 
was only required to sign a declaration that I was carry- 
ing no papers. Everybody else — even my wife — had to 
consent to being searched, an operation which was per- 
formed in a humiliating manner, and which led to many 
an unpleasant scene. Even little Huberta Hatzf eldt, who 
was only three months old, was stripped of her swaddling 
clothes. The Canadian authorities assessed the ** reason- 
able sum of money*' allowed at ninety dollars a head, and 
confiscated all moneys above that sum as contraband. In 
this way. Countess Manfred Matuschka lost 25,000 dol- 
lars, which, in ignorance of the regulations, she had 



THE KETURN HOME 401 

brought with her. The sum was to be deposited with a 
Canadian Bank, but has probably been lost forever by 
its owner. As I was forbidden to have any communica- 
tion whatsoever with the outside world, I was not able 
to carry out my intention of lodging a complaint at 
Washington regarding this breach of the Safe Conduct 
that had been granted to us. 

At last, however, our imprisonment came to an end, 
and we were allowed to pursue our journey. Amid the 
cheers of all on board, including particularly those of our 
excellent captain, who felt the affront we had received 
very deeply, we weighed anchor. Judge of the almost 
panic-stricken disappointment of all the passengers, 
therefore, when at the end of a few knots, the ship turned 
back on her course ! To the great relief of all concerned, 
however, it appeared that we had only forgotten to take 
on board the wireless telegraphy apparatus which had 
been taken from us at Halifax. From that moment, apart 
from very bad and cold weather, we continued our 
journey without further incident. "We took a sweeping 
curve northward, then sailed down the Norwegian coast 
without meeting either an enemy ship or a German 
submarine. Some of the neutral passengers were so 
much terrified of the latter, that they did not retire to 
their beds for many nights at a stretch. 

At ten o'clock in the morning we landed in the snow in 
Christiania. Meanwhile the Mexico telegram had been 
published in Washington, and Michaelis, the German 
Ambassador, in accordance with instructions, came on 
board, in order to learn from me whether I could offer 
any explanation of the fact — that is to say, whether I 
suspected treachery on the part of any of my staff. It is 
indeed plain from the oft-quoted reports of the Com- 
mittee of the Senate, that a host of underhand tricks 
must have been played, particularly in the Post Office; 



402 MY THEEE YEARS IN AMERICA 

nevertheless, I am of opinion that in this case the ex- 
planation which I^ave above is the correct one. The 
telegram in question, like many others, was presumably 
deciphered by the English. From the experience gained 
during the war, we have learned that the diplomacy of 
the future will never be allowed to rely, for important 
matters, upon the secret of a cipher; for skilful experts 
are now able to discover the most complicated code, pro- 
vided that they are able to intercept a sufficient number 
of telegrams. Over and above this, owing |;o our isolation 
in Washington, we were able to alter the cipher but very 
seldom. As to the suggestion of treachery on the part of 
any member of my staff — I never believed in this at the 
time, nor do I believe in it now. In very hard times they 
all proved themselves to be thoroughly loyal and efficient. 
We had to remain in Christiania longer than we ex- 
pected, because the route across the Sound to Copen- 
hagen was entirely ice-bound. Finally, with the help of 
ice-breakers, even this obstacle was overcome, and after 
a day's halt at Copenhagen, we at last reached Berlin 
via Warnemiinde. We had received an extremely hos- 
pitable and cordial welcome at Christiania and Copen- 
hagen, at the hands of the Ambassadors, Michaelis and 
Count Brockdorff-Rantzau — ^we also had an opportunity 
of convincing ourselves that the feeling in Denmark and 
Norway had turned against us just as sharply as in 
America. The balance of power was, however, different. 
If our neutral neighbors had not been living in fear of 
German power, they would at this time have responded 
to Mr. Wilson's call, and would have broken off all diplo- 
matic relations with us. I believe that the President was 
hoping that events might take this turn, and that he would 
thus be spared the need of waging war. If all the coun- 
tries in the world were to declare war against Germany 
and her Allies — this is what was assumed in Washington 



THE RETURN HOME 403 

— the economic pressure would alone suffice to compel 
the Central Powers to yield. The policy proposed was 
similar to the one which, in the future, the League of 
Nations would pursue against any refractory member of 
its body, and which the Entente proposes to adopt to-day 
against Bolshevist Russia. The great length of time 
which it took the United States to enter the war is, in 
my opinion, to be explained in this way. The idea was 
to wait and see how things would develop. Meanwhile, 
thanks to the Mexico telegram, war-propaganda in 
America was being worked with great success, and the 
military preparations made such steady progress, that 
even if economic measures did not prove sufficient to end 
the war, the United States would have obtained the army 
they had longed for for so many years, as also the fleet 
of war and merchant ships, for which in times of peace 
Congress would never have voted the necessary funds. 

On the evening of the day after our arrival in Berlin, 
I was received by the Imperial Chancellor, with whom 
I had a long interview. It was on this occasion that Herr 
von Bethmann-HoUweg informed me that he could not 
help consenting to the U-boat war, as the German people 
would never have understood it if we had concluded an 
unsatisfactory peace, without attempting to bring about 
a happy decision by means of the last and most effective 
weapon in which the nation felt any confidence. He also 
said that he would have been unable to go before the 
Reichstag with an offer of mediation from Mr. Wilson, 
because such intervention would not have been popular, 
public opinion would not have liked it, and it would only 
have been accepted by the Social Democrats. Herr von 
Bethmann-Hollweg declared that the Reichstag would 
have "thrown him out." This was the very expression 
he used. But this did not explain why, a few weeks pre- 
viously, Mr. Wilson's mediation had seemed desirable, if, 



404 MY THKEE YEARS IN AMERICA 

as a matter of fact, it was impossible to get the Reichstag 
to agree to it. Meanwhile, the political situation at that 
time has been completely elucidated by the evidence 
which Herr von Bethmann-HoUweg gave before the Ex- 
amination Committee of the National Assembly. In his 
account of the interview he had with me, he spoke as 
follows: 

"As regards my interview with Count Bernstorff, on 
his return from America, I should like to make the 
following remarks : I cannot recall all the details of the 
conversation I had with Count Bernstorff. Count Bern- 
storff has revealed in his evidence what I said to him, and 
I have no doubt that he has accurately reproduced my 
actual words. My duty was — and this is an idea I 
already touched upon earlier in the day — once the policy 
of an unrestricted U-boat war was resolved upon, never 
to reveal to anyone any doubts as to the efficacy of the 
scheme. In this case, too, I had to say, we shall achieve 
something by means of it. And that is why in my con- 
versation with Count Bernstorff, I did not reveal my in- 
most feelings on the subject — there was no need for me 
to do so — ^but simply referred to the reasons which could 
be adduced in favor of the U-boat war." 

The reception which I was given in Berlin, certainly at 
first left nothing to be desired. The Imperial Chancellor, 
on the occasion of our first meeting, had thanked me in 
a very hearty manner for my work in Washington, and a 
few days later, proposed that I should go on an extraor- 
dinary mission to Stockholm. On principle I was quite 
prepared to do this, seeing that the recent outbreak of 
revolution in Russia, and the prospective international 
Socialist conference in Stockholm, would offer fresh 
possibilities of peace, and an opportunity for useful 



THE EETURN HOME 405 

work. From various things I had noticed in Berlin, I 
gathered that — as the evidence before the Examination 
Committee proved — the Imperial Chancellor would have 
preferred to give up the idea of the U-boat war, and to 
accept American intervention in favor of peace, but that 
he was compelled to give in, owing to the overwhelming 
advocacy of the U-boat campaign. It was to be hoped, 
therefore, that with the expected speedy failure of U-boat 
tactics, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg would snatch at the 
next opportunity of making peace. As he remained in 
Office, in spite of the U-boat war, his chief motive for so 
doing must certainly have been that ** after his departure 
the whole of the power, both of external and internal 
politics, would have gone over without resistance to the 
machinery of war-fever.'* I regarded any policy as the 
right one, which arrived at a prompt conclusion of peace, 
provided that we did not make any confession of weak- 
ness by ourselves initiating fresh offers of peace. We had 
already erred once in this way. But in Stockholm it 
seemed likely that opportunities might occur of winning 
either the Russians or the foreign Socialists over to a 
movement in favor of peace. 

As I heard nothing, either about the Stockholm 
Mission, or about an audience with the Kaiser, which I 
was led to expect in connection with it, I went at the end 
of a few days to find out what had happened, and I was 
told that the Kaiser had declined to sanction my mission 
to Stockholm. Although I had a second interview with 
the Imperial Chancellor, I was never able to ascertain 
definitely the reason of the Kaiser's anger against me. 
Since, however, General Ludendorff, simply on the 
grounds of my particular views, made his "impassioned" 
attack on me before the Examination Committee of the 
National Assembly, I have no longer been in any doubt 
whatsoever as to the nature of the influence that was at 



406 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

work at General Headquarters. At the time, I only 
suspected the prevalence of some such feelings in that 
quarter, because I had heard it whispered that the Mon- 
arch did not like my ** democratic views." The reasons 
for the Kaiser's anger, which were given me officially, 
were of too trivial a nature to be even plausible. 

I must next refer to the dispatch box of the Swedish 
Legation in Washington. At New York Herr Ekengren 
had put on board the steamer Friedrich VIII. a box con- 
taining Swedish telegrams, which was to be forwarded 
to its destination. 

This box, the very existence of which we Germans knew 
nothing about, was taken possession of by the British 
authorities in Halifax, and dispatched to England. The 
London newspapers then reported that a dispatch box, 
belonging to Count Bernstorff, and containing documents 
of the German Embassy, had been opened there. Al- 
though the mistake, whether intentional or the reverse, 
was very soon elucidated, someone had laid the matter 
before the Kaiser in a distorted light. Apparently the 
Kaiser was allowed to form the suspicion that the open- 
ing of the box had betrayed the secret of the Mexico 
telegram. 

A further reason for his displeasure, at the time, was 
told me subsequently at Constantinople by the Kaiser 
himself. He said that I had "let him down most 
dreadfully," when I had recommended Mr. Gerard as 
American Ambassador to Berlin. I ought never to have 
supported the nomination of such a *' Tammany Hall" 
creature. If he — the Kaiser — had only known at the 
time who Gerard was, and what Tammany Hall could 
be, he would never have accepted this Ambassador. In 
Constantinople I was able to reply to the Kaiser pretty 
fully, as the interview took place during a somewhat long 
journey on the Bosphorus. I certainly did recommend 



THE RETURN HOME 407 

Mr. Gerard in due course, but only after he had already 
been selected as Ambassador by Mr. Wilson. Before he 
had been chosen I was not asked. If at that time — in the 
year 1913 — I had advised the rejection of Mr. Gerard, it 
would only have created a lot of unnecessary ill-feeling, 
as was the case at the nomination of Mr. Hill. It is the 
custom in America to select the Ambassadors from 
politically influential circles of the triimiphant party; 
irrespective of whether Tammany Hall or any other 
organization is concerned. 

Moreover, in 1903 I believed that Mr. Gerard would be 
welcome in Berlin, for social reasons alone. Everybody 
knew that the Kaiser liked to have Ambassadors who 
entertained on a lavish scale. Mr. Gerard was the only 
man, among all the candidates of that day, who seemed 
fitted for this and in a position to live up to it, while his 
rich and amiable wife was admirably suited to help him 
in his task. Before the war, an American Ambassador 
in Berlin really never had any political business to 
transact, for it was the tradition with the United States 
Government to conduct all negotiations almost exclu- 
sively with the diplomatic corps in Washington. In 1913, 
therefore, I had no reason to advocate the rejection of 
Mr. Gerard in Berlin. Unfortunately, it was precisely 
in the social sphere that he had, before the war, experi- 
enced certain disappointments in Berlin, which, as far as 
we were concerned, might have been avoided, and it is 
possible that Mr. Gerard may have been influenced by 
these regrettable incidents. In any case, the Ambassador 
did not like Berlin, and he took too little pains to conceal 
the fact. Mr. Gerard was not the sort of man to be able 
to swim against the tide of anti-German feeling, once it 
had become the proper thing in America to be pro- Ally. 
As to whether any other United States Ambassador 
would have shown less hostility to us, however, may be 



408 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

reasonably doubted. I have already singled out the 
Adlon dinner as a proof of the fact that Mr. Gerard 
could behave differently. 

Be all this as it may, the reasons which were alleged 
genuinely to justify the hostile attitude of General 
Headquarters towards myself, struck me as not being 
sufficiently weighty. I say ''General Headquarters" 
intentionally, for the Kaiser was manifestly only preju- 
diced against me by the usual whisperings that charac- 
terized the Wilhehninian epoch. 

Nevertheless, I had conducted the most important 
negotiations of the war, and the Monarch must, in any 
case, have had the wish to hear the report of it all from 
the person chiefly concerned. Besides, the Kaiser knew 
as well as I did, that in Washington I had pursued the 
policy of which he and the Chancellor were actually in 
favor. Otherwise, the Imperial Memorandum, which was 
sent to me about the U-boat war, and to which I have 
already referred, would be inexplicable. Meanwhile, 
however, this policy had not been able to prevail against 
the preponderating influence of the military party, who 
demanded the U-boat campaign. Now, of course, I have 
no longer any doubt that the views which General Luden- 
dorff expressed against me before the Examination Com- 
mittee of the National Assembly, simply as his personal 
opinion and without proof, constituted more or less what 
was suggested to the Kaiser at this time. Briefly, they 
wished to make me the scapegoat for the United States' 
entry into the war, and this, despite the fact that all that 
I had prophesied in regard to American policy had 
proved correct, and all that my opponents had prophesied 
had proved wrong. In their efforts to accomplish this 
end, they found that a poisonous mixture could be brewed 
out of my efforts for peace, and my well-known demo- 
cratic views, which the Kaiser was not able to resist. 



THE EETURN HOME 409 

The tmhappy Monarch unfortunately never once 
realized that the ''Democrats" were his best friends. 
The Imperial power could, in the long run, only be up- 
held, if it found both its support and its counter-weight 
in a strong democracy. Like Friedrich Wilhelm IV., 
William II. was also unable to adapt himself to the 
changing circumstances of his time. The one-sided com- 
position of his entourage, which was always recruited 
from among people who held his own views, was, at all 
events, chiefly to blame for this. 

Although the Imperial Chancellor had told me that he 
would overcome the Kaiser's displeasure in regard to 
myself, almost two months elapsed before I was received 
at General Headquarters, and even then, it was only be- 
cause a question had been asked about the matter in the 
Reichstag. "When I saw the Kaiser, towards the begin- 
ning of May, in Kreuznach, the American question was of 
interest merely to historians, and no longer to politicians. 
Consequently, my interview with the Monarch, which took 
place on a walk, was not of very great moment. With his 
customary skill, the Kaiser steered clear of any attempt 
to enter deeply into the political problems of the hour, 
and behaved towards me, for the rest, just as affably as 
he had been wont to do in the past. 

I had made the journey to Kreuznach in the company 
of my late friend, Ballin, whom I was never to see again. 
Whereas I was invited to lunch at the Imperial board, 
Herr Ballin was only asked to dinner. 

Among the many and various charges which were 
brought against me in my Washington days, was the 
allegation that I was principally an agent of Ballin 's. I 
had, in cordial agreement with Herr Ballin, always en- 
ergetically supported the interests of German Shipping 
Companies; but even my most bitter enemies can only 
justify their charge against me for the period preceding 



410 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

the war. For, during the war, Herr Ballin had no influ- 
ence at all, either in America or at home. He was, for 
instance, kept aloof from the Kaiser, because he was 
regarded as an "interested party'' and as a pessimist. 
On the occasion in question, a high oflScial of the Court 
said to me at the Imperial table that if I was seeing 
Ballin again before I left Kreuznach, would I please tell 
him that he was not to speak so pessimistically to the 
Emperor as he was wont to do. The Emperor ought 
not to be allowed to hear such stuff, otherwise he would 
lose nerve. This little passage of conversation is a proof 
of the carefully ** insulated" position in which, as every- 
one knows, the Kaiser was kept. 

After lunch I paid a visit to both of our great Army 
Commanders, whose acquaintance I made for the first 
time on this occasion. 

*' Bowing to necessity rather than to my own personal 
tastes," I must now, unfortunately, enter into personal 
matters, which hitherto I have diligently avoided in this 
book. I cannot, however, help referring here to the 
utterly unwarranted attacks made upon me by General 
Ludendorff, in his evidence before the Examination 
Committee of the National Assembly, with the view of 
refuting my own account of the interview which we had 
at Gr. H. Q. At all events, the General so completely lost 
control of himself before the Examination Committee, 
that this possibly explains his false interpretation of my 
evidence. 

To deal first with the reason which actuated me in 
visiting General Ludendorff, I reproduce below the dia- 
logue which took place thereanent before the Examina- 
tion Committee : 

Delegate Dr. Cohn: Was your interview with Field- 
Marshal Hindenburg and General Ludendorff brought 



THE EETURN HOME 411 

about by any particular person or persons— either by 
yourself, by the Imperial Chancellor, or by the Foreign 
Office; or was it purely accidental! 

Witness Count von Bernstorff: It was the outcome of 
the circumstances. I received a telegram which informed 
me, through the Foreign Office, that I was to report to 
the Kaiser at Kreuznach on the 4th of May. Now, Field- 
Marshal Hindenburg and General Ludendorff were also 
present at the lunch table, and I felt that I was bound in 
courtesy to pay a visit to the two gentlemen after the 
meal. 

Delegate Dr, Cohn: Good. If I understand you cor- 
rectly, my lord, G. H. Q. did not even feel the need of 
speaking with the Ambassador just recently returned 
from America? 

Witness Count von Bernstorff: No. I never received 
any summons for that purpose. 

I abide by these utterances to this day, because I 
actually remained seven weeks without being summoned 
to an interview with General Ludendorff, and then only 
visited him of my own free will, on the occasion when I 
reported to the Kaiser. In these circumstances, there- 
fore, I was entirely justified in describing my visit as 
simply an act of courtesy. In view of the circumstances, ' 
I might perhaps say : an act of super-courtesy. 

I do not dispute General Ludendorff 's statement that 
I had expressed the wish to see him; for if I had not 
had the wish, I should have left Kreuznach without pay- 
ing him a visit. As, however, General Ludendorff, in his 
evidence before the Examination Committee, allowed it 
to be plainly understood that, owing to the difference of 
our views, he did not like to have anything to do with 
me, I will at once emphasize the fact, that my wish to see 
him was actuated by purely official motives. In politics 



412 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

I have at all times laid all personal feelings entirely 
aside, and have thought only of the business and the 
interests of my country. "While I was kicking my heels 
in Berlin for all those weeks, waiting upon a summons 
to the Emperor, I was urged by many people to try and 
obtain an interview with General Ludendorff, in order 
to enlighten him regarding American affairs, as in this 
respect he was very badly informed. The latter fact, 
has, at all events, been substantiated by General Luden- 
dorff himself, in his evidence before the Committee. The 
gentlemen who urged me to obtain this interview, them- 
selves made efforts to bring it about. But these efforts 
were of no avail, and I therefore regarded them as too 
insignificant to be mentioned in my own evidence. In 
all my utterances before the Committee, I refrained from 
all allusion to personal and subjective matters. 

General Ludendorff has further maintained that I 
impugned his honor by declaring that, generally speak- 
ing, he did not wish to conclude peace. I naturally never 
made such a nonsensical statement. Immediately after 
my visit to General Ludendorff at G. H. Q., I made notes 
of the essential passages of our interview; because I 
suspected, what in my opinion has since become a cer- 
tainty, to wit, that the General wished to heap all the 
blame of the war with America upon my shoulders. 
Every impartial reader who examines the Notes given 
below, will be forced to admit, that they contain nothing 
whatsoever except assertions, which have been confirmed 
by all the evidence given before the Committee of the 
National Assembly; that is to say: 

(1) That I wished to accept Mr. Wilson's offer of 
mediation. 

(2) That the Imperial Government — that is to say, 
G. H. Q. or whoever was responsible for taking the final 



THE RETURN HOME 413 

decision — did not wish to accept Mr. Wilson's offer of 
mediation, in order to declare the unrestricted U-boat 
war instead. 

(3) That the Naval Authorities had declared them- 
selves in a position to bring about a desire for peace in 
England in five months from the 1st of February. 

My notes about the interview I had with General 
Ludendorff ran as follows : 

General Ludendorff received me with the following 
words : 

"In America yon wanted to make peace. You evi- 
dently thought we were at the end of our tether. '* 

I replied : 

**No, I did not think that; but I wanted to make peace 
before we came to the end of our tether. '* 

Whereupon the General said : 

**We, however, did not want to. Besides, it would not 
have been surprising if you had thought that we had 
come to the end of our resources. The communications 
you received, which I read from time to time, certainly 
led to that conclusion." 

Later on in the conversation, General Ludendorff 
asked me when, in my opinion, the Americans would 
participate in the war with great force. I replied that 
in twelve months a large American army was to be ex- 
pected in France, and that this army would be organized 
with comparative ease. To this the General rejoined 
that in that case we had ample time to end the war 
meanwhile; for the U-boats would force England to a 
peace in three months. He had received absolutely cer- 
tain information on this point. When I was on the point 
of leaving, General Ludendorff repeated this remark 
very positively. 



414 MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA 

^ Thougli the sense was tlie same, the actual wording of 
my evidence before the Examination Committee differs 
somewhat from that of the notes given above. This is 
explained, however, by the fact that I spoke quite freely, 
and therefore prefaced my remarks with the words: 
**So far as I can remember, and so far as I am able to 
say, under oath, the conversation was more or less as 
follows," etc. 

I did not enter into the personal views which General 
Lndendorff thought fit to express in his evidence before 
the Examination Committee; for I am of the opinion 
that the duty of the Committee was simply to establish 
the real truth by an inquiry into the facts. It is open to 
the Committee to put to me any questions they like con- 
cerning my activities in Washington, and I will answer 
them frankly; but I think that a quarrel between wit- 
nesses about their own personal opinions would have 
been an undignified spectacle, in which I distinctly re- 
fused to participate. I gladly leave it to the reader of 
the present volume to form his own ideas regarding my 
work in America. 

In May, 1917, I left G. H. Q., feeling quite convinced 
that for the moment there was no room for me in German 
diplomacy; for the only policy which I regarded as right, 
had no prospect of being realized. After my return from 
America, I was placed on half-pay. I was therefore at 
liberty to return home, however unwilling I may have 
felt, at that moment of great tribulation for my country, 
to give myself up to a life of ease and idleness. During 
my period of rest, a Reichstag resolution was passed, and 
there was a change of Chancellors. 

When Herr von Kuhlmann, who is a friend of mine, 
took over the Foreign Office, he summoned me by tele- 
gram to Berlin, and told me that the Imperial Chancellor, 
Michaelis, was going to offer me the post of Ambassador 



THE EETURN HOME 415 

in Constantinople. Some years previously Herr von 
Kiililmann and I had worked together in London. We 
had been on very good terms, and since then I had never 
lost touch with him. As he assured me very positively 
that he had taken over the Foreign Office in order to 
conclude peace, I felt no qualms about returning once 
more to diplomatic duties. I did not, however, conceal 
from Herr von Kiihlmann, that I expected that there 
would be very strong opposition at G. H. Q. to my being 
employed again on Foreign Service. The Secretary of 
State was of the opinion that we might confidently leave 
this side of the question to the Imperial Chancellor, who 
at that moment was on his honeymoon, and was therefore 
admirably situated to carry things through. My inter- 
view with Herr Michaelis only made me more eager than 
ever to undertake th6 Mission to Constantinople. He 
said to me that he was offering me a very difficult and 
unpleasant billet, for I should have to wring concessions 
from the Turks with the object of bringing about peace. 
This view of the situation corresponded entirely with my 
own. Contrary to my expectations, the Imperial ratifica- 
tion of my appointment arrived; but the Monarch also 
seized the opportunity of making certain remarks about 
my democratic views, without, however, withholding his 
signature from my credentials. 

In September I set out for Constantinople, where 
thirty years previously I had started my diplomatic 
career, and where I was now to end it. 



INDEX 



INDEX 



Ackerman, Karl, 338 
Albert, Privy Councillor, appoint- 
ment of, 36; financial affairs 
of, 40, 42, 46; office of, 41; 
propaganda work of, 49 ; mov- 
ing picture work*of , 56 ; ship- 
ping activities of, 80 ff., 85 
ff. ; hindrance of, 83 ff.; ma- 
rine insurance and, 89, 92; 
"conspiracies" and, 119; du- 
ties of, 165; robbing of, 196 
ff., 270 
Albrecht, Count, 395 
Algeciras Conference, 13 ff. 
Alsace, 329, 376 
America, see United States 
American Criminal Court, 119 
Embassy in London, 316 ff. 
Institute in Berlin, 23 
Law Department, 44, 262, 274 
Peace League, 291 
Peace Note, 318-321 
Press, 49 ff., 57, 94, 316 ff., 326, 

332 ff., 336 ff., 342 ff., 394 
Press Bureau, 47 
Secret Service, 47, 197 
War Propaganda Department, 
398 
Amsinck and Company, 261 
Ancona, sinking of, 210, 214 ff.; 

Lajasing and sinking of, 230 
Avdrew, 83 
Anglo-Saxons, 21 ~ 
Annie Larsen, 121 
Appam, 265 
Arabia, 303, 306, 342 
Arabic, sinking of, 90, 144, 168, 173; 
effect of sinking of, 173 ff., 
248; negotiations concerning, 
176 ff., 180 ff., 187 ff., 191 
ff. ; defense of sinking of, 
181 ff.; settlement of, 212, 
217, 219, 227, 236 



Arbitration Treaty, 24, 27 

Archibald, James, 197 ff. 

Armenian, sinking of, 163 

Asquith, Herbert, 298 

Associated Press, 32 ff., 51, 179, 221 

Atlanta, 102, 124, 338 

Atlantic, 87 

Austria-Hungary, Germany allied 
with, 2, 5; Serbian threat to, 
7; battle front of, 287; de- 
sire for peace in, 348 

Bagdad, 20 

Bakmetieff, 141 

Balkans, 7 

Ballin, 409 ff. 

Baltimore, 266 

Baltimore Sun, 38 

Bartelli, 261 

Baumgarten, Prof., 20 

Beachy Head, 246 

Beecher, Henry Ward, 43 

Belgium, invasion of, 30, 59, 130, 
387; atrocities in, 39, 53; 
atrocities of, 64; American 
aid to, 128, 267; proposed 
restoration of, 278, 287, 329, 
377, 392; deportations from, 
302, 305, 308 ff., 339 ff. 

Berchtold, Count, 7 

Berlin, 6, 36, 42, 46, 50, 63, 69, 71, 
95, 98 ff., 145, 154, 162, 164, 
167 ff. 173, 178 ff., 197, 214, 
220 ff., 230 ff., 243 ff., 247, 
250, 254 ff., 259, 262, 264, 283, 
285 ff., 290, 292 ff., 307, 309 
ff., 314 ff., 320, 322 ff., 325, 
340, 351, 358, 368 ff., 371, 373, 
375, 379, 400, 402, 407 

Bern Freie Zeitung, 44 

Bernstorff, Count, in London, 1, 16; 
pre-war policy of, 1 ff.; arbi- 
tration efforts of, 6 ff. ; Amer- 



419 



420 



INDEX 



ican relations with, 9; peace 
efforts of, 10 S., 60, 69; ap- 
pointment of, 23, 28; Roose- 
velt and, 28; newspapermen 
and, 39 ff.; Bryan and, 68, 
75; munition traffic and, 73; 
Col. House and, 79, 231, 270, 
281, 284, 290 S., 295 S., 373 
ff.; forged passports and, 104; 
"conspiracies" and, 108 ff., 
114, 119; submarine warfare 
and, 136 ff., 358 ff.; Lusitania 
affair and, 138, 149 ff., 152 ff., 
222 ff. ; Lusitania reports of, 
159 ff., 169, 171 ff., 213 ff.; 
Lansing and, 166, 172 ff., 177, 
180 ff., 205; Arabic affair 
and, 173, 188 ff.; Arabic re- 
ports of, 177 ff., 180, 182 ff., 
189 ff. ; German telegram on 
Arabic affair to, 179 ff. ; Ar- 
chibald affair and, 197 ff.; 
Boy-Ed, report of, 201; Sussex 
reports of, 241 ff., 244 ff., 
250 ff., 264; Bolo affair and, 
260; Polish relief report of, 
268; mediation reports of, 
274 ff., 279 ff., 285 ff., 295, 
353 ff.; 1916 election and, 300 
ff.; Commission of National 
Assembly and, 313 ff.; "Amer- 
ican opinion" described by, 
332 ff. ; Wilson's speech re- 
ported by, 372; departure of, 
393 ff.; article on, 394 ff.; 
arrival in Germany of, 403; 
German examination of, 403 
ff. 
Bethlehem Steel Works, 95 
Bethmann-Hollweg, von, 257, 311, 
325, 331 ff., 346, 379, 388 ff., 
403 ff. 
Bielaski, Commissioner Bruce, 44, 

111 ff., 121 ff. 
Bismarck, 2, 4, 11 
Bissing, von, 339 
Bode, 112 
Bopp, 112, 120 ff. 
Bosch Magneto Company, 96 ff. 
Boston, 160, 162, 333, 337„340 



Boston Evening Transcript, 38, 335, 
351 

Boy-Ed, Captain, office of, 41 ; recall 
of. 111, 123, 201 ff.; conspira- 
cies of, 114, 200; Rintelen 
and, 122 ff.; attacks on, 200 

Bremen, 94 

Bridgeport Projectile Company, 95 

Brinken, von, 112, 120 ff. 

British Royal Mail Steam Packet 
Company, 182 

Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 38, 335, 347 

Brown, Cyril, 338 ff. 

Bryan, William Jennings, 26; char- 
acter of, 27, 68; pacifism of, 
68, 75, 157; submarine war- 
fare and, 131 ff.; peace efforts 
of, 144 ff.; resignation of, 
151, 155 ff., 161, 169, 228, 264 

Bukarest, 312 

Bulgaria, 287 

Billow, Prince, 3, 4, 7, 24, 275 

Bunz, Dr., 102, 112 

"Bureau for Employment of German 
Workers," 116 

Burode, 203 

Cairo, 395 

Canada, 112 ff., 117 ff., 336 

Canadian Bank, 401 

Canadian Pacific Railway, 120 

Capelle, von, 263 

Caprivi, 2 ff. 

Carolyn, 86 

Carranza, 77 

Cavell, Edith, 53, 339 

"Central Office for Foreign Service," 
42 

"Central Purchasing Company," 36, 
165 

Charlotte, 343 

Chicago, 102, 116, 121, 123, 338 

Chicago Herald, 335 

Chicago Tribune, 38, 47 

China, 17, 99 

Christiania, 401 ff. 

Cincinnati, 28 

"Citizen's Committee for Food Ship- 
ments," 259 

Claussen, M. B., 48 

Clemenceau, 64 



INDEX 



421 



ClcTeland, 116, 140 

Collector of the Port of New York, 

84 
Commission of Inquiry, 43 ff., 49, 

111, 116, 124 flf. 
Commission of National Assembly, 

332. 368, 376, 379, 389, 404 

flf., 408, 410, 414 
Congress, 72, 95, 123, 144, 206, 214 

flf., 234, 236 flf., 301, 309, 352 

ff., 379 
Constantinople, 2, 68, 406, 415 
Copenhagen, 402 
Creel, George, 47 
Current History, 345 
Czechs, 122 



Dacher, 112, 125 

Danger Zone, 4 

Declaration of London, 90, 127, 134, 
136, 172, 256 

Democratic Party, 17, 26, 34, 62, 
235 flf. 

Denmark, 402 

Department of Justice, 111, 116 

Dernburg, Dr., appointment of, 36; 
duties of, 36; failure of mis- 
sion of, 40, 80; propaganda 
of, 41 ff., 44 ff., 50, 55 ff., 
115; funds of, 47; unpopu- 
larity of, 72, 145; submarine 
warfare and, 137 ; Lusitania 
affair defended by, 140; with- 
drawal of, 146, 162, 164 ff., 
215; Bernstorff supported by, 
168 I ?^ 

Deutsche Bank, 100 

Deutsche Tageszeitung, 383 ff. 

Deutscher Verein, 302 

Deutschland, 265 ff., 273, 281, 315, 
337 

Dewey, Admiral, 102 

De Wiart, Carton, 340 

Diedrichs, Admiral, 15 

Dieppe, 246 ff. 

Dobrudja, 288 

Dohna, Count, 265 

"Dollar Diplomacy," IT 

Dover, 37 



Dumba, Dr., 116; peace efforts of, 
155 ff., 169, ISg; Archibald 
affair and, 198 ff.; recall of, 
199, 210, 215 

Dunele, 181 

Duneyre, 83 

Dungeness, 246 

East Asiatic Squadron, 15 

Eastern Policy, 2, 12 

Eckhart, von, 115 

Eir, 83, 86 

Eitel Friedrich, 265 

Ekengren, 406 

Encirclement Policy, 3 

England, 43, 71, 88, 94, 179, 194, 
240; German relations with, 
1 ff., 36 ; Venezuela affair and, 
16; cables cut by, 38; inter- 
national law violated by, 40, 
80; propaganda expenses of, 
47; American press and, 51 
ff., 333; American relations 
with, 67, 190, 215, 217 ff., 
257, 264, 299, 305; blockade 
by, 81 ff., 92 ff., 99, 103, 127 
ff., 132, 145, 153, 164, 218, 
229, 232 ff., 235, 259, 264, 276 
ff., 281, 283, 343, 382; Wilson 
and, 171, 256 ff., 309; Amer- 
ican notes to: February 22, 

1915, 134 ff.; January 18, 

1916, 225; July 21, 1915, 226; 
October 21, 1915, 276 ff.; Lan- 
sing's note to, 76; debt of, 
186; merchantmen armed by, 
232; Polish relief and, 267 
ff.; mediation and, 275 ff., 
289, 306; resources of, 335; 
submarine warfare and, 341, 
413; peace feeling in, 348; 
wheat embargo against, 352; 
peace terms of, 374, 376; 
American financial aid of, 
382 

English Press, 16, 19, 305, 334 ff., 
337, 369 
propaganda, 30 
Secret Police, 195 
White Book, 233 



422 



INDEX 



Entente Note, quotations from, 6 ff. 
Entente Powers, aee England, France 

Falmouth, 92 

Fatherland, 39, 52 

Fay, Lt., 109, 112, 115, 124 ff., 199, 
203 

Federal Reserve Act, 93 

Federal Reserve Board, 308, 331, 
335 

Five Years War, 2, 6, 13 ff., 19, 
26, 29 

Flood, Representative, 75 

Folkestone, 246 ff. 

Ford, Henry, 344 

Franc-tireura, 64 

France, 3, 38, 240 ; German relations 
with, 8, 5; desire for war in, 
7; propaganda expenses of, 
47; munitions sent to, 122; 
mediation and, 231; pacifist 
agitation in, 261 ff.; Ameri- 
can sympathy for, 333; re- 
soiirces of, 335; public opin- 
ion in, 348; peace terms of, 
374, 376, 377; hope of Amer- 
ican aid in, 382 ff.; American 
army in, 413 

Francis-Ferdinand, Archduke, 35 

Frederick, Emperor, 1 

Frederick the Great, 66 

Free Poland, 350 

Frelinghuysen, Senator, 197 

Friedjung, Heinrich, 6, 15 

Friedrich VIII, 393 ff., 398 ff., 406 

Fritzen, 112 

Fuehr, Dr. Alexander, 48 ff., 57, 
115; duties of, 165; Hoff af- 
fair and, 196 ff. 

Gerard, Ambassador, I/usitania af- 
fair and, 156, 158; German 
memorandum to, 181 ff.; 
memorandum from, 183; sub- 
marine warfare and, 230, 245, 
250, 254 ff.; return of, 293 
ff.; negotiations with, 306 ff., 
313 ff., 354, 375, 396, 406 ff. 

Grerhardt, Meyer, 40, 49 ; mission of, 
151, 154 ff., 162, 168, 315 

G«rman-Americans, 22 ff., 72, 94, 
ff., 152, 186, 200, 209, 300, 



302, 332 ff.; illegal activities 
of, 101, 105; Red Cross work 
of, 165 
German- American ChamBer of Com- 
merce, 85, 300 

Press, 52 
G«rman Embassy in London, 1, 395 

Embassy in Washington, 24, 
148, 168, 195 ff. 

Foreign Office, 5, 14 ff., 42, 122, 
154, 165, 168, 172 ff., 187, 211 
"Information Service," 48 

Mercantile Marine, 124 
"Peace," 69 ff., 383 

Red Cross, 36, 40, 47, 140, 151, 
165, 300 

Union, 85 
Germany, policy of, 1 ff.; English 
relations with, 1 ff.; Ameri- 
can relations with, 1, 6 ff., 9 
ff., 10, 14, 16 ff., 29 ff., 71, 
91, 128 ff., 150, 234 ff., 250, 
258, 266, 309, 311, 331 ff.; 
French relations with, 3, 5; 
Russian relations with, 2 ff.; 
statesmen of, 4; world poli- 
tics of, A^S.; attempt to avoid 
war by, 7; spirit of, 8; Phil- 
ippine affair and, 15, 30; Ve- 
nezuelan affair and, 16, 30; 
propaganda of, 42 ff.; object 
of war in, 60 ; opinion of Wil- 
son in, 61 ff.; wireless sta- 
tions of, 65 ff.; American 
notes to, 78, 132 ff., 134 ff., 
147 ff., 155, 168 ff., 168 ff., 
218, 220, 248 ff., 252 ff.; 
finances of, 80, 98 ff.; Amer- 
ican exports to, 80 ff.; con- 
spiracies of, 101 ff.; conces- 
sions of, 236; 1916 conditions 
in, 287, 343; 1916 peace offer 
ofj 312 ff., 376 ff.; American 
offer refused by, 322 ff.; sub- 
marine warfare adopted by, 
331 ff., 853, 358 ff., 369, 372 
ff., 375, 378 ff., 382 ff., 387 
ff., 405; American Press and, 
333 ff. ; desire for peace in, 
348; rupture of American re- 
lations with, 380 



INDEX 



423 



Goltz, Horst von der, 112, 118 
Goschen, Sir Edward, 348 
Greece, violation of, 53, 334 

Hague Conference, 6, 66, 71 ff., 182 
S., 190, 247, 292 

Hale, William Bayard, 48, 116, 338, 
346 

Halifax, 399 flf., 406 

Hamburg, 20, 35, 92, 101 

Hamburg-Amerika Line, 48, 73, 80 
ff., 101 ff., 105, 114, 199 

Hamburger Nachrichten, 297 

Hampton Roads, 265 

Hapag Case, 215 

Harding, Senator, 384 

Hatzfeldt, Prince, 393 

Hatzfeldt, Huberta, 400 

Hay, John, 14, 17 

Hearst, William Randolph, 68, 
260 ff. 

Hearst Press, 38, 196, 261, 336 ff., 
343, 346, 351, 353 

Hecker, Rittmeister, 40, 47; Red 
Cross work of, 165 

Helfferich, Karl, 172, 254 ff., 286, 
310, 368 ff., 381, 392 

Henry, Prince, 23 

Hermann, F. & Co., 88 

Hilmy, Kiedive Abbas, 396 

Hindenburg, Marshal, 410 

Hirsch, Gilbert, 349 

Hoff, Alfred, 195 

Hofmeister, 112 

Holland, 81, 157, 228; allied meas- 
ures against, 334 

Holstein, von, 5 

Hong Kong, 102 

Horn, Werner, 112, 117 

House, Col., 29, 69 ff., 78, 242 ff., 
270; mediation supported by, 
79, 231, 275, 277, 284 ff., 291 
ff., 295, 305 ff., 313 ff., 353, 
382, 390 ; Bernstorff and, 205, 
231, 257, 264, 298; neutrality 
of, 228; German peace offer 
and, 323 ff., 328 ff., 378 

Huerta, 77, 123, 200 ff. 

Hughes, Charles Evans, 243, 281, 
284, 296, 298, 300 ff., 369 

"Hull Insurance," 88 



Igel, von, 262 ff., 274 

India, German plots in, 112, 121 

Indianapolis News, 351 

International Commission of In- 
quiry, 184 
Law, 40, 132, 145, 257, 271 
News Service, 336, 346 

Ireland, 131, 136; Easter rebellion 
in, 334, 372 

Italy, 81, 376; Austrian relations 
with, 5; English relations 
with, 5 

Iturbide, General, 161 

Jaeger, 113 

Jagow, von, 167 ff„ 180, 204, 286, 

292, 303 ff., 310 ff., 315, 348, 

388 
Japan, policy of, 3, 17; American 

relations with, 15, 115; entry 

into war of, 48 ff. 
Java, 121 

Joffre, Marshal, 335 
Journal of Conumerce, 335, 351 
Jusserand, M., 19 

Kaiser William, note from, 256 ff., 
296; submarine warfare and, 
293; mediation and, 294; 
Bernstorff and, 406 ff. 

Kaltschmidt, Albert, 112, 119 ff. 

Karlsruhe, 64 

Kerensky, 383 

Kirkwall, 198 

Kitchener, Lord, 128 

Kleist, von, 172 

Knox, Philander, 17 ff. 

Koeter, 112 

Konig, Capt., 265 ff. 

Kreuznach, 409 

Eronprinz Friedrich Wilhelm, 265 

Kruger Telegram, 3 

Kuhlman, von, 315, 414 ff. 

Lake Erie, 118 
Ontario, 118 

Lamar, 112 

Lansing, Robert, 44, 200, 205, 241, 
265, 306, 316, 393; German 
note to, 110; appointment of, 
156; qualities of, 157; Lusi- 



424 



INDEX 



tania negotiations and, 164, 
166, 169, 172 ff., 181, 213 ff., 
219 flf., 222; Arabic negotia- 
tions with, 174, 177, 180 flf., 
183 ff., 188, 190; January, 
1916, note of, 225 ff., 228 ff.; 
Sussex and, 264; Anglo- 
American agreement and, 264 
ff, ; Belgian deportations and, 
308, 340; peace note and, 317 
ff., 320, 323; submarine war- 
fare and, 327, 342, 379 

Law, Bonar, 382 

League of Nations, 270 ff., 291, 326, 
384 ff., 403 

League to Enforce Peace, 345 

Lechartier, G., 43 

Le Havre, 246, 340 

Lester, Capt., 49 

Liebenfels, 113 

Lincoln, Abraham, 43 

Lloyd-George, David, 298 

Lodge, Henry Cabot, 297, 355, 357 

London, 1, 19, 54, 69 ff., 164, 187, 
195, 209, 231, 337 ff., 340, 
369, 395, 406 
Daily Chraphic, 247 
Daily Telegraph, 139 
Morning Post, 334 
Times, 31 

Long, Breckenridge, 393 

Long Island, 65 

Lorraine, 329 

Los Angeles, 338 

LUbau Bureau, 116 

Luckenbach, 86 

Ludendorf, General, 286, 405, 408, 
410 ff. 

Liidentz, 112 

Lusitania, effect of sinking of, 30 
ff., 56, 141 ff., 150 ff., 162, 
166, 175, 248, 259, 280, 341, 
386; sailing of, 138; sinking 
of, 138 ff. ; defence of sinking 
of, 149; negotiations concern- 
ing, 138, 149 ff., 152 ff., 159 
ff., 169, 171 ff., 178, 190 ff., 
212 ff., 215 ff., 221 ff., 227 ff., 
236, 239, 255, 264, 274 

McAdoo, William, 317 



McClure, 259 ff. 

McCumber, Senator, 383 ff. 

Macao, 103 

Mach, von, 259 ff. 

Madden, 112 

Manchester Guardian, 337 

Manchuria, 17 

Manila, 15, 102, 150 

Mannheimer Versicherungsgesell- 

schaft, 88 
Marina, 303, 306, 342 
Marne, battle of, 8, 11, 59, 383, 390 
Marschall, 2 
Martin, 112 

Matuschka, Countess Manfred, 400 
Maumee, 83 
Mechlenburg, Dr., 49 
Mediterranean, English power on, 5 
Meloy, 113 

Metropolitan Club, 35, 265 
Mexico, 77, 115, 161; punitive expe- 
dition into, 242 ff. ; American 
relations with, 304, 306 

Dispatch, 234, 380 ff., 403, 406 
Michaelis, 401 ff., 414 ff. 
Milwaukee, 23 

Free Press, 352 
Monroe Doctrine, 14, 17, 20, 356 
Montenegro, sacrifice of, 334 
Morgan, J. P. & Co., 98, 186 
Munich, 36 



Nauen, 156 
Nelson, Senator, 111 
New England, 342 
New Hampshire, 270, 284 ff. 
New Jersey, 25, 65 
New London, 260 
Newmann, 113 
Newport, 267, 284, 296 
New Republic, 81 
New York, 38 ff., 47, 80 ff., 84 ff., 
88, 94, 102 ff., 118 ff., 122, 
124, 139, 142, 160 ff., 165, 186 
ff., 231, 234, 261, 294, 308, 
313, 333, 340, 350 ff., 396 ff. 
American, 38, 337, 346 
Evening Post, 38, 335, 349 ff. 
Evening Sun, 335, 346 
Evening Telegram, 38, 335 



INDEX 



425 



New York Exchange, 317 
Staats-Zeitung, 39 
Globe, 38, 335 

Herald, 38, 200, 236, 335, 356 
Journal, 261 
Press, 32, 41, 163 
v,S'un, 38, 189, 292, 335, 351 
Times, 38, 335, 339, 345 S., 348 

351 
Tribune, 38, 333 S., 343 ff., 394 

flf. 
World, 161, 197, 222, 294, 296, 
338, 340, 347, 351 
Xoordam, 37 
Norddeutsche Versicherungsgesell- 

achaft, 88 
Northcliffe, Lord, 51 
Norway, 402 



Olsen, 113 

"Open Door" Policy, 14, 17 
Oriental Policy, see Eastern Poliey 
Overman, Senator, 114 



Paderewski, Ignace, 349 ff. 

Panama Canal, 14 

Pan-German Party, 20 

Papen, von, office of, 41; financial 

affairs of, 46, 96; conspiracies 

of, 108 ff., 114, 116 ff., 198 

ff.; recall of, 111,202 ff., 215; 

Rintelen and, 122; attack on, 

200 
Paris, 69, 209, 231, 261, 371 
Parker, Sir Gilbert, 52 
Pavenstedt, 261 ff. 
Peace of Portsmouth, 14 
Philadelphia, 116, 140, 142, 152, 

160, 162, 333 
Philadelphia Inquirer, 336 
'North American, 350 
Public Ledger, 335, 340, 351 
Philippines, American policy toward, 

r5; Taft in, 17 
Pittsburgh, 116 

Post, 351 
Plage, Herr, 49 
Poland, plan for relief of, 267 ff.; 

autonomy of, 349 ff., 376 



Poppinghaus, 112 
Posen, 350 

Prince Waldemar, 83 
Princess Royal of England, 1 
Providence Journal, 105, 110, 200, 
335 

Ram Chandra, 112 

Ratcliffe, S. K., 337 

Reed, Senator, 46 

Reinsurance Treaty, 5 

Republican National Committee, 274 
Party, 17, 26 ff., 235, 356 

Rheims Cathedral, destruction of, 54 

Riano, Seiior, 35 

Rintelen, Franz, 109, 112 ff., 122 
ff., 199 ff., 203 ff. 

Risikoflotte, 4 

Ritz-Carlton, 42, 140 ff., 165, 198 

Roosevelt, Theodore, 17, 161, 224, 
243; policies of, 13 ff.; 
Venezuela affair and, 16; 
"trusts" and, 26; Bernstorff'a 
personal relations with, 28; 
Lusitania affair and, 145; 
Russo-Japanese war and, 281 ; 
1916 election and, 297 ff. 

Rotterdam, 37 

Rumania, 284 ff., 287 ff.; sacrifice 
of, 334 ; conquest of, 343, 376 

Ruroede, Carl, 112 

Russia, German relations with, 2 
ff. ; desire for war in, 7; Jap- 
anese relations with, 17; war 
begun by, 36; German con- 
spiracy against, 120; Poland 
oppressed by, 350; peace 
terms for, 376 ff.; revolution 
in, 383, 404; Bolshevism in, 
403 

Russo-Japanese War, 14, 281 

St. Louis Olobe-Democrat, 351 
St. Paul Pioneer Press, 351 
St. Regis Hotel, 199 
Salonika, 288 
San Francisco, 120 ff., 338 
Sayville Wireless Station, 53, 65 
Scandinavia, 81, 157; Allied meas- 
ures against, 334 



426 



INDEX 



Scandinavia-American Line, 82 

Schaek, von, 112, 120 ff. 

Scheele, 112, 124 

SchifF, Jacob, 139 fif. 

Scholtz, 112, 125 

Schurz, Carl, 22 

Serbia, war declared on, 7; sacri- 
fice of, 334 

Seven Years War, 8 

Sherman Act, 124 

Siam, 121 

Sielcken, Hermann, 25 

Silesia, 356 

Smith, Louis J., 120 

Soloman, 113 

Somme Front, 288, 338, 343 

South America, 20, 47, 53, 57, 89 

Spain, 81, 102, 312 

Spanish-American War, 13, 15, 179 

Speyer, James, 68 

Springfield Republican, 3SS 

Stahl, 113 

Starnberg, 35 ff. 

Stegler, 112, 201, 203 

Sternberg, 113 ff., 125 

Stockholm, 404 ff. 

Stone, Senator, 75, 235 ff. ; Wilson's 
note to, 337 ff. 

Straus, Oscar, 68 ff. 

Struve, Gothein & Co., 263 

Stumm, von, 313, 327 

Stuttgart, 96 ff, 

Suedenhorst, Zwiedeneck von, 210 

Sussex, 236 ff. ; sinking of, 241, 243, 
245 ff. ; result of sinking of, 
248, 254, 257, 379; negotia- 
tions over, 248 ff., 306; set- 
tlement of, 263 ff., 270, 276, 
293, 340, 365 

Switzerland, 112 

Swope, Herbert, 294, 296, 338 ff., 
349 



Taft, William, policy of, 17 ff.; 

Bernstorff's personal relations 

with, 28 
Tammany Hall, 406 ff. 
Tauschen, Hans, 112, 118 
Taylor, Dr. E. A., 260 
Thierichens, 113 



Tirpitz, von, 4, 143, 223, 244 ff., 

387 
Trans-Ocean Bureau, 154 
Treaty of Amiens, 59 
Triple Alliance, 2 ff., 5 
Tuckerton Wireless Station, 53, 65 
Tumulty, 34 
Turkey, 287, 376 



U-Boat campaign, opening of, 9; 
prosecution of, 10 ff.; negotia- 
tions concerning, 27; "armed 
merchantmen" and, 222, 224 
ff., 230, 237 ff., 258, 260, 354; 
surrender of, 263, 277; Amer- 
ican coast, 267 ff.; proposed 
reopening of, 282 ff., 288, 292 
ff., 296, 298 ff., 303 ff., 310 
ff., 314 ff., 325 ff., 330, 346 
ff., 358; German desire for, 
330 ff., 408; reopening of, 331 
ff., 353, 358 ff., 369, 372 ff., 
375, 378 ff., 380, 382 ff., 387 
ff., 405 

U-53, visit of, 267 ff., 296, 337; pi- 
racy of, 342 

Ultimatum of April 18, 1916, 379 

United States, German relations 
with, 1, 6 ff., 9 ff., 14, 16, 18 
ff., 29 ff., 60, 71, 91, 128 ff., 
150, 234 ff., 250, 258, 266, 309, 
311, 331 ff.; pre-war condi- 
tions in, 13, 29; pan-Ameri- 
can policy of, 14 ff. ; Japanese 
relations with, 14; Philip- 
pine affair and, 16; char- 
acteristics of, 18; English re- 
lations with, 18 ff,, 21, 29, 
81, 128, 130; Lusitania affair 
and, 30 ff., 50, 141 ff., 150 ff., 
162, 166, 175, 248, 259, 280, 
341, 386; public opinion in, 
31 ff,, 68; German wireless 
stations in, 65 ff. ; neutrality 
of, 58 ff., 65 ff.; munition 
traffic, 71 ff., 75 ff,; German 
notes to, 73 ff,, 134 ff., 149, 
158, 231 ff,, 245 ff,, 251 ff„ 
257; German propaganda in, 
42 ff., 89, 259 ff,; propaganda 



INDEX 



427 



work of, 43 S. ; German ships 
coaled in, 73 flf.; German 
finances in, 80; port control 
in, 83 flf.; German economic 
activities in, 80 flf.; German 
dyestuffs exported to, 99; 
German conspiracies in: coal- 
ing, 101 ff.; forged passports, 
103 flf.; bomb outrages, i05 
flf., 112 ff.; submarine war- 
fare against, 131 flf., 222, 224 
ff., 230, 237 ff., 258, 260, 282 
ff., 288, 292 ff., 296, 298 ff., 
303 ff., 310 ff., 314 ff., 325 
ff., 330, 340 ff., 358, 369, 372 
ff., 375, 378 ff., 380, 382 ff., 
387 ff., 405; Arabic affair 
and, 173 ff.; Arabic negotia- 
tions with, 176 ff.; English in- 
trigue in, 195 ff. ; Ancona af- 
fair in, 210; Sussex affair in, 
236; desire for peace in, 344; 
rupture of German diplomat- 
ic relations with, 380 ff.; 
army of, 413 
University of Berlin, 28 



Vaneboro, 117 

Vaterland, 35 

Venezuela, American relations with, 
13 ; English and German ulti- 
matum to, 16 

Vera Cruz, 21 ff. 

Verdun, 343 

Versailles, Wilson at, 10, 61, 63 ff., 
369 ff., 386 ff.; Peace Con- 
ference at, 14, 36, 130; Peace 
of, 63, 196, 360, 387 

Vienna, 156, 198, 210, 351 

Viereck, G. S., 39 

Villa, Pancha, 242 



Wall Street. 26, 162, 190, 355 

Warburg, Paul, 140 

Warm, 198 

Washington, D. C, 6, 19, 23 ff., 33, 
35 ff., 40 ff., 50, 60 ff., 66, 72, 
90, 140 ff., 148, 161, 168, 181, 



196, 211, 219, 222, 231, 241, 
243, 247, 252, 254, 257, 261, 
265, 290, 293, 306, 310, 326, 
342, 369, 378, 380 ff., 389, 
393 ff., 397, 400 ff., 406 ff., 
409, 414 
Washington Post, 38 
Wedell, H. A. von, 112, 203 
Welland Canal Case, 118, 262 
Western Policy, 1 ff., 12 
West Prussia, 350 
White, Andrew D., 15 
Whitehouse, Mrs. Norman, 44 
Wiegand, von, 338 
Wilson, President, 31, 61, 63 ff.; 
character of, 8, 25 ff., 28 ff.; 
English influence on, 8, 217; 
Vera Cruz speech of, 21 ff.; 
public opinion and, 34, 62; 
foreign loans prohibited by, 
46; neutrality of, 58 ff., 65, 
130, 136, 227 ff.; munition 
traflBc and, 72 ff. ; Lusitania 
speech of, 142 ff. ; Lusitania 
negotiations with, 144, 150 
ff., 161 ff., 169 ff., 212 ff., 216 
ff., 226 ff.; Arabic affair and, 
178 ff., 184 ff., 189; policy of, 
194; description of, 198; Con- 
gress opened by, 206 ff.; An- 
cona affair and, 210 ff.; au- 
tocracy of, 224; marriage of, 
225; mediation efforts of, 231, 
243, 256 ff., 267, 274 ff., 291, 
303 ff., 309 ff., 325 ff., 328 ff., 
344, 353 ff., 373 ff., 381 ff., 
386 ff., 390, 403, 412 ff.; 
candidacy of, 234 ff., 243 
ff., 256, 267, 275, 279, 286, 
291, 296; changed attitude 
of, 235; submarine warfare 
and, 237 ff., 242, 252, 303; 
Sussex and, 242, 247 ff., 
250; Kaiser's letter to, 267, 
296; Polish relief and, 267 
ff. ; League of Nations pro- 
posed by, 270 ff. ; reelection 
of, 299 ff.; Belgian deporta- 
tions and, 302 ff,; German 
peace offer supported by, 316 



428 



INDEX 



ff.; peace note of, 318 ff., 355 
ff.; peace speech by, 359 flf.; 
Gterman relations broken by, 
380; Germany condemned by, 
385 ff. 
Wolff Bureau, 25, 51, 154 



Woolpart, 112 
Wuimierburg, 112 

'Tellow Press," 105 

Zimmermann, 115, 156, 221, 307, 
310, 321, 327, 348 flf., 396 



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